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THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the Earlieſt Accounts till the

Diviſion of the Macedonian Empire in the Eaſt.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL. D. F. A. S.

Εκ μεν τοινυν της ἁπαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ὁμοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εὐοικοιτο και δυνηθειη κατοπτευσας, ἁμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ἱστοριας λαβειν. POLYBIUS, l. i. c. v.

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CHAP. XXVII. Tiſſaphernes prepares to make war on the Lacedæmonian

IT does honor rather to the modeſty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general hiſtory of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himſelf acted ſo diſtinguiſhed a part, and which immediately occaſioned very important tranſactions both in Aſia and in Europe. After the downfal

CHAP. XXVII.

allies in Aſia, by order of Artaxerxes. Olymp. xcv. 2. A. C. 399.

of Athenian greatneſs, the Spartans were naturally expoſed to the jealouſy and reſentment of Perſia, by their dominion in Greece, by their conqueſts on the coaſt of Aſia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and eſpecially by their open participation in the rebellious deſigns of Cyrus. The former circumſtances rendered their republic the rival of the king of Perſia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the perſonal enemies of Artaxerxes. His reſolution to chaſtiſe their audacity was communicated to Tiſſaphernes, who, after haraſſing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Aſia, to reſume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take poſſeſſion of the rich ſpoils of Cyrus, beſtowed on him by the gratitude of his maſter, in return for his recent and ſignal ſervices againſt that dangerous pretender to the throne.

Attacks the Æolian cities.

Honored with this magnificent preſent, Tiſſaphernes was farther intruſted with executing the vengeance of the great king againſt the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hoſtilities in the Eaſt ſeemed to render unneceſſary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the ſatrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and concurred with all his meaſures. The Lacedæmonian garriſon, ſupported by the townſmen, defended themſelves with their uſual courage, earneſtly ſoliciting, however, a reinforcement from

home, which might enable them to reſiſt and to ſurmount ſuch an unexpected danger [1]. CHAP. XXVII.

The Spartans ſend Thimbron with an army to their aſſiſtance;

On this important occaſion, the Spartan ſenate and aſſembly were not wanting to the aſſiſtance of their garriſons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thouſand Peloponneſian troops, and demanded a conſiderable ſupply from the Athenians. The latter ſent them three hundred horſemen, who having ſerved under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully ſacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partiſans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was intruſted to the Spartan Thimbron, who had orders [2], as ſoon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the diſhonorable ſervice of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, ſtill retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the propoſal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian ſtandard ſix thouſand men, the venerable remains of an army exhauſted and ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers [3].

which is reinforced by the Greeks who had returned from Upper Aſia.

Thimbron opens the campaign with ſucceſs; Olymp. xcv. 3. A. C. 398.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign againſt the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the diſtance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Epheſus to diſpute

[1] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 470. Diodor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.
[2] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor. p. 416.
[3] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. vii. p. 427.

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the crown of Perſia. The firſt impreſſions of the Grecian arms were attended with conſiderable ſucceſs. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Haliſarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium. But the walls of Lariſſa, a ſtrong city in the Troade, defied his aſſault; the vigilant garriſon baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of freſh water; and, aſſiſted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous ſally, repelled the beſiegers, and burned or demoliſhed their works.

fails in the ſiege of Lariſſa;

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could reſtrain the licentious paſſions of the troops, compoſed of a motley aſſemblage from ſo many different, and often hoſtile communities. Their ſeditious ſpirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Aſia. Their rapacity ſpared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the ſenate, aſcribing the violence of the troops to the weakneſs of the general. In conſequence of this repreſentation, Thimbron was recalled and diſgraced [4], and the command, for which he ſeemed ſo ill qualified, was beſtowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in reſources, who could often vary his conduct without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the diſcipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the beſt engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obſtinacy of

recalled and diſgraced;

is ſucceeded by Dercyllidas;

who adminiſters with equal ability the

[4] Xenoph. p. 481.

Lariſſa; and in the ſpace of eight days, reduced eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. The rapidity of his conqueſts recommended him to the Spartan ſenate, and his moderate uſe of victory endeared him to the Aſiatic colonies. He leſſened their taxes, encouraged their induſtry, heard their complaints with candor, and decided their differences with the moſt impartial juſtice. Diſdaining the cruel example of his predeceſſors, he impoſed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and huſbandmen; and leſt the maintenance of his troops ſhould prove burdenſome to the allies and ſubjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter-quarters in Bithynia, where the valor of Xenophon and his followers had lately ſpread the terror of the Grecian name.

CHAP. XXVII. affairs of war and peace.

Early in the ſpring, commiſſioners were ſent from Sparta to inſpect the affairs of Aſia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their obſervations and inquiries confirmed the very favorable accounts that had been given of his adminiſtration. On their arrival at Lampſacus, where the army was then aſſembled, they viſited the camp, and aſſured the ſoldiers, that the magiſtrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the laſt, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expreſſing the ſenſe of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet leſs different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This teſtimony of military approbation was not more flattering to the

Commiſſioners ſent from Sparta to prorogue his autho- Olymp. xcv. 4. A. C. 497.

CHAP. XXVII.

general, than ſatisfactory to the commiſſioners; who afterwards, at his requeſt, viſited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flouriſhing [5].

Dercyllidas fortifies the Cherſoneſus.

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Cherſoneſus had lately ſent to Sparta an embaſſy, requeſting aſſiſtance againſt the fierce Barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory; and that, ſhould circumſtances permit him to afford protection to thoſe induſtrious and diſtreſſed Greeks, he would perform a ſignal ſervice to the ſtate. The inactivity of Tiſſaphernes, who notwithſtanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Aſia, ſtill expected further reinforcements from the Eaſt, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this uſeful and meritorious enterpriſe. The Cherſoneſus was one of the moſt fertile [6] and beſt cultivated ſpots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flouriſhing cities, and ſeveral commodious harbours. The fields, producing the moſt valuable grains, were interſperſed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, ſtored with all ſorts of uſeful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an inſular form, its happineſs would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-ſeven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the

[5] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

[6] Παμφορωτατην και αριστην. Xenoph. p. 488.

fierceſt tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyl- CHAP.
lidas could eaſily have repelled their inroads. They XXVII.
might have puniſhed their cruelty by deſtroying their miſerable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a ſecure refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpleſs Cherſoneſus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more uſeful aſſiſtance to thoſe unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labor, of his ſoldiers. With inceſſant toil, begun in the ſpring, and continued almoſt to the autumn, they formed a ſtrong wall acroſs the iſthmus; the ſpace was marked out, and the labor diſtinctly apportioned to the ſeparate communities from which the army had been levied; and the ſpur of emulation was ſharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in perſon ſuperintending the work, and beſtowing rewards (laviſhly furniſhed by the wealthy Cherſonites) on the moſt diligent and deſerving [7].

Enters into treaty with Tiſſaphernes.

Dercyllidas had ſcarcely returned from this employment, juſtly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tiſſaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Epheſus. The general collected his whole ſtrength in order to give them battle; the European ſoldiers diſplayed a noble ardor for action; but the inhabitants of the Aſiatic coaſt, who had flocked to his ſtandard,

[7] Xenoph. p. 488.

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were intimidated by the ſight of an enemy whoſe numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tiſſaphernes felt the terror which they inſpired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thouſand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was ſwelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whoſe minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long ſeries of oppreſſion. The cowardice of the Perſians engaged Tiſſaphernes, much againſt the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propoſe a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the propoſal. Hoſtilities were thus ſuſpended; mutual hoſtages were given; overtures of peace were made; and meſſengers were diſpatched for inſtructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Perſia.

The Perſians ſecretly prepare to renew the war.

The deſign of Tiſſaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amuſing the enemy. The moſt ſolemn oaths and engagements had long loſt their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherouſly watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promiſed reinforcements from the Eaſt, and eſpecially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing, with ſilence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. Theſe ſecret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magiſtrates by the patriotiſm of Herodas, a Syracuſan, who, animated by the love of

Greece, betrayed his Phœnician maſter. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tiſſaphernes, and perhaps diſpleaſed with the too eaſy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the perſon of their firſt magiſtrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far ſurpaſſed him in renown. CHAP. XXVII.

The deſtructive expedition againſt the Eleans was the laſt exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his ſon Leotychides, whoſe legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Tymæa had expoſed to juſt ſuſpicion. But this late avowal of a ſucceſſor, whom he had ſo long diſowned, did not ſatisfy the partiſans of Ageſilaus, who was the brother of Agis on the ſide of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychides, the neareſt heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Ageſilaus concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of ſoul. Theſe reſpectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modeſty, candor, condeſcenſion, and unlimited complaiſance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the eſteem, of the firſt names of Sparta; and of none more than Lyſander, who, as his perſonal hopes of grandeur were blaſted by the univerſal jealouſy and reſentment that had been juſtly excited in Sparta againſt his oſtentatious abuſe of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandizement

Ageſilaus declared king of Sparta.

CHAP. XXVII.

of his favorite. That eloquence and addreſs[a], which would have been ineffectual if employed for himſelf, ſucceeded in behalf of another; and by the influence and intrigues of Lyſander, ſtill more than by the ſtrong claims of juſtice and of merit, Ageſilaus was declared ſucceſſor to the vacant throne; and, at the diſtance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Aſia; an office leſs ſplendid in name than that of king of Sparta, but carrying with it more ſolid weight and authority.

Cinadon's conſpiracy.

In the interval of theſe ſucceſſive honors, he approved his attentive vigilance in the ſervice of the republic, of which the ſafety, and even the exiſtence, was endangered by a daring and bloody conſpiracy. A youth named Cinadon, diſtinguiſhed above his companions by extraordinary ſtrength and agility, was not leſs conſpicuous for undaunted courage and ambition. Deſcended of an obſcure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under

[a] The partiſans of Leotychides, in pleading his cauſe before the aſſembly, alleged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. This pointed at Ageſilaus, who limped in walking. But Lyſander, by one of thoſe ready and unexpected turns, which often decide the reſolutions of numerous aſſemblies, directed the battery of the oracle againſt Leotychides, aſſerting, that it was the lameneſs of the title only which Apollo muſt have had in view, ſince it was a matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan kings walked gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they deſcended from Hercules, the ſon of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian profligate and exile. Com. Plut. in Ageſil. et Lyſand. et Xenoph. Ageſil. Panegyr. et Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.

which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities his youth might promiſe, and his manhood mature, the unfortunate circumſtances of his birth muſt for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of the ſtate, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the poſſibility of extending beyond that very limited ſphere. The warmth of his character, and the impetuoſity of his paſſions, prompted him to ſeek juſtice and revenge: nor was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that muſt lead to this favorite end. He communicated the horrid deſign to men of his own, and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel treatment by a ſtern ariſtocracy, which he contraſted with the mild equality of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps aſſerting, that if they muſt ſubmit to a maſter, it would be better to have one than many; that even the ſubjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality and liberty than the members of the Spartan republic[9], ſince the former all equally participated in thoſe preferments and honors, to which not only the ſlaves, the Helots, and freedmen, but the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people, were forbidden to aſpire. After this general repreſentation, he neglected not, what was more effectual and important, to arraign the arrogance

CHAP. XXVII.

[9] This language I have often heard from the *ſubjects* of a modern republic, whoſe *citizens* are not more remarkable for their firmneſs in maintaining power, than for their moderation in exerciſing it.

CHAP. XXVII. and cruelty of particular ſenators, and to inflame the reſentment of individuals againſt their private and domeſtic foes; nor did he forget to encourage them all with the certain proſpect of ſucceſs, by contraſting their own ſtrength and numbers with the weakneſs of an enemy, who might be taken unarmed, and cut off by ſurpriſe[10].

is diſcovered when ripe for execution.

The time for action approached, and the author of the conſpiracy commanded his aſſociates to ſtay at home, that they might be ready at a call. Ageſilaus, meanwhile, performed the accuſtomed vows and ſacrifices for the ſafety of the republic; the appearance of the entrails announced ſome dreadful and concealed danger; a ſecond victim was ſlain, a nd the ſigns were ſtill more unfavorable; but after examining the third ſacrifice, the prieſt exclaimed, "We ſeem, O Ageſilaus! to be in the midſt of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a perſon, whoſe name has not been thought worthy of record, denounced Cinadon to the magiſtrates, as guilty of a treaſonable deſign, of which he had endeavoured to render himſelf an accomplice. When the informer was deſired to explain his declaration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon having conducted him to the great ſquare of the city, which, being deſtined for the public aſſembly and the market, was the uſual place of rendezvous, deſired him to count the number of Spartans whom he ſaw in that ſpacious reſort. That he counted the king, the ephori, the ſenators, and about forty

[10] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, et ſeqq.

others, and then aſked Cinadon, for what purpoſe he had required him to take that ſeemingly uſeleſs trouble? Becauſe, replied the conſpirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the reſt, whoſe great numbers you behold in the market-place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we ſhall in each houſe and family have one enemy, the maſter, but all the ſervants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cauſe of the conſpiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was ſoon to be communicated to the ſlaves, peaſants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whoſe animoſity againſt the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greateſt part of the conſpirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the ſhops of the armorers, the tools of thoſe artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and ſtone, and even the inſtruments of agriculture, might furniſh ſuch weapons to the reſt, as would fully anſwer the purpoſe againſt unarmed men.

Activity and prudence of the Spartan magiſtrates.

This alarming intelligence rouſed the activity, without ſhaking the firmneſs, of the Spartan magiſtrates. It would have been imprudent to ſeize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his reſources, and the number of his aſſociates. On pretence of the public ſervice, they contrived to ſend him to Aulon (for in ſimilar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterpriſing valor), that he might

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ſeize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of juſtice, ſeveral daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old [11]. The ſenate prepared waggons for conveying the priſoners, and furniſhed every thing neceſſary for the journey. A body of choſen horſemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who ſet out without ſuſpecting that this long train of preparation was deſtined againſt himſelf alone. But no ſooner had he reached a proper diſtance from the city, than he was ſeized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were ſent to the ſenate, who inſtantly ſecured their perſons. Cinadon, Tiſamenus, a prieſt, and the other leaders of the conſpiracy, were ſcourged through the city, gored with inſtruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

Cinadon and his accomplices ſeized and puniſhed.

Ageſilaus takes the command of the Greek forces in Aſia. Olymp. xcvi. 1. A. C. 396.

The raſh enterpriſe of Cinadon ſtill filled the Spartans with alarm, when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, againſt whom the perſuaſive influence of Lyſander encouraged them to employ the great and ſolid, but as yet unknown, abilities of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Ageſilaus was the firſt Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Aſia; and his expedition, though not leſs

[11] Αγαγειν δ' εκελευον την γυναικα ἡ καλλιςη μεν ελεγετο αυτοθι ειναι, λυμαινεσθαι δ' εωκει τους αξιωμενους Λακεδαιμονιων και πρεσβυτερους και νεωτερους. Xenoph. p. 494.

important than the exploits of the ſons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior in renown; becauſe the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and ſplendid as it is, even beyond the uſual color of his compoſitions, muſt yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipſed by the luſtre of the Iliad. But the conqueſts of Ageſilaus, however different in fame, yet ſurpaſſed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the intereſts of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Ageſilaus proved the moſt fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote conſequences.

Diſgraces Lyſander, who alone rivalled his authority.

In the ſpring of the year three hundred and ninety-ſix before Chriſt, he left Sparta, with three thouſand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops, amounting to ſix thouſand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponneſus. Since the irregular and unjuſtifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition againſt Argos, the Spartan kings were uſually attended in the field by a council of ten ſenators, whoſe concurrence was held neceſſary in all public meaſures. Ageſilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined ſtroke of policy, which ſtrongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long adminiſtration, he uniformly promoted the views of his intereſt and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminiſhed its importance. Each member, as he poſſeſſed leſs weight and influence, felt himſelf leſs concerned in the honor of the body; and the whole were more eaſily ſwayed and governed by

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the king. Lyſander alone, whoſe name in Aſia was illuſtrious or terrible, rivalled for a while the power of Ageſilaus. But the colleagues of Lyſander were the firſt to diſpute his pretenſions, and to control his authority. Ageſilaus availed himſelf of their envy, and liſtened too eaſily to the dictates of ſelfiſhneſs, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatneſs. By thwarting the meaſures of Lyſander, by denying his requeſts, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity [12], he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of thoſe by whom he had been ſo long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aſpiring pride of the benefactor himſelf, which could excite ſuch black ingratitude in an otherwiſe virtuous breaſt, doubly prove the inſtability of friendſhip between ambitious minds. After a diſgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lyſander was ſent by Ageſilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian ſquadron in the Helleſpont, an inactive and ſubordinate ſervice, in which he could not expect an opportunity to perform any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with diſgrace, enraged by diſappointment, and vowing implacable revenge againſt the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which

[12] Lyſander was known in the Eaſt as a conqueror; Ageſilaus made him a commiſſary. Vid. Plut. in Ageſil. et Lyſand. et Xenoph. Hellen. L. iii. p. 497.

he

he felt more deeply than the injuſtice of all his enemies together.

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Ageſilaus fixed his head-quarters at Epheſus, a place recommended by its centrical ſituation, as the moſt convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his ſtandard from every part of the coaſt; at the ſame time that ſuch a ſtation enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his invaſion. Thither Tiſſaphernes ſent an embaſſy, demanding the reaſon of ſuch mighty preparations. Ageſilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Aſia might enjoy the ſame liberty with their brethren in Europe." The meſſengers of Tiſſaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hoſtile intentions againſt either them or the mother-country was totally void of foundation; and that, in conſequence of the recent tranſactions between Tiſſaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambaſſadors might ſhortly be expected from Suſa, empowered to ratify a firm and laſting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this deſirable work ſhould be completed, Tiſſaphernes earneſtly deſired a continuation of the truce, which, on his ſide, he was ready to ſeal by whatever formalities Ageſilaus thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his ſuſpicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unneceſſary war, he diſpatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late

Treachery of Tiſſaphernes.

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engagements with Tiſſaphernes. The perfidious ſatrap ſwore and deceived for the laſt time. No ſooner had he received the long-expected auxiliaries from the Eaſt, than he commanded Ageſilaus to leave Epheſus, and to evacuate the coaſt of Aſia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Perſian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, aſſumed an unuſual gaiety of countenance, obſerving, that he rejoiced to commence the war under ſuch favorable auſpices, ſince the treachery of Tiſſaphernes muſt render the gods his enemies.

Innocent ſtratagem of Ageſilaus.

Meanwhile he prepared to encounter the inſidious arts of the ſatrap, with equal, but more innocent addreſs. It was induſtriouſly given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favorite reſidence of Tiſſaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and ſtrengthened by a fortreſs, the repoſitory of his treaſures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furniſh a market, and to prepare every thing moſt neceſſary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tiſſaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended ſcene of war, eſpecially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horſe, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the paſſage of the enemy. But Ageſilaus having poſted a ſufficient garriſon in Epheſus, left that city, and

He defeats the Perſians, and plunders Phrygia.

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turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his ſoldiers. The ſelfiſh ſatrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whoſe winding ſtream ſkirts the northern frontier of Caria, ſtill ſuſpecting an invaſion of the Greeks from Epheſus and the neighbouring ſea-ports. During the greateſt part of the ſummer Ageſilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were ſhamefully defeated in ſeveral rencounters; at length they ceaſed to reſiſt his arms; nor attempted even to haraſs his retreat, when having gratified the juſt reſentment of his country, he returned, loaded with ſpoil, to winter in Epheſus [21].

Employment of the Greeks during their winter-quarters in Phrygia.

In the Phrygian expedition, Ageſilaus ſhared, and ſurpaſſed, the toils of the meaneſt ſoldier, from whom he refuſed to be diſtinguiſhed by his dreſs, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive ſeaſon of the year was moſt diligently and uſefully employed. Epheſus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardor of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of induſtry. Shields, ſpears, ſwords, and helmets, filled every ſhop, and crowded every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their beſt horſes to the diſcipline of the field; and

[21] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 498, et ſeqq.

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the wealthy citizens were exempted from the ſervice of the enſuing campaign, upon condition only that they furniſhed a horſeman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran ſoldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exerciſed within the walls of Epheſus, in thoſe martial amuſements which repreſented a faithful image, and which formed the beſt ſchool, of war. Ageſilaus often condeſcended to diſpute the prize of valor or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the ſuperiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himſelf, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honorable reward in the admired temple of Epheſian Diana. "What then (adds a ſoldier, a philoſopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops who delighted in the exerciſe of war, reſpected their general, and revered the gods [24]?"

Ageſilaus prepares for the enſuing campaign. Olymp. xcvi. 2. A. C. 395.

The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the intereſting ſcenes at Epheſus, which he has inimitably deſcribed, was fully gratified by the ſucceſs of the enſuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commiſſion of thirty Spartans was ſent early in the ſpring to ſupply the place of Lyſander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Ageſilaus diſtributed the various

[24] Xenoph. Panegyr. Ageſil.

departments of military command. The ſuperior abilities of Herippidas were intruſted with the veteran army who had ſerved under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Aſiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himſelf, as his peculiar care, the general reſerved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponneſian allies, choſen from the flower and vigor of many flouriſhing republics. With a view to encourage his ſoldiers before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian priſoners to be brought forth, ſtripped, and expoſed to ſale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteneſs of their ſkins, their flaccid muſcles, their awkward motions, their ſhapeleſs forms, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate ſoftneſs of their whole perſons. Such an enemy they conſidered as nothing ſuperior to an army of women [35].

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Ageſilaus had declared, that he would be no longer ſatisfied with ravaging the extremities, but was determined to attack the centre, of the Perſian power. Tiſſaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a ſecond feint, again conducted his ſquadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garriſons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been induſtriouſly reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hoſtilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the ſame game. On this

Attacks the centre of the Perſian dominions in Lower Aſia.

[35] Xenoph. p. 500.

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occaſion, therefore, he carried into execution the deſign which had been made public, marched toward the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without oppoſition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and ſhaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to reſiſt his progreſs. That reſiſtance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After ſeveral ſucceſsful ſkirmiſhes, he defeated the Perſians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, ſurrounded and took their camp, in which, beſide other riches, he found ſeventy talents of ſilver. He likewiſe expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tiſſaphernes; but that crafty traitor, ſuſpecting the event of the battle, had thrown himſelf, with a conſiderable body of troops, within the ſtrong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reſide, diſplaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to the hoſtile invader. The time of his puniſhment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been diſgraceful to himſelf; but its laſt ſcene had diſgraced the arms of his maſter, who cancelled, by one ſtroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his ſervice. Tithrauſtes was ſent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious ſatrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts [16], and met with a juſt fate; although

Death of Tiſſaphernes.

[16] Polyænus, l. vii. The fact is mentioned with few circumſtances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.

the author of his death was, perhaps, the only man in Perſia or in Greece with whom Tiſſaphernes had any claim of merit.

He is ſucceeded by Tithrauſtes, who purſues the ſame line of conduct.

Tithrauſtes, who had come from Babylon eſcorted by a powerful body of cavalry, poſſeſſed the mandate of the great king for aſſuming the government of Lower Aſia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had intereſt or ability to diſpute this extenſive and honorable commiſſion, his next care was to ſend an embaſſy to Ageſilaus, which, inſtead of indicating the character of a great general (for ſuch Tithrauſtes was eſteemed in the Eaſt), betrayed the mean and temporizing genius of his worthleſs predeceſſor. The ambaſſadors were inſtructed to declare, "That Tiſſaphernes, the author of thoſe troubles which embroiled Greece and Perſia, had ſuffered a juſt death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Ageſilaus withdrew his troops from Aſia." The Spartan honeſtly replied, "That the alternative of war or peace depended, not on himſelf, but on the reſolution of the aſſembly and ſenate; nor could he remove his forces from the Eaſt without the expreſs command of his republic." The artful ſatrap perceiving that it was impoſſible for him to interrupt, determined at leaſt to divert, the courſe of hoſtilities. None knew better than Tithrauſtes the uſe of money as an inſtrument of negociation. He condeſcended to purchaſe from Ageſilaus, by a very

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large ſum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it ſeemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Perſian dominions felt the weight of his invaſion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

Ageſilaus intruſted with the command of the Grecian fleet; Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

While he purſued his march northwards, he was overtaken in Ionia by a welcome meſſenger from home, who delivered him a letter, teſtifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and intruſting him with the numerous fleet, which had ſailed two years before, to counteract the deſigns of the enemy [17]. This fleet, conſiſting of ninety gallies, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Ageſilaus's victories, had ſilently performed very uſeful and meritorious ſervice. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above mentioned, firſt excited the alarm in Greece, were ſtill carried on with activity. Various ſquadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined ſtrength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ſhips were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Cherſoneſus, were open to his cruiſers. Availing himſelf of thoſe important advantages, he

[17] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

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steered with rapidity along the hostile shores; and seasonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually restrained the enemy from making their projected descents on Peloponnesus, and even deterred them from sailing the Asiatic seas [18]. Agesilaus, unmindful of this essential service, which had prevented any diversion of the Greek forces in the East, deprived Pharax of the command, and substituted in his stead Pisander, a near relation of his own, who possessed indeed the ambitious valor and manly firmness of the Spartan character, but neither the experience, nor the abilities, sufficient to qualify him for this weighty trust.

which he commits to Pisander.

The first effects of this fatal error were eclipsed by a momentary blaze of glory. Agesilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus; who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province [19]. The fame of the Grecian victories struck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys [20], or Corylas, the proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who disdained the friendship of the great king [21], sent humbly to request that the native valor of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be associated with the Spartan arms [22]. The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed

Agesilaus entertains hopes of conquering the Persian empire;

[18] Isocrat. Panegyr. He does not give the name of the admiral, which we find in Xenophon's Gr. Hist.

[19] Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

[20] He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hist. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabas. l. v. p. 370.

[21] Xenoph. ibid. [22] Plut. in Agesil.

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ſubjects, courted the protection of Ageſilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Perſia, of which they had long felt and regretted the ſeverity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had ſhared the guilt, without ſharing the puniſhment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a maſter againſt whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honors, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians who had followed the ſtandard of Cyrus and his own; and whoſe diſcontented ſpirits might eaſily be inflamed into a ſecond revolt [23]. The commotion was general in Leſſer Aſia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Ageſilaus, at the head of about twenty thouſand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to ſhake the throne of Artaxerxes; eſpecially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was ſtill the companion of his arms, muſt have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious enterpriſe [24].

which are blaſted by unexpected intelligence from Greece.

But an undertaking of which the ſucceſs, however ſplendid, could not probably have been followed by any ſolid advantages, becauſe the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a baſis far too feeble to ſupport ſuch a weight of conqueſt, was blaſted, in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and diſtreſsful. Tithrauſtes, who knew the power of gold over the

[23] Plut. in Ageſil. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 439.

[24] Diodor. ibid. et Xenoph. Ageſil. Panegyr. et Plut. in Ageſil.

Grecian councils, determined, with the approbation of the king his maſter, to give full play to this main-ſpring of politics. The Cretan and Ægean ſeas were careleſsly guarded by the unſuſpecting confidence of the new admiral. Tithrauſtes perceived the neglect; and diſpatched, without any fear of capture, various emiſſaries into Greece, well qualified, by bribes and addreſs, to practiſe with the diſcontented and factious demagogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of ariſtocratic government, and of the public tranquillity [35]. CHAP. XXVII.

Means by which the Perſians kindle a war in that country.

The principal inſtrument of theſe ſecret negociations was Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an intriguing and audacious ſpirit, who carried with him no leſs a ſum than fifty talents (above nine thouſand pounds ſterling), which he diſtributed, with laviſh promiſes of future bounty, to Cyclon of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyanthes of Corinth, to Androclides Iſmenias and Galaxadorus of Thebes; names for the moſt part obſcure in the annals of war, but important in the hiſtory of domeſtic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the perpetual theme of theſe venal hirelings, not only in their reſpective communities, but in every quarter of Greece, to which they were ſucceſſively carried with a mercenary diligence. They painted in the ſtrongeſt colors the injuſtice, the cruelty, and the immeaſurable ambition of that haughty republic, who had made ſoldiers of her ſlaves,

[35] Xenoph. p. 513, et ſeqq.

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that ſhe might make ſlaves of her allies. The deſtructive and impious devaſtation of the ſacred territory of Elis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The ſame calamities, it was propheſied, muſt ſoon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unleſs they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; ſince Sparta purſued her conqueſts in Aſia with no other view but to lull the ſecurity, and rivet the chains, of Greece [26].

Motives by which the enemies of Sparta were actuated.

Strong as theſe invectives may appear, and intereſted as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addreſſed to men well diſpoſed to believe them. Since the ſubverſion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almoſt alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achæans, complained with the warmth which juſtice gives, that, after ſharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponneſian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and eſpecially ſuch communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treaſure had been ſpent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valor had been rewarded by a more intolerable ſervitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aſpired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the

[26] Xenoph. p. 514.

Athenians, animated by the patriotiſm of Thraſybulus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the firſt moments of returning vigor in the purſuit of glory and revenge. CHAP. XXVII.

The corruption of thoſe morbid humors, which muſt have ſoon fermented of themſelves, was accelerated by the mercenary emiſſaries of Tithrauſtes. The occaſion, too, ſeemed favorable for aſſaulting the domeſtic ſtrength of a republic, whoſe arms were ambitiouſly employed in extending her diſtant conqueſts. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this deſign. They not only refuſed aſſiſtance to Ageſilaus towards carrying on his eaſtern campaign, but treated him without reſpect or decency, while he croſſed their dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he muſt have perceived and reſented their hoſtility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition againſt Aſia, till he had extinguiſhed the ſeeds of war in Greece. Circumſtances which encouraged their hoſtility.

But, notwithſtanding the concurring cauſes which haſtened a rupture, ſuch was the terror of the Spartan name, increaſed by the recent glory of Ageſilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their juſt animoſity. After various, but ſecret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were diſtinguiſhed, amidſt the very general diſcontent, by their unſhaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce Their caution in beginning the war.

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and inſolent people [27], who lived in the neighbourhood of Phocis, were eaſily perſuaded to levy contributions from a diſtrict on their eaſtern frontier, to which they had not the ſmalleſt claim, and of which the dominion had been long a matter of diſpute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both theſe ſtates ſeem to have been injured, and exactly in the ſame degree, by this aggreſſion; but the Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri, took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who were their friends, prepared to abet their injuſtice. They expected, and their expectation was gratified, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a quarrel that affected the moſt important intereſts of their Phocian allies; a meaſure which tended preciſely to that iſſue which prudence and policy required, ſince the Thebans would be compelled to arm in their own defence, and muſt appear to all the neutral ſtates of Greece, and even to their Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undeſignedly dragged into a war, not from an inclination to commit, but from the neceſſity to repel, injuries [28].

Campaign of Lyſander in Bœotia.

The iraſcible pride of Sparta, ever prone to chaſtiſe the ſmalleſt offences with unbounded ſeverity, conſpired with the moſt ſanguine hopes of Thebes and her allies. Inſtead of condeſcending to remonſtrate, inſtead of demanding ſatisfaction, inſtead of ordering the Thebans to

[27] Thucydid. l. i. p. 4. et p. 47.

[28] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 82. Plutarch. in Lyſand. p. 448, et ſeqq.

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evacuate the territory of Phocis, and to abſtain from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and marched to invade Bœotia. On the firſt rumor of hoſtilities, the activity of Lyſander had been employed to aſſemble their northern confederates, the Maleans, Heracleans, with thoſe who inhabited the villages of Doris and Mount Oeta. He penetrated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea by force, Orchomenus by addreſs, and prepared to aſſault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to Thebes, was the ſtrongeſt of the Bœotian cities. The difficulty of this enterpriſe made him diſpatch a meſſenger to haſten the arrival of Pauſanias, the Spartan king, who had led forth ſix thouſand Peloponneſians, to co-operate with this experienced commander. The unfortunate meſſenger was taken by the ſcouts of the Thebans, and with him a letter, in which Lyſander had ſignified his purpoſe, and appointed the time of rendezvous with Pauſanias, that they might ſurpriſe Haliartus with their combined forces [29].

The Thebans march in the night to the defence of Haliartus.

At the ſame time that this uſeful intelligence was brought to Thebes; there arrived in that city a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who, though their own capital was unwalled and defenceleſs, had been perſuaded by Thraſybulus to brave the reſentment of Sparta. To theſe generous auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their wives, their children, and every object of their moſt tender concern; while the warlike youth,

[29] Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, et ſeqq.

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and almoſt all thoſe of a military age, aſſembled in complete armor, ſet out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with ſilence and celerity, reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival ſtruck a pleaſing terror into their friends, who were affected ſtill more deeply, when they underſtood the cauſe of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans diſpelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to ſave Haliartus, but to obtain a ſignal advantage over the unſuſpecting confidence of the aſſailants.

Stratagem by which they defeat the aſſailants.

For this purpoſe, they ſent a ſtrong detachment to lie in ambuſh without the walls. The reſt, reinforced by the townſmen, formed themſelves in battle-array, and ſtood to their arms, behind the gates. Lyſander arrived in the morning; but Pauſanias, who had not received his meſſage, ſtill continued in the neighbourhood of Platæa. The ſoldiers, fluſhed by recent victory, diſdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requeſted Lyſander to lead them againſt the place; a meaſure to which he was otherwiſe much inclined, being eager to ſnatch the glory to himſelf, without dividing it with Pauſanias, his rival and enemy.

Battle of Haliartus, and death of Lyſander.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians ruſhed forth with one conſent, and with irreſiſtible fury. Lyſander, with a

prieſt

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prieſt who attended him, was ſlain on the firſt onſet. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, poſted in ambuſh without the city, occaſioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thouſand fell in the field of battle, the reſt were routed, put to flight, and purſued with great ſlaughter [30].

The firſt intelligence of this fatal diſaſter brought Pauſanias to the ſcene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitleſs to attempt the ſiege of Haliartus; but it was neceſſary to carry off the bodies of the ſlain. Pauſanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty ſhould be effected by force, or whether he might condeſcend to ſolicit the humanity of the victors. Force ſeemed dangerous, as the principal deſtruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impoſſible to approach without ſuffering extremely from the miſſile weapons of the enemy, and without being expoſed to a ſecond attack, perhaps more bloody than the firſt. It was therefore unanimouſly reſolved to ſend a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requeſting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponneſian army ſhould immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pauſanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of ſucceſs, rather than his demerit, ſubjected him to trial and condemnation. He eſcaped

[30] Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, et ſeqq. Plutarch. in Lyſand.

CHAP. XXVII. capital punishment by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards sickened and died. His son Agesipolis assumed the Spartan sceptre, which, at that juncture, required the direction of more experienced hands[11].

[11] Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, et seqq. Plutarch. in Lysand.

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Recal of Ageſilaus from the Eaſt. — He invades Bœotia. — Views of Evagoras King of Cyprus. — His friendſhip with Conon. — The latter intruſted with the Perſian Fleet. — He defeats the Lacedæmonians. — Battle of Coronæa. — The Corinthian War. — Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens. — Conqueſts of Conon and Thraſybulus. — Peace of Antalcidas.

CHAP. XXVIII. The league formed againſt Sparta obliges that republic to recal Ageſilaus from the Eaſt. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

THE defeat at Haliartus, which exaſperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and haſtened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The ſpirit of revolt ſeized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Theſſaly [1]. The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raiſed and cemented by a war of twenty-ſeven years, was ſhaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any reſource remain, but that of recalling Ageſilaus from his Aſiatic victories, that the fortune and valor of

[1] Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 407.

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this accompliſhed general might ſuſtain the falling ruins of his country. He received the fatal ſcytalé [a], intimating his recal, at the important criſis of his fortune. He had completed his preparations for marching into Upper Aſia, and his heart already beat with the ardor of promiſed conqueſt and glory [b].

He communicates his recal to the troops.

Having aſſembled the confederates, he communicated the revered order of the republic, with which he expreſſed his reſolution immediately to comply. The generous troops, having aſſociated their own honor with the renown of the general, teſtified their grief and their reluctance by tears and entreaties. But Ageſilaus remained firm in his purpoſe, to obey the command of Sparta, to ſet bounds to his triumphs in the Eaſt, and to turn the direction of his arms towards a leſs promiſing field, to which he was ſummoned by the danger of his country [c]. Before croſſing the Helleſpont, he detached four thouſand veteran ſoldiers, to ſtrengthen the Aſiatic garriſons; ſeveral of which he viſited in perſon, every where aſſuring his friends, that it was his moſt earneſt wiſh to rejoin them in Aſia, whenever the troubles of Greece ſhould permit his abſence.

[a] See Vol. II. c. xii. p. 194.

[b] Plutarch. in Ageſil. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 513.

[c] Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegyr. Ageſil. et Plutarch. in Ageſil. beſtow ſeemingly immoderate praiſes on this reſolution; but it is to be conſidered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not uncommon to behold a ſucceſsful general, proud of the zeal and ſtrength of his followers, ſet at defiance the feeble authority of his republic.

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The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had paſſed their apprenticeſhip in arms under his fortunate ſtandard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Ageſilaus encouraged this diſpoſition, which was extremely favorable to his views; and leſt it might be nothing but a ſally of temporary enthuſiaſm, artfully ſecured its permanence, by propoſing the diſtribution of valuable rewards, in the Thracian Cherſoneſus, to ſuch officers as brought the beſt companies of foot or cavalry for the ſervice of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promiſes with a generous magnificence; ſince, after defraying the neceſſary expenſes of the war, he carried from Aſia above a thouſand talents, or an hundred and ninety-three thouſand pounds ſterling [1].

Their deſire to follow him prudently encouraged by Ageſilaus.

When the whole forces were aſſembled in the Cherſoneſus, they probably amounted to about ten thouſand men. Their neareſt rout into Greece lay through the ſame countries that had been traverſed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Ageſilaus accompliſhed in a month what, to eaſtern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between theſe celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whoſe countries it was neceſſary to march, ſeem not to have made

His return to Greece.

[1] Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegyr. Ageſil. et Plutarch. in Ageſil. et Diodor. p. 441.

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much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were ſtill undiſciplined and diſunited; and their deſultory arms were alike incapable of oppoſing the Spartan and the Perſian. Ageſilaus deſcended without reſiſtance into the plains of Theſſaly, where his progreſs was ſtopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whoſe petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed againſt the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious diſpoſition of his forces, and by evolutions equally ſkilful and rapid, he ſpeedily ſurmounted this obſtacle. To the charge of the Theſſalian cavalry, he oppoſed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then with his own horſemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigor of the Theſſalians, he purſued them with great ſlaughter, took many priſoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and Narthacium[a], which form the weſtern boundary of the extenſive plain of Coronæa.

He defeats the Theſſalian cavalry.

Inſtead of continuing his journey through the hoſtile country of Locris, whoſe weakneſs he diſdained to chaſtiſe, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the ſhock of the war againſt the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than diſcouraged, by a bloody but undeciſive battle, which, ſoon after the diſaſter at Haliartus, had been

Invades Bœotia.

[a] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

fought againſt the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a small town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was ſtill about twenty thouſand ſtrong; the forces of Ageſilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received conſiderable ſupplies from Sparta and Phocis; and as the ſecondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their uſual envy and reſentment againſt their reſpective capitals. The hoſtile battalions approached; thoſe of Ageſilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephiſſus, while the Thebans impetuouſly deſcended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the ſcene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæa[7], a city thirty miles diſtant from Thebes, the ſuperſtition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipſe of the ſun; and the wiſdom of Ageſilaus was alarmed, far more juſtly, by moſt unexpected intelligence from the Eaſt[8]. CHAP. XXVIII.

Since his unfortunate partiality had intruſted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obſtinacy and inexperience of his kinſman Piſander, the Perſian, or rather Phœnician, ſquadrons had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the deciſive engagement at Ægos-Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the concluſion of the Peloponneſian war, Conon,

Evagoras recovers his hereditary dominion in Cyprus.

[7] The places diſtinguiſhed by that name are deſcribed by Strabo, p. 407. 410. 411. and 434.

[8] Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plut. in Ageſil.

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the Athenian admiral, escaped with a few gallies into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the isle of Cyprus. That city, and a considerable part of the island, was then subject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric represents as governing, with consummate wisdom [b], a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valor. This admired prince boasted a descent from Teucer, who, returning from the siege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the first Grecian colony on the Cyprian shore. During that long space of time, Salamis had undergone various revolutions. Evagoras was born and educated, under the reign of an usurper, who fell by the dagger of an assassin, who in his turn assumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the satrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, surprised and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

His attachment to Athens, and friendship for Conon the Athenian.

From the moment that he began to reign, he discovered the most partial fondness for Athens, in whose language, arts, and institutions, his youth had been liberally instructed; and which afterwards formed the study and delight of his manhood, the amusement and consolation of his declining age. But unfortunately for the sensibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happiness, he

[b] Isocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king: the character is only too perfect.

lived at a period when, before the ſituation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual aſſiſtance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the ſplendor and dominion which ſhe had enjoyed above ſeventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderneſs, and received with the kindeſt hoſpitality her oppreſſed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterpriſing Conon deſerved his affection and eſteem, and ſoon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happieſt concert for the ſecurity and aggrandizement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increaſing their arts and induſtry, extending navigation and commerce; and, in a ſhort time, Salamis was able to fit out a conſiderable naval power, and to ſubdue and incorporate with her own ſubjects ſeveral of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been conſidered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domeſtic concerns of the iſland, provided he received from thence his ſmall cuſtomary tribute. The flouriſhing ſtate of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the ſtipulated ſum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accompliſh, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage. CHAP. XXVIII.

Evagoras and Conon determine to retrieve the fortune of

But a deſign which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was ſtrongly incited by the ardent ſolicitations of Conon, was the reſtoration of Athens (which he conſidered as his

CHAP. XXVIII. that republic.

adoptive country and parent) to that ſtate of glory and pre-eminence from which ſhe had miſerably fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as ſuch contemporaries deſcribe them) are repreſented as pilots and mariners watching the tides and currents, and catching every propitious gale that might facilitate the execution of this hazardous enterpriſe. The victories of Ageſilaus in the Eaſt, which threatened to ſhake the throne of Artaxerxes, furniſhed an opportunity too favorable to eſcape their vigilance. Conon had been already recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and the recommendation had been enforced by Pharnabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The experienced ſkill of the illuſtrious Athenian, and of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus, had aſſiſted in equipping the Barbarian ſquadrons in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But the abilities of Pharax, the Spartan admiral, and the cowardice or negligence of the Perſian commanders, hitherto rendered uſeleſs a fleet of near three hundred ſail, which was ill manned, and which often wanted money.

Conon intruſted with the command of the Perſian fleet.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy theſe evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thapſacus, embarked on the Euphrates; and, as his veſſel was moved by the combined impulſe of winds, oars, and ſtream, he deſcended with rapidity along the winding channel to Babylon [10]. The only obſtacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes

[10] Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

was, his unwillingneſs to degrade the Athenian character by depreſſing the body, bending the knee, and paying the uſual marks of reſpectful ſubmiſſion, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the Eaſt; but which the Greeks refuſed to man, and reſerved for the majeſty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length obviated by thoſe whoſe mutual intereſt ſtrongly ſolicited an interview. Conon repreſented to the trembling monarch, who was ſtill agitated by the terror of Ageſilaus's victories, the neceſſity of oppoſing the Spartans vigorouſly by ſea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Aſiatic coaſt. A ſingle defeat at ſea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Aſia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king muſt employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the firſt, the valor of Pharnabazus could not eſcape his notice. The ſecond might be purchaſed by money. And ſhould Artaxerxes intruſt him with the requiſite ſum, he pledged his life that he would ſoon collect ſuch a number of ſailors (chiefly from the Grecian coaſts and iſlands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her eaſtern conqueſts. The propoſal pleaſed Artaxerxes, the money was raiſed, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accompliſh his undertaking.

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He defeats the Spartans, and takes

From various ſea-ports of Aſia, from the ſmaller Greek cities, the reluctant ſubjects of Sparta, from ſeveral maritime towns whoſe inhabitants were

CHAP. XXVIII. fifty gallies. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

ready to ſerve any maſter for pay, but chiefly from the powerful iſlands of Rhodes and Cyprus, he ſoon collected a naval force exceeding his moſt ſanguine hopes; and which might have enabled him (independent of the Barbarian ſquadrons commanded by Pharnabazus) to contend on nearly equal terms with Piſander. With their combined ſtrength, Conon and Pharnabazus ſailed weſtward in queſt of the hoſtile fleet, perſuaded that the raſh confidence of the Spartan admiral would not decline battle with a ſuperior enemy. As the united armament doubled the northern point of Rhodes, they perceived the Lacedæmonian ſquadron, amounting to near a hundred gallies, in the capacious bay which is formed between the projections of the Dorian ſhore, and the ſmall iſlands called Sporades, from the careleſs irregularity with which they ſeem to have been ſcattered by the hand of nature[11]. The unexpected approach of ſuch a formidable fleet did not ſhake the ſullen obſtinacy of Piſander. He commanded (as it had been foreſeen) his men to prepare for battle. They bore up againſt the enemy, but on a nearer ſurvey were alarmed and terrified with the exceſſive diſproportion of numbers. The greater part turned their prows, and retired towards the friendly ſhore of Cnidus. Piſander advanced in the admiral galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the

[11] Virgil expreſſes, in few words, the geography deſcribed in the text:

——— Et crebris legimus freta conſita terris.

Virg. Æneid. iii. v. 129.

Spartan honor, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigor of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakneſs of his counſels. The victors purſued; and after deſtroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty gallies; a capture ſufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic [12].

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The battle of Coronæa. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394.

It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the conſequences, in the loſs of the Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that juſtly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breaſt of Ageſilaus. He aſſembled the troops, honeſtly confeſſed the death of Piſander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was ſlain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himſelf and them to pay the uſual tribute of thanks and ſacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himſelf with a chaplet of flowers, and ſet the example of performing this pious duty.

[12] Polybius ſeems to conſider the battle of Cnidus as the æra at which the Spartans loſt the command of the ſea, which they had acquired by their victory at Ægos-Potamos. He ſays, their dominion laſted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between thoſe battles, as appears from the text. Other writers ſay, that the Lacedæmonian *empire*, which the Greeks ſpeak of as ſynonymus with the command of the ſea, laſted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of Ægos-Potamos to the defeat at Leuctra. But this number again is too ſmall for the interval between thoſe events; a remarkable proof of the careleſſneſs of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See Iſocrat. de Pace, et Caſaub. ad Polyb. vol. iii. p. 97—99. edit. Gronov.

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The devout ſtratagem was attended with a very ſalutary effect; for in a ſkirmiſh between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the Eaſt, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of their army advanced into the plain of Coronæa, at firſt in awful ſilence; but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raiſed an univerſal ſhout, and ran furiouſly to the charge. Their impetuoſity bore down every thing before them; but the troops immediately commanded by Ageſilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly conſiſting of Argives and Athenians. Already thoſe who ſurrounded his perſon ſaluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to ſeize the baggage. Ageſilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to fruſtrate this deſign. The Thebans perceiving this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an oppoſite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of Helicon. In the rencounter which followed, Xenophon is diſpoſed to admire rather the valor, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Inſtead of allowing the Thebans to paſs, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly oppoſed their progreſs, and aſſailed their front. The ſhock was terrible; their ſhields meeting, claſhed;

they fought, ſlew, and were ſlain. No voice was heard, yet none was ſilent; the field reſounded with the noiſe of rage and battle[13]; and this was the moſt deſperate and bloody ſcene of an action, itſelf the moſt deſperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmneſs of the Thebans effected their long attempted paſſage to Helicon; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained maſters of the field, the ſight of which ſeems to have deeply affected a ſpectator whoſe mind was habituated to ſuch objects of horror. It was covered with ſteel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiſcuouſly together, with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, ſome ſtrewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others ſtill graſped by the cold and inſenſible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with ſuch impetuous ardor[14].

Ageſilaus himſelf had received ſeveral wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he reſtrain his reſentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about fourſcore of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiouſly reſpected the right of ſanctuary,

[13] Και κραυγη μεν εδεισια πολλη, ω μεν ηδε σιγη. Φωνη δε τις ην τοιαυτη, οιαν οργη τε και μαχη παρασχοιτ' αν. Xenoph. Ageſilaus, c. xii. Such paſſages, inimitable in any other language, ſhow the ſuperiority of the Greek.

[14] Xenoph. Ageſil. c. xii.

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ordered his ſoldiers to abſtain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horſe to conduct them to a place of ſecurity. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the ſcene of this important action; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requeſting the bodies of the ſlain. Notwithſtanding his fatigue and wounds, Ageſilaus then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Aſiatic ſpoil (amounting to above a hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponneſus, he diſbanded his eaſtern troops, moſt of whom were deſirous to reviſit their reſpective cities; his Peloponneſian, and even Lacedæmonian, forces inclined alſo to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harveſt[15]; and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, ſailed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian feſtival.

The Corinthian war. Olymp. xcvi. 3. A. C. 394. Olymp. xcviii. 2. A. C. 387.

The ſea-fight off Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the moſt important and deciſive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian war, which laſted eight years. The contending republics ſeem at once to have put forth their ſting; and afterwards to have retained their reſentment when they had loſt the power of gratifying it. Petty hoſtilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads, and ravages in the ſpring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians iſſuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans

[15] The ſolar eclipſe, mentioned above in the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of Auguſt.

from

from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance againſt Sparta; but when their country was made the ſeat of war, they began to repent of this raſh meaſure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had moſt to fear, as they had moſt to loſe, talked of a ſeparate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to ſummon an aſſembly which might confirm this laudable reſolution. But the partiſans of Timolaus and Polyanthes, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian ſlave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a deſign ſo unfavorable to their intereſts, by committing one of the moſt horrid maſſacres recorded in hiſtory. They choſe the Eucleian feſtival [*], a circumſtance which ſeemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themſelves in the market-place, or aſſembled at the dramatic entertainments. The aſſault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were aſſaſſinated in the circles of converſation, ſome in the public walks, moſt in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the prieſts at the altar: nor did thoſe monſters ceaſe from deſtroying, till they had cut off whomever they deemed moſt willing, or moſt able, to oppoſe their meaſures. The great body of the people, who

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Maſſacre in Corinth.

[*] Xenophon, with the ſuperſtitious inſenſibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.

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perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whoſe knees they graſped), afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were reſtrained, firſt, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the aſſaſſins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partiſans of Sparta and ſlavery. This abominable maſſacre infected Corinth with the plague of ſedition, which ſilently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the ſix following years. The Spartans and Argives aſſiſted their reſpective factions; Corinth was alternately ſubject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were conſidered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garriſoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in poſſeſſion of the Argives.

The Spartans ſucceſsful by land, and the Athenians by ſea.

After the battles of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or ſea; and it is worthy of obſervation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of thoſe important victories. Succeſs for the moſt part attended the ſailors of Athens, and the ſoldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinſman of Ageſilaus, who ſurpriſed the Piræus with twelve gallies, took many merchantmen, deſtroyed ſeveral ſhips

of war, and ſcoured the coaſt of Attica, formed an exception extremely honorable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates the Athenian, though unimportant in their conſequences, announced thoſe great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him ſo illuſtrious. But, in general, Ageſilaus and the Spartans maintained their ſuperiority in the field; while Conon, Thraſybulus, and Chabrias, proved ſucceſsful againſt Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy [17]. CHAP. XXVIII.

Conqueſts of Conon.

In the actual ſtate of Greece, the reſpective ſucceſſes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any ſolid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unleſs we account as ſuch the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without reſiſtance the Argive and Bœotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, ſince, with the aſſiſtance of a ſuperior naval force, and with the command of the Perſian treaſury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole weſtern coaſt of Leſſer Aſia. This enterpriſe muſt have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unleſs the Perſian fleet kept the ſea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable), could only

[17] Diodor. l. xiv. ad Olymp. xcvi. 4. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. 4.

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employ about three months. The measures taken by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover their important possessions in the East, have scarcely deserved the notice of history, if we except their resistance at Abydus, a place less famous for this memorable defence, (such is the love of fiction, and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this strong and populous town, as the reward of his military services. Instead of imitating the pusillanimity of the neighbouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the disaster at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the places intrusted to their command, Dercyllidas assembled the Abydenians; assured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta[18], who, even before she had attained the sovereignty of the sea, now unfortunately lost, was able to reward her benefactors, and to punish her enemies. "The moment of adversity furnished an occasion to display their inviolable attachment to the republic; and it would be glorious for them alone, of all the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, to brave the power of Persia." Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of

Brave defence of Abydus.

[18] The remarkable expression of Xenophon shows the importance of this defeat in the general estimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himself, though he would fain dissemble it. Εσι δε ουχ ουτως εχον, ει τη ναυμαχια ἡττηθημεν, ουδεν αρα ετι εσμεν. "The matter stands not thus, that because we have been worsted in the sea-fight, we are therefore nothing."

Seſtos, acroſs the moſt frequented and narroweſt paſſage of the Helleſpont. Seſtos was the principal place of the Thracian Cherſoneſus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and ſafety to the uſeful labors of Dercyllidas [19]; and this claim of merit enabled him to ſecure their allegiance. The fidelity of theſe towns, amidſt the general defection of the coaſt of Europe and of Aſia, prevented the inconveniences and hardſhips to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garriſons of thoſe parts, muſt have been otherwiſe expoſed; and delivered them from the neceſſity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponneſus, through the territories of many hoſtile republics. The unfortunate governors and garriſons, who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their reſpective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Seſtos and Abydus. Their numbers increaſed the ſecurity of thoſe cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in ſuch a poſture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus. CHAP. XXVIII.

But the ſucceſs of theſe commanders was ſtill ſufficiently complete; and the importance of their ſervices excited the warmeſt gratitude in the breaſt of Artaxerxes. The merit of the ſatrap was acknowledged ſoon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

[19] See above, p. 6.

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Conon rebuilds the walls and harbours of Athens. Olymp. xcvi. 4. A. C. 393.

The patriotic Conon neither desired nor received any personal reward; but employed his favor with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed the honorable motive that had alone engaged, and that still retained him, in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the East by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens; a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation; the expense was liberally supplied; the Persian fleet set sail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coast of Laconia, and, after performing in detached squadrons whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long-deserted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important task of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished, with extraordinary

diligence. The ready ſervice of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet, aſſiſted the induſtry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurement of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labor of both was ſeconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themſelves, who juſtly regarded their actual employment as the ſecond foundation of their once glorious capital. CHAP. XXVIII.

The work was completed before the return of ſpring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magiſtrates of that republic with the cruelleſt anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the proſpect of recovering their loſt dominion in the Eaſt; they were deſirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the moſt humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themſelves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleaſure of revenge, and to abſtain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his ſatraps would grant them a condition, with which it was eaſy to comply, ſince it required nothing but that they ſhould ceaſe to laviſh their own money in raiſing the dangerous power of the Athenians. For effecting this purpoſe, they ſent ſucceſſive embaſſies to the court of Perſia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately ſucceeded Tithrauſtes in the government of the ſouthern provinces. They induſtriouſly neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reaſonably

Sparta, alarmed by that meaſure, ſolicits peace from Perſia. Olymp. xcvii. 1. A. C. 392.

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expect any favor, as the hoſtilities of Ageſilaus had peculiarly excited the reſentment of that warlike ſatrap.

Employ Antalcidas as their miniſter.

Among the miniſters employed by Sparta, in this negociation, was Antalcidas, a man whoſe prior hiſtory is little known. He appears to have had an intercourſe of hoſpitality with ſeveral noble Perſians [20]; it is not improbable that he had ſerved under the ſtandard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the Eaſt during the ſucceſſive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Ageſilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lyſander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, ſubtile, complying, a maſter in all the arts of inſinuation and addreſs, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an inſidious commiſſion at a corrupt court. The revered inſtitutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal and ſelf-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous ſatraps and courtiers, when he directed the poiſoned ſhafts of his ridicule againſt the manly firmneſs, the probity, and the patriotiſm of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and diſhonorable to Perſia.

His negociation facilitated by the un-

The ſucceſs of ſuch a miniſter, almoſt enſured by his own character and talents, was haſtened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athenians,

[20] Xenoph. Hellen.

too ſoon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of proſperity. When this illuſtrious commander co-operated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the Eaſt, he earneſtly exhorted the ſatrap to confirm the Aſiatic Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, leſt the fear of oppreſſion might ſuggeſt the means of reſiſtance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove unfavorable to Artaxerxes. In this plauſible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was poſſible for the Perſian at that time to diſcover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requeſted Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a ſquadron of Perſian ſhips, in conjunction with his own, to inveſt the territories of Sparta and her allies. The ſatrap, naturally unſuſpicious, and perhaps betrayed by his reſentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promiſed operations againſt the common enemy, thought only of promoting the intereſt of his republic. He ſailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Leſbos, and even to the coaſt of Eolis and Ionia, diſplayed the ſtrength of his armament, deſcribed the flouriſhing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to perſuade or to compel the aſtoniſhed Aſiatics and iſlanders to acknowledge the juſt authority of their ancient metropolis or ſovereign, who having riſen more ſplendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and ſubjects, to

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ſeaſonable ambition of Conon and the Athenians.

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resume her wonted power, and recover her hereditary renown.

Negociations of the adverse states with Persia.

The success of this extraordinary enterprise is not particularly described, nor is the omission material, since this last expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himself. His unjustifiable ambition furnished powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who represented him as guilty of the most unexampled audacity, aggravated by the most perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the assistance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himself owed so many recent and signal benefits. The accusation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealousy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring satrap, the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the last unwarrantable transaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obsolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the service of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus seems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendship by which he had been so long distinguished, so that the influence of that powerful satrap formed not any opposition to the negociations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, sent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emissaries, to watch and counteract his measures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animosity, inflamed and

exaſperated by the addreſs of Antalcidas, he ex- CHAP. XXVIII.
pected that the perſonal preſence of a man, who had formerly ſerved the Perſians with fidelity and ſucceſs, might obtain an eaſy pardon from the ſatrap, and perhaps prove uſeful to the affairs of Athens. The Bœotians and Argives likewiſe ſent their ambaſſadors, who had inſtructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But *their* overtures were little regarded, while thoſe of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

The overtures of Sparta moſt acceptable to the Perſian miniſters.

The Lacedæmonian ambaſſador declared that he had been commanded to offer ſuch terms of peace as ſuited equally the dignity and the intereſt of the great king. "The Spartans reſigned all pretenſions to the Greek cities in Aſia, which they acknowledged to be dependences of the Perſian empire. Why ſhould Artaxerxes, then, continue to laviſh his treaſure in vain? ſince the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of diſpute, but earneſtly deſired to promote the future proſperity of his dominions, by ſettling the affairs of Greece, as beſt anſwered his convenience. For this purpoſe they were ready to declare all the cities and iſlands, ſmall and great, totally independent of each other; in conſequence of which there would not be any republic ſufficiently powerful thenceforth to diſturb the tranquillity of Perſia." Theſe conditions, which the moſt inſolent miniſter of the great king might himſelf have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to ſuſpicion, But Teribazus was ſo

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blinded by partiality for the Spartan miniſter, that he ſeems not to have entertained the ſmalleſt doubt of his ſincerity. The terms of peace were tranſmitted to the court of Suſa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The ſubtilty of Antalcidas was rewarded by a conſiderable ſum of money; and the patriotiſm of Conon (a patriotiſm which had carried him beyond the bounds of juſtice and propriety) was puniſhed by immediate death [21], or by an ignominious confinement [22]. His fate is variouſly related; but his actions juſtly rank him with the firſt of Grecian names; and the fame of an illuſtrious father was ſupported and rivalled by that of his ſon Timotheus [23].

Death of Conon.

Obſtacles to the concluſion of the treaty of peace. Olymp. xcvii. 3. A. C. 390.

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, ſo advantageous and honorable for Perſia, ſhould have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negociation languiſhed for ſeveral years, partly on account of the temporary diſgrace of Teribazus, who was ſucceeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by ſome unknown motive, warmly eſpouſed the intereſt of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful ſolicitations and remonſtrances of the Bœotian and Argive ambaſſadors, who accuſed the ſincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition, of Sparta.

Military operations.

Meanwhile the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their

[21] Iſoc. Panegyr. [22] Xenoph. Gr Hiſt. l. iv.

[23] Dinarch. adv. Demoſt. p. 94. et Corn. Nepos, in Vit. Conon. et Timoth.

allies ſallied from their ſtrong garriſons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to deſtroy the harveſts and the villages of their Peloponneſian enemies. The Bœotians and Argives retaliated theſe injuries by ſeveral hoſtile incurſions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the ſea, bent the whole vigor of their republic towards an element long propitious to their anceſtors. CHAP. XXVIII

Conqueſts of Thraſybulus.

The recent ſplendor of Conon had eclipſed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thraſybulus, whoſe extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice reſcued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty ſail, was intruſted to Thraſybulus; who, having ſcoured the Ægean ſea, ſailed to the Helleſpont, and perſuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and ſeveral other Thracian cities, to aboliſh their ariſtocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed againſt the iſle of Leſbos, in which the Lacedæmonian intereſt was ſtill ſupported by a conſiderable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the iſland acknowledged the Athenian power, and ſeaſonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been ſubdued. Encouraged by

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this ſucceſs, Thraſybulus ſailed toward Rhodes, in order to aſſiſt the democratic faction, who equally contended for the intereſt of Athens and their own.

He is ſurpriſed and ſlain.

Before proceeding, however, to that important iſland, he determined to multiply the reſources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpoſe he raiſed conſiderable ſupplies of whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Aſia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious ſcene of Cimon's victories), and levied a heavy contribution on Aſpendus, the principal ſea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended [24]. The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accuſtomed; but even *their* ſervility could not brook the private rapacity and intolerable exactions of the ſailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reaſon) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The reſentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and ſurpriſed the ſecurity of Thraſybulus, who thus fell a ſacrifice to a very unjuſtifiable defect, which if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debaſed the dignity of his otherwiſe illuſtrious character [25].

[24] Corn. Nep. in Vit. Thraſybul.

[25] Lyſias againſt Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thraſybulus. He had aſſiſted him in expelling the thirty

CHAP. XXVIII. Activity of Antalcidas at the Perſian court. Olymp. xcvii. 4. A. C. 389.

The unjuſt treatment of Aſpendus, which had been retorted by ſuch ſignal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beſet by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful miniſter let ſlip no opportunity to rouſe the jealouſy of the great king againſt the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his reſentment againſt the Spartans, his recent but leſs natural enemies. The ſevere exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of perſuaſion, which the Spartan ambaſſador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Perſian monarch to concur with the meaſures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to diſpute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His intereſt and inclination were combated by his reſentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irreſolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whoſe mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coaſt of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thraſybulus in Thrace were highly honorable and meritorious; but his private behaviour was the reverſe. He ſtuck at nothing by which he could enrich himſelf or his dependants. Ergocles was condemned to death for the ſhare which he had taken in this unjuſtifiable peculation and rapacity. Lyſias's Orations againſt Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewiſe Ariſtophanes Eccleſiaz. v. 356. et Schol. ad locum.

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Revolt of Cyprus abetted by the Athenians.

The ſignal victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, and the riſing fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had received ſome late cauſe of diſguſt, to execute his long-meditated deſign of revolting from Perſia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war againſt the barbarous Carduchians[26], who were by no means a contemptible enemy. Theſe were very favorable circumſtances; but the Perſian fleet, which, after performing the ſervice for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cilician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterpriſe. The ſkilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, ſeconded by the youthful ardor of his ſon Protagoras, obtained an eaſy victory over the firſt ſquadrons that were ſent to invade his iſland. But there was reaſon to dread the arrival of a far ſuperior force. In this danger Evagoras requeſted, and obtained, the aſſiſtance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Perſia, but whoſe ambaſſadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

The great king dictates the terms of a general peace. Olymp. xcviii. 1. A. C. 388.

This extraordinary meaſure of a people, in preferring their gratitude to their intereſt; a gratitude which they might have foreſeen to be uſeleſs to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the moſt important intereſts of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to eſpouſe

[26] Theſe and the following circumſtances concerning the war of Cyprus are ſcattered through Diodorus, Iſocrates's Panegyric of Athens, and the panegyric of Evagoras.

the

the cauſe of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almoſt in the ſame words which had been propoſed by Antalcidas: "That the Greek cities in Aſia, with the iſland of Cyprus and the peninſula of Clazomené, ſhould be ſubject to Perſia; Athens ſhould be allowed to retain her immemorial juriſdiction in the iſles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, ſmall and great, ſhould enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected theſe conditions, ſo evidently calculated for preſerving the public tranquillity, muſt expect the utmoſt indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverſe and dangerous obſtinacy, by ſea and land, with ſhips and money[27]." CHAP. XXVIII.

Which the Grecian ſtates are compelled to accept. Olymp. xcviii. 2. A. C. 387.

Teribazus and Antalcidas returned from the Eaſt, charged with the definitive reſolutions, or rather the haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable ſanction of the royal ſignet. There was reaſon, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos, might ſtill reject the terms of a peace propoſed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate intereſts, and equally diſadvantageous and diſhonorable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Aſiatic colonies againſt the

[27] The laſt words are literally tranſlated from Xenoph. p. 550. See likewiſe Diodor. l. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Ageſil. p. 608; and Artaxerx. p. 1022.

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oppreſſion of Barbarians, could not indeed much influence the degenerate councils of thoſe republics; but the Thebans muſt reſign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia, the Argives muſt unwillingly withdraw their garriſon from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the ariſtocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians muſt abandon, with regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The oppoſition of theſe ſtates had been foreſeen by Antalcidas, who took the moſt effectual meaſures to render it impotent. By the aſſiſtance of Perſian money he equipped a fleet of eighty ſail, from the mercenary ſea-ports of Greece and Aſia, from the intermediate iſles, and even from the coaſts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the ſquadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the iſle of Cyprus, if the preſumption of Evagoras, unaſſiſted and alone, ſhould dare to provoke his hoſtility. The ſatrap alſo had collected a very conſiderable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Ageſilaus, who had aſſembled the domeſtic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the firſt ſummons, againſt any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas [28]. Theſe vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakneſs of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The

[28] Τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδᾳ εἰρήνης κεκλημένης. Xenoph. p. 277.

Thebans made the ſtrongeſt and moſt obſtinate reſiſtance; but their pretenſions were finally ſilenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which being deſerted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceaſed, tranquillity was reſtored, and the armies and fleets were, on both ſides, diſbanded and diſſolved [29].

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But amidſt this univerſal and moſt obſequious ſubmiſſion to the court of Perſia, one man avowed his diſcontent, and prepared to maintain his oppoſition. The article reſpecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who aſſerted the independence of his native iſland; and, with a magnanimity that formed a ſtriking contraſt with the degenerate and diſgraceful ſoftneſs of his Grecian allies, ſet the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras truſted to the reſources of his own vigorous mind, to the ſuperior ſkill of his ſeamen, and to the aſſiſtance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous ſquadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was diſcomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a ſiege. His reſiſtance had already exceeded what his ſtrength warranted, or what his dignity required. His

Evagoras alone rejects the authority of Perſia.

[29] Διελυθη μεν τα πεζικα, etc. Xenoph. p. 551.

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Submits to an honorable compromise. Olymp. xcviii. 4. A. C. 385.

enemies were incapable of perseverance, or unwilling to drive him to despair. He resigned his numerous and recent conquests in Cyprus, but retained possession of the ancient principality of Teucer, which his fortunate arms had recovered from an usurper; and submitted, without dishonor, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himself the tributary of the king of Persia [10].

[10] Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

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Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas. — Ambitious Views of Sparta. — State of Arcadia. — Siege of Mantinæa. — Olynthian Confederacy. — The Spartans make War on Olynthus. — Submission of that Republic. — Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon. — Phœbidas seizes the Theban Citadel. — The Measure approved by Agesilaus. — Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles. — The Theban Democracy restored.

CHAP. XXIX. Reflections on the peace of Antalcidas.

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and disgraceful æra in the Grecian history. The valuable colonies in Asia, the cause, the object, and the scene, of so many memorable wars, were resigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian master. The king of Persia dismembered the distant dependences, and controlled the domestic arrangements of a people who had given law to his ancestors [1]. Their ancient confederacies were dissolved; the smaller cities were loosened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were disunited and weakened;

[1] See the articles of the treaty consulted in 449 A. C. Isoc. Hel. c. xii. p. 214.

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and Greece felt the languor of peace, without enjoying the benefits of ſecurity.

But if the whole Grecian name was diſhonored by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy muſt belong to the magiſtrates of Sparta, by whom it was propoſed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of diſgrace? Or rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from ſuch ignoble condeſcenſion as ſeemed totally unworthy of their actual power, but far more unworthy of their ancient renown? This queſtion, like moſt political queſtions, may be beſt anſwered by facts; and the tranſactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly diſcover and aſcertain the ſecret, but powerful, cauſes of that diſhonorable, and ſeemingly diſadvantageous, meaſure.

Motives which engaged the Spartans eagerly to embrace that treaty.

The ambition of making conqueſts in the Eaſt, which it now appeared impoſſible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion, in Greece, acquired by the ſucceſs of the Peloponneſian war, and which they might have reaſonably expected to preſerve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their ſafety, was threatened by the arms of a hoſtile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Perſia. Athens, their rival, their ſuperior, their ſubject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aſpired to command the ſea. Thebes and Argos had become ſenſible of their natural ſtrength, and diſdained

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to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the ſtandard, of any foreign republic. The inferior ſtates of Peloponneſus were weary of obeying every idle ſummons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan maſters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodleſs conqueſts of the virtuous Braſidas, had forſaken the intereſt of Sparta, when Sparta forſook the intereſt of juſtice. Scarcely any veſtige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-ſeven years. The Eaſtern provinces (incomparably the moſt important of all) were irrecoverably loſt; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the courſe of ten years, and had been chiefly occaſioned by the fatal ſplendor of Ageſilaus's victories in Aſia.

Advantages which they derived from it.

About a century before, and almoſt on the ſame ſcene, the Spartans had been firſt deprived of their hereditary fame, and preſcriptive honors[2]. Almoſt every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the intereſts of their republic. They naturally began to ſuſpect, therefore, that ſuch diſtant expeditions ſuited not the circumſtances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but deſtitute of arts, induſtry, and commerce; and whoſe inhabitants, having little genius for the ſea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, ſuch a naval force as might

[2] See above, Vol. II. p. 192.

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command the obedience of an extenſive coaſt, attached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or, if regained, to preſerve, ſeemed a very prudent and ſalutary meaſure; ſince, in return for this imaginary conceſſion, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to ſuperintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the aſſiſtance of Perſian money, with which they might eaſily purchaſe Grecian ſoldiers. The condition requiring the ſmaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had propoſed it as the beſt means of preventing the future invaſion of Aſia), was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It repreſented them as the patrons of univerſal liberty, and reſtored them that honorable reputation which they had long loſt. From the nature of the condition itſelf, it could only apply to ſuch places as being kept in a reluctant ſubjection, ſtill poſſeſſed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the ſecondary towns of Meſſenia and Laconia, the ſtern policy of Sparta had cruſhed the hope, and almoſt the deſire, of obtaining this ineſtimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was leſs imperious and impoſing; the ſovereign and ſubject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, "That men are diſpoſed to reject the juſt rights of their equals, rather than to revolt againſt the unlawful

tyranny of their maſters[3]. But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior communities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which ſhe formed the head; and by ſuch multiplied acceſſions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-eſtabliſh that ſolid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Aſiatic triumphs[4]. CHAP. XXIX.

Their ambitious deſigns immediately after that event.

That ſuch conſiderations of intereſt and ambition, not a ſincere deſire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept ſecret; notwithſtanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garriſons from the places which they occupied. Leſt this injuſtice might occaſion general diſcontent, the Athenians were allowed the ſame privilege. The poſſeſſion of the unimportant iſles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into falſe ſecurity; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thraſybulus, they were averſe to renew the war for the ſake of their allies, whoſe intereſts were now ſeparated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emiſſaries negociated and intrigued in all the ſubordinate cities, encouraging the ariſtocratical

[3] Thucydid. paſſim. See particularly the ſpeech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, Vol. II. c. xv. p. 337.

[4] Vid. Iſocrat. de Pace, paſſim.

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factions, and fomenting the animosities of the citizens against each other, and against their respective capitals. The jealousies and complaints, which had been principally occasioned by these secret cabals, were usually referred to the Spartan senate; whose affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cause of the weak and the injured, always decided the contest in the way most favorable for themselves. But the warlike disciples of Lycurgus could not long remain satisfied with these juridical usurpations. They determined to take arms, which they probably hoped to employ with such artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with such cities as had not entered into the late confederacy against them, gradually extending their hostilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering successively those, whose entire and collective strength it would have been vain to assail[5].

State of Arcadia. Olymp. xcviii. 3. A. C. 386.

The first victim of this ambitious policy was the flourishing republic of Mantinæa, whose territory was situate almost in the centre of Arcadia, itself the centre of the Peloponnesus. The origin of Mantinæa was the same with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenos, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populousness and power from the scattered villages of shepherds inhabiting the vallies and mountains of

[5] Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. et Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland ſituation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure[6], together with the picturesque and animating ſcenery of this delightful region, ſeemed peculiarly adapted to inſpire, and to gratify, the love of rural happineſs; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *thoſe ſublime and ſacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and deſcribed with ſuch affecting ſenſibility. Every diſtrict of Arcadia was marked and diverſified by hills, ſome of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical deſcription, aſcend two miles in perpendicular height[7], and which ſupply innumerable ſtreams, that water and fertilize the rich vallies which they encloſe and defend. This ſecure and inſulated poſition of their territory long preſerved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of hiſtory now under review, they were diſtinguiſhed by the innocent ſimplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a paſtoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them to employ the ſword inſtead of the ſheep-hook. They had *reluctantly* taken arms; yet, when compelled by neceſſity, or excited by honor, the mountaineers of Arcadia had diſplayed ſuch ſtubborn valor, and exerted ſuch efforts of vigor and activity, as made their ſervices eagerly deſired,

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[6] Theſe circumſtances are common to Arcadia with the mountainous diſtricts of Greece, as well as with the islands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

[7] Deſcript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. I.

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and purchaſed with emulation, by the ſurrounding ſtates. Nor had they truſted to their perſonal ſtrength and bravery alone for the defence of their beloved poſſeſſions. Having quitted their farms and villages, they had aſſembled into walled towns, from which their numerous garriſons were ready to ſally forth againſt an hoſtile invader. The dangerous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the companions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal woods of mount Mænalus [8], into the fortifications of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the province [9], but afterwards rivalled and ſurpaſſed by Mantinæa, which was become an object of jealouſy and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of Arcadia, but even to Sparta herſelf.

The proud meſſage of the Spartans to the Mantinæans. Olymp. xcviii. 3. A. C. 386.

In the year immediately following the treaty of Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors were ſent to Mantinæa, to diſcharge a very extraordinary commiſſion. Having demanded an audience of the aſſembly, they expreſſed the reſentment of their republic againſt a people, who, pretending to live in friendſhip with them, had in the late war repeatedly furniſhed with corn their avowed enemies the Argives. That, on other occaſions, the Mantinæans had unguardedly diſcovered their ſecret hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and envying her proſperity. That it was time to anticipate this dangerous and unjuſt animoſity; for

[8] Mænalus argutumque nemus pinoſque loquentes
Semper habet; ſemper paſtorum ille audit amores
Panaque, etc. VIRG. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

[9] Herodot. l. vi. c. 105.

which purpoſe the Spartans commanded them to demoliſh their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to thoſe peaceful villages in which their anceſtors had lived and flouriſhed [10]. The Mantineans received this propoſal with the indignation which it merited; the ambaſſadors retired in diſguſt; the Spartans declared war; ſummoned the aſſiſtance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Ageſipolis, invaded the hoſtile territory. CHAP. XXIX.

But the moſt deſtructive ravages could not bend the reſolution of the Mantineans. The ſtrength and loftineſs of their walls bade defiance to aſſault; nor could a regular ſiege be undertaken with certain ſucceſs, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly ſtored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Ageſipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew firſt a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious ſervice exhauſted the patience of the beſiegers, without ſhaking the firmneſs of the Mantineans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Ageſipolis propoſed a new meaſure, which was attended with complete and immediate ſucceſs. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from Mantinæa beſieged.

[10] Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2, et ſeqq. Diodor. l. xv. c. 7, et ſeqq.

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mount Anchiſius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to ſtop the courſe of this copious ſtream; which was no ſooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the uſual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being leſs liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courſes, were preferred as the beſt defence againſt the battering-engines then in uſe. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as eaſily diſſolved by water, as wax is melted by the ſun[11]. The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to ſhake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage; ſo that, deſpairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they ſent to capitulate, requeſting that they might be permitted to keep poſſeſſion of their city, on condition that they demoliſhed their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

The town capitulates.

Ageſipolis and his counſellors refuſed to grant them any other terms of peace than thoſe which had been originally propoſed by the republic. He obſerved, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers expoſed them to the deluſions of ſeditious demagogues, whoſe addreſs

Hard conditions to which the inhabitants are compelled to ſubmit. Olymp. xcviii. 4. A. C. 385.

[11] This is the expreſſion of Pauſanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

and eloquence eaſily ſeduced the multitude from their real intereſt, and deſtroyed the influence of their ſuperiors in rank, in wealth, and in wiſdom, on whoſe attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could ſafely depend. They inſiſted, therefore, that the Mantinæans ſhould deſtroy their houſes in the city; ſeparate into four diſtinct communities [12]; and return to thoſe villages which their anceſtors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate aſſault made it neceſſary to comply with this humiliating demand but the moſt zealous partiſans of democracy, to the number of ſixty, afraid of truſting to the capitulation, were *allowed* to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an inſtance of moderation [13] in the Lacedæmonian ſoldiers, who might have put them to death as they paſſed through the gates. CHAP. XXIX.

The Spartans regulate, with a ſtrong hand, the affairs of Phlius. Olymp. xcix. 1. A. C. 384.

This tranſaction was ſcarcely finiſhed, when the Spartan magiſtrates ſeized an opportunity of the domeſtic diſcontents among the Phliaſians, to diſplay the ſame tyrannical ſpirit, but with ſtill greater exertions of ſeverity. The little republic of Phlius, like every ſtate of Greece in thoſe unfortunate, at leaſt turbulent times, was diſtracted by factions. The prevailing party baniſhed their opponents, the friends of Sparta and ariſtocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in conſequence of the commands and threats of Ageſi-

[12] Xenophon ſays four, Diodorus five.

[13] Or rather of good diſcipline; *πειθαρχια*. The nobles of the Mantinæans, *ὁ βελτιϛος των Μαντινεων*, were not ſo temperate; vide Xenoph. p. 552.

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laus [24]; but met not with that reſpectful treatment which ſeemed due to perſons who enjoyed ſuch powerful protection. They complained, and Ageſilaus again interfered, by appointing commiſſioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliaſians; an odious office, which muſt have been executed with unexampled rigor, ſince the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of intereſts, thenceforward continued invariably the ſteadfaſt ally of Sparta [25].

Embaſſy of Acanthus and Apollonia to Sparta.

Meanwhile ambaſſadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requeſting the Lacedæmonian aſſiſtance againſt the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occaſion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, was ſituate nine miles from the ſea, in a fertile and ſecure diſtrict, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly beſtowed on the inmoſt receſs of the Toronaic gulph. The vexatious government of Athens firſt drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppreſſive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to ſtrengthen thoſe walls, as well as to provide ſufficient garriſons to defend them; and the ſubſequent misfortunes of theſe domineering republics, together with the weakneſs of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of

[24] Xenoph. in Ageſil. et Hellen. l. v. p. 553.

[25] Ibid. l. vii. p. 624.

Olynthus

Olynthus successfully to employ, in offensive war, the forces which had been raised with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they subdued were either incorporated or associated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whose extent, power, resources, and hopes, occasioned just alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the southern shores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pieria, indented by two great and two smaller bays, and affording, in the highest perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, pasturage, and commerce. They aspired at acquiring the valuable district of mount Pangæus, whose timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favorably situate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itself the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, might have preserved and extended her dominion, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commission at Sparta. They applied to the Ephori, who introduced them to the greater assembly, consisting, not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies sent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, spoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidst the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing

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They petition the assistance of that republic against the

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Olynthian confederacy.

diſorder which threatens, like a peſtilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increaſed with their power. By the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the ſmaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to ſubdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this acceſſion of ſtrength, they have wreſted from the king of Macedon his moſt valuable provinces. They actually poſſeſs Pella, the greateſt city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amynthas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to ſtop their progreſs. The independent tribes of that warlike but divided country, reſpect the authority, and court the friendſhip of the Olynthians, who will doubtleſs be tempted to extend their dominion on that ſide, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhauſtible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extenſive plan ſhould be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a deciſive ſuperiority by ſea and land? and ſhould they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a meaſure actually in contemplation), what will become, we ſay not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and ſafety? The preſent emergency, therefore, ſolicits, by every motive of intereſt and of honor, the activity and valor of your republic. By yielding a ſeaſonable aſſiſtance to Acanthus and

Apollonia, which, unmoved by the puſillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto ſpurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will ſave from oppreſſion two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an uſurping tyrant. The reluctant ſubjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, eſpecially as they are not yet inſeparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and conſanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and poſſeſſions [16]. When ſuch a connexion ſhall take place (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it), you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

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The ſpeech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious views of the republic to which it was addreſſed, afford reaſon to conjecture that the ambaſſadors neither aſked any thing in favor of their own communities, nor urged any accuſation againſt Olynthus, which had not been previouſly ſuggeſted by the Spartan emiſſaries in Macedon. The reception given to the propoſal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this concluſion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, deſired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occaſion to declare what none could be ſo blind as to miſtake. The confederates with one conſent, but eſpecially thoſe

The Spartans readily liſten to a requeſt probably ſuggeſted by themſelves. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

[16] Επιγαμιαις και εγκτησεσι παραλληλαι. Xenoph. p. 555.

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Their preparations for the Olynthian war.

who wiſhed to ingratiate themſelves with Sparta[17], determined to undertake the expedition againſt Olynthus. The Spartans commended their reſolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the ſtrength of the army to be raiſed, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was reſolved, that the whole forces ſhould amount to ten thouſand effective men; and a liſt was prepared, containing the reſpective contingents to be furniſhed by the ſeveral cities. If any ſtate ſhould be unable to ſupply the full complement of ſoldiers, money would be taken in their ſtead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money were ſent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would puniſh the diſobedience of the obſtinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the ſum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambaſſadors then roſe up and Cleigenes, again ſpeaking for the reſt, declared that theſe were indeed noble and generous reſolutions; but, unfortunately, could not be executed with ſuch promptitude as ſuited the urgency of the preſent criſis. The dangerous ſituation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate aſſiſtance. He propoſed, therefore, that thoſe troops which were ready, ſhould inſtantly take the field; and inſiſted

[17] Και μαλιϛα οἱ ἑλομενοι χαριζεϛθαι τοις Λακεδαιμονιοις. Xenoph. p. 555.

on this meaſure as a matter of the utmoſt importance to the future ſucceſs of the war.

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The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expedience of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thouſand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we ſhall have occaſion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of thoſe auxiliaries, until the ſeaſon for action had been nearly ſpent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very eſſential ſervice. He ſtrengthened the garriſons of ſuch places as were moſt expoſed to aſſaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the ſpirit of revolt among the allies and ſubjects of Olynthus; and ſoon after his march into the Chalcidicé, Eudamidas received the voluntary ſurrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the iſthmus of Palené.

First campaign againſt Olynthus. Olymp. xcix. 2. A. C. 383.

Such was the firſt campaign of a war which laſted four years, and was carried on under four ſucceſſive generals. Eudamidas, too much elated by his firſt ſucceſs, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and unguardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and ſlain, and his army diſperſed or loſt[28].

Eudamidas defeated and ſlain.

Teleutias, the brother of Ageſilaus, whoſe naval exploits have been already mentioned with applauſe, aſſumed the conduct of this diſtant

Second campaign under Teleutias, the brother of Ageſilaus.

[28] Xenoph. p. 556.

C. H. A. P. XXIX. Olymp. xcix. 3. A. C. 382.

expedition, with a body of ten thouſand men. He was aſſiſted by Amyntas, king of Macedon, and ſtill more effectually by Derdas, the brother of that prince, and the governor, or rather ſovereign, of Elymea, the moſt weſtern province of Macedon, which abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts of theſe formidable enemies, the Olynthians, who had been defeated in various rencounters, were ſhut up within their walls, and prevented from cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length marched with his whole forces, in order to inveſt, or if he found an opportunity, to aſſault the place. His ſurpriſe and indignation were excited by the boldneſs of the Olynthian horſe, who ventured to paſs the Amnias in ſight of ſuch a ſuperior army; and he ordered the targeteers, who were commanded by Tlemonidas, to repel their inſolence. The cavalry made an artful retreat acroſs the Amnias, and were fiercely purſued by the Lacedæmonians. When a conſiderable part of the latter had likewiſe paſſed the river, the Olynthians ſuddenly faced about, and charged them. Tlemonidas, with above a hundred of his companions, fell in the action. The Spartan general beheld with grief and rage the ſucceſsful bravery of the enemy. Graſping his ſhield and lance, he commanded the cavalry, and the remainder of the targeteers, to purſue without intermiſſion; and, at the head of his heavy armed men, advanced with leſs order than celerity. The Olynthians attempted not to ſtop their progreſs, till they arrived under the walls and battlements. At that moment

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the townſmen mounted their ramparts, and aſſailed the enemy with a ſhower of darts and arrows, and every kind of miſſile weapon, which greatly added to the confuſion occaſioned by the rapidity of their march. Meanwhile the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purpoſely drawn up behind the gates, ſallied forth with irreſiſtible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was ſlain in the firſt onſet; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and purſued with great ſlaughter, while they fled in ſcattered diſorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa [19].

Teleutias likewiſe defeated and ſlain.

This mortifying diſaſter did not cool the ardor of the Spartans for gaining poſſeſſion of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and eighty-one before Chriſt, which was the third of the war, they ſent Ageſipolis, with a powerful reinforcement, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince early in the ſpring, revived the hopes of the vanquiſhed, and confirmed the attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged ſuch parts of the Olynthian territory as had been ſpared in former incurſions, and took by ſtorm the ſtrong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himſelf of theſe advantages for rendering his ſucceſs complete, he was ſeized by a calenture, a diſeaſe incident to warm climates, and, as the name expreſſes, affecting the patient with a painful ſenſation of burning heat, which he is eager to

Third campaign under king Ageſipolis. Olymp. xcix. 4. A. C. 381.

who dies of a calenture.

[19] Xenoph. p. 561, et ſeqq.

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extinguish by the most violent and dangerous remedies[20]. Agesipolis had lately visited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranaic gulph. In the paroxism of his disorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the shady walks and groves, and the cool crystalline streams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not save his life. He died on the seventh day of the disease, within the precincts of the consecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta[21]. His brother Cleombrotus succeeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was invested with the command in Macedon.

Fourth campaign under Polybiades. Olymp. c. 1. A. C. 380.

Polybiades, imitating the example of his predecessors, conducted a powerful reinforcement against Olynthus, which was completely surrounded by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian gallies blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecyberna. The events of the siege, which lasted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to sally forth against such a superior force: yet they must have been exceedingly distressed by famine before their

[20] It is supposed, with great probability, that the sailors who suddenly disappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of summer, have been attacked in the night by the calentore, and have thrown themselves into the sea. Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc. The disorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, Phil. Transf. Abridg. vol. iv.

[21] Xenoph. p. 564.

obſtinacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquiſhed all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicé: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient ſovereign; and engaged, by ſolemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and maſters[22]. In conſequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this abſolute ſubmiſſion of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forſook the royal reſidence of Ægæ or Edeſſa, and re-eſtabliſhed his court at Pella, a place of great ſtrength and beauty, ſituate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of conſiderable extent, was defended by the rivers Anius and Lydias, and by impervious lakes and moraſſes. The city was diſtant only fifteen miles from the Ægean ſea, with which it communicated by means of the above-mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in conſequence of the misfortunes and ſurrender of Olynthus, Pella became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of Macedon.

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Olynthus finally ſubmits.

Pella reſtored to Amyntas, and continues thenceforth the capital of Macedon.

The commencement, and eſpecially the concluſion of the Olynthian war, breathed the ſame ſpirit with the peace of Antalcidas, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandize the Barbarians on every ſide, in order to obtain their aſſiſtance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This ſelfiſh and

Daring enterpriſe of the Spartan Phœbidas.

[22] Xenoph. p. 565.

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cruel ſyſtem of policy deſerved the indignation and reſentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited againſt Sparta by a very extraordinary tranſaction, to which we already had occaſion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition againſt Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas ſhould follow him at the head of eight thouſand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponneſus, and in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hoſtility of contending factions. Iſmenias, whoſe name has already occurred on a very diſhonorable occaſion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades ſupported the intereſt of Sparta and ariſtocracy; and both were inveſted with the *archonſhip*, the chief magiſtracy in the commonwealth. It is not abſolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this diſſenſion [a], when he was accoſted by Leontiades, "who exhorted him to ſeize the opportunity, which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a ſignal ſervice to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the diſtracted ſtate of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become maſter of the citadel; ſo that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war againſt

[a] Diodorus boldly aſſerts that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints againſt him were nothing but a maſk to diſguiſe or to conceal the injuſtice of the community.

Olynthus, he himſelf would acquire poſſeſſion of a much greater city [24]."

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In time of peace he ſeizes the Theban citadel. Olymp. xcix. 2. A.C. 383.

A contemporary hiſtorian, whoſe known partiality for the Lacedæmonians diſpoſed him to regard this ſingular enterpriſe as an act of private audacity, repreſents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a ſplendid action more than life itſelf, and who embraced, with childiſh tranſports of joy [25], the propoſal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was ſoon ſettled between them. To elude ſuſpicion Phœbidas made the uſual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was ſuddenly recalled by his aſſociate. It was the month of July; the heat was intenſe; and, at mid-day, few or no paſſengers were to be ſeen in the roads or ſtreets. The Theban matrons celebrated the feſtival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preſerve the hope of a favorable harveſt. The appropriated ſcene of their female worſhip was the Cadmæa, or citadel, of which the gates had been purpoſely thrown open, and which was totally defenceleſs, as the males were univerſally excluded from this venerable ceremony. Every circumſtance conſpired to facilitate the deſign of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortreſs, without finding the ſmalleſt oppoſition. He immediately deſcended to the ſenate, which,

[24] Xenoph. p. 297, et ſeqq. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

[25] Ανεκωφισθη is the expreſſion uſed by Xenophon.

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though it usually assembled in the Cadmæa, was then sitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpose of hostility; seized Ismenias with his own hand as a disturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into safe custody. Many were caught and imprisoned, and about four hundred escaped to Athens [26].

The measure approved by Agesilaus.

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the senate and assembly resounded with real or well-feigned complaints against the madness of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently seized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Agesilaus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; possibly he had prompted the enterprise of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extensive as his abilities, he easily persuaded his countrymen to justify the fortunate rashness [27] of that commander, by keeping possession of the Theban citadel.

The cruelties of Sparta drive the Thebans to despair.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmæa, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the

[26] Xenoph. p. 557.

[27] To save appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accusers were offended, not at his injustice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. ibid. et Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 336.

partiſans of ariſtocracy acquired an abſolute aſcendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in ſuch a manner as beſt ſuited their own intereſt, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to deſcribe the baniſhments, confiſcations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is ſufficient for the purpoſe of general hiſtory to obſerve, that the miſerable victims of their vengeance ſuffered ſimilar calamities to thoſe which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The ſeverity of the government at length drove the Thebans to deſpair; and both the perſecuted exiles abroad, and the oppreſſed ſubjects at home, prepared to embrace any meaſures, however daring and hazardous, which promiſed them a faint hope of relief [28]. CHAP. XXIX.

Conſpiracy of the Theban exiles. Olymp. c. 3. A. C. 378.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whoſe perſons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the ſon of Hippocles, a youth whoſe diſtinguiſhed advantages might have juſtly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he ſurpaſſed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exerciſes ſo much eſteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities ſtill more eſtimable, generoſity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the late melancholy revolution, was

[28] Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. idem de Genio Socratis, p. 322, et ſeqq.

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marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the perſon moſt worthy of adminiſtering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-ſufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and reſtoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thraſybulus, who, with a handful of men, had iſſued from Thebes, and effected a ſimilar, but ſtill more difficult, enterpriſe. While they ſecretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal aſſembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whoſe enterpriſing activity, ſingular addreſs, and crafty boldneſs, juſtly entitle him to the regard of hiſtory.

Aſſiſted by Phyllidas, ſecretary to the Theban council.

Phyllidas was ſtrongly attached to the cauſe of the exiles; yet, by his inſinuating complaiſance, and officious ſervility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magiſtrates, or rather tyrants[29], of the republic. In buſineſs and in pleaſure, he rendered himſelf alike neceſſary to his maſters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of ſecretary to the council; and he had lately promiſed to Archias and Philip, the two moſt licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the converſation and the perſons of the fineſt women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which theſe magiſterial

[29] Την περι Αρχιαν τυραννιδα. Xenoph.

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debauchees expected with the greateſt impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas ſet out for Athens, on pretence of private buſineſs [10].

The time and means of execution adjuſted.

In Athens, the time and the means were adjuſted for executing the conſpiracy. A body of Theban exiles aſſembled in the Thriaſian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where ſeven [11], or twelve [12], of the youngeſt and moſt enterpriſing, voluntarily offered themſelves to enter the capital, and to cooperate with Phyllidas in the deſtruction of the magiſtrates. The diſtance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conſpirators had thirteen miles to march through a hoſtile territory. They diſguiſed themſelves in the garb of peaſants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and paſſed the gates without ſuſpicion. During that night, and the ſucceeding day, the houſe of Charon, a wealthy and reſpectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas, and a determined enemy of the ariſtocracy, afforded them a ſecure refuge, till the favorable moment ſummoned them to action.

Fidelity of the conſpirators to each other.

The important evening approached, when the artful ſecretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treaſury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the ſenſes, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleaſure. But a ſecret and obſcure rumor, which had ſpread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the feſtivity. It had been darkly

[10] Xenoph. p. 566. [11] Ibid. [12] Plutarch. in Pelopid.

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reported, that ſome unknown ſtrangers, ſuppoſed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the houſe of Charon. All the addreſs of Phyllidas could not divert the terrors of his gueſts. They diſpatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate preſence of Charon. The conſpirators were already buckling on their armor, in hopes of being immediately ſummoned to execute their purpoſe. But what was their aſtoniſhment and terror, when their hoſt and protector was ſternly ordered to appear before the magiſtrates! The moſt ſanguine were perſuaded that their deſign had become public, and that they muſt all miſerably periſh, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban firſt went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant ſon, an only child, and preſented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requeſting them to retain in their hands this deareſt pledge of his fidelity. They unanimouſly declared their entire confidence in his honor, and entreated him to remove from danger an helpleſs infant, who might become, in ſome future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his ſon could never aſpire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honorably with his father and friends."

Their diſſimulation and addreſs.

So ſaying, he addreſſed a ſhort prayer to the gods, embraced his aſſociates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treaſury, he was met by

Archias

Archias and Phyllidas. The former aſked him, in the preſence of the other magiſtrates, whoſe anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are thoſe ſtrangers ſaid to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had compoſed his countenance ſo artfully, and retorted the queſtion with ſuch well-diſſembled ſurpriſe, as conſiderably quieted the ſolicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whiſper of Phyllidas, "That the abſurd rumor had doubtleſs been ſpread for no other purpoſe but that of diſturbing their pleaſures." CHAP. XXIX.

The Theban magiſtrates aſſaſſinated.

They had ſcarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if ſhe had taken pleaſure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raiſed up a new and moſt alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haſte and trepidation, deſiring to ſee Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magiſtrate of the ſame name, his ancient friend and gueſt. This letter revealed the conſpiracy; a ſecret not intruſted to the meſſenger, who had orders, however, to requeſt Archias to read the diſpatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmoſt importance. But that careleſs voluptuary, whoſe thoughts were totally abſorbed in the expected ſcene of pleaſure, replied with a ſmile, "Buſineſs to-morrow;" depoſited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient cuſtom, he lay at the entertainment; and reſumed his converſation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promiſed to introduce. Matters

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were now come to a criſis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conſpirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing ſwell of female attire, and their countenances overſhadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this diſguiſe they were preſented to the magiſtrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given ſignal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpoſe [31]. Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody ſcene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult taſk remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, ſtill lived, to avenge the murder of their aſſociates. The conſpirators, encouraged by their firſt ſucceſs, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admiſſion into their houſes ſucceſſively, by means of the unſuſpected ſecretary. On the appearance of diſorder and tumult, Leontiades ſeized his ſword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of deſtroying the principal author of the Theban ſervitude and diſgrace. His aſſociates periſhed without reſiſtance; men whoſe names may be conſigned to juſt oblivion, ſince they were diſtinguiſhed by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppreſſive tyranny.

The priſoners ſet at liberty.

The meaſures of the conſpirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different priſons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary

[31] Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 470.

power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, tranſported with joy and gratitude, increaſed the ſtrength of their deliverers. They broke open the arſenals, and provided themſelves with arms. The ſtreets of Thebes now reſounded with alarm and terror; every houſe and family were filled with confuſion and uproar; the inhabitants were univerſally in motion; ſome providing lights, others running in wild diſorder to the public places, and all anxiouſly wiſhing the return of day, that they might diſcover the unknown cauſe of this nocturnal tumult. CHAP. XXIX.

During a moment of dreadful ſilence, which interrupted the noiſe of ſedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and ſummoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the ſon of Polymnis, a youth of the moſt illuſtrious merit; who united the wiſdom of the ſage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valor, and patriotiſm, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendſhip. The principles of the Pythagorean philoſophy [34], which he had diligently ſtudied under Lyſis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averſe to engage in the conſpiracy, leſt he might embrue his hands in civil blood [35]. But when the ſword was once

Epaminondas joins the inſurgents.

[34] See Vol. II. p. 152 — 176.

[35] Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 279, et paſſim.

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drawn, he appeared with ardor in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domeſtic and foreign tyranny.

The Theban democracy reſtored. Olymp. c. 3. A. C. 378.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriaſian plain. The partiſans of the conſpirators were continually increaſed by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompaſſed by ſuch an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his aſſociates proceeded to the market-place; ſummoned a general aſſembly of the people; explained the neceſſity, the object, and the extent of the conſpiracy; and, with the univerſal approbation of their fellow-citizens, reſtored the democratic form of government [36].

The revolution communicated to the Athenians, who aſſiſt in expelling the Lacedæmonian garriſon.

Exploits of valor and intrepidity may be diſcovered in the hiſtory of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes diſplayed not leſs wiſdom of deſign, than enterpriſing gallantry in execution. Amidſt the tumult of action, and ardor of victory, the conſpirators poſſeſſed ſufficient coolneſs and foreſight to reflect that the Cadmæa, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garriſon of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the firſt intelligence of danger, by the reſentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which muſt have rendered the conſequences of the conſpiracy incomplete and precarious, they

[36] Xenoph. Diodor. et Plutarch. ibid.

commanded the meſſenger, whom, immediately after the deſtruction of the tyrants, they had diſpatched to their friends in the Thriaſian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that ſtate, and to ſolicit the immediate aſſiſtance of the Athenians, whoſe ſuperior ſkill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This meſſage was attended with the moſt ſalutary effects. The acute diſcernment of the Athenians eagerly ſeized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta [37], which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thouſand men were ordered to march; and no time was loſt, either in the preparation, or in the journey, ſince they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-eſtabliſhed the democracy. CHAP. XXIX.

The ſeaſonable arrival of thoſe auxiliaries, whoſe celerity exceeded the moſt ſanguine hopes of the Thebans, increaſed the ardor of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the ſiege are variouſly related [38]. According to the moſt probable account, the garriſon made a very feeble reſiſtance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthuſiaſm, as well as the increaſing numbers of the aſſailants, who already amounted to fourteen thouſand men, and received continual acceſſions of ſtrength from the neighbouring cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapſed, when the Lacedæ- The Cadmæa ſurrenders. Olymp. c. 3. A. C. 378.

[37] Dinarch. Orat. contra Demoſth. p. 100.

[38] Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

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monians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans, whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition of the Athenians [39]. So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood.

[39] Xenoph. et Plutarch. ibid.

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The Bœotian War. — Unſucceſsful Attempt of Sphodrias againſt the Piræus. — Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Tranſaction. — Ageſilaus invades Bœotia. — Military Succeſs of the Thebans. — Naval Succeſs of the Athenians. — Congreſs for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes. — Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes. — Cleombrotus invades Bœotia. — Battle of Leuctra. — State of Greece. — Jaſon of Theſſaly. — His Character and Views. — Aſſaſſinated in the midſt of his Projects.

CHAP. XXX. The Bœotian war. Olymp. c. 3. A. C. 378.

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magiſtrates of the latter republic prepared to puniſh, with due ſeverity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their ſubjects. The Thebans firmly reſolved to maintain the freedom which they had aſſumed; and theſe diſpoſitions on both ſides occaſioned a memorable war, which, having laſted with little interruption during ſeven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

First campaign under Cleombrotus.

The ardent mind of Ageſilaus had long inſpired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country.

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He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the odium, attached to his exalted ſituation; and fearing to increaſe the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague. In the heart of a ſevere winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His preſence confirmed the obedience of Theſpiæ, Platæa, and other inferior communities. He defeated ſome ſtraggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incurſions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impreſſion on the well-defended ſtrength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garriſon in Theſpiæ, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterpriſe, but little prudence.

Sphodrias left with a garriſon in Theſpiæ.

Meanwhile the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly diſavowed the aſſiſtance which they had given to Thebes; and having diſgraced, baniſhed, or put to death [1], the adviſers of that daring meaſure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendence, a deſign (could we believe tradition) in which they ſucceeded by a very ſingular ſtratagem. The light and raſh character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed ſecret emiſſaries

Stratagem of Thebes for widening the breach between Athens and Sparta.

[1] Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Dinarchus, cited above.

to perſuade him, by arguments moſt flattering to his paſſions, to attack by ſurpriſe the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. Theſe artful miniſters of deceit repreſented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valor, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally ſolicited the activity of his enterpriſing mind. "The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthuſiaſm of newly-recovered freedom, were determined, rather than ſurrender, to bury themſelves under the ruins of their country. But their ſecret and perfidious ally, whoſe aſſiſtance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in ſecurity. The moment had arrived for cruſhing the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by ſurpriſing the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by poſterity above the kindred glory of Phœbidas, who, during the time alſo of an inſidious peace, had ſeized the Theban citadel[2]."

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Unſucceſsful attempt of Sphodrias to ſeize the Piræus.

The diſtance between Thebes and Theſpiæ, which was not more than twenty miles, furniſhed an eaſy opportunity for carrying on theſe ſecret practices; but the diſtance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterpriſe of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Theſpiæ with the flower of his garriſon, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus

[2] Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 472.

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before the dawn of the ſucceeding day. But he was ſurpriſed by the return of light in the Thriaſian plain. The borough of Eleuſis was alarmed; the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with their uſual alacrity, ſeized their arms, and prepared for a vigorous defence. The mad deſign, and the ſtill greater madneſs of Sphodrias, in ravaging the country during his retreat, provoked the fury of the Athenians. They immediately ſeized the perſons of ſuch Lacedæmonians as happened to reſide in their city. They ſent an embaſſy to Sparta, complaining, in the moſt indignant terms, of the inſult of Sphodrias. The Spartans diſavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried, but ſaved from death by the authority of Ageſilaus. This powerful protection was obtained by the interceſſion of his ſon Cleonymus, the beloved companion of Archidamus, the ſon and ſucceſſor of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with the modeſt eloquence of tears, for the father of a friend, his equal in years and valor, with whom he had been long united in the moſt tender affection. Cleonymus declared on this occaſion, that he ſhould never diſgrace the ardent attachment of the royal youth: and illuſtrious as Archidamus afterwards became, Xenophon affirms, that his early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not the ſhade, but rather the faireſt light, of his amiable and exalted character [3].

[3] Xenoph. p. 570.

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Such is the account of this tranſaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is ſome reaſon to ſuſpect that Ageſilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable deſign of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the meaſure, had it been crowned with ſucceſs; and that even the philoſophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Ageſilaus and the Lacedæmonians; has employed the perſuaſive ſimplicity of his inimitable ſtyle, to varniſh a very unjuſtifiable tranſaction. Such, at leaſt, it appeared to the Athenian aſſembly, who, offended by the crime, were ſtill more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to inliſt ſailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war, with a reſolution firmly to maintain the cauſe of Thebes and their own.

Doubts concerning Xenophon's account of this tranſaction.

While they were buſied in ſuch preparations, Ageſilaus repeatedly invaded Bœotia, without performing any thing worthy of his former renown. His army amounted to eighteen thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred horſe. The enemy were aſſiſted by a conſiderable body of mercenaries, commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes, by a ſtratagem not leſs ſimple than uncommon. The Theban army prepared to act on the defenſive againſt a ſuperior force, and occupied a riſing ground in the neighbourhood of their city. Ageſilaus detached a body of light-armed troops, to

Ageſilaus repeatedly invades Bœotia. Olymp. c. 4. A. C. 377. & Olymp. ci. 1. A. C. 376.

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provoke them to quit this advantageous poſt; but the Thebans cautiouſly maintained their ground, and obliged the enemy to draw out their whole forces, in order to diſlodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach, commanded his troops to execute a new movement, which he had recently taught them for ſuch an emergency. They ſupported their advanced bodies on their left knee, extended their ſhields and ſpears, and thus firmly maintained their ranks *. Alarmed at the determined boldneſs of an unuſual array, which ſeemed to bid him defiance, Ageſilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himſelf with committing farther ravages on the country.

* The words of Nepos, in Chabria, are better explained by reading, "Qui obnixo genu ſcuto, projectâque haſtâ, impetum excipere hoſtium docuit." This agrees with the ſtatue of Chabrias in the Villa Borgheſe, whoſe ſingular attitude has given ſo much trouble to antiquaries. Winkelmann conjectures this maſter-piece of art to be the moſt ancient ſtatue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agaſias with which it is inſcribed. He obſerves, that it is erroneouſly ſuppoſed to be a gladiator, ſince the Greeks never honored gladiators with ſuch monuments; and the ſtyle of the workmanship proves it more ancient than the introduction of that inhuman ſpectacle into Greece. The body of the ſtatue is advanced, and reſts on the left thigh; the right arm graſps a javelin, or ſpear; around the left is ſeen the leather thong, or handle of a shield. It ſeems, ſays Winkelmann, the particular attitude of a warrior on ſome dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Leſſing fortunately diſcovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. "Hoc (the ſtratagem of Chabrias) uſque eò tota Græcia famâ celebratum eſt, ut illo ſtatu Chabrias ſibi ſtatuam fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Athenienſibus in foro conſtituta eſt."

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In the ſkirmiſhes which happened after his retreat, the Thebans proved repeatedly victorious. He returned home, and continued at Sparta during the following year, to be cured of his wounds; where he ſuffered the mortifying reproaches of his adverſary Antalcidas, "for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The generals who ſucceeded him had not better ſucceſs. Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who had been appointed governor of Theſpiæ, was defeated and ſlain, with the greateſt part of the garriſon of that place. Pelopidas, with his own hand, killed the Spartan commander in the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched battle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though ſuperior in number, were broken and put to flight; a diſgrace which, they reflected with ſorrow, had never befallen them in any former engagement.

Succeſs of the Thebans. Olymp. ci. 2. A. C. 375.

While the war was thus carried on by land, the Athenians put to ſea, and gained the moſt diſtinguiſhed advantages on their favorite element. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of ſixty ſail, commanded by Pollis, was ſhamefully defeated near the iſle of Naxos, by the ſkilful bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately, and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral and general[5]. But the principal ſcene of action was the Ionian ſea, where Timotheus[6] and Iphicrates every where

Naval ſucceſs of the Athenians. Olymp. ci. 1. A. C. 376.

[5] Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. 1.

[6] Corn. Nep. in Vit. Timoth. et Dinarch. adv. Demoſth. Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the ſatirical

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prevailed over the commanders who oppoſed them. The fleet of Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who repeatedly ravaged the coaſts of Laconia [7], and laid under heavy contributions the iſlands of Corcyra, Zacinthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Even the iſles and cities more remote from the ſcene of this naval war, particularly the valuable iſland of Chios, and the important city of Byzantium, deſerted their involuntary connexion with the declining fortune of Sparta, and once more accepted the dangerous alliance of the Athenians [8].

The Greeks aſſiſt Artaxerxes in the Egyptian war.

Theſe hoſtile operations, which weakened, without ſubduing, the ſpirit of the vanquiſhed, were interrupted by the ſolicitations and bribes of the king of Perſia, who earneſtly promoted the domeſtic tranquillity of Greece, that he might enjoy the aſſiſtance of its arms in cruſhing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emiſſaries met with equal ſucceſs in Athens and Sparta, which were alike weary of the war, the former having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior ſtates, being implicitly governed by the reſolves of theſe powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And ſo precarious and miſerable was the condition of them all, in that diſorderly period, that about twenty thouſand men abandoned

artiſts of the times painted him aſleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and iſlands entangled and caught themſelves. Plutarch. de invid. et odio.

[7] Xenoph. p. 578.

[8] Id. ibid.

their homes and families, and followed the ſtandard of the Perſians. The merit of Iphicrates juſtly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which was unanimouſly conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of ſuch a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, diſguſted with the ignorant pride, and ſlothful timidity, of the Perſian commanders, who durſt not undertake any important enterpriſe, without receiving the ſlow inſtructions of a diſtant court.[9] CHAP. XXX.

Meanwhile the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted proſperity, had proudly diſregarded the repreſentations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diverſion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce ſeveral inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Theſpiæ were raſed to the ground; Platæa met with the ſame fate; and its inhabitants, after ſuffering the cruelleſt indignities, were driven into baniſhment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles ſhould have ſought refuge in Sparta, whoſe authority they had uniformly acknowledged, ſince the diſhonorable peace of Antalcidas. But ſo diſſimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular tranſactions of modern times (governed by the lifeleſs but ſteady principle of intereſt), that the Platæans had recourſe to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people by whom they had been ſo unjuſtly perſecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of paſt ſervices, and the promiſe of future

The Thebans raſe Platæa. Olymp. ci. 3. A. C. 374.

[9] Corn. Nepos in Iphicrat. Diodorus, l. xv. ad Olymp. c. iv.

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gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian aſſembly, who kindly received them into the boſom of their republic, and expreſſed the warmeſt indignation againſt their inſolent oppreſſors [15].

Congreſs for peace held under the mediation of Artaxerxes. Olymp. cii. 1. A. C. 372.

This affecting tranſaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great meaſure indebted for their proſperity. Their ſubſequent conduct tended ſtill farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal diſdain, the remonſtrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies. Their unuſual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who ſeemed finally diſpoſed to conclude a laſting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their reſpective garriſons ſhould be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, ſmall as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The intereſt of the king of Perſia, who ſtill needed freſh ſupplies to carry on the Egyptian war, induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this ſpecious purpoſe; and a convention of all the ſtates was ſummoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to ſend a repreſentative; but a repreſentative, whoſe firmneſs and magnanimity were well fitted to ſuſtain and elevate the aſpiring pretenſions of his republic.

[15] Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. et Iſocrat. Orat. pro Plat.

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In effecting this glorious revolution, which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations; which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valor, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice [11]. Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be intrusted), Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

Epaminondas appears as deputy from Thebes.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office which he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the

His character.

[11] Plut. in Pelopid.

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philoſophy of Lyſis the Pythagorean, to preſer the mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He reſiſted the generous ſolicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honorable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taſte and choice, and juſtly delighting in a ſituation, which is more favorable, eſpecially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wiſdom recommends as the greateſt good. Nor was he more careleſs of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the ſtudy of learning and philoſophy, or employed in the exerciſe of public and private virtue. Yet to become uſeful he was not deſirous to be great. The fame ſolicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas ſhowed to avoid, the dangerous honors of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better ſatisfied to direct, by a perſonal influence with the magiſtrates, the adminiſtration of government from the boſom of his beloved retirement [11], when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and ſtill more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and ſuch was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a leſs turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by ſelect friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and poſterity.

[11] The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philoſophy.

CHAP. XXX. Conference at Sparta. Olymp. cii. 1. A. C. 372.

Such was the man to whoſe abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their moſt important intereſts in the general congreſs of the Grecian ſtates. The Athenians ſent Antocles and Calliſtratus; the firſt a ſubtile [13], the ſecond an affecting orator [14]. Ageſilaus himſelf appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were eaſily adjuſted between thoſe leading republics, who felt equal reſentment at the unhappy fate of Theſpiæ and Platæa. They lamented their mutual jealouſy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occaſioned ſo many bloody and deſtructive wars; and commemorated the ſhort but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended ſo evidently to their own and the public felicity. Inſtructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themſelves and to their neighbours, which was neceſſary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be uſeful or permanent, unleſs it were eſtabliſhed on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was propoſed, therefore, to renew that ſalutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous conſent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their reſpective confederates.

[13] Επιχρησης ρητωρ. Xenoph. l. vi.

[14] The pathetic pleading of Calliſtratus, for the citizens of Oropus, firſt inſpired Demoſthenes with the ambition of Eloquence. Plut. in Demoſth.

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Demands of Epaminondas.

Epaminondas [15] then ſtood up, offering to ſign the treaty in the name of the Bœotians. "The Athenians," he took notice, "had ſigned for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had ſigned not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponneſus. Thebes was entitled to the ſame prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently ſubmitted to the arms of her citizens." Ageſilaus, inſtead of anſwering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honor, nor denied with juſtice, aſked, in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Bœotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians," ſaid the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas with firmneſs, "you reſtore freedom to the Lacedæmonians, the Meſſenians, and the oppreſſed communities of Peloponneſus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous ſervitude."

[15] The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The firſt writer is ſilent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furniſh the hints which I have made uſe of in the text. It is not impoſſible that there were two conventions, at different times, reſpecting the ſame object. In that caſe, Xenophon muſt have totally omitted one of them.

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He addreſſes the deputies of the allies.

Then turning to the deputies of the allies, he repreſented to them the cruel mockery by which they were inſulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, inſtead of eſtabliſhing theſe invaluable and ſacred rights, confirmed the ſtern tyranny of an imperious maſter." That "the cities, ſmall and great, ſhould be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes ſhould give freedom to Bœotia, and thereby weaken her own ſtrength, while Sparta kept in ſubjection the extenſive territories of her confederates, in whoſe name ſhe had ſigned that perfidious contract, and whoſe aſſiſtance ſhe expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies perſiſted in their actual reſolution, they conſented to deſtroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them againſt Spartan uſurpation; they conſented to continue the payment of thoſe intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppreſſed; and to obey every idle ſummons to war, of which *they* chiefly ſuffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any reſpect for the glorious name of their anceſtors; if they entertained any ſenſe of their own moſt precious intereſts, they would be ſo little diſpoſed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auſpicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent

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government, not by *inſcriptions* [16] and treaties, but by arms and valor.

Permanent effect of his repreſentations.

The juſt remonſtrances of Epaminondas made a deep impreſſion on the deputies. Ageſilaus, alarmed at its effect, anſwered him in a ſtrain very different from that deſpotic brevity [17] which the Spartans uſually affected. His ſpeech was long and eloquent. He reaſoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into ſubmiſſion, leſs perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas ſunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impreſſion to their conſtituents; and its influence was viſible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

Reflections on his conduct;

As the Grecian ſtates were accuſtomed to grant more unreſerved powers to their generals and miniſters, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we muſt be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negociation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulſe of his own mind, or only executed, with boldneſs and dignity, the previous inſtructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refuſal to acknowledge the freedom of Bœotia, not only excluded

[16] The public deeds and tranſactions of the Greeks were *inſcribed* on pillars of marble. Thucyd. et Xenoph. paſſim.

[17] Epaminondas ſaid, or more probably it was ſaid for him, that he had compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monoſyllables. Plut. in Ageſil.

Thebes from the treaty, but expoſed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reaſon to accuſe both the prudence and the juſtice of the admired Theban; his prudence, in provoking the ſtrength of a confederacy, with which the weakneſs of any ſingle republic ſeemed totally unable to contend; and his juſtice, in denying to *ſeveral* communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been expoſed to ſuch odious reproaches. Succeſs juſtified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthuſiaſm to aggrandize their reſpective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotiſm and magnanimity, qualities which, in the ſober judgment of poſterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reaſons, however, not merely ſpecious, by which Epaminondas might juſtify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unaſſiſted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exiſt but in words, ſince the jealouſy of ſeveral ſtates, and particularly of Athens, would be diſpoſed rather to commiſerate, than to increaſe, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta [18]. He perceived the effect of his ſpirited remonſtrances on the moſt ſteadfaſt adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumſtances of

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[18] Xenophon hints at this diſpoſition, l. vi. p. 608.

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his country, and of the enemy, he found ſeveral motives of encouragement to the ſeemingly unequal conteſt.

which is juſtified by the ſtate of Sparta.

The Spartans had been weakened by the defection and loſs of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their preſcriptive honors, and had forſaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great meaſure ceaſed to govern them; and the ſeeds of thoſe corruptions were already ſown, which have been cenſured by philoſophers and ſtateſmen with equal juſtice and ſeverity [19]. Nor were they expoſed to the *uſual* misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the inſtitutions of Lycurgus formed one conſiſtent plan of legiſlation, which could not be partially obſerved and partially neglected. While the ſubmiſſive diſciples of that extraordinary lawgiver remained ſatisfied with their ſimplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had ſcarcely any other object in view, but to reſiſt the ſolicitations of pleaſure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which diſcouraged a commercial intercourſe with foreign nations, and which excluded ſtrangers, whatever merit they might poſſeſs, from aſpiring to the rank of citizens, was an eſtabliſhment ſtrictly conformable to the peculiar ſpirit of the Lacedæmonian conſtitution. But when Sparta abandoned the ſimplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy,

[19] Ariſtot. Politic. l. ii. c. 9.

triumphant, and almoſt continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the inſtrument of power and conqueſt, conſiſtency required that ſhe ſhould have laid aſide her pretenſions to thoſe excluſive honors which ſhe no longer deſerved. When ſhe relinquiſhed the virtuous pre-eminence of her anceſtors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponneſus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honor, ſhe would have given them an intereſt in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, inſtead of adopting this generous policy, which poſſibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wiſdom indeed, but not with more virtue or more valor, afterwards became, the miſtreſs of the world, ſhe increaſed her pretenſions in proportion to the decline of her merit; ſpurned the equality of a fœderal union, to which the Peloponneſians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their juſt ſhare in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the ſenate and aſſembly of Sparta. A long courſe of almoſt uninterrupted hoſtilities had deprived her of the beſt half of her citizens, whoſe numbers were continually diminiſhing, without the poſſibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the addreſs and bravery of about four thouſand warriors, the ſplendor of a great name, and the

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reluctant assistance of insulted allies and oppressed subjects[20].

The consideration of these circumstances, which could not fail to present themselves to the sagacity of Epaminondas, might have encouraged him to set the threats of his adversaries at defiance, especially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whose civil and military institutions had recently acquired new spirit and fresh vigor.

Compared with that of Thebes

The Thebans, with their subjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithless race, with strong bodies but ignoble souls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a sluggish and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for stupidity[21]. From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the pursuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the ponderous strength of their gigantic members. To acquire renown in

[20] The condition of Sparta, represented in the text, is taken from the history of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Aristotle's Politics, l. ii. c. 9. the Oration of Archidamus, and the Panathenaan Oration of Isocrates. The last writer reduces the number of Spartan citizens to two thousand; a diminution principally occasioned by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, which happened a considerable time before the composition of that discourse.

[21] Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor. Epist. i. l. 11.

war, ſuch people only wanted that ſpark of ethereal fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta firſt animated their inactive languor. Having ſpurned an oppreſſive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and in the exerciſe of defenſive war, gained many honorable trophies over enemies who had long deſpiſed them. Succeſs enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory, as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preſervation. They had introduced a ſevere ſyſtem of military diſcipline; they had conſiderably improved the arms and exerciſe of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, ſuperior to thoſe practiſed by their neighbours. Emulation, ardor, mutual eſteem, and that ſpirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and diſtracted times, had united a conſiderable number of their citizens in the cloſeſt engagements, and inſpired them with the generous reſolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This aſſociation originally conſiſted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelopidas, the glorious reſtorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable ſanctity of their friendſhip, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valor was as permanent as their friendſhip. During a long ſucceſſion of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought; and at length fell together, with immortal

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glory, in the field of Chæronea, with the fall of Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in general, were the circumſtances and condition of thoſe rival republics[22], when they were encouraged by their reſpective chiefs to decide their pretenſions by the event of a battle.

Cleombrotus invades Bœotia. Olymp. cii. 2. A. C. 371.

In the interval of ſeveral months, between the congreſs at Sparta and the invaſion of Bœotia, Ageſilaus and his ſon Archidamus collected the domeſtic ſtrength of their republic, and ſummoned the tardy aid of their confederates. Sickneſs prevented the Spartan king from taking the field in perſon; but his advice prevailed with the Ephori and ſenate, to command his colleague Cleombrotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a conſiderable body of troops into Phocis, in order to repel the Thebans from that country) to march without delay into the hoſtile territory, with aſſurance of being ſpeedily joined by a powerful reinforcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the plain of Leuctra, which ſurrounded an obſcure village of the ſame name, ſituate on the Bœotian frontier almoſt at the equal diſtance of ten miles from the ſea and from Platæa. The plain was encompaſſed on all ſides by the lofty ridges of Helicon, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the village was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of two Theban damſels, the daughters of Scedaſus, who had been violated by the brutality of three Spartan youths. The diſhonored females had

The Spartans and their confederates aſſemble in the plain of Leuctra.

[22] Plut. in Pelopid. v. 11. p. 355 — 366.

ended their disgrace by a voluntary death; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their despair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men [21].

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The Thebans encamp on the neighbouring mountain.

The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans could not muster half that strength, after assembling all their troops, which had been scattered over the frontier, in order to oppose the desultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled those of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in discipline and in valor. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and disgrace of a siege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

Proceedings of Epaminondas before the battle.

Having heard an account of the superior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans still determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the most timorous of the senses, they were seized with terror and consternation at beholding the massy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than six) were averse to an engagement, strongly dissuading the

[21] Xenoph. p. 595.

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general from this dangerous meaſure, and artfully increaſing the panic of the troops, by recounting many ſiniſter omens and prodigies. The magnanimous chief oppoſed the dangerous torrent of ſuperſtitious terror, by a verſe of Homer[24], importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was neceſſary of the favorable will of Heaven, ſince they were immediately employed in a ſervice peculiarly agreeable to the gods. At the ſame time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in conſequence of which the prieſteſſes had announced a victory; that the armor of Hercules, repoſited in the Cadmæa, had ſuddenly diſappeared, as if that invincible hero in perſon had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedaſus. Theſe artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themſelves on the ſide of the general.

His magnanimity ſeconded by fortune.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas diſplayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all thoſe to retire, who either diſapproved his cauſe, or were averſe to ſhare his danger; a permiſſion

[24] Εις οιωνος αριστος αμυνεσθαι περι πατρης. Il. xii. v. 243.

which the Theſpians firſt thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whoſe ſervices were uſeleſs in time of action, gradually ſeized the ſame opportunity to leave the camp. The ſwelling multitude appeared as a ſecond army to the Spartans, who ſent a powerful detachment to oppoſe them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whoſe hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of ſuch a conſiderable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimouſly to ſtand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to periſh in the attempt; and the ardor of the troops equalling the ſkill of the general, the union of ſuch advantages rendered them invincible.

Diſpoſition of the forces on both ſides.

Cleombrotus had diſpoſed his forces in the form of a creſcent, according to an ancient and favorite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were poſted in ſquadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in perſon. The allies compoſed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this diſpoſition, and ſenſible that the iſſue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domeſtic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorouſly with his left, in order to ſeize or deſtroy the perſon of Cleombrotus; thinking that ſhould this deſign ſucceed, the Spartans muſt be diſcouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt muſt occaſion great diſorder in their ranks, as the braveſt would haſten, from

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every quarter, to defend the ſacred perſon of their king. Having reſolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left diviſion of his forces, he ſtrengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppoſe the Spartan horſe, whom they excelled in experience and valor. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular ſtation worthy of their proweſs, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of ſucceſs, or by the proſpect of diſtinguiſhed danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were expoſed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being ſurrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan creſcent. This danger the general foreſaw; and in order to prevent it, he ſpread out his right wing, of which the files had only ſix men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

Battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii, 2. A. C. 371.

The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan ſide, conſiſted chiefly of ſuch horſes as were kept for pleaſure by the richer citizens in time of peace; and which, proving an unequal match for the diſciplined valor of the Thebans, were ſpeedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulſe and rout occaſioned conſiderable diſorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks,

which

which was greatly heightened by the impetuous onſet of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed himſelf of this momentary confuſion, to perform one of thoſe rapid evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of battles. He formed his ſtrongeſt, but leaſt numerous diviſion, into a compact wedge, with a ſharp point and with ſpreading flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as ſoon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which, from the oblique arrangement in which it had been originally drawn up, ſeemed prepared for a retreat. The event anſwered his expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced againſt his right wing, where they found little or no reſiſtance, he ruſhed forward with his left; and darting like the beak of a galley[25] on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the poſt occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate diſciples of Lycurgus. The braveſt warriors flew from every quarter to the aſſiſtance of their prince, covered him with their ſhields, and defended him with their ſwords and lances. Their impetuous valor reſiſted the intrepid progreſs of the Thebans, till the Spartan horſemen, who attended the perſon of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himſelf, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathleſs

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[25] Xenophon employs this expreſſion on a ſimilar occaſion, in relating the battle of Mantinæa.

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or expiring bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, reſentment, and deſpair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the ſuperſtitious ideas of paganiſm, the death of their king appeared to them a ſlight misfortune, compared with the diſgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the inſults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmoſt valor, and their ſtrenuous efforts were ſucceſsful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmneſs and rapidity of his regular aſſault gained a complete and deciſive victory over the deſperate reſiſtance of broken troops. The principal ſtrength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling raſhly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irreſolution. They determined, almoſt with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loſs of about two thouſand men; and the Thebans remained ſole maſters of the field [26].

The Spartans crave permiſſion to bury their dead.

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to deſpair, ſeem to have prevented Epaminondas from purſuing the vanquiſhed to their camp; which, as it was ſtrongly fortified, could not be taken without great ſlaughter of the

[26] Xenoph. p. 596, et ſeqq. et Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, et ſeqq.

assailants. When the Lacedæmonians had assembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their security from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with astonishment and sorrow on the humiliating consequences of their recent disaster. Whether they considered the number of the slain, or reflected on the mortifying loss of national honor, it was easy for them to perceive, that, on no former occasion, the glory of their country had ever received such a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their disgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, instead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty (which would be acknowledging their defeat), they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous resolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers of most experience and authority. They observed, that of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred. Their army indeed still outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domestic forces formed scarcely the tenth part of their strength, nor could they repose any confidence in the forced assistance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingness to renew the battle, and scarcely concealed their

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satisfaction at the humiliation and disgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the necessity of this miserable juncture, the Spartans sent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans[27].

News of the defeat at Leuctra brought to Sparta.

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and, on this memorable occasion, the Spartans exhibited that striking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally resulted from the institutions of Lycurgus. Availing himself of the extraordinary respect which uncultivated nations bestow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accomplishments, that legislator allowed to the man who had lost his defensive armor, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate soldier was either driven into perpetual banishment, and subjected to every indignity which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the resentment of neighbouring and hostile tribes; or, if he submitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public assemblies, from every office of power or honor, from the protection of the laws, and almost from the society of men, without the shadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this stern law, which seems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illustrated in a very striking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

[27] Xenoph. p. 596, et seqq. et Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, et seqq.

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Singular behaviour of the Spartans on that occaſion.

The meſſenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual cuſtom, were celebrating, in the month of July, gymnaſtic and muſical entertainments, and invoking Heaven to preſerve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public diſaſter. Theſe magiſtrates commanded the feſtival to proceed; ſending, however, to each family a liſt of the warriors whom it had loſt, and enjoining the women to abſtain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of ſuch as had periſhed in the field of battle, appeared in the public places, dreſſed in their gayeſt attire, ſaluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinſmen of thoſe who had ſaved themſelves by a ſhameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in ſilence over their domeſtic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, diſcovered every ſymptom of unutterable anguiſh and deſpair. Their perſons were ſhamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms folded, their eyes fixed immoveably on the ground; expecting in humble reſignation, the ſentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magiſtrate againſt the unworthy cauſes of their ſorrow[a]. But, on this critical emergency, the rigor of the Spartan diſcipline was mitigated by Ageſilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited puniſhment. He

[a] Xenoph. p. 596.

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Decision of Ageſilaus reſpecting the vanquiſhed in the field of Leuctra.

endeavoured to atone for abandoning the ſpirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us ſuppoſe," ſaid he, "the ſacred inſtitutions of Lycurgus to have ſlept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them reſume their wonted vigor and activity:" a ſentence extravagantly praiſed by many writers, as preſerving the authority of the laws, while it ſpared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot diſcover the admired ſagacity of Ageſilaus in diſpenſing this act of lenity; ſo, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itſelf, which the preſent circumſtances of his country rendered not only expedient, but neceſſary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extenſive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been uſefully ſacrificed to the honor of military diſcipline. But a community exceedingly ſmall, and actually weakened by the loſs of four hundred members, could ſcarcely have ſurvived another blow equally deſtructive. No diſtant proſpect of advantage, therefore, could have juſtified ſuch an unſeaſonable ſeverity.

State of Greece after the battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 2. A. C. 371.

When the intelligence was diffuſed over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loſs of only three hundred men, had raiſed an immortal trophy over the ſtrength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every-where conſpicuous. The deſire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponneſus with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every

people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aſpired at independence. The leſs conſiderable ſtates expected to remain thenceforth unmoleſted, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle ſummons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud ſenators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had ſo often inflicted on their neighbours. CHAP. XXX.

But amidſt this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their paſſions and animoſities, than by the principles of juſtice or ſound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illuſtrious example of political moderation [29]. Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been diſpatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offenſive alliance againſt a republic, which had ever proved the moſt dangerous, as well as the moſt inveterate enemy of their country. But the aſſembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to deſtroy them. Affected moderation of Athens.

The ancient and illuſtrious merit of the Spartans, their important ſervices during the Perſian war, and the fame of their laws and diſcipline, which ſtill rendered them a reſpectable branch of the Views of that republic.

[29] Xenoph. p. 598.

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Grecian confederacy, might have a conſiderable influence in producing this reſolution. But it chiefly proceeded from a jealouſy of the growing power of Thebes, the ſituation of whoſe territories might ſoon render her a more formidable opponent to Athens, than even Sparta herſelf. This political conſideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted national antipathy. The Theban herald was not received with reſpect, nor even with decency. He was not entertained in public, according to the eſtabliſhed hoſpitality of the Greeks; and although the ſenate of the Five Hundred (who uſually anſwered foreign ambaſſadors) was then aſſembled in the citadel, he was allowed to return home without receiving the ſmalleſt ſatisfaction on the ſubject of his demand. But the Athenians, though unwilling to ſecond the reſentment, and promote the proſperity of Thebes, prepared to derive every poſſible advantage from the misfortunes and diſtreſs of Sparta. Convinced that the inhabitants of Peloponneſus would no longer be inclined to follow her ſtandard, and ſhare her danger and adverſity, they eagerly ſeized the opportunity of delivering them for ever from her yoke; and, leſt any other people might attain the rank which the Spartans once held, and raiſe their own importance on the ruins of public freedom, ambaſſadors were ſent ſucceſſively to the ſeveral cities, requiring their reſpective compliance with the treaty of Antalcidas. Againſt ſuch as rejected this overture, war was denounced in the name of Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all

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Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that she had determined to check the ambition of every republic whose views were too aspiring [30].

The Thebans court the alliance of Jason of Thessaly.

Disappointed of the assistance of Athens, the Thebans had recourse to an ally not less powerful. The extensive and fertile territory of Thessaly, which had been so long weakened by division, was fortunately united under the government of Jason of Pheræ, a man whose abilities and enterprising ambition seemed destined to change the face of the ancient world [31].

His character, and fortunes.

To the native virtues of hospitality and magnificence, which peculiarly distinguished his country, Jason added indefatigable labor and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftiest designs, and a character ready to promote them by the meanest artifices [32]. His family descended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthiest house in Pheræ, which had already attained considerable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Thessaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatness to which they frequently conduct, Jason deceived his brothers and kinsmen, and appropriated almost the sole use of his domestic opulence. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whose assistance he acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than any former general or king had ever enjoyed [33]. But the

30 Xenoph. p. 602.
31 Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seqq.
32 Polyæn. Stratagem.
33 Plut. Polit. et san. tuend.

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government of a ſingle city could not ſatisfy his aſpiring mind. By ſtratagem, by ſurpriſe, or by force, he extended his dominion over the richeſt parts of Theſſaly; and was ready to graſp the whole, when his deſigns were obſtructed by the powerful oppoſition of Polydamas the Pharſalian [a].

His ambition oppoſed by Polydamas.

Next to Pheræ and Lariſſa, Pharſalus was the largeſt and moſt flouriſhing city in that northern diviſion of Greece. But the inhabitants, diſtracted by factions, exhauſted their ſtrength in civil diſcord and ſedition, until a ray of wiſdom illuminating both parties, they committed their differences, and themſelves, to the probity and patriotiſm of Polydamas, which were equally reſpected at home and abroad. For ſeveral years Polydamas commanded the citadel, and adminiſtered juſtice and the finances with ſuch diligence and fidelity, as might reaſonably have entitled him to the glorious appellation of Father of his country. He firmly oppoſed and counteracted the ſecret practices, as well as the open deſigns, of Jaſon, who eagerly ſolicited his friendſhip by every motive that could actuate a mind of leſs determined integrity.

Conference between them.

At a conference which was held between them at Pharſalus, where Jaſon had come alone and unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a generous adverſary, the Pheræan diſplayed the

[a] Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. 1. et ſeqq.

magnitude of his power and resources, which it seemed impossible for the weakness of Pharsalus to resist; and promised, that, on surrendering the citadel of that place, which must otherwise soon yield to force, Polydamas should enjoy in Thessaly the second rank after himself; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labors might raise their common country to that station in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the subjugation of the neighbouring states opened vaster prospects, which forced themselves irresistibly on his mind, when he considered the natural advantages of Thessaly, the fertility of the soil, the swiftness of the horses, the disciplined bravery and martial ardor of the inhabitants, with whom no nation in Europe, or in Asia, was able to contend.

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Determined integrity of Polydamas.

Polydamas heard with pleasure the praises of his native land, and admired the magnanimity of Jason. But he observed, that his fellow-citizens had honored him with a trust which it was impossible for him ever to betray; and that their community still enjoyed the alliance of Sparta, from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual assistance, he would defend to the last extremity the walls of Pharsalus. Jason commended his integrity and patriotism, which, he declared,

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inſpired him with the warmer deſire to obtain the friendſhip of ſuch an illuſtrious character.

Jaſon declared leader of the Theſſalians. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 370.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and propoſed his demand in the council; exhorting the magiſtrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigor; for if they expected to oppoſe the forces of Jaſon by their undiſciplined peaſants, or half-armed ſlaves, they would infallibly bring diſgrace on themſelves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unſucceſsfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Theſſaly, held a ſecond conference with Jaſon. He ſtill refuſed to ſurrender the citadel, but promiſed to uſe his beſt endeavours for making the Pharſalians ſubmit of their own accord; and offered his only ſon as a pledge of his fidelity. Jaſon accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was ſoon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharſalus and all Theſſaly; a modeſt appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power [35].

His admirable diſcipline;

He began his reign by adjuſting, with equity and preciſion, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raiſed by the ſeveral cities in his dominions. The new levies, added to his ſtanding army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thouſand horſe, twenty thouſand heavy-armed

[35] Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et ſeqq. et Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 388.

foot, and ſuch a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match [36]. But numbers formed the leaſt advantageous diſtinction of the army of Jaſon. Every day he exerciſed his troops in perſon; diſpenſed rewards and puniſhments; caſhiered the ſlothful and effeminate; honored the brave and diligent with double, and ſometimes treble pay, with large donatives in money, and with ſuch other preſents as peculiarly ſuited their reſpective taſtes. By this judicious plan of military adminiſtration, the ſoldiers of Jaſon became alike attached to their duty, and to the perſon of their general, whoſe ſtandard they were ready to follow into any part of the world [37]. CHAP. XXX.

He began his military operations by ſubduing the Dryopes [38], the Dolopians, and the other ſmall but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the ſouthern frontier of Theſſaly. Then turning northwards, he ſtruck terror into Macedon, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and moſt probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both ſides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the diviſions, and inſulted the weakneſs, of his country; and by conquering the ſmall and uncultivated diſtrict of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous and rapid ſucceſs.

[36] Xenophon expreſſes it more ſtrongly; πελταστικον γε μην ικανον προς παντας ανθρωπους αντιταχθηναι, p. 600.

[37] Xenoph. p. 600.

[38] Strabo, l. viii. p. 299.

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principality under Alcetas [39], an anceſtor of the renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of Theſſaly from the Ægean to the Ionian ſea, and encompaſſed, as with a belt, the utmoſt breadth of the Grecian republics.

His views on Greece.

It cannot be doubted that the ſubjugation, or at leaſt the command, of thoſe immortal commonwealths, was the aim of the Theſſalian prince, who declared to his friends, that he expected, by the aſſiſtance of Greece, to imitate the glorious example of Cyrus and Ageſilaus, and to effect, by the united ſtrength of the confederacy, what theſe generals had nearly accompliſhed by a body of ten or twelve thouſand ſoldiers [40]. While the Spartans, however, preſerved their long-boaſted pre-eminence, and regarded it as their hereditary and unalienable right to conduct their confederates to war, Jaſon could not hope to attain the principal command in an Aſiatic expedition. As the natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced in their unproſperous war againſt the Thebans; nor could he receive ſmall ſatisfaction from beholding the ſouthern ſtates of Greece engaged in perpetual warfare, while he himſelf maintained a reſpected neutrality, and watched the firſt favorable

[39] In ſpeaking of Arrybas (the ſon of Alcetas, and the grandfather of Pyrrhus), who received his education at Athens, Juſtin ſays, "Quanto doctior majoribus ſuis, tanto et gratior populo fuit. Primus itaque leges et ſenatum annuoſque magiſtratus et reipublicæ formam compoſuit. Et ut a Pyrrho ſedes, ſic vita cultior populo ab Arryba ſtatuta."

[40] Xenoph. p. 600.

occaſion of interfering, with deciſive effect, in the final ſettlement of that country.

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His alliance with Thebes.

He ſeldom ventured indeed into the Peloponneſus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, ſeveral journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connexion with the moſt diſtinguiſhed characters of thoſe republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after ſerving his country with equal glory and ſucceſs, was, according to the uſual fortune of Athenian commanders, expoſed to a cruel perſecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honor and his life. On the day of trial the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian aſſembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and among the reſt Jaſon, habited in the robe of a ſuppliant, humbly ſoliciting the releaſe of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favor to the ſimple recommendation of ſo powerful a prince[41]. In a viſit to Thebes he endeavoured to gain or ſecure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large preſents and promiſes; but the illuſtrious Theban, whoſe independent and honorable poverty had rejected the aſſiſtance of his friends and fellow-citizens, ſpurned with diſdain the inſolent generoſity of a ſtranger[42]. Yet, by the intervention of Pelopidas, Jaſon contracted

[41] Demoſthenes et Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.

[42] Plut. Apophtheg.

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an engagement of hoſpitality with the Thebans, in conſequence of which he was invited to join their arms, after their memorable victory at Leuctra.

Rapidity of his movements.

The Theſſalian prince accepted the invitation, though his deſigns reſpecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the ſuperintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure. To avoid marching through a hoſtile territory, he ordered his gallies to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by ſea to the coaſt of Bœotia. His naval preparations amuſed the attention of the Phocians, while Jaſon entered their country with a body of two thouſand light horſe, and advanced with ſuch rapidity that he was every where the firſt meſſenger of his own arrival.

His views in mediating a truce between Thebes and Sparta.

By this unuſual celerity, he joined, without encountering any obſtacle, the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great diſtance from the enemy. Inſtead of an auxiliary, Jaſon thought it more ſuitable to his intereſt to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to reſt ſatisfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, without driving their adverſaries to deſpair; that the recent hiſtory of their own republic and of Sparta, ſhould teach them to remember the viciſſitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a

victorious

victorious and vanquiſhed army. That the preſent criſis ſeemed totally adverſe to the re-eſtabliſhment of their greatneſs; that they ſhould yield to the fatality of circumſtances, and watch a more favorable opportunity to reſtore the tarniſhed luſtre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hoſtilities were ſuſpended; the terms of a peace were propoſed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had ſo little confidence in this ſudden negociation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward, with the diligence of diſtruſt and fear, until they got entirely beyond reach of the Thebans [43].

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Jaſon had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty haſtily concluded between enemies, whoſe reſentments were irritated and inflamed by ſo many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a ſincere and laſting peace between theſe powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wiſhed to obtain the reputation of appeaſing the diſſenſions of Greece; a circumſtance of great importance to the accompliſhment of his ambitious deſigns.

In his return home, he demoliſhed the walls of Heraclea, a town ſituate near the ſtraits of Thermopylæ, not fearing, ſays his hiſtorian [44], that any of the Greek ſtates ſhould invade his dominion from that ſide, but unwilling to leave a

He is aſſaſſinated in the midſt of his projects. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 370.

[43] Xenoph. p. 600. [44] Ibid. p. 599.

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place of ſuch ſtrength on his frontier, which, if ſeized by a powerful neighbour, might obſtruct his paſſage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of preſiding, as an honor due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Theſſaly to fatten ſheep, goats, ſwine, and oxen, and propoſed honorable rewards to ſuch diſtricts as furniſhed the beſt victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burdenſome impoſition on his ſubjects, he collected a thouſand oxen, and, of ſmaller cattle, to the number of ten thouſand. At the ſame time, he prepared the whole military ſtrength of his kingdom, by whoſe aſſiſtance, ſtill more effectually than by the merit of his ſacrifices, he might maintain his pretenſions to the ſuperintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the adminiſtration of the ſacred treaſure, which he regarded as ſo many previous ſteps to the conqueſt of Greece and Aſia. But, amidſt theſe lofty projects, Jaſon, while reviewing the Pheræan cavalry, was ſtabbed, by ſeven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding juſtice againſt each other. Two of the aſſaſſins were diſpatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horſes, which had been prepared for their uſe, and eſcaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with univerſal acclamations of joy, and honored as the ſaviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but

ambitious tyrant[45]. The projects and the empire of Jaſon periſhed with himſelf; Theſſaly, as we ſhall have occaſion to explain, relapſed into its former ſtate of diviſion and weakneſs: but it is the buſineſs of hiſtory to relate not only great actions, but great deſigns; and even the deſigns of Jaſon announce the approaching downfal of Grecian freedom.

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[45] Xenoph. et Diodor. ibid. et Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

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Tumults in the Peloponneſus — Invaſion of Laconia. — Epaminondas rebuilds Meſſené. — Foundation of Megalopolis. — Archidamus reſtores the Fortune of Sparta. — Affairs of Theſſaly and Macedon. — Negociations for Peace. — The Pretenſions of Thebes rejected. — Epaminondas invades the Peloponneſus. — Revolutions in Achaia. — Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council. — Deſigns of Thebes. — Diſconcerted by Athens. — Pelopidas's Expedition in Theſſaly. — The Arcadians ſeize the Olympic Treaſure. — Battle of Mantinæa. — Ageſilaus's Expedition into Egypt.

CHAP. XXXI. History of the laſt ſtage of Grecian freedom.

THE death of Jaſon removed the terror of Greece; but of a country which owed its ſafety to the arm of an aſſaſſin, the condition may juſtly be regarded as extremely unſtable and precarious. There elapſed, however, thirty-three years of diſcord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, ſuch ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accompliſh the lofty deſigns of the Theſſalian. The hiſtory of this laſt ſtage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indeciſive wars, which exhauſted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the acceſſion of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by

the ſucceſs and glory of Macedon, and clouded by the diſgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics.

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The unexpected iſſue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and ſtrengthening that of their enemies. In leſs than two years after that important event, the alliance of Peloponneſus, over which Sparta had ſo long maintained an aſcendant, was totally diſſolved, and moſt cities had changed not only their foreign connexions, but their domeſtic laws and government. During the ſame period, the confederacy, of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponneſus courted her protection, and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean ſea, and even the iſle of Eubœa, increaſed the power, and in ſome meaſure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The hiſtory of theſe revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their conſequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponneſians, after being delivered from the oppreſſion of the Spartan yoke, were ſubjected to the more deſtructive tyranny of their own ungovernable paſſions[1]. Every ſtate and every city was torn by factions which frequently blazed forth into the moſt violent ſeditions. The exiles from ſeveral republics were nearly as numerous as thoſe who

Tumults and ſeditions in the Peloponneſus after the battle of Leuctra. Olymp. cii. 3. A. C. 370.

[1] Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et ſeqq. Iſocrat. in Archidam. et de Pace.

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had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were baniſhed from Tegea; two thouſand [2] were ſlain in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and thoſe who, in the firſt encounter, had got poſſeſſion of the government and the capital, were ſometimes attacked [3] and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone ſeem to have acted wiſely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they labored to rebuild their walls, which the inſolence of Sparta had demoliſhed. The work was ſoon brought to a concluſion; and the Mantinæans, united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preſerve the ſtrength of their city, which appeared neceſſary to maintain their political independence.

The exiles fly to Sparta.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this ſcene of diſorder. The former found ſufficient employment for their arms and negociations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were ſo much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themſelves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected aſſault of their capital. For this purpoſe they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military

[2] This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different ſcenes of the ſedition, which is called the Scytaliſm by Diodorus (ubi ſupra), and Pauſanias (Corinth), from the Greek word σκυταλη, ſignifying a club, which, it ſeems, was the principal inſtrument of ſlaughter.

[3] Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et ſeqq.

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ſervice [4]. They had commanded into the field even thoſe citizens who were employed in ſuch ſacred and civil offices as are deemed moſt uſeful in ſociety; and, as their laſt reſource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulſions of Peloponneſus ſoon ſupplied them with leſs dangerous auxiliaries [5]. The incenſed partiſans of ariſtocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourſe to the moſt ancient and diſtinguiſhed patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this ſeaſonable reinforcement, the Spartans ſet at defiance the Theban invaſion, by which they had been ſo long threatened, and ſent a conſiderable detachment to recover their loſt authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other ſtate of the Peloponneſus, the influence which ſhe had loſt in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and ſlain in the firſt rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnanimous leader. Nor did Ageſilaus perform any thing deciſive againſt the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little reſiſtance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they ſhould be joined by the Theban confederacy, whoſe aſſiſtance they had ſent to ſolicit, and had juſt reaſon to expect [6].

That republic attempts in vain to recover her authority in Arcadia.

[4] Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597. [5] Id. p. 603. [6] Id. p. 605.

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The Thebans take the field at the head of their allies. Olymp. cii. 4. A. C. 369.

At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own ſtrength, and collected into one body the flower and vigor of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiſcuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurement of plunder. They had no ſooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united maſs of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards ever aſſembled in Greece under one ſtandard, amounting to fifty, ſome ſay to ſeventy thouſand men[7]. The Thebans, and the reſt of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily reſigned their authority. Apprized of the march of ſuch a formidable army, conducted by generals of ſuch unqueſtionable merit, Ageſilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a meaſure which he fortunately effected, before his ſoldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hoſtile camp, and thus avoided the diſgrace of retiring before the enemy[8]. His unreſiſted devaſtation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his ſucceſsful retreat, gave freſh ſpirits to his followers, and made them return with better

The Spartans evacuate Arcadia.

[7] The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. Pauſan. Bœotic. Diodorus, l. xv. et Plut. in Pelopid.

[8] Xenoph. p. 606.

hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invaſion.

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Invaſion of Laconia.

The Thebans, though they had no longer any occaſion to protect the Arcadians from inſult, were determined[9], by many powerful motives, to employ the vaſt preparations which they had collected. Their particular reſentment againſt Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to deſtroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of ſeveral other towns in Laconia, declared their reſolution to revolt from Sparta, as ſoon as the enemy ſhould enter their boundaries. In a council of war ſummoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waſte the country, and, if poſſible, to take poſſeſſion of the capital.

Brave defence of the diſtrict Sciritis.

That this reſolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four diviſions, deſtined, by ſeparate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellaſia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Bœotians, Elians, and Argives penetrated, without oppoſition, by the particular

[9] They at firſt oppoſed the eagerneſs of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives, for invading Laconia, conſidering ὁτι δυσεμβαλωτατη μεν ἡ Λακωνικη ελεγετο ειναι, Φρουρας δε καθιζαναι ενομιζον επι τοις ευπροσοδωτατοις. "That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural ſtrength of its frontier, or by vigilant garriſons." Xenoph. p. 607.

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routes which had been aſſigned them. But when the Arcadians, who formed the fourth diviſion of the army, attempted to traverſe the diſtrict Sciritis, the brave Iſchilas, who guarded that important paſs, determined to repel them, or to periſh. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthuſiaſm in the breaſt of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies ſo far exceeded his own, that death ſeemed the ſure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all thoſe to decline danger who were not ambitious to ſhare it. He even *commanded* the youth to leave his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be riſked in ſo deſperate an enterpriſe. He, with the old ſoldiers who followed him, choſe the preſent opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were ſold dearly. The action was long doubtful: the loſs of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle ceaſe till the laſt of the Spartans had periſhed [10].

Devaſtation of Laconia.

The confederates having ſoon after aſſembled at Sellaſia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and deſtroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a ſimilar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into conſternation. The women were terrified by the ſmoke and tumult raiſed by the invaders; a ſpectacle,

[10] Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607. et Diodor. l. xv. p. 376. The former indeed adds, ει μη τις αμφιγνωθεις διεφυγε. "Unleſs, perhaps, ſome one eſcaped unknown through the enemy."

concerning which it had been their uſual boaſt, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were ſenſible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peaſants and ſlaves, whom they commonly treated with ſuch an exceſs of cruelty. Not leſs than ſix thouſand of theſe unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promiſes, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they deteſted. Their formidable numbers increaſed the general panic, which had ſeized the magiſtrates and citizens, and which did not finally ceaſe until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever oppoſed the *deſpotiſm*, were unwilling to permit the *deſtruction* of Sparta.

Vigilant intrepidity of Ageſilaus.

This ſeaſonable reinforcement not only removed the conſternation of the Spartans, but made them paſs with rapidity from the depths of deſpondency to the joys of ſucceſs. The kings and magiſtrates could ſcarcely reſtrain their impetuoſity from ruſhing into the field: and this martial enthuſiaſm, guided by the conſummate prudence of Ageſilaus, enabled them to repel the firſt aſſaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every ſucceeding attempt to get poſſeſſion of the city, muſt be attended with ſuch fatigue, and danger, and loſs of men, as could not be compenſated by the ſucceſs of that enterpriſe. The conduct of Ageſilaus, during this critical emergency, has been highly extolled by all

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writers [11], and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambuſh in the temple of the Tyndaridæ [12], he defeated the deſigns of the aſſailants: by very uncommon preſence of mind [13], he quelled a dangerous inſurrection; and while, by force or ſtratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domeſtic and foreign enemies, he negociated the moſt powerful aſſiſtance for the relief of his country.

The Spartans and their allies negociate at Athens a treaty of defence.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra the Athenians had declared their reſolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminiſhed the grandeur, yet ſecured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakneſs of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithſtanding this declaration, which was univerſally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from reſentment or from policy, remained above two years ſpectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneaſineſs might be occaſioned by the increaſing ſtrength of their

[11] Xenoph. et Plut. in Ageſilao. Diodorus, l. xv. et Pauſanias Lacon.

[12] Caſtor and Pollux, ſo called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

[13] The mutineers had entered into a conſpiracy to ſeize an important poſt in the city. Ageſilaus obſerved them as they marched thither, and immediately ſuſpecting their deſign, called out, that they had miſtaken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they ſhould ſeparate into different diviſions, and repair to the ſeveral poſts which he named. The conſpirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpoſe, and ſeparating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in ſuch numbers as rendered them dangerous.

new rival, was sufficiently balanced by the decay and downfal of their ancient and inveterate enemy. But though, doubtless, they ardently desired the ruin of the Spartan power, they could not sincerely approve the cruel destruction of their persons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devastation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compassion for a people whose exploits, on many memorable occasions, had done such signal honor to the Grecian name.

Arguments which they employed for this purpose.

The emissaries of Agesilaus, whose superior mind had assumed dictatorial power amidst the distress of his country, seized the favorable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which seldom operate amidst the cold lifeless politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually assisted each other in seasons of distress, and that the most glorious æra of their story was that in which the two republics had united their councils and measures against a common enemy. That when the spirit of rivality and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were exposed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta against the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wished to demolish the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren solitude of the Crissean plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been saved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but delivered from the yoke of domestic tyrants, and the cruel tyranny

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of the Piſiſtratidæ. The merit of theſe ſervices deſerved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary renown of Athens urged her to protect the miſerable; and juſtice demanded that ſhe ſhould aſſert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which ſhe herſelf had propoſed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had ſo manifeſtly violated.

How received by the Athenians.

A loud and diſcordant murmur ran through the aſſembly. Some approved the demand, others obſerved that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, whenever they became powerful, aſſume a very different tone, and, inſtead of coloring by falſe diſguiſes, diſplay in its native force, their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any aſſiſtance, ſince they themſelves had begun the war by the invaſion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjuſt motive of ſupporting the tyrannical uſurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow-citizens.

Speech of Cleiteles the Corinthian.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambaſſadors, had come thoſe of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently diſtinguiſhed by an unſhaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, obſerving what turn the debate was likely to take, ſtood up and ſaid, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggreſſors, the melancholy experience of *our* ſtate would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, ſurely, have

not committed hoſtilities againſt any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houſes, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuſe your aſſiſtance to thoſe who have been ſo manifeſtly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your expreſs deſire, they acceded and ſwore?" The aſſembly loudly approved the diſcourſe of Cleiteles, which was ſupported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliaſian. CHAP. XXXIX.

Of Patrocles the Phliaſian.

"It is manifeſt, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that ſhould Sparta be deſtroyed, Athens muſt be the next object of the hoſtility of Thebes, ſince that city alone would then ſtand in the way of her ambition. The cauſe of the Lacedæmonians therefore is, in fact, your own. You muſt embrace it with ardor, as the laſt opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar ſeverity. By taking this reſolution, which is equally generous and ſalutary, you will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favors, or more ambitious of honeſt fame, but alſo with us their allies, who, ſince we have continued faithful to our friends in their adverſity, cannot be ſuſpected of ingratitude to our proſperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and

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afflicted always had recourſe to Athens, and were never diſappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but ſee, the Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, ſoliciting your protection againſt the Thebans, whoſe unrelenting cruelty could not perſuade Sparta, in the height of her reſentment and of her power, to deſolate your country, and to reduce you into ſervitude. Your anceſtors acquired juſt renown by ſaving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the ſacred rites of burial [14]. How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous aſſiſtance, ſhall be ſaved from death. It was deemed meritorious in *them* to have defended the children of Hercules againſt the unnatural perſecution of Euryſtheus; but it will be far more glorious for *you* to have defended not only the deſcendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the ſenate, the magiſtrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itſelf, and otherwiſe inevitable. During the proſperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your deſtruction by a decree, which diſplayed their humanity, without expoſing their ſafety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animoſities, repay the important

[14] See vol. i. c. i. p. 26. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens; by Plato, Lyſias, Iſocrates, and Thucydides.

ſervices

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ſervices which, in the Barbarian war, the valor of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece."

Iphicrates, with twelve thouſand men, ſent to defend Laconia.

The aſſembly was ſo deeply affected by the perſuaſive diſcourſe of the Phliaſian, that they refuſed to hear any thing in oppoſition to it, and determined, almoſt unanimouſly, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thouſand men were ordered to repair to his ſtandard; the ſacrifices were propitious; the troops took a ſhort repaſt; and ſuch was their ardor to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander [15].

Epaminondas continues his ravages in that province.

Epaminondas, meanwhile, had committed dreadful devaſtation in Laconia. His repulſe from the capital had exaſperated his hoſtilities againſt the country. He had deſolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houſes, and abounding in all the conveniences of life known to the auſtere ſimplicity of Sparta. He had aſſaulted Helos and Gythium; and, traverſing the whole province, had deſtroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the ſword. Even theſe terrible ravages did not ſatisfy his reſentment; he determined, that the invaſion of Laconia ſhould not be a temporary evil, which the labor of years might repair; and for this purpoſe employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, muſt leave the Lacedæmonians expoſed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Rebuilds Meſſené. Olymp. cii. 2. A. C. 369.

We have had occaſion to relate the various fortunes of the Meſſenians. About three centuries

[15] This whole tranſaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613.

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before the period now under review, their city had been demoliſhed by the Spartans; their territory had been ſeized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into ſervitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel maſters; or diſperſed in miſerable baniſhment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compaſſion on this unfortunate race, and ſettled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring iſland of Cephalenia. The Meſſenians diſplayed their gratitude by important ſervices during the Peloponneſian war; but their moſt vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Meſſenians were the firſt objects of her memorable tyranny, being univerſally enſlaved, baniſhed, or put to death. It is probable that the ſcattered remains of this miſerable community would flock from every quarter to the ſtandard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting perſecution of a people, who now ſuffered the calamities which they had ſo often inflicted. But the general voice of hiſtory aſcribes to Epaminondas, the merit of aſſembling the Meſſenians[16]. It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in poſſeſſion of their territory; an act of generous compaſſion which inflicted a moſt unexpected and

[16] Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pauſan. Meſſen. p. 265.

cruel punishment on the Spartans, who beheld the ashes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured to extinguish, revive and flourish in their neighbourhood; continually increase by the accession of Spartan subjects and slaves; and, encouraged by a Theban garrison, and their own inveterate hostility, watch every favorable occasion to exert the full power of their vengeance [17]. CHAP. XXXI.

Epaminondas had accomplished this extraordinary enterprise, when he received intelligence of the motions of the Athenian army commanded by Iphicrates. That illustrious general had allowed the ardor of his troops to evaporate, by pursuing a conduct which it is impossible, at this distance of time, to explain, but which the military historian [18] condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown. When celerity was of the utmost importance, he wasted several precious days at Corinth, without any necessity, or even pretence, for this unseasonable delay. His soldiers loudly demanded to meet the enemy, or even to assault the walls of Argos, the strongest and most populous city in Peloponnesus, and not inferior to Thebes itself in active animosity against their common foe. Iphicrates, however, embraced none of those measures, but led his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps, what actually happened, that the news of his arrival there would deliver Laconia from the hostile invader. The Athenians take the field.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epaminondas feared the issue of an engagement with the The Thebans evacuate Laconia.

[17] Diodor. l. xv. c. 16. [18] Xenoph. l. vi. versus finem.

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Athenians. But he was juſtly alarmed with the intereſt which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and reſentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, diſcovered on this occaſion, taught him what ſentiments his conduct muſt excite in more impartial ſtates, ſhould he perſiſt in his original plan, deſtroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expreſſed it, "pluck out an eye of Greece[19]." Many concurring cauſes tended alſo to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houſes and families. The Elians and Argives were anxious to ſecure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had conſumed ſeveral winter-months, a ſeaſon in which they were not accuſtomed to keep the field. Proviſions likewiſe grew ſcarce; and Epaminondas, preſſed by difficulties on every ſide, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until "every thing of value had been conſumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down[20]."

The Thebans and Athenians reſpectively accuſe their commanders.

At the ſame time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual conſent, and returned to their reſpective cities by ſeparate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progreſs of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhauſted by the fatigue

[19] Ariſtot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10. [20] Xenoph. p. 519.

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of a winter's campaign, to paſs unmoleſted through the Iſthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accuſed and tried before the Theban aſſembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former diſcovered leſs courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the ſword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his inſolent accuſers. But Epaminondas diſplayed, on this occaſion, the ſuperiority of philoſophical firmneſs, ſeated in the mind, to that conſtitutional courage which is the reſult of blood and ſpirits. The latter is ſufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield ſupport in every viciſſitude of fortune.

Epaminondas defends his conduct.

Inſtead of obſerving the formality of a regular defence, the illuſtrious Theban undertook the invidious taſk of pronouncing his own panegyric [21]. After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by obſerving, "that he could ſubmit to death without reluctance, ſecure of immortal fame, earned in the ſervice of his country." The ſeditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the aſſembly againſt himſelf and his colleague diſſolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

[21] Plutarch. de ſui Laude, p. 540.

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Intricacy of the subsequent events.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinæa, there elapsed six years of indecisive war and tumultuous activity; battles lost and gained, conquests made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissensions which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the history of this period, we may perceive the same confusion in the relation, which appears at first sight to have been in the events themselves. It is necessary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be supposed to act *entirely* without design: their motives, unsteady and capricious as they often are, form the invisible chain which it is the business of the historian to investigate and to follow; since it is otherwise impossible that the transactions which he describes, should afford either real instruction, or any rational entertainment.

The alliance between Athens and Sparta confirmed and extended. Olymp. ciii. 1. A. C. 368.

Early in the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who still adhered to their cause, dispatched an embassy to Athens, in order to strengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic. In the conference held for that purpose, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earnestly desired the continuance of similar favors. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories

and fortune of Athens, juſtly entitled her to the ſovereignty of the Grecian ſeas; and when this conceſſion, which had hitherto been with-held with ſuch diſdain, could not ſatisfy the more patriotic, or rather the leſs generous, members of the aſſembly, they condeſcended to grant another acknowledgment ſtill more inconſiſtent with the pride of their hereditary pretenſions; that in ſuch military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command ſhould be equal and alternate; ſo that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliaſian, whoſe eloquence and addreſs had been diſtinguiſhed in the former negociation, was not leſs active in the preſent; chiefly by *his* intervention, matters were finally adjuſted; an alliance of the moſt intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the aſſiſtance of the generous Phliaſian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage, without the diſgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long ſupplicatory ſpeeches, which they deemed of all things the moſt grievous [a].

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The Spartans negociate treaties with Dionyſius and Artaxerxes.

The Spartan negociations, ſo fortunate in Athens, were equally ſucceſsful with Dionyſius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Perſia. The former, himſelf a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and diſtreſs of a people, who, during ſeven hundred years, had formed the

[a] Xenoph. p. 613—616.

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principal ornament and defence of the Dorian race; and the latter purſued his ordinary ſyſtem of politics, of aſſiſting the weaker party, in order to balance the contending powers, and to perpetuate the hoſtilities of Greece.

Military operations.

While the Lacedæmonians gained ſtrength by theſe important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Pallené, an Achæan republic, which ſtill remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waſte, the villages burned, the city taken by ſtorm, and the garriſon, conſiſting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the ſword. Soon after this ſucceſs, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewiſe marched ſouthward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to ſeven thouſand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Iſthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thouſand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionyſius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the moſt reſpected, or at leaſt the moſt popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with the ſouthern allies. For this purpoſe they ſtrongly guarded, and even fortified the Iſthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice ſince the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and aſſaulted Corinth.

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But Chabrias, who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulſed them with ſuch loſs, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and diſgraced by his countrymen, who, inſolent with proſperity, thought themſelves entitled always to conquer.

Retreat of the Thebans.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not eaſy to conjecture the real cauſe [23], occaſioned much diſſatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This ſimple, but warlike people, had obtained diſtinguiſhed honor in ſeveral recent expeditions. They were uſually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterpriſe and perſevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally reſpected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious wherever they fought. But their principal merit was diſplayed in ambuſhes and ſurpriſe, and all the dangerous ſtratagems of deſultory war. When a favorable occaſion ſummoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor ſtorms, nor darkneſs, could interrupt their courſe, or prevent their unexpected aſſault [24]. Unaſſiſted and alone, they had often defeated ſuperior ſtrength

Pretenſion of the Arcadians.

[23] The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accuſed Epaminondas of treacherous correſpondence with the enemy, or at leaſt of ſecretly favoring their cauſe; but this is altogether improbable.

[24] Vid. Xenoph. 618, et ſeqq.

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and numbers; and when, together with their Peloponnesian allies, they served under the Theban standard, their prowess had been acknowledged and admired by the united army.

Encouraged by Lycomedes.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave relief and splendor to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community in Peloponnesus; but that they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by *their* assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state; and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly[21] resolution of Lycomedes;

[21] Xenophon's expression is lively; και μονον ανδρα ηγουντες; "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

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and, in order to render it effectual, determined to keep poſſeſſion of ſuch places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conqueſts in theſe and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponneſus.

The Spartans take the field to oppoſe the deſigns of the Arcadians. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

For ſeveral months they met with little interruption in this deſign, the Spartans, after the departure of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the enſuing year, when they received a new ſupply of troops from Dionyſius, and both troops [a] and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Theſſaly and Macedon, as we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to relate; ſo that every circumſtance conſpired to haſten the march of Ageſilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was intruſted to his ſon Archidamus, his colleague Ageſipolis not poſſeſſing great abilities either for war or government.

Glorious campaign of the Spartans under Archidamus.

The rapid ſucceſs of Archidamus, who ſeemed deſtined to reſtore the declining fortune of Sparta, juſtified the prudent choice of the magiſtrates and people. He expelled the hoſtile garriſons from the inferior cities of Laconia, ſtormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the ſword. From thence he haſtened to Arcadia, laid waſte the ſouthern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhaſia, when the united ſtrength of the Arcadians,

[a] "Theſe were not Perſians, but ξενικοι, Greek mercenaries." Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

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commanded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obſcure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Ciſſidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his abſence was expired, and, without waiting an anſwer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the neareſt paſſage into that country had been ſeized by the Meſſenians. In this difficulty Ciſſidas applied to Archidamus, who haſtened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the ſame time decamped. The hoſtile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta from Midea and Eutreſios. As ſoon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addreſſed them as follows: "Fellow-citizens and friends! if we are ſtill brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to poſterity as we received it from our anceſtors. Let us ſtrive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us ceaſe being the reproach (inſtead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

Battle of Midea won by the Spartans with-

While he yet ſpoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and ſerene. The ſoldiers, rouſed by the noiſe, looked towards the direction

from which it came, and behold, in a conſecrated grove at no great diſtance, an altar and ſtatue of Hercules, the great progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of ſuch auſpicious circumſtances, they were tranſported with an enthuſiaſm of valor, and impetuouſly ruſhed againſt their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought that they had to do with a vanquiſhed and ſpiritleſs people, were aſtoniſhed at their mien and aſpect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach, were totally deſtroyed; many thouſands periſhed in the purſuit; it is ſaid by ancient hiſtorians [27], that the Spartans loſt not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and diſpatched a meſſenger to Sparta. The people were aſſembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Ageſilaus ſhed tears of joy. The Ephori and ſenators ſympathized with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakneſs was communicated from breaſt to breaſt; the amiable contagion ſpread; the ſterneſt members of this numerous aſſembly diſſolved in ſoftneſs, and melted in ſenſibility [28].

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out the loſs of a man.

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a conſiderable reinforcement which the Arcadians ſoon afterwards received from Thebes. By the aſſiſtance of theſe troops, the Menalians and Parrhaſians, who, from

Foundation of Megalopolis.

[27] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 622. Diodor. et Plut. ubi ſupra.

[28] Xenoph. ibid. He obſerves, ὅτῳ κοινὸν τι ἀρα χαρᾶς καὶ λύπης δάκρυα ἐστιν. "So common are tears to joy and ſorrow."

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their ſituation on the ſouthern frontier of Arcadia, were moſt expoſed to the incurſions of the enemy, found means to execute a deſign ſaid to have been formerly ſuggeſted by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty ſtraggling and defenceleſs villages; and chuſing an advantageous ſituation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortreſs there, which they ſurrounded with a ſtrong wall. The benefit of ſecurity attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis [29], the laſt city built by the Greeks, while they preſerved the dignity of independent government [30].

Revolutions in Theſſaly.

The temporary ſucceſs of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally aſcribed to the valor of that commander, was principally occaſioned by the withdrawing from Peloponneſus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes; which was at that time called northward, in order to take an important and honorable part in the affairs of Macedon and Theſſaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jaſon, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and diſorders. Juſt gratitude and reſpect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Theſſalians to perpetuate the honors of his family. He was ſucceeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not being

[29] "The great city."

[30] I have melted together Pauſanias in Bœotic. and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384. but followed the chronology of the latter.

able to endure the reſtraint of a limited, much leſs of a divided rule, attained, by the aſſaſſination of his colleague, the ſole dominion of Theſſaly. His ſtern deſpotiſm was aboliſhed by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinſman [31] Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is repreſented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the deteſted tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of hiſtory. The Theſſalians were delivered from ſuch a monſter by the domeſtic conſpiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jaſon, and her brothers Tiſiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious ſway, till the power and addreſs of Philip deſtroyed their uſurpation, and rendered their diſtracted country, which ſeemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Theſſaly; but the bloody reign of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

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A cautious reader will always receive, with ſome diſtruſt, the accounts tranſmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants [32].

Tyranny of Alexander.

[31] His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

[32] The acceptation of the word tyrant in Greek hiſtory is well known. The Greeks called τυραννοι, "tyrants," thoſe who had acquired ſovereignty, in ſtates formerly republican. Theſſaly, Sicily, Corinth, etc. were governed, not by βασιλεις, but τυραννοι, "not by kings, but tyrants; whereas, Macedonia, which had never been ſubject to any ſpecies of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννοι, but βασιλεις, "not by tyrants, but kings."

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The popular hiſtories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful deſcriptions of Buſiris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted that the tyrant of Theſſaly was cruel to his ſubjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at ſea [33]: but that it was his uſual diverſion to bury men alive, to incloſe them in the ſkins of wild beaſts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the preſence of their parents [34], can ſcarcely be reconciled with his ſhedding tears for the imaginary ſufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the repreſentation of the Troades [35]. It is true, that he is ſaid to have been aſhamed of this weakneſs, and to have left the theatre with confuſion; but what could have engaged a monſter, ſuch as Alexander is deſcribed, to liſten to the pathetic ſtrains of the tender Euripides? What pleaſure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirſting for human blood, receive from ſuch an entertainment? Although we abſtract from his ſtory many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deſerve the reſentment of the Theſſalians. His injured ſubjects took arms, and ſolicited the protection of Thebes, whoſe juſtice or ambition readily embraced their cauſe. As Epaminondas ſtill continued under the diſpleaſure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Iſmenias. Their arrival ſtruck terror into the conſcious breaſt of the tyrant, who,

The affairs of Theſſaly ſettled by Pelopidas.

[33] Theſe are the words of Xenophon, p. 601.
[34] Plut. in Pelopid. [35] Id. de Fort. Alexand.

without

without daring to truſt his defence to the numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his uſurpation was ſupported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, ſubmitting to the moſt humiliating conditions which their wiſdom might judge proper to exact for the future ſecurity of his ſubjects [36].

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Pelopidas eſtabliſhes Perdiccas on the throne of Macedon, and receives Philip as a hoſtage. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

This tranſaction was ſcarcely ended, when the Thebans, whoſe reputation and ſucceſs rendered them the moſt proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, ſince the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during ſix years, to all the calamities of a diſputed ſucceſſion. Amyntas left three legitimate ſons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural ſon, Ptolemy, whoſe intrigues chiefly occaſioned the diſorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the acceſſion of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and ſhortened his reign, which laſted only one year; after which Ptolemy aſſumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It ſoon appeared, however, that his ambition would not reſt ſatisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a conſiderable party to his intereſt, baffled the oppoſition of Perdiccas's partiſans, and boldly uſurped the ſovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourſe to the juſtice

[36] Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. et Plut. in Pelopid.

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and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; reſtored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had baniſhed; aſſerted the juſt rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hoſtages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Theſſaly, having finally re-eſtabliſhed the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom [37].

Is treacherouſly ſeized and impriſoned by Alexander, in his journey through Theſſaly. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

In his journey through a country where he had ſo lately acted the part of a judge and maſter, it ſeemed as if little danger could reaſonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had ſent before him a conſiderable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hoſtages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched ſecurely through the territory of his Theſſalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this ſuſpicious circumſtance could not undeceive the ſanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this meaſure in order to ſhow him reſpect, and to juſtify himſelf againſt ſome recent complaints of his injured ſubjects. With an imprudence which all hiſtorians agree to condemn [38], both Pelopidas and Iſmenias threw themſelves

[37] Diodor. l. xv. c. xvii. et Plut. in Pelopid.

[38] Beſides Diodorus and Plutarch, the ſage Polybius ſeverely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Caſaub. t. ii. p. 98. Polybius in that paſſage ſpeaks of the expedition as an embaſſy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that ſeemed moſt probable and conſiſtent.

into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in deſpiſing laws human and divine. They were inſtantly ſeized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, impriſoned, and expoſed to the inſulting eyes of an invidious multitude. CHAP. XXXI.

It might be expected that the Theban ſoldiers ſhould have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their beloved chiefs. But their numbers were too ſmall to contend with the Theſſalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the firſt encounters with the enemy, the abſence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmoſt difficulties, encompaſſed on every ſide, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops juſtly accuſed the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponneſus, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on thoſe memorable occaſions, actually ſerved in the ranks. The ſoldiers with one accord ſaluted him general. The ſingular abilities of this extraordinary man ſoon changed the poſture of affairs; the tyrant was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, inſtead of puſhing him to extremity, which might have turned his deſperate fury againſt the valuable lives of the Theban priſoners, hovered round with a victorious army, oſtentatiouſly diſplayed the advantages of military ſkill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual Delivered by Epaminondas.

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respect and fear, yet left him sufficient time for repentance and submission. This judicious plan of operations was attended with success. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of restoring the persons of Pelopidas and Ismenias [43].

Interview of Pelopidas, during his confinement, with Thebé queen of Thessaly.

Those who love to find in history events extraordinary and romantic, would not easily excuse my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his imprisonment, with the Thessalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jason united the beauty of the one sex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her husband with such love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by suspicion. At her earnest and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to see, and converse with, the Theban general, whose merit and fame she had long admired. But his appearance did not answer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and squalid figure, she was seized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "*You*, Thebé! are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a prisoner, continue the voluntary slave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expression is said to have sunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when, ten years afterwards, she supported the courage, and urged the hand, of the assassins of Alexander [44].

[43] Plut. in Pelopid. et Diodorus, ibid. [44] Xenoph. p. 601.

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But this moral narrative, however ſtrongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occaſioning ſome degree of ſcepticiſm concerning the hiſtory of Alexander. Had he been the monſter which reſentment or credulity have taken pleaſure to delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who ſlept in a lofty inacceſſible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog[41], it is incredible that he ſhould have permitted an interview between a ſecret and open enemy.

Anecdote of Pelopidas and Alexander.

Nor will it be eaſy to reconcile with the fierceneſs of the Theſſalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to diſplay the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which diſplays ſtill more ſtrongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Pheræ, the latter is ſaid to have exceeded his uſual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas conſoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even ſent to reproach the abſurdity of the tyrant, in deſtroying daily ſo many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the firſt moment of freedom to puniſh his manifold enormities. "And is Pelopidas ſo deſirous to die?" was the anſwer of the Theſſalian. "Yes," replied the priſoner, "that *you* may the

[41] Cicero de Offic. l. 2. Plut. in Pelopid. But the ſtory, as related by Xenophon, is diveſted of ſuch improbable fictions; and Xenophon ſeems hardly to believe all that he relates. He ſays λεγεται ὑπο τινων, — and repeats that it was a hearſay, a few ſentences below.

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ſooner periſh, having rendered yourſelf ſtill more obnoxious to gods and men[42]." The reſentment of Pelopidas, if ever it was expreſſed, proved an empty boaſt; for immediately after his deliverance, the Theban army was, for very urgent reaſons, withdrawn from Theſſaly.

Congreſs of Grecian deputies in Perſia. Olymp. ciii. 2. A. C. 367.

The Theban expedition in the north had allowed the Spartans, in ſome degree, to recover their influence in the ſouth of Greece. Archidamus had obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians, the braveſt and moſt powerful of the confederates. The crafty[43] Antalcidas, with Euthycles[44], a Spartan of abilities and intrigue, had been ſent as ambaſſadors to Perſia, in order to haſten the ſupplies of troops, or money, expected from that country. It was time for Thebes to aſſert her intereſt in the Peloponneſus, and to counteract the dangerous negociations of her enemies with Artaxerxes. Epaminondas, whoſe recent and illuſtrious merit had ſilenced the unjuſt clamors of faction, was confirmed in his military command; and Pelopidas, whoſe unfortunate adventure in Theſſaly was aſcribed leſs to his own imprudence than to the treachery of Alexander, was diſpatched to the Eaſt, as the perſon beſt qualified to conduct a negociation with the miniſters of the great king. He was accompanied by the ambaſſadors of Elis, Argos, and Arcadia; thoſe of Athens followed ſoon afterwards; ſo that there appeared, for the firſt time, a general congreſs of the Grecian ſtates, to ſettle

[42] Plutarch. in Pelopid.
[43] Plut. in Artaxerx.
[44] Xenoph. Hellen.

and adjuſt their intereſts at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a ſcene ſo new and intereſting ſhould have excited the attention of hiſtorians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Antalcidas with that partial kindneſs due to an ancient gueſt and favorite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majeſtic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta[45], entitled him to a juſt preference, which the king, whoſe rank and temper alike diſdained reſtraint, was at no pains to conceal. CHAP. XXXI.

Repreſentations of Pelopidas to the Perſian monarch.

The Theban repreſented, that in the battle of Platæa, fought above a century ago, and ever ſince that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the intereſt of Perſia, at the riſk of looſing whatever men hold moſt precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occaſioned by their open and ſteady oppoſition to the meaſures of the Spartans, previous to their deſtructive invaſions of Aſia. The imperious pride of Ageſilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer ſacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hoſtilities without juſtice, and carried them on without ſucceſs. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the ſtrength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reaſon to

[45] Plut. in Pelopid.

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boaſt of its recent ſucceſs in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reaſons equally important and honorable, from aſſiſting their Peloponneſian confederates. Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient [46] hiſtory has not condeſcended to explain, ſeconded, with vigor and addreſs, the arguments of the illuſtrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonſtrate againſt his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to expreſs their aſtoniſhment and indignation, the king deſired Pelopidas to explain

Behaviour of the other deputies.

[46] The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deſerves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambaſſador of a ſtate actually at war with it. We may gueſs his motives by his reward. He received from the king of Perſia, at his departure, gold and ſilver, and other valuable preſents, particularly a bed of curious conſtruction, with Perſian ſlaves to make it, the Greeks being little acquainted with that operation; and he was carried in a ſedan to the ſea-ſhore at the king's expenſe. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public aſſembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was ſo uſual, that the Athenians had loſt the proper ſenſe of its baſeneſs. He perhaps remembered the pleaſant propoſal of Epicrates, that inſtead of nine Archons, the Athenians ſhould annually elect nine ambaſſadors, choſen from the pooreſt citizens, who might return rich from Perſia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lyſias. Yet the Athenians were leſs indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humor. Timagoras, however, was not ſo fortunate; he was accuſed by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, becauſe he had betrayed his truſt, and accepted bribes, but becauſe the Athenians were extremely diſpleaſed that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commiſſion at the Perſian court. Plut. in Pelopid.

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the object of his commiſſion, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been ſent to propoſe and ratify a treaty between his republic and Perſia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, ſince the carrying of them into execution would deſtroy the power of thoſe ſtates which had hitherto occaſioned ſo much diſturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His propoſals were, that the Athenians ſhould be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Meſſenia ſhould be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any oppoſition to the treaty were made by theſe powers, that war ſhould be levied againſt them by Perſia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in ſo juſt a cauſe, that their obſtinacy ſhould be puniſhed with an exemplary ſeverity. The king approved theſe articles, which were immediately conſigned to writing, confirmed by the royal ſeal, and read aloud to the ambaſſadors. On hearing the clauſe which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it ſeems, muſt look out for ſome other ally, inſtead of the king of Perſia." After this daring threat, the ambaſſadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all poſſible expedition [47].

Overtures of the Perſians and Thebans rejected in a conven-

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Perſian of diſtinction, intruſted with the inſtrument containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately aſſembled, and being

[47] Xenoph. p. 621, et ſeqq.

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tion of the Grecian ſtates;

acquainted with the happy fruits of his embaſſy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without loſing a day, meſſengers were diſpatched to demand the attendance of repreſentatives from the Grecian ſtates, whoſe intereſts were all alike concerned in the late important negociation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condeſcended to obey the ſummons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Perſian read the treaty, ſhowed the king's ſeal, and, in the name of his maſter, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths uſually employed on ſuch occaſions. The repreſentatives almoſt unanimouſly declared that they had been ſent to hear, not to ſwear; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general conſent, its conditions muſt be previouſly diſcuſſed in the particular aſſembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate anſwer of the other deputies; but the high-ſpirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambaſſador of Arcadia at the Perſian court, returned diſguſted by the contempt ſhown towards his country by the great king, who heſitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embaſſy to the Ten thouſand (the name uſually beſtowed on the Arcadians ſince the re-union of their tribes in Mantinæa and Megalopolis), he indulged himſelf in many contumelious expreſſions againſt Artaxerxes and his ſubjects, which were greedily liſtened to by the reſentment and envy of his hearers. "Neither

the wealth nor the power of the great king were so great in reality as flattery and falſehood repreſented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been ſo oſtentatiouſly deſcribed, could ſcarce afford ſhade to a graſſhopper. He himſelf had been an attentive obſerver; yet all he could find in Perſia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a uſeleſs and ſervile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himſelf ſaw, nor thought it poſſible for others to diſcover." The proud diſdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breaſt of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were ſuch a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, ſince every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal ſcene of war. CHAP. XXXII.

and by each republic in particular.

The Theban magiſtrates diſcovered the mingled ſymptoms of diſappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accuſed Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he deſpiſed their empty clamors, and, without deigning an anſwer, walked from the aſſembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithſtanding this ſevere mortification, the Thebans did not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favorable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congreſs of the ſtates, ſo that they allowed the aſſembly to break up without inſiſting farther on their demands.

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But at the diſtance of a ſhort time, they renewed the ſame propoſal to the ſeveral republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakeſt, yet moſt wealthy, in hopes that whatever oppoſition the overtures of the king of Perſia, and their own, had found in the united ſtrength and confidence of the aſſembled confederacy, few ſingle ſtates at leaſt would venture to provoke the indignation of ſuch powerful adverſaries. But in this, too, they were diſappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Perſia, and ſet his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the ſecret practices of the Thebans were equally fruitleſs with their open declarations and demands.

Epaminondas invades the Peloponneſus. Olymp. ciii. 3. A. C. 366.

Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that pre-eminence which they had vainly expected to obtain by negociation. His renown, juſtly increaſed by the recent tranſactions in Theſſaly, rendered his influence irreſiſtible. He was again intruſted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponneſus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hoſtile to each other, were alike diſpoſed for rebellion againſt Thebes; but inſtead of marching into their territories, a meaſure which might have engaged them to ſettle their private differences, and to unite againſt the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quaſh their diſaffection by the rapid conqueſt of Achaia, which, ſtretching along the Corinthian gulph, ſkirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia.

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Compels the Achæans to accept the Theban alliance.

From the nature of their government the Achæans uſually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They poſſeſſed not any great town, whoſe needy and turbulent inhabitants, ſeduced by popular demagogues, could rouſe the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the eaſt and the iſthmus of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as ſeparate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of conſtituting the uſual place of convention for the ſtates of Achaia; but Dymé, Tirtæa, and Pellené, ſcarcely yielded to Ægium in populouſneſs and power, and ſeem, with ſeveral places of inferior note, to have formed ſo many ſeparate and independent communities, all alike ſubject to the ſame equitable ſyſtem of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invaſion the ariſtocracy had acquired an undue weight in the conſtitution of Achaia, ſo that the principal nobles and magiſtrates were no ſooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, ſoliciting his favor and friendſhip, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preſerve their perſonal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themſelves betrayed by thoſe who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of reſiſtance. Epaminondas accepted the ſubmiſſion of the magiſtrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia ſhould thenceforth adhere to the intereſt

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Revolutions in Achaia.

of Thebes, and follow the ſtandard of that republic [11].

This conqueſt, which was effected without ſtriking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was deſtructive and bloody in its conſequences. Epaminondas, for reaſons not ſufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints againſt his conduct had been made in the Theban aſſembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniences of ariſtocracy, ſhould have confirmed that ſevere form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia ſecretly ſent emiſſaries to ſecond the complaint. The enemies of Epaminondas ſeized the favorable opportunity of accuſing and calumniating that illuſtrious commander, and the capricious multitude were perſuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to ſend commiſſioners into Achaia, who, with the aſſiſtance of the populace, as well as of a conſiderable body of mercenaries, diſſolved the ariſtocracy, baniſhed or put to death the nobles, and inſtituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had ſcarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common conſent, and, after a bloody and deſperate ſtruggle, recovered their ancient influence in their reſpective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or expelled;

[11] Xenoph. p. 622.

the ariſtocracy was re-eſtabliſhed; and the magiſtrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unſteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infeſted the ſouthern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its ſituation between two implacable enemies [49].

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Euphron uſurps the government of Sicyon. Olymp. ciii. 3. A. C. 366.

Sicyon, though governed by the Achæan laws, did not follow, on this occaſion, the example of its neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the ſeat of luxury and the arts, was reſerved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was deſirous of obtaining equal conſideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by ſo many foreign connexions, to render himſelf abſolute maſter of his little republic. For this purpoſe he ſecretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the ſame laws and government, would naturally embrace the ſame alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of this event he would undertake to remove, with very ſlender aſſiſtance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not loſt; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron aſſembled the people; the government was changed; new magiſtrates were appointed, and Euphron was intruſted with the command of the national force, conſiſting chiefly

[49] Xenoph. p. 623.

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of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained all. By careſſes, bribes, and flattery, the troops were gained over to his party, and became attached to his perſon. His colleagues in the government were removed by ſecret treachery or open violence. His private enemies were held the enemies of the ſtate, accuſed, condemned, and baniſhed; and their confiſcated eſtates augmented the wealth of Euphron, whoſe rapacity knew no bounds, ſparing neither the property of individuals nor the public treaſury, nor the conſecrated gold and ſilver which adorned the temples of Sicyon. The ſums amaſſed by ſuch impious means enabled him to confirm his uſurpation. He augmented the number of his mercenary guards, who, while they oppreſſed the republic, were uſeful auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. Whatever theſe nations thought proper to command, the ſoldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and partly by this alacrity in their ſervice, partly by bribing[50] the principal men in Argos and Arcadia, the crafty tyrant expected to prevent thoſe neighbouring communities from interfering in the domeſtic affairs of Sicyon.

His uſurpation overturned by Æneas, the Stymphalian.

Such was the venality and corruption of the Greeks, that this deteſtable policy was attended with ſucceſs, until Æneas, the Stymphalian, obtained the command of the Arcadians. This man, availing himſelf of the vicinity of Sicyon to Stymphalus, the place of his birth and reſidence, had formed a connexion with the oppreſſed citizens

[50] Τοις μεν τοι και χρημασι διεπραττετο. Xenoph. p. 624.

of

of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not sufficiently shared the largesses of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature [51] lamented the sufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to restore their liberty. CHAP. XXXI.

Euphron is assassinated at Thebes.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage successively in his favor the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He spared neither pains, nor promises, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambassador; and his activity and abilities must have risen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal states of Greece, one after another, to support, in direct opposition to their principles, the tyranny of a single man. Insurrections at home, and hostilities from abroad, at length occasioned his downfal. He escaped to Thebes with the greatest part of his treasure. His enemies sent proper persons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the address of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magistrates, and he expected to be restored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity with the principal men of that city, had recourse to the only expedient that seemed capable of frustrating his designs, and assassinated Euphron in the Cadmæa, while the Theban archons and

[51] Xenophon seems to approve this reason. He says Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομισας ουκ ανεκτως εχειν τα εν Σικυωνι. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

[52] Ως δε ἑωρων αυτον οικειως τοις αρχουσι συνοντα. Xenoph. p. 630.

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senators were assembled within the walls of that edifice [53].

This action publicly justified.

The murderers were seized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was strongly represented to the senate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loss of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the rest, not only avowed but justified the assassination as equally lawful, advantageous, and honorable. And so little horror do men feel at crimes which prevail in their own age, and with which their fancies are familiar, that the assassins were unanimously acquitted by the Theban senate, whose award was approved by the assembly [54].

The allies of Sparta ask permission of that republic to negociate a peace with Thebes. Olymp. ciii. 3. A. C. 366.

Meanwhile the war languished on both sides, and the hostile confederacies were on the point of being dissolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally disgusted with their respective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes the Mantinæan, who was slain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negociation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens, were the allies of Thebes; and the united strength of these three republics was at that time sufficient to subdue and enslave the rest of Greece. The terror was increased when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate several places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend against the

[53] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630. [54] Id. ibid. p. 631, et seqq.

Arcadians and Thebans. By ſeaſonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a deſign, too unjuſt to be publicly avowed; they cautiouſly diſſembled their fears; graciouſly thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his ſervice, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindneſs and condeſcenſion, accompanied with warm profeſſions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garriſons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow eſcape which they had made, and the dread of being expoſed in future to any ſimilar danger, made them extremely ſolicitous to promote a general peace on the terms propoſed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the ſame kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained faithful to Sparta. A ſimilarity of intereſts occaſioned a cloſe communication of views and meaſures among all thoſe communities; who agreed, by common conſent, to diſpatch an embaſſy to Sparta, requeſting that ſhe would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if ſhe thought it inconſiſtent with honor to cede her juſt pretenſions to Meſſené, that ſhe would allow her faithful but helpleſs allies to enter into a ſeparate negociation with the Theban republic.

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The reaſonableneſs, and even modeſty, of this requeſt muſt have been apparent to the Spartans,

Reaſonableneſs of this demand.

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when they reflected on the useful services of the allies, and considered how much they had already suffered in their cause. The Phliasians, in particular, had, during five years, given such illustrious proofs of their unshaken adherence to Sparta, as stand unrivalled in the history of national honor and fidelity. Situated in the midst of enemies, they had continually, since the battle of Leuctra, suffered the invasions and assaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally wasted; their city closely besieged; their citadel, more than once, surprised and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhausted, and they subsisted precariously on provisions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they had pledged their beasts of burden and instruments of agriculture. Yet, under the pressure of these multiplied calamities, they had preserved their fidelity inviolate; they had disdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forsaking Sparta; even, at last, they were determined to negociate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly solicited permission to embrace this measure, until Corinth, the only source of their subsistence, seemed ready to forsake them [55].

The Spartans deliberate on that subject.

The strength of such arguments urged by the eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian, might have softened, if any thing could have softened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan senate, and disposed

[55] Xenoph. 624. et 634.

that assembly to prefer the interest of their allies, and their own immediate safety, to the insisting on a fruitless claim to Messené, which, unaided and alone, they could never expect to maintain. But the pretensions of this extraordinary people seem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to support them; and, on that particular occasion, the proud obstinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increased by an animated speech of Archidamus, full of the most confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

Speech of Archidamus.

He spoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates. "The Phliasians, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting surprise, express an anxiety for peace; safety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to sustain, which it would be infamous to relinquish. They expect not barely to exist, but to enjoy fame and honor, the true sweeteners of existence; and, if that be impossible, they must perish! Yet is not their situation desperate: a nation cannot be reduced to any condition of distress, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are still unrivalled; and such a system of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boast. We enjoy, besides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleasure and wealth; an ardor for martial glory, and an ambition of honest fame. These are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the

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immortal gods, whoſe oracles anciently approved our juſt conqueſt of Meſſené. Nor, though the Corinthians and Achæans forſake us, ſhall we be deſtitute of warlike allies. The Athenians, ever jealous of Thebes, their moſt formidable neighbour, will again take arms in our cauſe. Dionyſius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther aſſiſtance; the king of Egypt, and many princes of Aſia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all naturally our friends. We poſſeſs, beſides, though not the perſons and actual ſervice, the hearts and affections at leaſt, of whatever is moſt eminent in Greece. In all the republics, whoever is diſtinguiſhed by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues, though he may not accompany our ſtandard, ſecretly wiſhes ſucceſs to our arms. I am of opinion, too, that the crowd [1] of Peloponneſus, that mob on which we at firſt too vainly relied, will at length return to their duty. They have obtained none of thoſe advantages, the vain proſpect of which urged them to revolt. Inſtead of acquiring the independent government of their own laws, they have fallen a prey to lawleſs anarchy, or been ſubjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The bloody ſeditions, of which they once knew the nature by report only, they have long experienced; and there are actually more exiles from particular cities, than were formerly from all Peloponneſus. But even baniſhment is happineſs to thoſe who,

[1] Ὀχλος. Iſocrat. in Archid. He means the Arcadians, Elians, etc. formerly allies of Sparta.

while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, inſtead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, periſhed for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponneſians, whoſe lands have been laid waſte, their cities deſolated, and that conſtitution and thoſe laws, under which they once lived the happieſt of men, overturned from the foundation. We might ſubdue them by force; but *that* is not neceſſary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and ſolicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their miſery, and prevent their total ruin.

"But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more diſpoſed to injure us, than the other to abet their injuſtice, I have ſtill one reſolution to propoſe, harſh indeed and ſevere, but becoming thoſe ſentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Proſperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adverſity alone that can diſplay the full luſtre of a firm and manly character. I propoſe, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your anceſtors acquired by the blood and labor of twenty victorious campaigns, you ſhould remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindneſs in Italy, Sicily, Cyrené, and many parts of Aſia. Thoſe who are fit to bear arms muſt alſo leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not eaſily be tranſported. They muſt, then, fix on ſome poſt well fortified by nature, and which art

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may render ſecure againſt every hoſtile aſſault. This, thenceforth, muſt be their city and country; and from this, as a centre, they muſt on all ſides infeſt the enemy, until either the Thebans remit their arrogance, or the laſt of the Spartans periſh [57]."

The Spartans determine to perſevere in the war.

The ſpeech of Archidamus expreſſed the general ſenſe of his country. The allies were diſmiſſed with permiſſion to act as beſt ſuited their convenience, but with aſſurance that Sparta would never liſten to any terms of accommodation while deprived of Meſſené. With this anſwer the ambaſſadors returned to their reſpective cities. Soon afterwards they were diſpatched to Thebes, where, having propoſed their demands, they were offered admiſſion into the Theban confederacy. They anſwered, that this was not peace, but only a change of the war; and at length, after various propoſitions and reaſonings, they obtained the much deſired neutrality [58].

Ambitious views of Epaminondas and the Thebans. Olymp. civ. r. A. C. 364.

The Spartans, thus deſerted on every ſide, would probably have been the victims of their pride and obſtinacy, if circumſtances, unforeſeen by Archidamus, had not prevented the Thebans and Arcadians from carrying on the war with their uſual animoſity. Projects of glory and ambition had diſarmed the reſentment of Epaminondas. That active and enterpriſing leader, who thought that nothing was done, while any thing was neglected, had ſet himſelf to render Thebes miſtreſs

[57] Iſocrat. in Archidam. [58] Xenoph. ubi ſupra.

of the ſea. The attention and labor of the republic was directed to this important object; preparations were made at Aulis with ſilence and celerity; and when the deſign ſeemed ripe for execution, Epaminondas ſailed to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, to concert meaſures with thoſe maritime ſtates, which had already begun to feel the ſevere yoke of the Athenians, and become eager to ſhake it off. But the vigilance of the latter, who had ſent out a ſtrong fleet under Laches, a commander of reputation and ability, prevented the dangerous conſequences of this defection, and the Theban arms were, at the ſame time, ſummoned to a ſervice which more immediately concerned their intereſt and honor. CHAP. XXXI.

Diſconcerted by the activity of Athens.

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, began once more to diſplay the reſources of his ſertile genius, and the inhuman cruelty of his temper. His numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and kept together with ſingular addreſs, and the ſecret aſſiſtance of Athens, enabled him to overrun the whole territory, and to gain poſſeſſion of all the principal cities, of Theſſaly [59]. The oppreſſed Theſſalians had recourſe to Thebes, whoſe powerful protection they had ſo happily experienced on former occaſions, and whoſe ſtandard they had uniformly followed, with an alacrity which afforded a ſufficient pledge of their gratitude. The Thebans decreed to aſſiſt them with ten thouſand men, and the command was

Laſt expedition of Pelopidas into Theſſaly. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

[59] Plutarch. In Pelopid.

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intruſted to Pelopidas, the perſonal enemy of Alexander. But the day appointed for the march was darkened by an eclipſe of the ſun, which greatly diminiſhed the army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the reluctant ſervices of men diſpirited by the imaginary terrors of ſuperſtition. Such only as, deſpiſing vain omens, deſired to follow their beloved general, were conducted into Theſſaly; and being joined by their allies in that country near the town of Pharſalus, they encamped at the foot of the mountains of Cynoſcephalæ.

He is ſlain in the battle of Cynoſcephalæ.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty thouſand ſtrong, boldly offering them battle. Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement, though his foot were, in number, inferior to the enemy. The action began with the cavalry, and was favorable to the Thebans; but the mercenaries of Alexander having gained the advantage of the ground, preſſed with vigor the Theban and Theſſalian infantry. In this emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging the retiring troops with his voice and action, gave them ſuch freſh ſpirits, that Alexander did not doubt their having received a conſiderable reinforcement. The mercenaries were preſſed in their turn, and thrown into diſorder. Pelopidas darting his eye through their broken ranks, eſpied Alexander in the right wing rallying his men, and preparing to advance with his uſual intrepidity. At this ſight the Theban was no longer maſter of his paſſion. Naturally a foe to tyrants, he beheld a perſonal foe in the tyrant Alexander. Accompanied by a few horſemen, he

impetuouſly ruſhed forward, calling aloud to his adverſary, and challenging him to ſingle combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man whom he had injured, retired behind his guards, who received, firſt with a ſhower of javelins, and then with their ſpears, the little band of Pelopidas; who, after producing ſuch carnage [**] as Homer aſcribes to the rage of Diomed or Achilles, fell a victim to the blindneſs of his own ungovernable fury. Meanwhile, his troops advancing to the relief of their general, the guards of the tyrant were repelled; the Thebans, with their allies, proved victorious in every part of the battle; the enemy were diſperſed in flight, and purſued with the loſs of three thouſand men. CHAP. XXXI.

Honors paid to his memory.

But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom over the victory. He was lamented by the Thebans and Theſſalians with immoderate demonſtrations of ſorrow. Accompanied by an innumerable crowd of real mourners, his body was carried in proceſſion to Thebes. The Theſſalians, in whoſe ſervice he had fallen, requeſted the honor of ſupplying the expenſes of his funeral; which was celebrated with every circumſtance of ſad magnificence. The multitude recollected the eclipſe which preceded his departure, and which, as they believed, announced his misfortune; and, in alluſion

[**] Diodorus ſays, that the bodies of thoſe whom he ſlew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolical. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in military deſcription too familiar to the Greek hiſtorians, I mean, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pauſanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better.

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to that fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the ſun of Thebes was ſet, and her glory departed for ever." The Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to the command in Theſſaly. The tyrant was again defeated, and ſtripped of all his conqueſts. But what appears extraordinary, he was allowed to live and reign in Pheræ [61], while the neighbouring cities entered into a cloſe alliance with Thebes.

The tyrant ſtripped of all his conqueſts.

The foreign expeditions which have been deſcribed, were not the only cauſes that diverted the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of Peloponneſus. While Epaminondas was employed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in Theſſaly, the government of Thebes was on the point of being overturned by an ariſtocratical faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the ſecond city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival of Thebes [62], entered into this conſpiracy, which was to be executed at the annual review of the Orchomenian troops. But the plot was diſcovered by the fears or the repentance of ſome accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were ſurrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance ſatisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, beſieged and took the city, raſed it to the ground, put the men of full age to the ſword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity [63].

The Thebans demoliſh Orchomenus.

[61] Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.
[62] Pauſanias Bœotia.
[63] Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

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The Arcadians ſeize Olympia, and prepare to celebrate the games. Olymp. civ. 1. A. C. 364.

While operations, deſtructive or fruitleſs, employed the activity of Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were occupied with deſigns ſtill more blameable. Their own ſtrength and numbers, together with a confidence in Athens, their new confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give full ſcope to their ambition, by which they had been long animated. To pave the way for the total conqueſt of the Peloponneſus, in which they had already obtained a dangerous aſcendant, they began by wreſting ſeveral places from the Elians, the leaſt warlike, and moſt wealthy, of their neighbours. The Elians, worſted in every encounter with the enemy, craved the aſſiſtance of Sparta, which being reinforced by the Achæans (notwithſtanding the neutrality ſo recently ſtipulated), made ſeveral vigorous, but unſucceſsful efforts, for the defence of the Elian territory. The Arcadians ſtill puſhed their conqueſts in that country, gaining one town after another, and at length Olympia itſelf, the moſt precious jewel of the Elians, and the greateſt ornament of the Peloponneſus. As poſſeſſors of the ſacred city, and by virtue of a pretended right derived from the inhabitants of Piſa, an ancient but decayed place in the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At the approach of this auguſt ſolemnity, the concourſe, as uſual, was great from every part of Greece; hoſtilities were ſuſpended; and all parties united in common amuſements, and common ceremonies of religion.

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Which are interrupted by the arrival of the Elians in arms.

The prayers and ſacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and ſpectators were alarmed by the ſudden claſhing of armor, and the ſight of a *real* battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and ſurpriſed the Arcadians; who, with two thouſand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the ſacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigor of their unexpected aſſault ſucceſſively repelled theſe intruders, who fled in diſorder through the ſtreets, and were purſued by the Elians with an *inſpired* valor, "ſince," ſays Xenophon, "Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accompliſh but in great length of time; make cowards courageous [64]." The Arcadians, however, recovering from their conſternation, began to rally. The aſſailants were reſiſted with obſtinacy; but did not retire, till having loſt Stratolas their commander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conſpicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to thoſe who had long deſpiſed the ſoftneſs of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken theſe neceſſary precautions againſt a ſecond ſurpriſe, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the feſtival, which, though brought to an undiſturbed

[64] Τοιουτοι γενομενοι οιους την πρωτην θεος μεν αν εμπνευσας δυνασθαι και εν ημερᾳ αποδειξαι. ανθρωποι δε αν εν πολλῳ χρονῳ τους μη ονταις αλκιμους ποιησειαν. P. 639.

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conclusion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians [65].

The Arcadians seize the Olympic treasure

After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourse of people returned to their respective homes, and the Arcadians found themselves sole masters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treasures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and superstition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injustice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious designs, had raised a body of standing troops called Eparitoi, laid hold of the sacred treasure, in order to pay those mercenaries, whose demands they were otherwise incapable of satisfying, without great inconvenience.

The Mantinæans protest against this impiety.

The Mantinæans first protested against this unwarrantable rapacity. Instead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they imposed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themselves, of which they transmitted the produce to the archons, or magistrates, appointed by the Ten Thousand to administer the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themselves freely handled the sacred money, represented to their constituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans as an obstinacy extremely dangerous to the states of Arcadia, and insinuated that this unseasonable regard for justice and piety most probably concealed some very criminal design.

[65] Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, et seqq. et Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

MUSEUM BRITANNICUM

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The States General of Arcadia approve the resolution of the Mantinæans;

The Ten Thousand, or, as we should say, the States-General, listened to this insidious accusation; and summoned the municipal magistrates of Mantinæa to appear and answer for their conduct. They refused to obey; a detachment of the Epariti was sent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans shut their gates. This firmness roused the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that assembly began to suspect that the Mantinæans must possess some secret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to set at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected first on the alarming consequences to which Arcadia might be exposed by plundering the shrines of Jupiter; and then on the injustice and impiety of the deed itself. These sentiments, enforced by the superstition of the age, spread with rapidity in the assembly; it was determined thenceforth to abstain from a consecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themselves, and entail a curse on their posterity; and, to prevent the bad consequences of the desertion of the Epariti, whose pay must thereby be diminished, many wealthy Arcadians, who could subsist on their private incomes, enrolled themselves in their stead.

and restore Olympia to the Elians.

These measures, though approved by the States, gave great uneasiness to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had shared the Olympic spoil, lest they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the sums which they

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they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourſe to the Thebans, from whom they requeſted immediate aſſiſtance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, ſent an embaſſy requeſting the Thebans not to paſs the Iſthmus, until they ſhould receive farther invitation. Nor were they ſatisfied with barely counteracting the negociations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to reſtore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to thoſe who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who ſolicited it with much earneſtneſs, as a meaſure highly conducive to the general intereſt of the Peloponneſus.

Thoſe who had embezzled the Olympic treaſure ſeize their opponents by aſſiſtance of the Thebans.

The congreſs, aſſembled for this beneficial purpoſe, was held at Tegea, and conſiſted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were ſeemingly adjuſted to the ſatisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as uſual, were prepared; and the deputies, except thoſe of Mantinæa, moſt of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feaſt of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and ſuch others as dreaded the conſequences of this haſty accommodation, addreſſed themſelves to a Theban general, who commanded a conſiderable body of Bœotian troops that had long garriſoned Tegea, in order to ſecure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had

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himſelf made free with the ſacred treaſure, and was therefore eaſily prevailed on to embrace any meaſure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared ſo proper for this purpoſe as to ſeize and detain the unſuſpecting deputies, who conſiſted of the leading men from moſt cities of Arcadia. This ſcheme was no ſooner propoſed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were ſecured; a body of armed men ſurrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of feſtivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one priſon to contain [a].

The priſoners ſet at liberty.

Next day, the Mantinæans, being apprized of this unexpected event, diſpatched meſſengers, demanding ſome few of their citizens who happened to remain a Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the ſame time acquainting the magiſtrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewiſe, without loſs of time, diſpatched an embaſſy to the ſeveral cities of Arcadia, rouſing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to reſcue their impriſoned citizens, and to avenge the inſult offered to the general body of their nation. When thoſe who had committed the outrage, and eſpecially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigor of theſe proceedings, they began

[a] Xenoph. p. 640.

to be more alarmed than before. As they had seized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantages from the hostages of that city, whose resentment they had most reason to fear. They were sensible of deserving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece must condemn the irregularity and violence of their measures. Intimidated by such reflections, the Theban commander at once set the prisoners at liberty; and, appearing next day before an assembly as numerous as could be collected in such troublesome times, endeavoured to excuse his conduct, by saying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that several of the deputies, whom he had seized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this shallow artifice; yet they abstained from punishing their own wrongs, and sent ambassadors to Thebes, who might describe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals[57].

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Upon hearing the accusation, Epaminondas, who was then general of the Bœotians, declared, that his countrymen had done better in seizing, than in discharging the Arcadians, whose conduct was highly blamable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be assured" continued he to the ambassadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and support their friends in that province." This resolution, which expressed

Epam. nondas prepares to march into the Peloponnesus, at the head of the Bœotians and their confederates. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

[57] Xenoph. p. 641.

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the general ſenſe of the republic, was heard with great indignation by the Arcadian ſtates, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They obſerved, that the Thebans could not have felt, much leſs have expreſſed, any diſpleaſure at the peace of Peloponneſus, if they had not deemed it their intereſt to perpetuate the diviſions and hoſtilities of a country which they wiſhed to weaken and to ſubdue. They entered into a ſtricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; ſending ambaſſadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the meaſures of a neighbouring and rival ſtate, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valor of Sparta had long formed the ſtrength and bulwark.

His laſt expedition into that country. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

During theſe hoſtile preparations, Epaminondas took the field with *all* the Bœotians, with the Eubœans, and with a ſtrong body of Theſſalians, partly ſupplied by Alexander, and partly raiſed by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponneſus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Meſſenians, and ſeveral communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With theſe hopes, he proceeded ſouthward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, diſtinguiſhed by the games celebrated in honor of Hercules. There he encamped for ſeveral days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whoſe neareſt route into

Peloponneſus lay through the diſtrict of Nemea; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increaſe the number of the Theban partiſans in every part of Greece. But this ſcheme was defeated by the prudence of the Athenians, who, inſtead of marching through the Iſthmus, ſailed to the coaſt of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Apprized of this deſign, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being ſtrongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central ſituation, was judiciouſly choſen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponneſian confederates. Having continued ſeveral weeks at Tegea, he was much diſappointed that none of the neighbouring towns ſent to offer their ſubmiſſion, and to ſolicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waſte of time gave him the more uneaſineſs, as his command was limited to a ſhort term. The ſtrength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increaſing. Ageſilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewiſe ſhould join, the combined forces would prove ſuperior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thouſand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thouſand. Conſidering theſe circumſtances, he ſuddenly determined on an enterpriſe, which, if crowned with ſucceſs, would render the preſent CHAP. XXXI.

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Fails in his attempt to ſurpriſe Sparta;

hitherto fruitleſs expedition not unworthy of his former fame.

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a haſty march of thirty miles, in order to ſurpriſe Sparta; and had not the extraordinary ſwiftneſs of a Cretan deſerter apprized Ageſilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence[a]. The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the deſign of the enemy; but the aged king, with his ſon Archidamus, returned, with a ſmall but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the moſt extraordinary that hiſtory records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar ſagacity could ſuggeſt; he did not approach Sparta by thoſe narrow roads, where a ſuperiority of numbers would afford him ſmall advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with miſſile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of ſurpriſing him by ſtratagem or ambuſcade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times ſo dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to deſcend into it with every advantage on

[a] Xenophon ſays, ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνόντων. Xenophon, p. 644. "As a neſt quite deſtitute of its defenders."

his ſide, and without the ſeeming poſſibility of being expoſed to any inconvenience. But the iſſue of ſo well concerted an enterpriſe, the hiſtorian heſitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to aſcribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by deſpair. Archidamus, with ſcarcely a hundred men, oppoſed the progreſs of the enemy, cut down the firſt ranks, and advanced to aſſault the remainder. Then, ſtrange to relate! thoſe Thebans, ſays Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had ſo often conquered, who were far ſuperior in number, and who poſſeſſed the advantage of the ground, ſhamefully gave way. The Spartans purſued them with impetuoſity, but were ſoon repelled with loſs; for the divinity, whoſe aſſiſtance had produced this extraordinary victory, ſeems alſo to have preſcribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend [59]. CHAP. XXXI.

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promiſed ſuch a fair proſpect of ſucceſs, did not ſink under his diſappointment. As he had reaſon to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately ſounded a retreat, returned and in that againſt Mantinæa;

[59] Plutarch tells a ſtory, on this occaſion, of a young Spartan named Iſadas, who ſtripped naked, anointed himſelf with oil, ſallied forth with a ſpear in one hand, and a ſword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickeſt of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valor, but fined for fighting without his ſhield. Plut. in Ageſil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous deſcription of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inſpired, by finding, inſtead of νεοττιαν ερημον, "a defenceleſs neſt," the vigorous oppoſition of men in arms.

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to Tegea with the utmoſt expedition, and allowing his infantry to take time for reſt and refreſhment, he, with admirable preſence of mind, ordered the horſe to advance forward to Mantinæa (which was diſtant only twelve miles), and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the reſt of the army. He expected to find the Matinæans totally unprepared for ſuch a viſit, and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that moſt of the townſmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wiſe, and well executed. The ſituation of the Mantinæans correſponded to his hopes. But it ſeemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his ſagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful ſquadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then firſt learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had ſcarcely received this intelligence, when the Thebans appeared, and, advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpoſe of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refreſh themſelves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Theſſalian cavalry, with whom they muſt contend; yet, regardleſs of every conſideration but the ſafety of their allies, they ruſhed into the field, ſtopped the progreſs of the aſſailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which diſplayed great courage on both ſides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of

which is ſaved by the Athenian cavalry.

their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their useful valor, which had saved the corn, cattle, slaves, women, and children [70] of Mantinæa from falling a prey to the invaders. CHAP. XXXI.

Epaminondas determines to risk a general engagement.

The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honorable death, fighting to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies [71] taken the field during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian [72], to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprized of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honorable cause, in the right wing, the

His movements preceding the battle of Mantinæa.

[70] Xenophon, l. vii. p. 644.
[71] Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.
[72] Xenoph. p. 645.

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Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Elians forming the main body. Meanwhile Epaminondas marched ſlowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wiſhed to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hoſtile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occaſioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it ſeemed evident that he had laid aſide all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, diſperſed in their tents, and loſt not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation [73], that martial ardor of mind, which ought to animate ſoldiers at the near proſpect of an engagement. Epaminondas ſeized the deciſive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His troops were thus diſpoſed inſtantaneouſly in the ſame order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which conſiſted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a ſharp point, and with ſpreading flanks, he advanced againſt the Spartans and Mantinæans; and truſting the event of the battle to the rapid impulſe of this unexpected onſet, he commanded the centre and right wing, in which

[73] Ελυσε μεν των πολεμιων την εν ταις ψυχαις προς την μαχην παρασκευην. ελυσε δε την εν ταις συνταξεσιν. Xenoph. p. 645.

he placed leſs confidence, to proceed with a ſlow pace, that they might not come up and grapple with the oppoſing diviſions of the enemy, until the victory of his left wing had taught them to conquer.

Battle of Mantinæa. Olymp. civ. 2. A. C. 363.

This judicious deſign was crowned with merited ſucceſs. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful ſhock to which they were expoſed, flew to their arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled their horſes, and ſuddenly reſumed their ranks; but theſe different operations were performed with the trepidation of ſurpriſe and haſte, rather than with the ardor of hope and courage; and the whole army had the appearance of men prepared rather to ſuffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or terrible [74]. The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn up in firm order, ſternly waited the firſt brunt of the aſſailants. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their ſpears were broken, both parties had recourſe to their ſwords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line, and this advantage encouraged his centre and right wing to attack and repel the correſponding diviſions of the enemy. The Theban and Theſſalian cavalry were equally ſucceſsful. In the intervals of their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whoſe miſſile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horſe, who were drawn up too deep. He had likewiſe taken the precaution to

[74] Παντες δε πεισομενοις τι μαλλον η ποιησασ εφικεσθαι. Xenoph. p. 646.

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occupy a rising ground on his right with a considerable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound [75], and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watch-tower [76], probably that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the spirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuously broke through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which

[75] Pausanias, in Arcad. says, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the Athenian; and, as a proof of this assertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa, in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both subsisting in the time of Pausanias, and both ascribing to this Athenian the honor of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in Agesilao, says, that Anticrates, a Spartan killed Epaminondas with a sword; that his posterity were thence called Machairionides; and that, as late as the days of Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honors as a recompence for the merit of their ancestor Anticrates in destroying the worst enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the son of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the silence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, *but when Epaminondas fell*, the rest knew not how to use the victory." What sublimity in this passage, if Gryllus really slew Epaminondas!

[76] Pausan. ubi supra.

had been poſted amidſt the Theban and Theſſalian horſe, being left behind in the purſuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry, commanded by Hegelochus. Elated with this ſucceſs, the Athenians turned their arms againſt the detachment placed on the heights, conſiſting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight, after a terrible ſlaughter. With ſuch alternations of victory and defeat ended this memorable engagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered [77]; and this battle, which being certainly the greateſt, was expected to have proved the moſt deciſive, ever fought among the Greeks, produced no other conſequence but that general languor and debility long remarkable in the ſubſequent operations of thoſe hoſtile republics.

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When the tumult of the action ceaſed, the moſt diſtinguiſhed Thebans aſſembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin; and the ſurgeons declared, that it was impoſſible for him to ſurvive the extraction of the weapon. He aſked whether his ſhield was ſafe? which being preſented to him, he viewed it with a languid ſmile of melancholy joy. He then demanded, whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being anſwered in the affirmative (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had firſt ſent to demand the bodies of their ſlain), he declared himſelf ready to quit life without regret, ſince he left his

Death of Epaminondas.

[77] Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

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country triumphant. The ſpectators lamented, among other objects of ſorrow, that he ſhould die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You miſtake," ſaid he with a cheerful preſence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra and Mantinæa, who will tranſmit my renown to the lateſt ages." So ſaying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful ſolemnity of his death correſponded with the dignified ſplendor of an active and uſeful life. He is uſually deſcribed as a perfect character [78]; nor does the truth of hiſtory oblige us to detract any thing from this deſcription, except that in ſome inſtances, and particularly in his laſt fatal invaſion of the Peloponneſus, he allowed the blaze of patriotiſm to eclipſe the mild light of juſtice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument ſtill exiſted, after four centuries, in the time of Pauſanias, with an inſcription in elegiac verſe, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then maſter of the Roman world, added a ſecond column; with a new inſcription [79], in honor of a character, whom that unſteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmneſs to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehenſive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during

[78] Cicero Acad. Quæſt. l. i. et paſſim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos, Pauſan. [79] Vid. Pauſan. in Arcad. et Bœotic.

his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece; whereas both before and afterwards, that republic continually languiſhed in ſervitude or dependence [80]. But this obſervation betrays the inaccurate partiality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory of a favorite hero, at the expenſe of hiſtoric truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence, the ſource of her confidence, and the ſpring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth leſs ambitious, and her arms leſs enterpriſing [81]. But ſix years after that event, ſhe controlled the deciſions of the Amphictyonic council; and, inſtead of being reduced to a condition of dependence, her power was ſtill formidable to the moſt warlike of her neighbours. CHAP. XXXI.

Soon after the battle of Mantinæa, a general peace was propoſed under the mediation of Artaxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check the inſurrections in Egypt and Leſſer Aſia, which diſturbed the two laſt years of his reign. The only condition annexed to this treaty was, that each republic ſhould retain its reſpective poſſeſſions. The Spartans determined to reject every accommodation until they had recovered Meſſenia; and as Artaxerxes had uniformly oppoſed this demand, they tranſported forces into Egypt, to foment the

Ageſilaus's expedition into Egypt. Olymp. civ. 3. A. C. 362.

[80] Hujus de virtutibus vitaque ſatis erit dictum, ſi hoc unum adjunxero, *quod nemo eat inficias*; Thebas et ante Epaminondam natum, et poſt ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno paruiſſe imperio; contra eas, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuiſſe totius Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

[81] Vid. Polyb. Hiſt. l. vi. c. xli.

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defection of that province. At the head of a thouſand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten thouſand mercenaries, Ageſilaus ſupported one rebel after another, having ſucceſſively ſet on the throne Taches and Nectanebus [80]. In this diſhonorable war he amaſſed conſiderable wealth, by means of which he probably expected to retrieve the affairs of his country. But returning home by Cyrenaica, he died on that coaſt, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and forty-firſt of his reign [81]. His character has been ſufficiently illuſtrated in the courſe of this work. He was the greateſt, and the moſt unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He had ſeen the higheſt grandeur of Sparta, and he beheld her fall. During the time that he governed the republic, his country ſuffered more calamities and diſgrace than in ſeven centuries preceding his reign. His ambition and his obſtinacy, doubtleſs, contributed to her diſaſters; yet ſo natural were the principles from which he acted, ſo probable his hopes of ſucceſs, and ſo firm and manly his ſtruggles for victory, that a contemporary writer, who could ſee through the cloud of fortune, ventured to beſtow on Ageſilaus a panegyric [82], which exalts him beyond the renown of his moſt illuſtrious predeceſſors.

His death. Olymp. civ. 4. A. C. 361.

[80] Plut. in Ageſilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxii.

[81] Diodor. l. xv. c. xxii.

[82] Ὁ λογος ὁ Ἀγεσιλαον, by Xenophon.

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State of Greece after the battle of Mantinæa. — The Amphictyonic Council. — Returning Proſperity of Athens. — Vices reſulting from its Government. — Abuſes of the judiciary Power. — Of the Theatre. — Degeneracy of Grecian Muſic. — Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians. — The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude. — The Social War — Baniſhment of Timotheus and Iphicrates. — Diſgraceful Iſſue of the War. — Philoſophy. — Statuary. Praxiteles. The Cnidian Venus. — Painting. Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis. — Literature. Xenophon. His Military Expeditions. Religious and Literary Retreat. Lyſias. Iſocrates. Plato. His Travels. He ſettles in the Academy. His great Views. Theology. Coſmogony. Doctrine of Ideas. Of the Human Underſtanding. The paſſions. Virtues. State of Retribution. Genius, and Character.

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WITH the battle of Mantinæa ended[1] the bloody ſtruggle for dominion, which had long exhauſted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had loſt their

[1] Xenophon's Greek hiſtory likewiſe ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumſtances of great events, which the orators

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ableſt generals, and the flower of their troops. No Theban aroſe to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the deſigns of that illuſtrious patriot. Archidamus, who ſucceeded on the Spartan throne, imperfectly juſtified the high opinion conceived of his early wiſdom and valor. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitleſs, thoſe republics ſunk into ſuch weakneſs, as encouraged pretenſions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

The Amphidyonic council reſumes its ancient authority. Olymp. civ. 4. A. C. 361.

During the *ſuperiority*, or, in the language of ancient writers, during the *empire* of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the majeſty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated ſome ceremonies of ſuperſtition; it ſuperintended games and ſpectacles; it preſerved peace and good order among the crowd of ſtrangers who aſſembled, at ſtated times, to conſult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century paſt, the public meaſures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the reſidence of the Amphictyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging, by their preſence there, the reſpective authority of thoſe capitals which were regarded as the heads of their ſeveral confederacies. But when firſt the Peloponneſian, then the Bœotian

Iſocrates and Demoſthenes, Ariſtotle's Treatiſe of Politics, and Xenophon's Diſcourſes on the Revenues and Government of Athens, will enable us more fully to explain.

war, and laſt of all the battle of Mantinæa, had levelled the greatneſs, and overthrown the proud tyranny of thoſe domineering republics, the Amphictyonic council once more emerged from obſcurity; and the general ſtates of Greece having aſſembled according to their national and hereditary forms, ſpurned the imperious dictates of any ſingle community. CHAP. XXXII.

The Athenians recover many of their maritime poſſeſſions. Olymp. cv. 1.—cv. 3. A. C. 360.—348.

While this event ſtrengthened the fœderal union, and tended to reſtore the primitive equality of the Grecian ſtates, various circumſtances concurred to revive the aſpiring ambition of Athens. During the Bœotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making ſuch efforts as enfeebled their ſtrength, their arms had acquired great luſtre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhauſted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to ſubdue, and the impoſſibility of keeping in ſubjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous iſlands of the Ægean and Ionian ſeas, the remote coaſts of Thrace and Aſia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conqueſts, fearleſs of domeſtic envy. It appears, that ſoon after the death of Epaminondas, Eubœa again acknowledged the authority[a] of Athens; an

[a] Comp. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 513. et Demoſthenes de Cherſoneſo, ſub fine, et Æſchines in Cteſiphont. It appears, however, from theſe authors that the Thebans ſoon afterwards endeavoured to recover Eubœa. The Athenians again reſcued it from their power, at the exhortation of Timotheus, whoſe pithy ſpeech is commended by Demoſthenes: "What, my countrymen, the Thebans in the

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event facilitated by the deſtruction of the Theban partiſans, belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinæa. From the Thracian Boſphorus to Rhodes, ſeveral places along both ſhores ſubmitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having ſurvived Ageſilaus and Epaminondas, were far ſuperior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendſhip of a people capable to interrupt their navigation and to deſtroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reaſon to hope that Amphipolis would ſoon be rendered their ſubject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the ſea, with a fleet of near three hundred ſail, and employed the beſt half of her citizens and ſubjects in ſhips of war or commerce [3].

The vices aſcribed to the ſuppoſed degeneracy of the Athenians, reſulted from the

This tide of proſperity, which flowed with moſt apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinæa [4], has been ſuppoſed productive of very important conſequences. While Epaminondas lived, the Athenians, it is ſaid, were kept vigilant in duty through jealouſy and fear; but after the

island, and you ſtill deliberating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the ſea covered with your navy?" Demoſthen. ubi ſupra.

[3] Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xi. Iſocrat. Panegyr. et de Pace.

[4] Juſtin. l. vi. c. ix. firſt made this obſervation, which has been ſo frequently repeated.

death of this formidable enemy, they ſunk into thoſe vices which occaſioned their ruin. This ſpecious remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injuſtice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly deſcribed by one of the moſt reſpectable of their countrymen [5], who compoſed a ſyſtem of wiſe laws in order to aſcertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuſes that ſeem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but ſtill more as new-modelled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and ſlaves in another. The diviſion of the executive power of government among the archons, the ſenate, aſſembly, and even various committees of the aſſembly, rendered it impoſſible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppreſſion. Men knew not from what quarter their ſafety might be aſſailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, inſtead of making united oppoſition to the injuſtice of their magiſtrates, contented themſelves with inflicting the ſame injuries which they had either previouſly ſuffered, or ſtill apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the paſſions

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nature of their government.

[5] See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 241. and the elegiac verſes of Solon preſerved in Demoſthenes Orat περι παραπρεσβειας; a title that can only be translated by a paraphraſe, "the miſconduct of Æſchines in his embaſſy."

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of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exerciſe power will commonly be attended with a ſtrong inclination to abuſe it. Unleſs power, therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unleſs an impervious line of ſeparation be drawn between prerogative and privilege, and that part of the conſtitution which ſuſtains its political life, be kept ſeparate and diſtinct from that which tends to corruption, it is of little conſequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thouſand; in both caſes alike the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

This ſubject illuſtrated;

This radical defect in the Grecian policies produced many ruinous conſequences in affairs foreign and domeſtic, which were commonly directed by the ſelfiſh paſſions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, rather than by the rational and permanent intereſt of the community. But as diſeaſes and other accidents often bring to light the latent weakneſs and imperfections of the body, ſo the vices of the Athenian government firſt appeared in their full magnitude after the unfortunate war of Peloponneſus; and, although the exceſs of the malady ſometimes checked itſelf, and returns of eaſe and proſperity ſometimes concealed its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil ſtill maintained its deſtructive progreſs, till it wrought the ruin of the conſtitution.

In the abuſes of the judiciary power;

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, where the judiciary power frequently prevailed over the legiſlative, the ſources of diſſenſion were

innumerable; while the feeble reſtraint of laws, ill adminiſtered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary diſtinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed two diſtinct parties, which had their particular views and ſeparate intereſts. In ſome republics the higher ranks bound themſelves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors[6]. The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not leſs atrocious[7]. During the intervals of party-rage, private quarrels kept the ſtate in perpetual fermentation. Beſide the ordinary diſputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honors, or eluding puniſhments or burdens, opened an ever-flowing ſource of bitter animoſity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himſelf a friend[8]. Hereditary reſentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the ſeeds of diſcord being ſown in ſuch abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal proſecutions. The uſual employment of ſix thouſand Athenians conſiſted in deciding law-ſuits, the profits of which afforded the principal reſource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to a hundred and fifty talents; the bribes

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[6] Ariſtot. Polit. Iſocrat. et Lyſias, paſſim.

[7] Xenoph. de Rep. Athen.

[8] See Lyſias paſſim. et Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748., et ſeq.

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which they received, ſometimes exceeded that ſum; and, both united, formed a ſixth part of the Athenian revenues[9], even in the moſt flouriſhing times. As the moſt numerous but moſt worthleſs claſs of the people commonly prevailed in the aſſembly, ſo they had totally engroſſed the tribunals[1]; and it was to be expected that ſuch judges would always be more ſwayed by favor and prejudice than by law and reaſon. The law puniſhed with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but "we," ſay the Athenian writers[10], "advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this reſpect, with the higher and more lucrative honors is he inveſted." Thoſe who courted popular favor, laviſhed not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the paſſions of their adherents; an abuſe which began during the ſplendid adminiſtration of Pericles[11], extended more widely under his unworthy ſucceſſors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the firſt dawn of returning proſperity[12].

and in thoſe of the theatre.

In the licence of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themſelves alike entitled to enjoy every ſpecies of feſtivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expenſe, and of paying for the admiſſion of the populace. At the period of which we write, a conſiderable portion

[9] Ariſtoph. Veſp.

[10] Iſocrates de Pace, et Demoſthenes, paſſim.

[11] Thucydides, p. 108, et ſeqq. [12] Plut. in Pericle.

of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and ſome years afterwards [13], a law was propoſed, by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the ſenate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propoſe diverting, the *theatrical* money to any other end or object [14].

Circumſtances which rendered the Grecian theatre peculiarly liable to abuſe.

Of all amuſements known in poliſhed ſociety, the Grecian theatre was, doubtleſs, the moſt elegant and ingenious; yet ſeveral circumſtances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuſe. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were repreſented, naturally introduced maſks, the better to diſtinguiſh the different *perſons* [15], or characters, of the drama; ſince the variations of paſſion, with the correſpondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could ſcarcely have been obſerved by an immenſe crowd of people, many of whom muſt have been placed at a great diſtance from the ſcene. The ſame cauſes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave riſe to muſical declamation [16], which might ſometimes fortify paſſion, but always rendered ſpeech more ſlow and articulate,

[13] Before Chriſt 349, according to S. Petitus, de Leg. Attic. p. 385.

[14] Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demoſthen. Oration. paſſim.

[15] It is well known that the word *perſona* originally ſignified a maſk, from *perſonare*, becauſe the ancient maſks, both Greek and Roman, were ſo made as to increaſe and invigorate ſound.

[16] Notwithſtanding the aſſertions of Caſaubon, Gravina, etc. the Greeks in ancient times ſeem not to have been acquainted with the abſurd practice of dividing the acting and ſpeaking between two perſons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flouriſhed 240 years before Chriſt.

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and therefore more eaſily heard by the remote part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects ſuch incidents as are improper for repreſentation. Theſe, if neceſſary for carrying on the action of the piece, are ſuppoſed to be tranſacted elſewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for ſuch events, when they are not ſimultaneous with thoſe exhibited on the ſtage, neceſſarily interrupts the repreſentation, and leaves room for the choral ſongs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increaſes the ſpectator's delight; conſequences extremely different from thoſe attending the act-tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, univerſally condemned by good judges, as ſuſpending the action, and deſtroying the intereſt of the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to ſhine in trills and diviſions, at the expenſe of poetry and good ſenſe. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taſte of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the diſcerning judgment of the wiſe and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Ariſtophanes, and his profligate contemporaries and ſucceſſors [17]. Theſe pernicious productions formed the favorite entertainment of the populace. The maſk, diſguiſing the countenance of the performer, allowed him to

[17] See above, vol. ii. c. xiii. p. 280

indulge in the moſt unbluſhing licence of voice and geſture; the declamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the muſic became glaring, tawdry, voluptuous, and diſſolute in the higheſt degree, and ſuited only that perverſe debauchery of ſoul from which it originally ſprung, and which it ſerved afterwards to inflame and nouriſh[18].

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Extreme profligacy of the Athenians.

A myſterious cloud hangs over the Grecian muſic, to which effects are aſcribed far tranſcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuſe our aſſent to the concurring teſtimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almoſt univerſally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Cauſes which operate on the many, are not eaſily miſtaken; but ſhould we ſtill doubt the cauſe, the effect at leaſt cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are ſaid to have diſſipated their fortunes, and melted the vigor of mind and body, in wanton and expenſive dalliance with the

[18] Ariſtotle, l. viii. de Republ. ſays ironically, "Every kind of muſic is good for ſomething; that of the theatres is neceſſary for the amuſement of the mob; being well ſuited to the perverſion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Ariſtoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of muſic, as the main ſource of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been uſed as the vehicle of religious and moral inſtruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and diſſolute paſſion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Ariſtoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. et Plutarch. de Muſicâ. In ſpeaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the ſpirit of an ancient legiſlator, ſays, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who ſhould make its laws." Fletcher of Saltoun's Works, p. 266.

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female performers on the theatre [19]. Weary and faſtidious with exceſs of criminal indulgence, they loſt all capacity or reliſh for ſolid and manly occupations; and at once deſerted the exerciſes of war, and the ſchools of philoſophers. To fill up the vacuities of their liſtleſs lives, they, as well as perſons more advanced in years, loitered in the ſhops of muſicians, and other artiſts [20]; or ſauntered in the forum and public places, idly inquiring after news, in which they took little intereſt, unleſs ſome danger alarmed the inſipid uniformity of their pleaſures [21]. Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous exceſs; and are ſo keenly ſtigmatized by the moral writers of the age, that it ſhould ſeem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal [22]. The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the ſenſual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately beſtowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honor by princes and kings [23]) on the ſons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery [24].

Their idleneſs, poverty, and ignorance.

Idleneſs, indulgence, and diſſipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to

[19] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general deſcription of Athenian profligacy.

[20] Iſocrat. in Areopag. and Lyſias's defence of a poor man accuſed before the ſenate, translated in the Life of Lyſias, p. 114.

[21] Demoſthen. Philipp. paſſim.

[22] Athenæus, l. xii. Lyſias in Alcibiad.

[23] Demoſthen. de Republic. ordinand.

[24] Athenæus, l. iii. p. 119.

extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally deſtitute of *immoveable* poſſeſſions [25]. Their dreſs was frequently ſo mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to diſtinguiſh them from ſlaves; a circumſtance which aroſe not from ſlovenlineſs, but from poverty, ſince we are aſſured that ſuch as could afford the expenſe ſpared no pains to adorn their perſons; and that many who danced during ſummer in embroidered robes, ſpent the winter in places too ſhameful to be named [26]. And how is it poſſible (to uſe the words of their own authors [27]) that wretches, deſtitute of the firſt neceſſaries of life, ſhould adminiſter public affairs with wiſdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing thoſe offices with which they were intruſted. As the lower ranks had in a great meaſure engroſſed the adminiſtration of juſtice, it was not uncommon to

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[25] See the Diſcourſe of Lyſias upon a propoſal for diſſolving the ancient government of Athens. Lyſias's orations were chiefly written in the ſpace of twenty years, between 404 and 384 before Chriſt. They afford an uniform picture of the poverty, miſery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my tranſlation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flouriſhing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their reſources were again exhauſted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raiſed by the conqueſts of Timotheus, Phocion, etc. and the good management of Lycurgus and Demoſthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

[26] Iſocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

[27] Iſocrat. et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

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bribe the clerks employed in tranſcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is ſtill more extraordinary, ſuch a groſs artifice frequently ſucceeded; nor was the deceit diſcovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws [28]. When their negligence could not be ſurpriſed, their avarice might be bribed; juſtice was ſold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always expoſed to danger, and often ended in diſgrace [29]. For thoſe needy Athenians, who formed the moſt numerous claſs in the republic, endeavoured to alleviate their miſery by a very criminal conſolation; perſecuting their ſuperiors, baniſhing them their country, confiſcating their eſtates, and treating them on the ſlighteſt provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmoſt injuſtice and cruelty [30]. Though occaſionally directed by the equity of an Ariſtides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the moſt part, liſtened to men of an oppoſite character. He who could beſt flatter and deceive them obtained moſt of their confidence. With ſuch qualifications, the turbulent, licentious, and diſſolute, in a word, the orator who moſt reſembled his audience, commonly prevailed in the aſſembly; and ſpecious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Iſocrates [31] aſſures us of the fact; and Xenophon [32]

[28] Life of Lyſias, prefixed to his Orations, p. 116.

[29] See Lyſias's pleadings throughout.

[30] Iſocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this hiſtory.

[31] In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

[32] In his treatiſe de Republic. Athen.

affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government. CHAP. XXXII.

With such principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate leader, to involve them in designs the most extravagant and pernicious. Such a personage presented himself in Chares, whose soldier-like appearance, blunt address, and bold impetuous valor, masked his selfish ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His person was gigantic and robust, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he asserted positively, and promised boldly; and his presumption was so excessive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himself. Though an enterprising and successful partisan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more striking and palpable, when compared with the abilities of Iphicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, who prevailed as often by address as by force, and whose conquests were secured to the republic by the moderation, justice, and humanity, with which they had been obtained, and with which they continued to be governed. Chares proposed a very different mode of administration; he exhorted his countrymen to supply the defects of their treasury, and to acquire the materials of those pleasures which they regarded as essential to their happiness, by plundering the wealth of their allies and colonies. This counsel was too faithfully obeyed; the vexations, anciently exercised against the tributary and

The vices of Chares render him the favorite of the multitude.

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dependent ſtates, were renewed and exceeded [33]. The weaker communities complained, and remonſtrated, againſt this intolerable rapacity and oppreſſion; while the iſlands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they ſhould obtain peace and independence [34].

The ſocial war. Olymp. cv. 3. A. C. 358

Chares, probably the chief inſtrument, as well as the adviſer, of the arbitrary meaſures which had occaſioned the revolt, was ſent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quaſh at once the hopes of the inſurgents. He ſailed towards Chios, with an intention to ſeize the capital of that iſland, which was ſuppoſed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greateſt part of their force. The city of Chios was beſieged by ſea and land. The iſlanders defended themſelves with vigor. Chares found it difficult to repulſe their ſallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without ſucceſs; the ſhip of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whoſe valor and integrity merited a better fortune, though deſerted by the fleet, yet forſook not the ſhip intruſted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their ſhields, and ſaved themſelves by ſwimming to the Athenian ſquadron, which was ſtill within their reach.

[33] Diodor. l. xvi. et Iſocrat. de Pace.

[34] Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

But

But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honorable death to a diſgraceful life [35]. CHAP. XXXII.

Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at firſt affected to deſpiſe them, the inſurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the iſles of Lemnos and Samos. The Athenians, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies ſhould fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mneſtheus, the ſon of Iphicrates, and ſon-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would reſpectfully liſten to the advice of thoſe great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares poſſeſſed any ſhare of authority. That general had raiſed the ſiege of Chios, and now cruiſed in the Helleſpont; where, being joined by Mneſtheus, the united ſquadrons amounted to a hundred and twenty ſail. It was immediately determined to cauſe a diverſion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying ſiege to Byzantium. The deſign ſucceeded; the allies withdrew from theſe iſlands, collected their whole naval ſtrength, and prepared vigorouſly for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

Chares accuſes Timotheus and Iphicrates.

The hoſtile armaments approached each other, with a reſolution to join battle, when a ſudden and violent ſtorm aroſe, which rendered it impoſſible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the ſea, without being expoſed to

[35] Nepos in Chabr. et Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423, et ſeqq.

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shipwreck. Chares alone confidently insisted on commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the disadvantage, and declined the unequal danger[16]. His impetuosity, thus over-ruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into resentment and fury; he called the soldiers and sailors to witness their opposition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the first opportunity, dispatched proper messengers to Athens, to accuse them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accusation was supported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Their trial;

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former trusted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter used a very extraordinary expedient to sway the judges, conformable, however, to the spirit of that age, when courts of justice were frequently instruments of oppression, governed by every species of undue influence, easily corrupted and easily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, disciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the same reputation in Greece, which the *Fabian* soldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the *Iphicratensian* troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whose person (notwithstanding the strictness of his discipline) they were strongly

[16] We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the disadvantage and danger were on the side of the Athenians; probably, being better sailors, they expected to profit of their skill in *manœuvre*, which the storm rendered useless and unavailing.

attached by the ties of gratitude and eſteem. The youngeſt and braveſt of this celebrated band readily obeyed the injunctions of their admired general; ſurrounded, on the day of trial, the benches of the magiſtrates; and took care ſeaſonably to diſplay the points of their daggers [37].

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It was the law of Athens, that, after preliminaries had been adjuſted, and the judges aſſembled, the parties ſhould be heard, and the trial begun and ended on the ſame day; nor could any perſon be twice tried for the ſame offence. The rapidity of this mode of procedure favored the views of Iphicrates. The magiſtrates were overawed by the imminence of a danger, which they had neither ſtrength to reſiſt nor time to elude. They were compelled to an immediate deciſion; but, inſtead of the ſentence of death, which was expected, they impoſed a fine [38] on the delinquents, which no Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to pay. This ſeverity drove into baniſhment thoſe able and illuſtrious commanders. Timotheus ſailed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the iſle of Leſbos, both which places his valor and abilities had recovered for the republic, and which, being choſen as his reſidence in diſgrace, ſufficiently evince the mildneſs of his government, and his

and baniſhment.

[37] It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being reproached with betraying the intereſts of his country, aſked his accuſer, "Would you, on a like occaſion, have been guilty of that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates, ſhould be guilty?" Quinctilian. l. v. c. xii.

[38] One hundred talents, about twenty thouſand pounds.

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moderation in proſperity. Iphicrates travelled into Thrace, where he had long reſided. He had formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the moſt conſiderable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived and died in obſcurity [39]; nor did either he or Timotheus thenceforth take any ſhare in the affairs of their ungrateful country [40]. Thus did the ſocial war deſtroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the beſt generals whom Greece could boaſt; and, the brave and honeſt Phocion excepted, the laſt venerable remains of Athenian virtue [41].

Chares intruſted with the ſole conduct of the war; Olymp. cv. 4 A. C. 357.

By the removal of thoſe great men, Chares was left to conduct, uncontrolled, the war againſt the allies; and to diſplay the full extent of his worthleſſneſs and incapacity. His inſatiable avarice rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens; his weakneſs and negligence expoſed him to the contempt of the inſurgents. He indulged his officers and himſelf in a total neglect of diſcipline; the reduction of the rebels was the leaſt matter of his concern; he was attended by an effeminate crowd of ſingers, dancers, and harlots [42], whoſe

[39] Diodorus only ſays, that he was dead before the battle of Chæronea, which happened twenty years after his baniſhment.

[40] Nepos ſays, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athenians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his ſon Conon to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus, which his grandfather had rebuilt from the ſpoils of the enemy.

[41] *Military* virtue. Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Athenienſium, Iphicratis, Chabriæ, Timothei; neque poſt illorum obitum quiſquam dux in illâ urbe fuit dignus memoriâ. Nepos in Timoth. The biographer forgets Phocion.

[42] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

luxury exhauſted the ſcanty ſupplies raiſed by the Athenians for the ſervice of the war [43]. In order to ſatisfy the clamorous demands of the ſoldiers, Chares, regardleſs of the treaties ſubſiſting between Athens and Perſia, hired himſelf and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy ſatrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his maſter Artaxerxes Ochus, the moſt cruel and deteſtable tyrant that ever diſgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks ſaved Artabazus from the implacable reſentment of a monſter incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious ſervices were amply rewarded by the laviſh gratitude of the ſatrap. CHAP. XXXII.

which ends diſgracefully for the Athenians. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.

This tranſaction, how extraordinary ſoever it may appear to the modern reader, neither ſurpriſed nor diſpleaſed the Athenians. They were accuſtomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without inſtructions or control; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Perſian money. But the triumph of falſe joy was of ſhort duration. Ochus ſent an embaſſy to remonſtrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unleſs they immediately withdrew their forces from Aſia, he would aſſiſt the rebels with a fleet of three hundred ſail. This juſt menace, want of ſucceſs againſt the confederates, together with a reaſon ſtill more important, which will ſoon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recal

[43] Demoſthen. Philipp. 1.

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their armament from the East, and to terminate the social war, without obtaining any of the purposes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldness had urged; regained complete freedom and independence [44]; and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppression of subsidies and contingents, till they submitted, with the rest of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irresistible fortune of the Macedonians.

State of philosophy.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardor and success. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries [45]. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus [46] of Cnidus, Timæus [47] of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens [48]. The Megaric school flourished under Stilpo, the most learned and acute of that disputatious sect, which, from its continual wranglings, merited the epithet of contentious [49]. The doctrines of Aristippus were maintained by his daughter Areté,

[44] Diodor. p. 436.

[45] Galenus de Natur. Facultat. et Hippocrat. Περι κρασεων, etc.

[46] Laert. l. viii. sect. 86. et Suid. in Eudox.

[47] Jambl. de Pythagor. [48] Censorin. de Die natal.

[49] Ερισικη. Laert. l. vi. sect. 107.

and improved by Hegeſias and Anniceris, who paved the way for Epicurus [50]. The ſevere philoſophy of Antiſthenes had fewer followers [51]. But Diogenes alone was equal to a ſect [52].

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Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artiſts in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Polycletus were the moſt admired. His greateſt work was the coloſſal ſtatue of Argive Juno, compoſed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, ſtill furniſhed the uſual materials for ſculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly thoſe of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our preſent obſervations relate. One figure of Polycletus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactneſs of the proportions [53], it was called the rule, or ſtandard. Even Lyſippus, the contemporary

Of the fine arts. Statuary.

[50] Laertius et Suidas. [51] Ælian. Var. Hiſtor. l. x. c. xvi.

[52] We ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

[53] Winckelmann, p. 653. and his tranſlator Mr Huber, vol. iii. p. 84. differ from Pliny, l. 34. c. 19. They confound the ſtatue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, becauſe graſping a ſpear. Pliny's words are, Polycletus Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; idem et Doryphorum viriliter pucrum. Fecit et quem canona artifices vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo petentes, velut a lege quadam; ſoluſque hominum artem ipſe (forſe ipſum) feciſſe, artis opere judicatur." They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, ſpeaking incidentally on the ſubject, might more naturally miſtake than Pliny, writing expreſsly on ſculpture.

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and favorite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

The works of Praxiteles. Olymp. cv. 1. A. C. 360.

Between Polycletus and Lyſippus flouriſhed Praxiteles, whoſe works formed the intermediate ſhade between the ſublime ſtyle, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lyſippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The ſtatues of Praxiteles bore a ſimilar relation to thoſe of Phidias, which the paintings of Guido and Correggio bear to thoſe of Julio Romano and Raphael. The works of the earlier artiſts are more grand and more ſublime, thoſe of the later more graceful and more alluring; the firſt claſs being addreſſed to the imagination, the ſecond to the ſenſes. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a ſtatue to be ſeen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted ſpectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two ſtatues of the goddeſs at the ſame time, the one clothed, the other naked. The decent modeſty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchaſed by the Cnidians, and long regarded as the moſt valuable poſſeſſion of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languiſhed after this ſtatue; to purchaſe ſuch unrivalled charms he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immenſe; but the Cnidians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived ſo much celebrity. "Having conſidered,"

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The Gnidian Venus.

ſays an ancient author [54], "the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the ſacred dome. In the middle ſtands the ſtatue of the goddeſs, in marble of Paros. A ſweet ſmile ſits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an inſtinctive impulſe, conceals thoſe parts which modeſty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the ſtone the ſoftneſs and ſenſibility of fleſh. O Mars, the moſt fortunate of the gods!" But it is impoſſible to tranſlate his too faithful deſcription into the decency of modern language; a deſcription more animated and voluptuous than even the chiſel of Praxiteles.

The ſtate of painting.

The honor which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in ſculpture, was, during the ſame age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes [55]. The works of

[54] Lucian. Amor.

[55] Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of Art, when inconſiſtent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek hiſtorians, from whom he copied this part of his work, found it convenient, at every pauſe in their narrative, to give ſome account of men who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the arts and ſciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public tranſactions, and deſcribing wars and negociations. The æra of every peace furniſhed a proper reſting-place to the hiſtorian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to poſterity. Every ſuch æra, therefore, Pliny, and after him Winckelman, have conſidered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not ſuddenly ariſe and flouriſh,

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Eupompus are now unknown, but in his own times his merit and celebrity occaſioned a new diviſion of the ſchools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Aſiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian ſchool was ſubdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his ſcholar Apelles, gave freſh luſtre to the latter ſchool, which ſeems to have flouriſhed longer than any other in Greece, ſince the paintings exhibited at the celebrated proceſſion of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian maſters [56].

works of Pamphilus.

Few works of Pamphilus are deſcribed by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the aſſiſtance of the Athenians, has not, however, eſcaped the vigilant eye of national vanity [57]. He was by birth a Macedonian, but well verſed in literature and ſcience, which he thought indiſpenſably neceſſary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his ſcholars, and ſeems to have been the firſt who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profeſſion ſo faſhionable, that it became cuſtomary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to inſtruct the ſons of wealthy families in the arts of deſign. This liberal profeſſion was forbidden to ſlaves; nor, during the

and when once they flourish, do not ſuddenly decay; ſince the mind long retains the impulſe which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not eaſily lulled to repoſe.

[56] Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 190. [57] Ariſtoph. Plut. v. 385.

existence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated production in sculpture or painting come from servile hands [58].

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Of Euphranor.

Euphranor the Corinthian excelled both in painting and statuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted the twelve gods. He said that *his* Theseus had fed on flesh, that of Parrhasius on roses. He wrote on colors and symmetry.

Apollodorus.

Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the first who knew the force of light and shade [59]. His priest in prayer, and his Ajax struck with lightning, were held in high estimation.

Nicias.

Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of coloring. His Calypso, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed just fame; but his greatest composition was the Necromanteia of Homer [60].

[58] Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxxvi. sect. 8.

[59] This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny speaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Festinans ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refulsit Apollodorus Atheniensis, . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praises often clash with each other. He frequently calls different persons the first in the art, and even in the same branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expressions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and statues are not without their merit; since the perfection of those works of art consists in making a deep impression, in transporting and elevating the affections, and in raising that glow of sentiment, which Pliny is so happy in communicating to his readers.

[60] Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and statuaries translated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

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Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a great age) offered twelve thouſand pounds for this picture; but the artiſt, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a preſent to his native country. Praxiteles, when aſked which of his ſtatues he moſt valued, anſwered, "Thoſe of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis.

Zeuxis is ſaid to have been born at Heraclea, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refuſed money, boaſting that no price could pay them. The modeſty of his Penelopé was equal to a leſſon of morality. He painted Hercules ſtrangling the ſerpents in the preſence of the aſtoniſhed Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he choſe as models five virgins, whoſe united charms were expreſſed in this celebrated piece. His greateſt work was Jupiter ſitting on his throne, and ſurrounded by the gods [61].

[61] Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. ſpeaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inſcribed the following lines of Homer:

Ου νεμεσις, Τρωας και ευκνημιδας Αχαιους
Τοιηδ' αμφι γυναικι πολυν χρονον αλγεα πασχειν
Αινως αθανατησι θεης εοικεν ιδεσθαι. Il. iii. v. 156.

"They cry'd, No wonder ſuch celeſtial charms
For nine long years have ſet the world in arms:
What winning graces! what majeſtic mien!
She moves a goddeſs, and ſhe looks a queen." POPE.

CHAP. XXXII. Timanthes.

Timanthes reached the higheſt perfection of his art; but his genius ſurpaſſed the art itſelf. In his ſacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of ſorrow was ſeen in the faces of the ſpectators. It was carried to the utmoſt height, conſiſtent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was ſtill more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In ſeveral others of his pieces,

Pope has paraphraſed the laſt line, "For ſhe is wonderfully like to the immortal gods." This muſt have ſounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtleſs have conſidered "looking a queen," as a ſinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to ſhow by what different means poetry and painting attain the ſame end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey a high idea of Helen's beauty; but Homer does it by the effects of this beauty, which could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, etc. whom he has juſt inimitably deſcribed:

Γηραι δη πολεμοιο πεπαυμενοι, αλλ' αγορηται
Εσθλοι, τεττιγεσσιν ἐοικοτες οἵτε κατ' ὐλην
Δενδρεῳ ἑφεζομενοι οπα λειριοεσσαν ἱεισι.

When the Greek monk Conſtantinus Manaſſes (Chron. p. 20.) deſcribes the beauty of Helen.

Ην ἡ γυνη περικαλλης ευοφρυς ευχρωτατη
Ευπαρειος ευπροσωπος βοωπις χιονοχρους;

and ſo on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we ſee a man laboriouſly rolling ſtones up one ſide of a hill, which immediately roll down the other. Arioſto's deſcription of the beauty of Alcina. (cant. viii.) is in the ſame bad taſte. How different is Virgil's "Pulcherrima Dido." Virgil knew the difference between poetical and pictureſque images. Our English romances abound with examples of this ſpecies of bad taſte, ariſing from miſtaking the boundaries of diſtinct, though kindred, arts. See above, vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 312.

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Timanthes discovered the power of transporting the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the descriptions of Homer and Milton, more was understood than expressed.

Expression of Greek painting.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. The civil and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtless, great advantages to their artists in this respect. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sacking of a town; among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "*felt and feared*"[62], that after she was dead the child should suck blood instead of milk." Parrhasius of Ephesus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens, in a figure that characterized them as at once cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such discriminations, as well as such complications of passion, are unquestionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore, by many, be pronounced impossible. It is worthy of remark, that the fame Parrhasius, who seems to have united the excellences of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was distinguished by the gliding motion of his outline, and the sweetness with which it melted into the ground"[63].

[62] These are the words of Pliny.

[63] Pliny considers this as the perfection of art. "Hæc est in picturâ summa sublimitas. Corpora enim pingere et media

CHAP. XXXII. Coloring.

Ideal beauty, juſt proportion, natural and noble attitudes, a uniform greatneſs of ſtyle, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and ſtatuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not juſtify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been ſuppoſed deficient in coloring; and this ſuppoſition has been ſupported by the words of Pliny: "With four colors only, Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced thoſe immortal works, which were ſingly purchaſed by the common-wealth of cities and republics." The colors were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often ſaid that with theſe only on his palette, a painter cannot color like nature, far leſs attain the magic of the *clair obſcure*. Yet a great artiſt of our own country thinks that four colors are ſufficient for every combination required. The fewer the colors, the cleaner, he obſerves, will be their effect. Two

rerum, eſt quidem magni operis; ſed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, et deſinentis picturæ modum includere, rarum in ſucceſſu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet ſe extremitas ipſa, et ſic deſinere, ut promittant alia poſt ſe; oſtententque etiam quæ occultat." Ibid. c. xxxvi. ſect. 4. Mr. Falconet, in his obſervations on this paſſage, is of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the ſhades and tones which round the extremities of objects; becauſe the former, though expoſed to the light, muſt have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He inſtances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck ſeen in front. Pliny, had he lived in later times, might have inſtanced, in his turn, the ſweet outlines and inimitable ſoftneſs of Correggio.

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colors mixed together will not preſerve the brightneſs of either of them ſingle, nor will three be as bright as two "." Pliny ſays, that Apelles ſpread over his pictures, when finiſhed, a tranſparent liquid like ink, which increaſed the clearneſs and brilliancy of the whole, while it ſoftened the glare of too florid colors. This, according to the ſame excellent painter, is a true and artiſt-like deſcription of ſcambling or glazing, as practiſed by the Venetian ſchool, and by Correggio, in whoſe works, as well as thoſe mentioned by Pliny, it was perceptible only to ſuch as cloſely examined the picture. He very reaſonably concludes, therefore, that if the maſter-pieces of ancient painting remained, we ſhould probably find them as correctly drawn as the Laocoon, and as admirably colored as the glowing productions of Titian.

Clair obſcure.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect of the clair obſcure, or the diſtribution of all the tones of light and ſhade relatively to the different plans of the picture, has been denied by thoſe who allow them the higheſt excellence in coloring ſingle figures. They might excel, it has been ſaid, in a ſolo, but were incapable of producing a full piece for a concert of different inſtruments. Whether this obſervation be well founded can only be diſcovered by carefully examining ancient authors, from whom it would appear that even

" See Sir Joshua Reynolds's notes on Mr. Maſon's translation of Freſnoy's Art of Painting.

in

in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient [65].

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Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than compoſition in proſe. The hiſtory of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we ſhould form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian hiſtory, to which he ſeems not to have put the laſt hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finiſhed works, we ſee the ſcholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the ſcholar who moſt reſembled his maſter in his ſentiment and expreſſion [66], in the excellences as well as in the reſpectable weakneſſes [67] of

Literary compoſition.

Xenophon.

His character.

[65] In ſpeaking of Nicias, Pliny ſays, "Lumen et umbras cuſtodivit, atque ut eminerent è tabulis picturæ maxime cuſtodivit." Unleſs the *clair obſcure* be meant the ſecond member of this ſentence is a pleonaſm. Another paſſage is highly to the purpoſe, l. xxxv. c. xi. "Tandem ſe ars ipſa diſtinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentiâ colorum alternâ viâ ſeſe excitante. Deinde adjectus eſt ſplendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc et umbram eſſet, appellaverunt tonon; commiſſuras vero colorum et tranſitus, harmogen." *Clair obſcure* in painting is ſomething like counterpoint in muſic; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more ſubſtantial parts of the arts loſt nothing by the neglect. In melody and deſign, effect and expreſſion, they probably excelled the moſt boaſted productions of later ages.

[66] See the deſcription which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence, in Plato's Sympoſium.

[67] It is remarkable that the ſuperſtitious belief of Xenophon in celeſtial warnings, of which ſee innumerable examples, particularly Anabaſ. l. iii. c. i. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. i. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never reſtrained him from any thing uſeful or virtuous. The admonitions likewiſe of Socrates's dæmon were always the ſame with the dictates of right reaſon.

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his character. The ſame undeviating virtue, the ſame indefatigable ſpirit, the ſame erect probity, the ſame diffuſive benevolence, the ſame credulity, the ſame enthuſiaſm, together with that unaffected propriety of thought and diction, whoſe native graces outſhine all ornaments of art.

His military expeditions.

This admirable perſonage, who, had he lived before the Athenians were grown too conceited to learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved the ſaviour of his country, reached his fiftieth year in a happy obſcurity, enjoying the confidential ſociety of Socrates and a few ſelect friends. Of theſe Proxenus, an illuſtrious Theban exile, who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited him to Sardis, from a deſire to introduce him to Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor of Lower Aſia, whoſe friendſhip he himſelf had found more valuable than the precarious honors of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xenophon communicated the propoſal to Socrates, who, ſuſpecting that the Athenians might not reliſh his friend's deſign, becauſe the Perſians were then allied with Sparta, deſired him to conſult the oracle of Delphi[68]. This counſel was but partially followed; for Xenophon, who ſeems to have been fond of the journey, aſked not the oracle whether it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of what prayers and ſacrifices it might be rendered ſucceſsful. Socrates approved not this precipitation; yet as the god had anſwered, he thought it

[68] Anabaſ. l. v. p. 356, et ſeqq.

neceſſary for Xenophon to obey. The important conſequences of this reſolution to the Ten thouſand Greeks who followed the ſtandard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Aſia, Xenophon remained ſeveral years on the weſtern coaſt, and ſhared the victories of his admired Ageſilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

His religious and literary retreat.

Meanwhile a decree of baniſhment paſſed againſt him in Athens. But having acquired conſiderable riches in his Aſiatic expedition, he had depoſited them at Epheſus with the Sacriſtan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he periſhed in battle, his wealth ſhould be employed in honor of the goddeſs. Having ſurvived the bloody engagement of Coronæa, which he afterwards ſo affectingly deſcribed in his Hellenica, he ſettled in the town of Scilluns, a new eſtabliſhment formed by the Lacedæmonians, ſcarce three miles diſtant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacriſt of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully reſtored his depoſit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined by an oracle, purchaſed in that neighbourhood a beautiful ſpot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Epheſus. On the banks of Elian Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple, incomparably ſmaller indeed, yet ſimilar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddeſs reſembled that at Epheſus, as much as a figure in cypreſs could reſemble a ſtatue of gold. The banks of the river

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were planted with fruit trees. The ſurrounding plains and meadows afforded excellent paſture. The adjoining foreſts and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other ſpecies of game. There Xenophon's ſons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual feſtival ſacred to Diana. A modeſt inſcription on a marble column, erected near the temple, teſtified the holineſs of the place. "This ſpot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever ſhall poſſeſs it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in ſacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the goddeſs[49]." By this inſcription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind ſeems to forebode the calamities which at laſt befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was ſeized by Elian troops; and the amiable philoſopher and hiſtorian, who had, in this delightful retreat, compoſed thoſe invaluable works, which will inſpire the laſt ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to ſeek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His works.

His Expedition, his Grecian Hiſtory, his deſcription of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian govern-

[49] Xenoph. Anabaſ. l. v. p. 356, et ſeqq.

ments, have been noticed in their proper place. The Cyropædeia, or inſtitutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philoſophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines, taught by Socrates in the Memorabilia, and to prove the ſucceſs which naturally attends the practice of wiſdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The higheſt panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have miſtaken it for a true hiſtory, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and perſuaſiveneſs of the narrative, have believed it poſſible that, during the various ſtages of a long life, Cyrus ſhould have invariably followed the dictates of the ſublimeſt philoſophy. In his Oeconomics, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not leſs uſeful taſk, of regulating the duties of domeſtic life. The dialogue, entitled Hiero, paints the miſery of tyrants contraſted with the happineſs of virtuous princes, in colors ſo lively, and in lines ſo expreſſive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a ſingle ſtroke to the picture. In ſpeaking of the works of Xenophon, we muſt not forget his treatiſe on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his baniſhment. Inſtead of reſenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them moſt judicious and ſeaſonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reaſon to believe, was in part adopted. CHAP. XXXII.

The orators Lyſias and Iſocrates flouriſhed in the period now under review. The former was diſtinguiſhed by the refined ſubtilty of his pleadings; The orators Lyſias and Iſocrates.

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the latter by the poliſhed elegance of his moral and political orations [70]. Iſocrates ventured not to ſpeak in public, neither his conſtitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions neceſſary for that purpoſe. His ſchool of oratory and compoſition was frequented by the nobleſt youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic ſchool, his long and honorable labors tended to keep alive ſome ſparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen [71].

Plato. His birth and education.

But the man of learning in that age, whoſe abilities, if properly directed, might have moſt benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man juſtly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The ſame memorable year which produced the Peloponneſian war gave birth to Plato. He was deſcended from the Codridæ, the moſt illuſtrious as well as the moſt opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnaſtic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the ſtudies of poetry [72] and geometry, from which he derived that acuteneſs of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to exceſs, render him at once the moſt ſubtile and the moſt flowery writer of antiquity [73]. In his twentieth

[70] See the lives of Lyſias and Iſocrates, prefixed to my translation of their works. [71] Idem, ibid. [72] Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

[73] Plato's Dialogues are ſo different from each other, in point of thought and expreſſion, that, if we knew not the verſatility

year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with thoſe of his immortal predeceſſors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himſelf to philoſophy. During eight years he continued an aſſiduous hearer of Socrates; an occaſional [74] indiſpoſition prevented him from aſſiſting at the laſt converſations of the ſage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet theſe converſations, as related to him by perſons who were preſent, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of poſterity; and the affecting ſenſibility with which he minutely deſcribes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occaſion, proves how deeply the author was intereſted in his ſubject. CHAP. XXXII.

His travels.

Fear or diſguſt removed the ſcholar of Socrates from the murderers of his maſter. Having ſpent ſome time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the converſation of ſeveral of his fellow-diſciples, the love of knowledge carried him

of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling, in the Cratylus, Parmenides, Meno, Theætetus, and Sophiſtes. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid, in his Timæus, Panegyric, Sympoſium, and Phædrus. But in thoſe invaluable writings, the Apology, Crito, Alcibiades, Gorgias, Phædo, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his ſtyle is inimitably ſweet and attractive, always elegant, and often ſublime. His Republic, which is generally conſidered as the greateſt work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See Dionyſ. Halicarn. de Platon.

[74] Πλατων δε (οιμαι) ησθενει. Phædo, 2.

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to Magna Græcia; from thence he ſailed to Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deſerved his curioſity, as the country to which the ſcience of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived ſeveral tenets of their philoſophy.

He ſettles in the academy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were paſt when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of ſociety, the example and influence of one able and diſintereſted man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecillity. His luxuriant fancy compares them ſometimes to old men, who have outlived their ſenſes, and with whom it is vain to reaſon; ſometimes to wild beaſts, whom it is dangerous to approach; ſometimes to an unfruitful ſoil, that choaks every uſeful plant, and produces weeds only [75]. He prudently withdrew himſelf from a ſcene, which preſented nothing but danger or diſguſt, and purchaſed a ſmall villa in the ſuburbs near the academy, or gymnaſium, that had been ſo elegantly adorned by Cimon [76]. To this retirement, his fame attracted the moſt illuſtrious characters in his age: the nobleſt youths of Athens daily frequented the ſchool of Plato; and here he

[75] Republic, l. vi. p. 38. [76] See above, vol. ii. p. 207.

continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, inſtructing his diſciples, and compoſing his dialogues, to which the moſt diſtinguiſhed philoſophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting thoſe who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as viſionary.

General character of his philoſophy.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of ſcience. The objects of human thought had, previouſly to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain claſſes or genera[77]; the nature of truth had been inveſtigated; and men had diſtinguiſhed the relations[78], which the predicate of any propoſition can bear to its ſubject. The ſciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of ſyllogiſm was not as yet

[77] Many leſs perfect diviſions had probably been made before. Archytas of Tarentum diſtinguiſhed the ten Categories. Simplicius et Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium, Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. t. ii. p. 282. This diviſion, the moſt perfect of any that philoſophers have yet been able to diſcover, Plato learned from Archytas. It conſiſted in ſubſtances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual ſubſtances, which neither are in any other ſubject, nor can be predicated of it; or ſecondary, which ſubſiſt in the firſt, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and ſpecies of ſubſtances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having, doing, and ſuffering. Ariſtot. de Categor.

[78] Theſe are called by logicians the five Predicables, or more properly, the five claſſes of Predicates. They are the genus, ſpecies, ſpecific difference, property, and accident. The uſe of theſe diſtinctions is univerſal in every ſubject requiring definition and diviſion; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any ſubject the enumeration is doubtleſs incomplete.

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invented; and the Logic of Plato[79] was confined to the more uſeful ſubjects of definition and diviſion, by means of which he attempted to fix and aſcertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abſtruſe and ſhadowy ſpeculations of myſtical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius ſhould have miſtaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human underſtanding, and that moſt of the inquiries of Plato and his ſucceſſors ſhould appear extremely remote from the public tranſactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the ſpeculations in which they were engaged, how little ſoever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, ſeem too intereſting in themſelves to be entirely omitted in this hiſtorical work, eſpecially when it is conſidered that the philoſophy of Plato and his diſciples has been very widely diffuſed among all the civilized nations of the world; that, during many centuries, it governed with uncontrolled ſway the opinions of the ſpeculative part of mankind; and that the ſame philoſophy ſtill influences the reaſonings, and divides the ſentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

Difficulty of explaining and abridging his doctrines.

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the opinions of Plato are explained by himſelf, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dialogues,

[79] The ſcience properly called Logic was invented by Ariſtotle; the diviſion of the ſciences into Logic, Phyſics, and Ethics, was firſt given by his contemporary Xenocrates. Vid. Brucker, de Ariſtot. et Xenocrat. Of Ariſtotle more hereafter.

the irony of Socrates, and the continual intermixture of Plato's own ſentiments with thoſe of his maſter, heighten the difficulty, and make it impoſſible, from particular paſſages, to judge of the ſcope and tendence of the whole. The works of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent ſtudent to ſeparate the pure ore of Socrates from the adventitious matter with which it is combined in the rich vein of Platoniſm; and by carefully comparing the different parts of the latter, he may with certainty determine the principal deſigns of its author.

The great views of that Philoſopher.

From this view of the ſubject, it would appear that Plato aimed at nothing leſs, than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wiſe government of a ſelf-exiſtent unchangeable cauſe; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles reſulting from theſe diſcoveries, to build a ſyſtem of ethics, which, in proportion as it were followed by mankind, would promote not only their independence and ſecurity in the preſent world, but their happineſs and perfection in a future ſtate of exiſtence.

His theology.

Let us look where we will around us, we ſhall every-where, ſaid Plato, perceive a paſſing proceſſion[**]: the objects which compoſe the material

[**] This was borrowed from Heraclitus, who expreſſed the ſame idea, by ſaying, that all corporeal things were in a perpetual flux. Vid. Platon. in Theætet. p. 83. et in Sophiſt. p. 108.

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world, ariſe, change, periſh, and are ſucceeded by others, which undergo the ſame revolutions[82]. One body moves another, which impels a third, and ſo forwards in ſucceſſion; but the firſt cauſe of motion reſides not in any of them. This cauſe acts not fortuitouſly; the regular motions of the heavenly bodies[83], the beautiful order of the ſeaſons, the admirable ſtructure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author[84]. It is difficult by ſearching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impoſſible by words to deſcribe it; yet the works which he has done, atteſt his power, his wiſdom, and his goodneſs, to be greater than human imagination can conceive[85]. In the ſelf-exiſtent cauſe, theſe attributes muſt unite. He is therefore unchangeable[86], ſince no alteration can increaſe his perfections, and it would be abſurd to ſuppoſe him ever inclined to diminiſh them[87].

Coſmogony.

Impelled by his goodneſs, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all poſſible exiſtence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the univerſe from that rude indigeſted matter, which, exiſting from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of

[82] Timæus, ſub initio.

[83] By theſe he meant the fixed ſtars; the motions of the planets he aſcribed to another cauſe, as will appear below.

[84] Plato de Legibus, l. x. p. 609.

[85] Timæus, p. 477. et de Repub. l. ii. p. 144.

[86] For the immutability of the Deity, Plato, contrary to his general cuſtom, condeſcends to uſe an argument from induction: "Even of material things, the moſt perfect leaſt feel the effects of time, and remain longeſt unaltered." De Repub. p. 150.

[87] Ibid. p. 150.

motion [87]. This principle, which Plato calls the irrational ſoul of the world, he thought ſufficiently atteſted, in the innumerable deviations from the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, in the extravagant paſſions of men, and in the phyſical and moral evil, which, in conſequence of theſe deviations and paſſions, ſo viſibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain ſtubborn intractability, and diſorderly wildneſs, eſſential to matter, and therefore incapable of being entirely eradicated or ſubdued, it ſeemed impoſſible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity [88]. CHAP. XXXII.

From theſe rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful ſtructure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of thoſe eternal exemplars [89], or patterns, which ſubſiſt in Plato's doctrine of ideas.

[87] Politic. p. 120, et ſeqq. et Timæus, paſſim.

[88] De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

[89] Theſe exemplars, or παραδειγματα, are the *ideas* of Plato, which were ſo much miſrepreſented by many of the later Platoniſts, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, ἰδεας, ειδη, εικονας, τα κατα ταυτα, et ὁσαυτως ἐχοντα. The two laſt expreſſions are uſed to diſtinguiſh them from the fleeting and periſhable forms of matter. Plato repreſents theſe ideas as exiſting in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the ſenſes, and not circumſcribed by place or time. By the firſt univerſal Cauſe, theſe ideas were infuſed into the various ſpecies of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius, in Porphyr. Introduct. p. 29.) they exiſted, as the impreſſion of a ſeal exiſts in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-exiſtent ſtate, the human mind viewed theſe *intelligible* forms in their original ſeat, the field of truth. But ſince men were impriſoned in the body, they receive theſe ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platoniſts, and even ſeveral

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the divine Intelligence[90]. Conſidering that beings poſſeſſed of mental powers were far preferable to thoſe deſtitute of ſuch faculties, God infuſed into the corporeal world a rational ſoul, which, as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, eſſentially inherent in matter[91]. Having thus formed and animated the earth, the ſun, the moon, and the other viſible divinities, the great Father of ſpirits proceeded to create the inviſible gods and dæmons[92], whoſe nature and hiſtory Plato deſcribes with a reſpectful reverence for the religion

writers of the preſent age, have imagined that he aſcribed to ideas a ſeparate and independent exiſtence. Vid. Brucker, Hiſtor. Philoſoph. p. 695, et ſeqq. Gedike, Hiſtor. Philoſoph. ex Ciceron. Collect. p. 183, et ſeqq. Monboddo, Origin of Language, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the abſurdities embraced by philoſophers, this doubtleſs would be the greateſt, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and ſpecies of things exiſting apart, and independent of the mind by which theſe abſtract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian ſchool, whoſe extravagant fancies could fix and embody metaphyſical abſtractions, and realiſe intellectual ideas, ſhould animate and perſonify the λογον τϖ θεϖ, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, theſe ideas reſided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The ſame viſionary fanatics who diſcovered, in the λογος of Plato, the ſecond perſon of the Trinity, recogniſed the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill correſponded to the third perſon of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-coſmian ſoul, concerning which Plato is altogether ſilent. See the Encyclopedie, article *Eclectique*. Brucker. Hiſt. Philoſoph. vol. i. p. 712, et ſeqq. et Meiner's Beytrag zur Geſchichte der Denkart der erſten Jahrhunderte nach Chriſti Geburt in einigen Betrachtungen über die neue Platoniſche Philoſophie.

[90] Timæus, Polit. l. vi.

[91] Ib. p. 477, et ſeqq.

[92] Timæus, p. 480.

of his country[93]. After finiſhing this great work, the God of gods, again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three ſpecies of beings, which he realiſed in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The taſk of forming theſe ſenſible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; becauſe, had this laſt work likewiſe proceeded from his own hands, it muſt have been immortal like the gods[94]. The ſouls of men, on the other hand, he himſelf formed from the remainder of the rational ſoul of the world. They firſt exiſted in the ſtate of dæmons, only inveſted with a thin æthereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the groſs corporeal maſs, by which their divine faculties are ſo much clogged and encumbered[95]. CHAP. XXXII.

Plato's morals.

It was neceſſary briefly to explain the metaphyſical theology of Plato, how viſionary ſoever it may appear, becauſe the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-exiſtent ſtate of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philoſophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the ſouls of men enjoyed the preſence of their Maker; and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and eſſences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining theſe eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, conſiſted the nobleſt energy, and higheſt perfection of celeſtial ſpirits[96], which,

[93] Apolog. Socratis. [94] Timæus, p. 480, et 481.
[95] Ibid. [96] Repub. l. vi. Phædrus, Philebus, etc.

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being emanations of the Deity, can never reſt ſatisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual ſtate, men can perceive, with their corporeal ſenſes, only the fleeting images and imperfect repreſentations of theſe immutable eſſences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are ſo little ſteady and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them [97]. Beſide this, our ſenſes themſelves are liable to innumerable diſorders; and unleſs we are conſtantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us [98]. Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we purſue; hence the very inadequate means by which we ſeek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and miſery of life. Yet even in this degraded ſtate, to which men were condemned for paſt offences, their happineſs ceaſes not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can riſe ſo high, none can ſink ſo low, as to eſcape the eye and arm of the Almighty [99]. The divine Providence obſerves and regulates the meaneſt, as well as the greateſt, of its productions. But the good of the part being ſubordinate to that of the whole, it is neceſſary that each individual ſhould be rewarded or puniſhed, in proportion as he fulfils the taſk aſſigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favor of his Maker [100]; for

[97] Phædo, Timæus, etc.
[98] Phædo, p. 31. et Repub. l. v.
[99] De Legibus.
[100] Eutyphron.

it is ridiculous to think that this inestimable benefit can be purchased by rich presents and expensive sacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of interest [101]. What can we offer to the gods, which they have not first bestowed on us? Will they thank us for restoring their own gifts? It is absurd to think it. To please the Divinity, we must obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpose of our creation, and fulfil our destiny, without aspiring at those noble powers with which we were originally endowed [102]; and which, even in our present degenerate state, it is still possible, by proper diligence, to recover [103].

His account of the origin of human knowledge.

Our senses give us information of external objects, which are stored up in the memory, and variously combined by the imagination [104]. But it is remarkable that those ideas, thus acquired and retained have the power of suggesting others far more accurate and perfect than themselves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unless (which is impossible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cause. That we possessed, in a pre-existent state, those ideas which modern philosophers refer by an easy solution to the powers of generalization and abstraction [105], Plato thought evident from the

[101] Repub. l. ii. p. 100, et seqq.

[102] Minos, p. 510. Timæus, p. 500.

[103] Repub. l. v.

[104] Theætet. p. 85, et seqq. et Philem. 184, et seqq.

[105] The ancients were not ignorant of this philosophy. Simplicius, speaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in

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facility with which we recalled them [106]. Of this he gave an example in Meno's ſlave, who, when properly queſtioned by Socrates, eaſily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the ſciences of arithmetic and geometry [107]. According to Plato, therefore, all ſcience conſiſted in reminiſcence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of thoſe uniform and unchangeable eſſences, about which the human mind had originally been converſant, and after the model of which all created things were made [108]. Theſe intellectual forms, comprehending the true eſſences of things, were the only proper objects of ſolid and permanent ſcience [109]; their fluctuating repreſentatives

the human mind, ſays, ἡμεις αφελοντες αυτα εν ταις ἡμετεραις ενοιαις κατα ἑαυτα ὑπεςησαμεν: "We ourſelves, abſtracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abſtraction, given them an exiſtence in themſelves." Simp. in Præd. p. 17.

[106] Menon. p. 344.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Repub. l. vi.

[109] Επιςημη, ſcience, in oppoſition to δοξα, opinion. The material world he called το δοξαςον, that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only. Repub. l. v. The *ideas* of Plato, which, according to that philoſopher, formed the ſole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his ſcholar and rival Ariſtotle. Yet the latter, who was ſo ſharp-ſighted to the faults of Plato, never accuſes him of maintaining the ſeparate and independent exiſtence of intellectual forms. The obſcure paſſage in Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, p. 201, which has been conſtrued into ſuch an accuſation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the τα καθ' ὁλυ, general ideas, as differing in no reſpect from our notions of the genera and ſpecies of things; whereas Plato made a diſtinction between them, aſſert-

in the material world; the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes [110]; but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves [111]. From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that

Of the powers of perception and intellect.

ing these ideas to have existed in the divine intellect before the creation, etc. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his Ethics to Nicomachus, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, etc. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honor, pleasure, are not comprehended under any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only his art is concerned."

[110] Parmen. p. 140. [111] Repub. l. vii.

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the duty and happineſs of men conſiſted in withdrawing themſelves from the material, and approaching the intellectual world [112], to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpoſe was the great aim of his philoſophy. If we were deceived by the ſenſes, he obſerved, that we were ſtill more fatally endangered by the paſſions, thoſe flimſy ſails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying guſt of imagined good or evil [113]. The pains and pleaſures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, deſirous to unite and incorporate theſe ſeemingly oppoſite natures, had at leaſt joined their ſummits; for pleaſure was nothing elſe but a rapid ceſſation of pain; and the livelieſt of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneaſineſs, and followed by languor [114]. To illuſtrate the neceſſity of governing with a ſtrong hand the appetites and paſſions, Plato compared the ſoul to a little republic, compoſed of different faculties or orders [115]. The judging or reaſoning faculty, juſtly entitled to the ſupremacy, was ſeated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the ſenſes were its guards and ſervants; the various deſires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

Of the paſſions.

Of theſe deſires, which were all of them the natural ſubjects of the ruling faculty, Plato

[112] Repub. p. 134. et Phæd. p. 26.
[113] Phædrus.
[114] Philem. et Repub. l. ii. p. 262, et ſeqq.
[115] Repub. l. iv.

distinguished two orders, ever ready to rebel against their master. The first consisted of those passions which are founded in pride and resentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irascible part of the soul [116]; and were seated in the breast. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible [117] part of the soul, and were seated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. These different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public interest, and unless restrained by the wisdom and authority of their sovereign, must inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmost disorder and misery [118].

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Yet, according to Plato, both these sets of passions were, in the present state of things, necessary parts of our constitution; and, when properly regulated, became very useful subjects. The irascible asserted our rank and dignity, defended us against injuries, and when duly informed and tempered by reason, taught us with becoming fortitude to despise dangers and death, in pursuit of what is honorable and virtuous. The concupiscible provided for the support and necessities of the body; and, when reduced to such submission as to reject every gratification not approved by reason, gave rise to the virtue of temperance. Justice

Of the virtues; and wisdom the greatest virtue.

[116] The Το θυμοειδες of Plato.

[117] The Το επιθυμητικον of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Aristotle call the ορεκτικον, the seat of the desires and passions.

[118] Ibid. 254.

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took place, according to Plato, when reaſon directed and paſſion obeyed, and when each paſſion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due reſpect towards its ſuperior. In the ſtrength, acuteneſs, and perfection of the ruling faculty, conſiſted the virtue of prudence, the great ſource and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even juſtice itſelf, were nothing but empty ſhadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exerciſe of prudence or wiſdom, man reſembled his Maker, and contemplated thoſe intellectual forms, which taught him to diſcern with certainty the ends proper to be purſued, and the means neceſſary to attain them. The wiſe man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleaſure. He thus learns to deſpiſe the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to diſdain its pleaſures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, ſince whoever depends on the body, muſt conſider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by ſome greater terror, ſo that in him who is not truly wiſe, fortitude itſelf muſt be the effect of timidity [119]. In the ſame manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will ſpring from the impure ſource of the oppoſite vices. He will deny himſelf ſome pleaſures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will ſubmit to ſmall pains to avoid the greater [120]. He thus continues through life,

[119] Repub. l. vi.

[120] Phædo, p. 26, et ſeqq.

exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wiſdom, the only precious merchandiſe. CHAP. XXXII.

But the temple of wiſdom is, according to Plato, ſituate on a rock, which few men have the ſtrength to aſcend [121]. This difference of ability proceeds from various cauſes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect [122]. 2. They were not alike criminal during their pre-exiſtent ſtate [123]. 3. The groſs bodies which they now inhabit are variouſly moulded, ſome being too ſtrong, others too weak, and very few in juſt harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated [124]. 4. Early inſtitution and example occaſion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are leſs chargeable on thoſe who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and inſtructors [125]; and it ſeems hardly poſſible for thoſe who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wiſdom and virtue. Even when the moſt favorite circumſtances unite, the mind muſt ſtill, however, have a tendence to degenerate, while united with matter [126]. The body, therefore, muſt be continually exerciſed and ſubdued by the gymnaſtic, the ſoul muſt be purified and ennobled by philoſophy. Without ſuch attention, men can neither reach the perfection of

Cauſes of the diverſity of moral character.

[121] Repub. l. vi. p. 74. [122] Phædrus.
[123] Ibid. [124] Timæus. [125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid. p. 484. et Repub. paſſim.

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their nature, nor, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated poſt, from which they look down with compaſſion on the errors and miſery of their fellow-creatures[127].

Plato's ſage.

In the deſcription of his imaginary ſage, Plato employs the colors which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of theſe ſects, as will appear hereafter, were ſo well entitled as the Platoniſts, to boaſt their philoſophical happineſs, and to aſſert their ſuperiority to the viciſſitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the firſt philoſopher who ſupported the doctrine of a future ſtate, by arguments that ſeemed capable to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the ſimplicity and indeſtructibility of the ſubſtance in which they reſide[128]. He deſcribed the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero[129] and Buffon[130] have not been able to ſurpaſs. And ſince he regarded the ſoul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it abſurd to ſuppoſe that the diſeaſes and death of the body ſhould take from this principle ſuch qualities as it eſſentially poſſeſſed in itſelf, and accidentally communicated to matter[131]. It was his firm perſuaſion, that according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the ſoul, after its ſeparation from the body, would be raiſed

Immortality of the ſoul.

State of retribution.

[127] Timæus, p. 484. et Repub. paſſim.
[128] Phædo, p. 25, et ſeqq.
[129] See Cicer. de Offic. l. i. et paſſim.
[130] Buffon ſur l'Homme.
[131] Phædo.

to a higher, or depreſſed to a lower ſtate of exiſtence [132]. CHAP. XXXII.

This belief, which raiſed his hopes to a higher ſcene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different claſs of philoſophers, for the periſhing affairs [133] of the preſent world. Like ſome others of the ſcholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been juſtly obſerved by a great genius [134], is rather a treatiſe of education than a ſyſtem of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no leſs acuteneſs than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil ſociety, and traces the plan of a republic nearly reſembling the Spartan model. His republic.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profuſely ſcattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not conſidered as that viſionary ſpeculatiſt which he has appeared to later ages. His ſcholars, Ariſtonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were ſucceſſively ſent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians [135], at the earneſt requeſt of thoſe communities. From Xenocrates, another of his diſciples, Alexander deſired rules for good government [136]. The fame of Ariſtotle Genius and character of Plato.

[132] Phædrus, et Phædo, paſſim.

[133] The Epicureans.

"Non res humanæ, perituraque regna." GEORG.

Of this more below.

[134] Rouſſeau in his Emile.

[135] Plutarch. adverſ. Colot. Epicur. [136] Idem, ibid.

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is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a maſter, whoſe opinions he often combated with ſeeming reluctance, and real ſatisfaction. Plato was no leſs capable to diſtinguiſh ideas than to combine images. He united warmth of fancy and acuteneſs of underſtanding, in a greater degree than perhaps has fallen to the ſhare of any other man. Yet when compared with his maſter Socrates, his genius will appear more ſubtile than ſagacious. He wanted that patient ſpirit of obſervation which diſtinguiſhed the illuſtrious ſage, who in all his reaſonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every ſtep he made, looked back with wary circumſpection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod ſecurely the paths of truth and nature; but his adventurous diſciple, truſting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

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History of Macedon. — Reign of Archelaus. — Series of Usurpations and Revolutions. — Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians. — Distracted State of Macedon. — First Transactions of Philip. — State of Thrace and Paonia. — Philip defeats Argæus and the Athenians. — His Treatment of the Prisoners. — His military Arrangements. — He defeats the Illyrians. — His Designs against Amphipolis. — He prevents an Alliance between Athens and Olynthus. — Amuses the Athenians. — Takes Amphipolis. — His Conquests in Thrace. — The Mines of Crenidæ. — Philip marries Olympias. — His Letter to Aristotle.

CHAP. XXXIII. The kingdom of Macedon founded by Caranus. A. C. 814.

FOUR hundred and sixteen years before the Christian æra, and little more than half a century before Philip assumed the government of Macedon, that country, to a superficial observer, might have appeared scarcely distinguishable from the barbarous kingdoms of Thrace, Paonia, and Illyricum, which surrounded it on the north, east, and west. Towards the south, it was excluded from the sea by a chain of Grecian republics, of which Olynthus and Amphipolis were the most flourishing and powerful. To this inland

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district, originally confined to the circumference of about three hundred miles, Caranus, an Argive prince of the numerous race of Hercules, eluding the dangers which proved fatal to royalty [1] in most communities of Greece [2], conducted a small colony of his adventurous and warlike countrymen, and, having conquered the barbarous natives, settled in Edessa, the capital of the province then named Emathia, and afterwards Macedonia, for reasons equally unknown [3]. The establishment of this little principality, which, under Philip, grew into a powerful kingdom, and, under Alexander, swelled into the most extensive empire known in the ancient world, was adorned (could we believe historic flattery) by many extraordinary circumstances, presaging its future greatness. The gods took care of the infancy of Macedon, and sent, as oracles had announced, a herd of goats to conduct Caranus to his new capital of Edessa, which thence changed its name to Ægæ, the city of goats; a fiction unworthy of record, did it not explain the reason why goats were adopted as the ensigns of Macedon, and why the figures of those animals are still to be seen on the coins of Philip, and those of his successors.

Prudent conduct of its first

Caranus, as well as the princes Cœnus [4] and Thyrimas, who immediately followed him, had occa-

[1] Justin. l. vii. c. i. Velleius Paterculus, l. i. c. vi.
[2] See vol. i. p. 105.
[3] Crophius Antiquit. Macedon.
[4] Justin. ubi supra. Syncell. Chronic.

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sion to exercise their prudence still more than their valor. Their feeble colony of Greeks might have fallen an easy prey to the unhospitable ferocity of the barbarous tribes, by whom it was on all sides surrounded But the policy of the first kings of Macedon, instead of vainly attempting to repel or to subdue, endeavoured, with more success, to gain, by good offices, the ancient inhabitants of Emathia and the neighbouring districts. They communicated to them the knowledge of many useful[5] arts; they gave them the Grecian religion[6] and government[7] in that state of happy simplicity which prevailed during the heroic ages; and while, to render intercourse more easy and familiar, they adopted, in some degree, the language and manners of the barbarous natives, they, in their turn, imparted to the latter a tincture of the Grecian language and civility[8]. By this judicious and liberal system, so unlike to that pursued by their countrymen in other parts of the world, the followers of Caranus gradually associated with the warlike tribes in their neighbourhood, whom it would have been alike impossible for them to extirpate or to enslave; and

kings the primary cause of the greatness of Macedon.

[5] Pausanias Achaic. et Thucyd. l. ii.

[6] Arrian, Exped. Alexand. l. iv. p. 83.

[7] Φιλιππῳ μεν παιδι, Ἡρακλειδῃ δε απο γενους, ὁτῳ οἱ προγονοι εξ Αργους εις Μακεδονιαν ηλθον, ᾧ δε ειχε αλλα νομῳ Μακεδονων αρχοντες διετελεσαν. Arrian, l. iv. p. 86. In another passage of the same book he says, the subjects of Macedon had more liberty than the citizens of Greece.

[8] Demosthenes, Arrian, and Curtius.

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the ſame generous policy, being embraced by their deſcendants, deſerves to be regarded as the primary cauſe of Macedonian greatneſs.

Tranſactions of the Macedonians preceding the reign of Archelaus I. A.C. 713—416.

Perdiccas, the firſt of that name, ſo far eclipſed the fame of his three predeceſſors, that he is accounted the founder of the monarchy by Herodotus [9] and Thucydides [10]. His hiſtory has been magnified by fable, which has alſo obſcured or diſtorted the actions of the five princes [11] that intervened between him and Alexander I. who filled the Macedonian throne when Xerxes invaded Greece [12]. Here we attain hiſtoric ground. Alexander, as related above [13], took an important and honorable part in the affairs of Greece and Perſia, without neglecting the intereſt of his own kingdom, which he extended to the river Neſſus on the eaſt, and to the Axius on the weſt. His ſon, Perdiccas II. inherited the abilities of his father, without inheriting his integrity. During the Peloponneſian war, the alliance of this prince formed an object of important concern to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. He eſpouſed the cauſe of the latter, which he regarded as his own, becauſe the Athenians, who had occaſionally levied tribute on his anceſtors [14], were then maſters of the Greek ſettle-

[9] Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxxvii. [10] Thucydid. l. ii. p. 168.

[11] Argæus I. Philip I. Æropus I. Alcetas, Amyntas I. Juſtin. l. vii. c. ii.

[12] Herodot. l. v. c. xix. [13] Vol. ii. p. 105.

[14] Thucydid. ubi ſupra, et Demoſthenes paſſim.

ments along the Macedonian coaſt, the vicinity of which naturally tempted the ambition of Perdiccas. Under the ſpecious pretence of enabling Olynthus and the other cities of Chalcidicé to recover their independence, he lent his aid to deſtroy the Athenian influence there, expecting to eſtabliſh the Macedonian in its ſtead. But this deſign failed of ſucceſs. The Olynthian confederacy was broken, its members became ſubject to Sparta, and after the misfortunes of that republic had encouraged the Olynthians to reſume their freedom, they felt themſelves ſufficiently powerful not only to reſiſt the encroachments of Macedon, but to make conſiderable conqueſts in that country [15].

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The ſtate of Macedon greatly improved by that prince A. C. 416—410.

Archelaus I. who ſucceeded to the throne, diſplayed an enlightened policy, far more beneficial to his kingdom than the courage of Alexander, or the craft of Perdiccas. Like thoſe princes, Archelaus was ambitious to enlarge his dominions (having conquered Pydna and other towns in the delightful region of Pieria [16]); but his main care was to cultivate and improve them. He facilitated communication between the principal towns of Macedon, by cutting ſtraight roads through moſt parts of the country; he built walls and places of ſtrength in the ſituations moſt favorable for that purpoſe; encouraged agriculture and the arts, particularly thoſe ſubſervient to war; formed magazines of

[15] See above, vol. iv. c. xxix. p. 80, et ſeqq.

[16] Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. xvi.

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arms; raiſed and diſciplined a conſiderable body of cavalry; and in a word, added more to the ſolid grandeur of Macedon than had been done by all his predeceſſors together[17]. Nor was he regardleſs of the arts of peace. His palace was adorned by the works of Grecian painters. Euripides was long entertained at his court; Socrates was earneſtly ſolicited to live there after the example of this philoſophic poet, formed by his precepts, and cheriſhed by his friendſhip: men of merit and genius, in all the various walks of literature and ſcience, were invited to reſide in Macedon, and treated with diſtinguiſhed regard by a monarch duly attentive to promote his own glory and the happineſs of his ſubjects[18].

Series of uſurpations and revolutions. A. C. 405—360.

A reign of ſix years was too ſhort a period for accompliſhing the important ends which Archelaus had in view. By his death the proſperity of Macedon was interrupted for almoſt half a century, crowded by a ſucceſſion of ten[19] princes or uſurpers,

[17] Thucydides ſays, "than the eight kings who preceded him," counting Perdicnas for the firſt. Αρχελαος ὁ Περδικκου υἱος, Βασιλευς γενομενος τα τειχη νυν οντα εν τῃ χωρᾳ ϕκοδομησε, και ὁδους ενθειας ετεμε, και τ' αλλα διεκοσμησε παντε κατα τον πολεμον ἱπποις και ὁπλοις και τῃ αλλῃ παρασκευῃ κρεισσων η ξυμπαντες ὁι αλλοι Βασιλεις οκτω ὁι προ αυτου γενομενοι. Thucydides, p. 168.

[18] Ariſtot. Rhetor. l. ii. c. xxix. Stobæus, Sermon. 237.

[19] Their names, with the dates of their acceſſion or uſurpation, are as follows:

1 Oreſtes,	A. C. 405	6 Argæus II.	A. C. 385
2 Æropus II.	402	Amyntas again re-eſtabliſhed,	383
3 Archelaus II.	364	7 Alexander II.	372
4 Amyntas II.	392	8 Perdiccas III.	371
5 Pauſanias,	391	9 Ptolemy,	370
Amyntas II.	390		

whoſe

whose history forms a perpetual series of crimes and calamities. Amidst these disorders, the sceptre still remained in the family of Hercules; but almost every prince of the blood had an ambition to reign. In order to attain their purpose, the different competitors courted the assistance of the Thracians, of the Illyrians, of the Thessalians, of the Olynthian confederacy, of Athens, of Sparta, and of Thebes; and each of those powers endeavoured to turn to their own immediate profit the dissensions in Macedon. Bardyllis, an active and daring chief, who by his abilities in acquiring, and his equity[20] in dividing the spoil, had risen from the condition of a private robber to the command of the Illyrian tribes, entered Macedon at the head of a numerous army, dispossessed Amyntas II. the father of Philip, and placed Argæus on the throne, who consented to become the tributary of his benefactor[21]. The Thracians supported the title of another prince named Pausanias: but the assistance of Thessaly and Olynthus enabled Amyntas to resume the government; the Olynthians refusing, however, to surrender several places of importance which Amyntas had intrusted to their protection, or which they had conquered from his competitor. Amyntas complained to Sparta; and that republic, for reasons above[22] related, declared war against

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A. C. 382.

A. C. 383.

Perdiccas,	A. C. 368	to Amyntas,	A. C. 360
Ptolemy,	367	To him Philip succeeded in	
Perdiccas,	365	the same year.	

[20] Cicero de Offic. l. ii. [21] Diodor. l. xiv. c. xcii.

[22] See vol. iv. c. xxix. p. 89.

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Olynthus, and reinſtated the Macedonian king in full poſſeſſion of his dominions. In conſequence of that event, Amyntas eſtabliſhed, and thenceforth held, his court at Pella, where he enjoyed ſeveral years of tranquillity, cultivating the friendſhip of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

The uſurper Pauſanias.

The ſhort reign of his ſon Alexander was diſturbed by a freſh invaſion of the Illyrians, from whom he purchaſed a precarious peace [23]. He left two brothers, Perdiccas and Philip, of whom the eldeſt was ſtill a minor. Availing himſelf of *their* youth and weakneſs, Pauſanias found means to uſurp the throne, being ſupported not only by the Thracians, but by a conſiderable body of Greek mercenaries, as well as by a powerful party in Macedon.

Dethroned by Iphicrates, at the entreaty of Eurydicé. A. C. 370.

Iphicrates, the Athenian, happened at this critical juncture to return from Amphipolis, the recovery of which formed the main object of his expedition. In former journies to the coaſt of Thrace, he had been treated with diſtinguiſhed regard by Amyntas, whoſe widow Eurydicé now craved the protection of Iphicrates for the ſons of his friend. This princeſs was deſcended from the Bacchiadæ, the nobleſt family of Corinth, who, rather than live on an equality with their fellow-citizens in that republic, had become the leaders of the Lynceſtæ, a barbarous tribe inhabiting the moſt weſtern diſtrict of Macedon. Eurydicé inherited all the ambition of her race, and was diſtinguiſhed by a bold

[23] Diodorus et Juſtin. ubi ſupra.

intriguing ſpirit [24] ſtill more than by her beauty and accompliſhments. With her young ſons ſhe ſuddenly appeared before Iphicrates, in the ſuppli-cating form of calamity and woe; preſented the eldeſt to his hand, placed Philip, the younger, on his knee, and conjured him, by "the ſincere friend-ſhip which Amyntas had ever entertained for Athens and for himſelf, to pity their tender years, oppreſſed by cruel uſurpation." The dignity of her ſorrow prevailed with Iphicrates, who reſpected the ſacred ties of hoſpitality, and who ſaw the advantage that might accrue to Athens by gaining an intereſt in Macedon. We are not informed by what means he eſtabliſhed Perdiccas on the throne. The revolution was effected with ſuch rapidity [25], that we may ſuppoſe a ſudden inſurrection of the people, who, on important emergencies, were accuſtomed, as in the heroic ages, to aſſemble in arms. CHAP. XXXIII.

During the minority of the young prince, the kingdom was governed by his natural brother Ptolemy, whoſe ambition, unſatisfied with a delegated power, openly aſpired to reign. This uſurper (as we have related above) was dethroned by Pelopidas and the Thebans, who reinſtated Perdiccas in his dominions; and, in order to ſecure the dependence of Macedon on Thebes, carried into that city as hoſtages thirty Macedonian youths, and with them Philip, the younger brother of the king. Ptolemy dethroned by Pelopidas, who ſends Philip as a hoſtage to Thebes. A. C. 367.

Perdiccas ſeemed proud of his chain. Elated with the protection of the Thebans, then in the Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians.

[24] Juſtin. l. vii. c. iv.

[25] Cornel. Nepos, in Iphicrat. Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

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height of their prosperity, he forgot the gratitude due to Iphicrates and the Athenians; disputed the right of that people to Amphipolis, which had been acknowledged by the general council of Greece [26]; and his opposition rendered fruitless their well-directed endeavours to recover that important establishment. The Athenians found an avenger in Bardyllis the Illyrian, to whom Perdiccas had denied the tribute that had been paid by his predecessors Argæus and Alexander. Bardyllis maintained his claim by force of arms. The Macedonians met him in the field, but were totally defeated with the loss of four thousand men [27]. Perdiccas was taken prisoner, and soon after died of his wounds. His son Amyntas was an infant. Thebes having lost her pre-eminence in Greece, was unable to protect her distant allies. Athens was hostile, and Macedon, surrounded by enemies on every side, already experienced the fury of Barbarian invaders.

Macedon distra ed by two pretenders to the throne, and desolated by four foreign armies.

Not only the Illyrians and Bardyllis, who ravaged the west, but the Pæonians, a powerful and warlike tribe, having received some cause of offence from Perdiccas, now indulged their revenge, and insulted the northern frontier without interruption or control. The Thracians still supported the cause of Pausanias, whom they prepared to send back into Macedon at the head of a numerous army. Ptolemy was dead; but Argæus, the ancient competitor of king Amyntas, emboldened by the victory of the Illyrians, who had formerly placed him on the throne, renewed his pretensions

[26] Æschin. de falsâ Legat. [27] Diodor. l. xvi. sect. 2.

to that dignity; and, grown old in intrigue, eaſily perſuaded the Athenians, by the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, to exert themſelves in his favor, eſpecially againſt the ſon and brother of Perdiccas, by whoſe inſolence and ingratitude they were juſtly provoked and diſguſted. Impelled by ſuch motives, the Athenians launched their fleet, and ſailed towards the coaſt of Macedon, with three thouſand heavy-armed men, commanded by Mantias [28].

Amidſt theſe calamities Philip arrives in Macedon. Olymp. cv. 1. A. C. 360.

Such were the evils which threatened, and the calamities which oppreſſed, that unfortunate and diſtracted kingdom, when Philip appeared, aſſerting, unterrified, the rights of his infant nephew, againſt two candidates for the throne, and four formidable armies. A prince of leſs courage than Philip would have ſhrunk from a deſign ſeemingly deſperate and impracticable; and had courage been his principal virtue, he would have only heightened the diſorders which he hoped to remedy [29]. But on this emergency, the young Macedonian (for he was only in his twenty-third year [30]) diſplayed thoſe extraordinary abilities which diſtinguiſh his reign, and render it the moſt intereſting ſpectacle that hiſtory can preſent to thoſe who are delighted with ſurveying, not the vulgar revolutions of force and fortune, but the active energies and reſources of a vigorous and comprehenſive mind. Such was the obſcurity in which his merit had hitherto lain concealed from the

[28] Diodorus, ubi ſupra. [29] Olivier Vie de Philippe, p. 47.
[30] Comp. Diodor. p. 510. et Juſtin. l. ix. c. viii.

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His education and transactions preceding that period.

public, that hiſtorians [31] diſagree as to the place of his reſidence, when he was informed of the defeat and death of his brother Perdiccas. From the age of fifteen he had lived chiefly in Thebes, in the family, and under the direction of Epaminondas [32], whoſe leſſons and example could not fail to excite, in a kindred mind, the emulation of excellence, and the ardor of patriotiſm [33]. It is probable that, agreeably to the cuſtom of Greece and Rome, where the youth alternately frequented the ſchool and the camp, and might ſometimes find a ſchool of philoſophy in the tent of a general, that Philip accompanied the Theban hero in many of his military expeditions. It is certain that, attended ſuitably to his rank, he viſited the principal republics of Greece, whoſe inſtitutions in peace and war he examined with a ſagacity far ſuperior to his years [34]. The tactics of the Lacedæmonians were the firſt new eſtabliſhment which he introduced into Macedon. Nor was the improvement of his knowledge the only fruit of his travels. The brother of a king found an eaſy acceſs to whomever he had an intereſt to know and cultivate. Even in Athens, then hoſtile to Thebes, and naturally unfavorable

[31] Diodorus places him in Thebes; Athenæus, l. ii. p. 506, in Macedon; and adds, Διατρεφων δε ενταυθα δυναμιν, ως απεθανε Περδικκας, εξ ετοιμου, δυναμεως υπαρχουσης, επεπεσε τοις πραγμασι. Words which admirably correſpond to the rapid motions of Philip after the death of Perdiccas.

[32] Plutarch. in Pelopida.

[33] Plutarch ſpeaks with the partiality of a Bœotian for Epaminondas, and the reſentment of a native of Chæronea againſt Philip. See Plutarch. in Pelopid.

[34] Plutarch. in Alexand. Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

to a pupil of Epaminondas, Philip acquired the friendſhip and eſteem of Plato [35], Iſocrates [36], and Ariſtotle [37]; and the early connexion which he formed with the principal leaders of Athens, and the neighbouring republics, contributed, perhaps, in no ſmall degree, to the ſucceſs of his future deſigns [38]. CHAP. XXXIII.

His ſeaſonable appearance in Macedon, after the defeat and death of Perdiccas, ſuddenly changed the fortune of that ſeemingly devoted kingdom. Yet our admiration of Philip ought not to make us overlook the favorable circumſtances which ſeconded his abilities, and conſpired to promote his ſucceſs. The places of ſtrength built by Archelaus furniſhed a ſecure retreat to the remains of Perdiccas's army; the Macedonians, though conquered, were not ſubdued; they had conſiderable garriſons in the fortreſſes and walled towns ſcattered over the kingdom [39]; their whole forces had not been engaged in the unfortunate battle with the Illyrians [40]; and thoſe fierce invaders, impatient of delay, and only ſolicitous for plunder, having ravaged the open country, returned home to enjoy the fruits of their violence and rapine. They probably intended ſoon to aſſault Macedon with increaſed numbers, and to complete their devaſtations; but The Illyrians evacuate Macedon.

[35] Athenæux, l. xi. Ælian, l. iv. c. xix.

[36] Iſocratis Epiſtolæ, et Oratio ad Philipp.

[37] Ariſtotle at this time lived in the Academy with Plato, where, moſt probably, Philip firſt ſaw him. Dionyſ. Halicarnaſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

[38] Demoſthen. paſſim.

[39] Thucyd. l. xi. p. 168.

[40] Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

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they seem to have been alike incapable to concert or to pursue any permanent plan of conquest; and being distinguished, as historians relate, by their blooming complexions, active vigor, and longevity [41], they were not less distinguished by that irregular and capricious mode of acting, and that inattention to remote consequences, which characterize the manners of Barbarians.

State of Thrace and Pæonia.

The warriors of Pæonia and Thrace [42] were less formidable by their numbers, and equally contemptible for their ignorance and indocility. In early times, the Pæonians indeed had been regarded as a tribe less savage, and more considerable [43] than their Macedonian neighbours; but the former had remained stationary, in the rudeness of their primitive state, while the latter had been improved by a Grecian colony, and by frequent communication and intercourse with the Grecian republics. Of the Thracians we have had occasion to speak in the preceding parts of this work. The destructive ravages of Scuthes [44] represent the ordinary condition of that unsettled and inhospitable country, sometimes united under one chief, more frequently divided among many, whose mutual hostilities banished agriculture, industry, and every useful art. Exclusive of the Grecian settlements on the coast, Thrace contained not any city, nor even any considerable town. The Barbarian Cotys, who was

[41] Lucian. in Macrobiis, et Cornel. Alexand. apud Plinium, lib. vii. cap. clvii.

[42] Cornel. Nepos in Iphicrat. Xenoph. Anab. l. vii. p. 393.

[43] Hippocrat. de Epidem.

[44] See vol. iii. p. 381, et seqq.

dignified with the title of king, led a wandering life, encamping on the banks of rivers with his flocks and followers[45]. War and pasturage formed the only sources of his grandeur, and even the only means of his subsistence. CHAP. XXXIII.

Such were the first enemies with whom Philip had to contend. Their own capricious unsteadiness delivered him from the Illyrians. To the Pæonians, who ravaged the north, he either sent a deputation, or applied in person; and partly by bribes, partly by artful promises and flattery, persuaded the invaders to retire. The same arts prevailed with the selfish king of Thrace[46], whose avarice readily sacrificed the cause of Pausanias, while Philip thought the remaining wealth of Macedon usefully consumed in removing those barbarous foes, that he might resist, with undivided strength, the more formidable invasion of Argæus and the Athenians. Philip disarms the resentment of those countries.

The Athenian fleet already anchored before the harbour of Methoné; Argæus, with his numerous followers, had encamped in the province of Pieria; and their united forces prepared to march northward to Edessa, or Ægæ, the ancient capital of Macedon, where they expected to be joined by a powerful party, whom fear or inclination would bring to the standard of the banished king. The Macedonians Philip declared king of Macedon. Olymp. cv. 1. A.C. 360.

[45] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 331.

[46] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 3. Horace alludes to these events:

——— diffidit urbium
Portas vir Macedo, et subruit *æmulos*
Reges muneribus. Lib. iii. Ode 16.

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who adhered to the intereſt of Perdiccas, or rather of his infant ſon, had been diſpirited by the recent victory of the Illyrians, and the misfortunes conſequent on that event. But the manly exhortations, and undaunted deportment of Philip, rouſed them from their deſpair. They admired the dexterity with which he had diſarmed the reſentment of the Thracians and Pæonians. His graceful perſon, inſinuating addreſs, and winning affability, qualities which he poſſeſſed in a very uncommon degree[47], gained the affections of the Macedonians, who either recollected, or were ſtudiouſly reminded of, a prophecy[48], that announced great glory to their nation under the reign of the ſon of Amyntas. In an aſſembly held at Ægæ, they exclaimed, with one conſent, "This is the man whom the gods point out as the founder of the Macedonian greatneſs. The dangerous condition of the times admits not of an infant reign. Let us obey the celeſtial voice, and intruſt the ſceptre to hands alike worthy to hold, and able to defend it[49]." This propoſal ſeemed not extraordinary in a country which had been long accuſtomed to interruptions in the lineal order of ſucceſſion. Amyntas was ſet aſide, and Philip, who had hitherto poſſeſſed

[47] Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

[48] In the Sibylline verſes preſerved in Pauſanias (in Achaic.) Philip is named as the author of the Macedonian greatneſs, and the deſtruction of the kingdom is foretold under another Philip. Theſe verſes, though evidently compoſed after the event, ſerve to confirm the fact, that the ſuperſtition of the multitude was wrought upon for the purpoſes of Philip. Juſtin. l. vii. c. vi.

[49] Ibid. idem.

only the delegated power of regent, was inveſted with the royal title and authority [50].

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He defeats the pretender Argæus, and his Athenian auxiliaries.

While all ranks of men were thus animated with affectionate admiration of their young king, the obſolete claims of Argæus could only be maintained by arms. Attended by his Athenian allies, he marched towards Edeſſa; but that city ſhut its gates againſt him. Diſpirited by this repulſe, he made no farther attempts to gain admiſſion into any of the Macedonian cities, but directed his courſe backward to Methoné. Philip, who had now collected ſufficient ſtrength to take the field, haraſſed his retreat, cut his rear to pieces, and defeated him in a general engagement, in which Argæus himſelf fell, with the flower of his army. The reſt, whether Greeks or Barbarians, were made priſoners of war [51].

Uncommon treatment of the Athenian and Macedonian priſoners.

It was on this occaſion that Philip firſt diſplayed that deep and artful policy, which, in the courſe of a long reign, gained him ſuch a powerful aſcendant over the paſſions of other men, and enabled him uniformly to govern his own by the intereſt of his ambition. In the midſt of proſperity, his proud and lofty ſpirit muſt have been highly provoked by the Athenians, as well as by the followers of Argæus; and the barbarous maxims and practices which prevailed in that age, left him at full liberty to wreak his vengeance on the unhappy priſoners of both, who had fallen into his hands.

[50] Diodorus, l. xvi. ſect. 3.

[51] Diodorus, ibid. et Demoſth. in Ariſtocrat.

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But the intereſt of Philip required him rather to ſooth than to irritate the people of Athens, and to obtain by good offices (what he could not command by force) the confidence of his Macedonian ſubjects. The captives of the latter nation were called into his preſence, rebuked with gentleneſs and humanity, admitted to ſwear allegiance to their new maſter, and promiſcuouſly diſtributed in the body of his army. The Athenian priſoners were treated in a manner ſtill more extraordinary [52]. Inſtead of demanding any ranſom for their perſons, he reſtored their baggage unexamined, and entertained them at his table with ſuch condeſcending hoſpitality, that they returned home, full of admiration for the young king, and deeply perſuaded of his attachment and reſpect for their republic [53].

Philip amuſes the Athenians with a treaty of peace and friendſhip. Olymp. cv. 2. A. C. 359.

They had only time to blaze forth the praiſes of Philip, when his ambaſſadors arrived at Athens [54]. He knew that the loſs of Amphipolis principally excited the reſentment of the Athenians; he knew that the intereſt of Macedon required that reſentment to be appeaſed. Impreſſed with theſe ideas, he renounced all juriſdiction over Amphipolis,

[52] The fair ſide of Philip's character is deſcribed by Diodor. l. xvi. p. 510, et ſeqq. and 539. By Juſt. l. ix. c. viii. The moſt diſadvantageous deſcription of him is given by Demoſthenes, paſſim, and by Athenæus, l. iv. c. xix. l. vi. c. xvii. et l. x. c. x. Cicero ſeems not to have regarded the aſſertions of Demoſthenes, when, in ſpeaking of Philip and Alexander, he ſays, "Alter ſemper magnus, alter ſæpe turpiſſimus. But the artificial character of Philip, which varied with his intereſt, merits neither the panegyrics nor invectives too liberally beſtowed on it.

[53] Demoſthenes in Ariſtocrat. [54] Ibid.

which was formally declared a free and independent city, ſubject only to the government of its own equitable laws [55]. This meaſure, together with the diſtinguiſhed treatment of the Athenian priſoners, inſured the ſucceſs of his embaſſy. An ancient treaty was renewed, that had long ſubſiſted between his father Amyntas and the Athenians. That capricious and unſteady people, not leſs ſuſceptible of gratitude, than prone to anger, were thus lulled into repoſe, at a time when Fortune having placed them at the head of Greece, both their preſent power and ancient glory urged them to take the front of the battle againſt Philip. Confiding in the inſidious treaty with that prince, they engaged in a ruinous war with their allies [56]; and ceaſed, during ſeveral years, to make any oppoſition to the ambitious deſigns of the Macedonian. CHAP. XXXIII.

Philip inſtitutes the order of δορυφοροι, *ſpearmen, companions.* Olymp. cv. 2. A. C. 359.

The young king having given ſuch illuſtrious proofs of his abilities in negociation and war, availed himſelf of the affectionate admiration of his ſubjects to eſtabliſh, during a ſeaſon of tranquillity, ſuch inſtitutions as might maintain and extend his own power, and confirm the ſolid grandeur of Macedon. The laws and maxims which prevailed in the heroic ages, and which, as we have already obſerved, had been early introduced into that kingdom, circumſcribed the royal authority within very narrow bounds. The chiefs and nobles, eſpecially in the more remote provinces, regarded themſelves as the rivals and equals of their ſovereign. In

[55] Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. 17. [56] See vol. iv. p. xxxii.

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foreign war they followed his ſtandard, but they often ſhook his throne by domeſtic ſedition; and, amidſt the ſcanty materials for explaining the internal ſtate of Macedon in ancient times, we may diſcover ſeveral inſtances in which they diſavowed their allegiance, and aſſumed independent government over conſiderable diſtricts of the country [57]. The moment of glory and ſucceſs ſeemed the moſt favorable for extinguiſhing this dangerous ſpirit, and quaſhing the proud hopes of the nobles. In this deſign Philip proceeded with that artful policy which characterizes his reign. From the braveſt of the Macedonian youth, he choſe a ſelect body of *companions* [58], who, being diſtinguiſhed by honorable appellations, and entertained at the royal table, attended the king's perſon in war and in hunting. Their intimacy with the ſovereign, which was regarded as a proof of their merit, obliged them to ſuperior diligence in all the ſevere duties of a military life [59]. The noble youth, animated with the hope of glory, vied with each other to gain admiſſion into this diſtinguiſhed order; and while, on one hand, they ſerved as hoſtages [60] for the allegiance of their families, they formed, on the other, a uſeful ſeminary of future generals [61], who, after conquering for Philip and Alexander,

[57] Strabo, l. vii. p. 326. Xenoph. Hiſt. Græc. l. v.

[58] Arrian, et Ælian. [59] Ælian, l. xiv. c. 49

[60] Arrian ſays, "των εν τελει Μακεδονων τους παιδας," "the ſons of men in office;" which well agrees with the idea of their being hoſtages for the fidelity of their parents. He alſo aſcribes the inſtitution to Philip. Εκ Φιλιππου ην καθεστηκος. Arrian, l. iv. p. 89.

[61] Curtius, l. viii. c. 6.

at length conquered for themſelves, and divided the ſpoils of the ancient world.

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It is ignorantly ſaid by ſome writers [62], that Philip, in the firſt year of his reign, invented the phalanx, a body of ſix thouſand men, armed with ſhort ſwords, fit either for cutting or thruſting; ſtrong bucklers, four feet in length, and two and a half in breadth; and pikes fourteen cubits long, which, uſually arranged ſixteen deep, formed the main battle of the Macedonians. But this is nothing different from the armor and arrangement which had always prevailed among the Greeks, and which Philip adopted in their moſt perfect form; nor is there reaſon to think that a prince, who knew the danger of changing what the experience of ages had approved, made any alteration in the weapons or tactics of that people [63]. His attention was more judiciouſly directed to procure, in ſufficient abundance, arms, horſes, and other neceſſary inſtruments of war; in reviewing and

His military arrangements.

[62] Diodorus Siculus, l. xvi. ſ. 3. and all the Roman writers of Greek hiſtory. It was natural for the Romans, who began to know Greece and Macedon almoſt at the ſame time, and who found the phalanx moſt complete in the latter, to ſuppoſe it invented in that country.

[63] The improvement in the countermarch, to which Philip gave the appearance of advancing, inſtead of retreating, mentioned by Ælian in his tactics, c. xxviii. was borrowed, as this author tells us, from the Lacedæmonians. If Philip increated the phalanx, uſually leſs numerous, to ſix thouſand men, this was far from an improvement; and the latter kings of Macedon, who ſwelled it to ſixteen thouſand, only rendered that order of battle more unwieldy and inconvenient. The higheſt perfection of Grecian tactics is to be found in Xenophon's expedition. See vol. iii. c. xxvi. p. 354, et ſeqq. See alſo Polyb. l. xvii. p. 764. et Liv. l. xliv. c. 40.

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exerciſing his troops; and in accuſtoming them to that auſtere and laborious life [84], which is the beſt preparation for the field.

Conquers Pæonia. Olymp. cv. 3. A. C. 358.

The military reſources which his activity had provided, his ambition did not allow to remain long unemployed. The death of Agis, the moſt warlike chieftain, or, as he is called by an hiſtorian [85], king of the Pæonians, drew Philip into the field, to revenge recent injuries which thoſe Barbarians had inflicted on Macedon. Among a people where the laws of peace or war are neglected or unknown, almoſt every thing depends on the precarious character of their leaders. Deprived of the valor of Agis, the Pæonians loſt all hopes of defence. Philip over-ran their country without reſiſtance; carried off ſlaves and plunder; impoſed a tribute on their chiefs; took hoſtages; and reduced Pæonia to an abſolute dependence on Macedon.

Defeats the Illyrians, and extends his territory to the Ionian ſea.

It is probable that, according to the practice of the age, he permitted or required a certain number of the vanquiſhed to follow his ſtandard; but the Pæonians were no ſooner reduced, than Philip, to whom all ſeaſons ſeemed alike proper for war, undertook a winter's campaign againſt Bardyllis and the Illyrians, the hereditary enemies of his family and kingdom. He marched towards the frontier of Illyria [86] at the head of ten thouſand

[84] Polyænus, l. iv. c. 3. Frontin. Strat. l. iv. c. 1.

[85] Diodorus, l. xvi. ſect. 4.

[86] The Greek name of this country is Ἰλλυρίς, but more commonly οἱ Ἰλλυριοι, from its inhabitants. Vid. Arrian, l. i. paſſim.

foot

foot and six hundred horse, and, before entering the country, animated the resentment and valor of his troops by a military oration, after the custom of the Greeks, whose manners he seemed, on every occasion, ambitious to imitate. Indignation of past injuries, the honor of his subjects, and the glory of his crown, might be topics proper to influence the Macedonian soldiers[a], who could not fully enter into the more refined motives of their sovereign. Illyria had been extended on the east, to the prejudice of Macedon, which it totally excluded from the excellent harbours on the Hadriatic[b]. This was an important consideration to a prince, who seems to have early meditated the raising of a naval power. Beside this, it was impossible for Philip to undertake with safety the other measures which he had in view, should he leave his kingdom exposed to the predatory incursions of a neighbouring enemy, who, unless they feared Macedon, must always be formidable to that country. Directed by such solid principles of policy, rather than governed by resentment, or allured by the splendor of victory, Philip proceeded

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The Latin name is *Illyricum*; most English writers of ancient history use *Illyria*, probably from the French *Illyrie*. The Greek Ἰλλυρὶς is described by Strabo, l. vii. p. 317. It comprehended the eastern shore of the Hadriatic, between Epirus and Istria. The Latin *Illyricum* had a signification far more extensive. See Gibbon's History, vol. i. p. 28.

[a] The heads of the speech are given, indirectly, in the fragments of Theopompus.

[b] Strabo says, ἁπάντων τῶν Ἰλλυρικῶν (scilicet) χωρῶν εὐθέως εὐλιμένων ἐστί; and adds, that the shore of Illyria is as abundant, as the opposite coast of Italy is defective, in good harbours. Strabo l. vii.

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forward, with the caution neceſſary to be obſerved in a hoſtile territory. After a fruitleſs negociation, Bardyllis met him in the field with an adequate body of infantry, but with only four hundred horſe. The preciſe ſcene of the engagement is unknown. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the Illyrian column[69] in front, while the targeteers and light-armed troops galled its flanks, and the cavalry haraſſed its rear. The Illyrians, thus ſurrounded on every ſide, were cruſhed between two oppoſite aſſaults, without having an opportunity to exert their full ſtrength[70]. Their reſiſtance, however, muſt have been vigorous, ſince ſeven thouſand were left on the field of battle, and with them their gallant leader Bardyllis, who fell, at the age of ninety, fighting bravely on horſeback. The loſs of their experienced chief, and of the flower of their youthful warriors, broke the ſtrength and courage of the Illyrian tribes, who ſent a deputation to Philip, humbly craving peace, and ſubmitting their fortune to the will of the conqueror. Philip granted them the ſame terms[71] which he

[69] The Illyrians were drawn up in the order of battle called πλινθιον, from πλινθος, a brick; which clearly points out its form.

[70] Frontinus Stratag. l. ii. c. 3.

[71] It ſhould ſeem from Diodorus, that the Illyrians had entertained the ſame ſuperſtitious terror of neglecting the interment of the dead, which prevailed among the Greeks. Yet Diodorus, perhaps, only uſed a privilege too common among hiſtorians, of transferring their own feelings to thoſe concerning whom they write. He ſays, that Philip "reſtored their dead, and erected a trophy." Pauſanias (in Bœotic.) denies that either Philip or his ſon Alexander ever erected any of thoſe monuments of victory; which practice, he ſays, was contrary to a Macedonian maxim,

had lately impoſed on the Pæonians. *That* part of their country which lies eaſt of the lake Lychnidus he joined to Macedon, and probably built a town and ſettled a colony on the ſide of the lake, which watered a fertile country, and abounded in different kinds of fiſh, highly eſteemed by the ancients. The town and lake of Lychnidus were fifty miles diſtant from the Ionian ſea; but ſuch was the aſcendant that the arms and policy of Philip acquired over his neighbours, that the inhabitants of the intermediate diſtrict ſoon adopted the language and manners of their conquerors; and their territory, hitherto unconnected with any foreign power, ſunk into ſuch an abſolute dependence on Macedon, that many ancient geographers conſidered it as a province of that country [73].

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Philip's deſigns againſt Amphipolis. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

Having ſettled the affairs of Illyria, Philip returned home, not to enjoy the ſweets of victory and repoſe, but to purſue more important and more arduous deſigns than thoſe which he had hitherto carried on with ſuch ſignal ſucceſs. He had ſecured and extended the northern and weſtern frontier of Macedon; but the rich ſouthern ſhores, chiefly inhabited by Greeks, preſented at once a more tempting prize, and a more formidable enemy. The confederacy of Olynthus, having thrown off

eſtabliſhed as early as the time of Caranus, when a lion having overturned one of his trophies, the wiſe founder of the monarchy regarded this event as a warning to forbear raiſing them in future. But the medals of Philip and Alexander, of which the reverſe is ſometimes charged with trophies, refute the aſſertion of Pauſanias; which is likewiſe contradicted by Arrian, Curtius, and all the writers of the life, or expedition, of Alexander.

[73] Strabo, l. vii. p. 327.

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the yoke of Sparta, had become more powerful than ever. It could ſend into the field ten thouſand heavy-armed men, and a large body of well-diſciplined cavalry. Moſt towns of the Chalcidicé had become its allies or ſubjects; and this populous and wealthy province, together with Pangæus on the right, and Pieria on the left, the cities of both which were either independent, or ſubject to the Athenians, formed a barrier ſufficient not only to guard the Grecian ſtates againſt Macedon, but even to threaten the ſafety of that kingdom. Every motive concurred to direct the active policy of Philip towards acquiſitions immediately neceſſary in themſelves, and eſſential to the completion of his remote purpoſes. In the courſe of twenty years he accompliſhed his deſigns, and conquered Greece; often varying his means; never changing his end; and notwithſtanding the circumſtances and events that continually thwarted his ambition, we behold the opening and gradual progreſs of a vaſt plan, every ſtep in which paved the way for that which followed, till the whole ended in the moſt ſignal triumph, perhaps, ever attained by human prudence, over courage and fortune.

Importance of that place.

The importance of Olynthus and Chalcidicé could not divert the ſagacity of Philip from Amphipolis, which he regarded as a more neceſſary, though leſs ſplendid, conqueſt. The poſſeſſion of Amphipolis, which would connect Macedon with the ſea, and ſecure to that kingdom many commercial advantages, opened a road to the woods and mines of mount Pangæus, the former of which

was so essential to the raising of a naval power, and the latter to the forming and keeping on foot a sufficient military force. The place itself Philip in the beginning of his reign had declared independent, to avoid a rupture with the Athenians, who still asserted their pretensions to their ancient colony. But their measures to regain Amphipolis had hitherto been rendered ineffectual by the caprice or perfidy of Charidemus, a native of Eubœa, who, from the common level of a soldier of fortune, had risen to the command of a considerable body of mercenaries, frequently employed by the indolence and licentiousness of the Athenians, a people extremely averse both to the fatigue and restraint of personal service. They determined, however, to renew their attempts for recovering their dominion, while the Amphipolitans, having tasted the sweets of liberty, prepared to maintain their independence. CHAP. XXXIII.

Amphipolis enters into the Olynthian confederacy.

In this posture of affairs, the hostile designs of Philip, which all his artifice had not been able to conceal from the suspicious jealousy of the new republic, alarmed the magistrates of Amphipolis, and obliged them to seek protection from the Olynthians, who readily admitted them into their confederacy. Emboldened by this alliance, they set at defiance the menaces of their neighbouring, as well as of their more distant, enemy; and their imprudent insolence readily furnished Philip with specious grounds of hostility. The Olynthians perceived that the indignation of this prince must soon break forth into action, and overwhelm the

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Amphipolitans; while they themſelves might be involved in the ruin of their new confederate. To anticipate this danger, they ſent ambaſſadors to Athens, requeſting an alliance with that republic againſt the natural enemy of both ſtates, and an enemy whoſe ſucceſsful activity rendered him a juſt object of terror.

The intrigues of Philip prevent an alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

This alliance, had it taken place, muſt have given a fatal blow to the riſing greatneſs of Macedon, which as yet was incapable to contend with the united ſtrength of Olynthus and Athens. The ſpies and emiſſaries of Philip (for he had already begun to employ thoſe odious, but neceſſary, inſtruments of policy) immediately gave the alarm. The prince himſelf was deeply ſenſible of the danger, and determined to repel it with equal vigor and celerity. His agents reached Athens before any thing was concluded with the Olynthian deputies. The popular leaders and orators were bribed and gained; the magiſtrates and ſenate were flattered and deceived by the moſt plauſible declarations and promiſes. A negociation was immediately ſet on foot, by which Philip ſtipulated to conquer Amphipolis for the Athenians, on condition that they ſurrendered to him Pydna, a place of far leſs importance. He promiſed, beſides, to confer many other advantages on the republic, which it was not proper at preſent to mention, but which time would reveal[98]. Amuſed by the artifices

[98] Και το φιλτατον ποτε αυτοις χαρισασθαι τουτον. Demoſthen. Olynth. I. p. 5. edit. Wolfii. It is ſtrange that Wolfius has changed the order of the Olynthian orations, ſo diſtinctly marked by Dion. Halicarn. in his letter to Ammæus.

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of the Macedonian, deceived by the perfidy of their own magiſtrates, and elated with the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, the great object of their ambition, the ſenate of the Five Hundred (for the tranſaction was carried on with ſuch haſte as allowed not time for aſſembling the people) rejected with diſdain the overtures of the Olynthians [74], who returned home diſguſted and indignant.

Artifices by which he gained the Olynthians.

They had ſcarcely time to communicate to their countrymen the angry paſſions which agitated their own breaſts, when the ambaſſadors of Philip craved audience in the aſſembly of Olynthus. That artful prince affected to condole with the Olynthians on the affront which they had received from the inſolence of Athens; but at the ſame time teſtified his ſurpriſe, that they ſhould condeſcend to court the diſtant protection of that proud republic, when they might find in Macedon an ally near at hand, who wiſhed for nothing more earneſtly than to enter into equal and laſting engagements with their confederacy. As a proof of his moderation and ſincerity, he offered immediately to put them in poſſeſſion of Anthemus, a town of ſome importance in their neighbourhood, the juriſdiction of which had long been claimed by the kings of Macedon [75]; at the ſame time aſſuring them of his intentions to deſerve their gratitude by ſtill more important ſervices, and particularly by employing his arms to

[74] Demoſthenes expreſſes it in the ſtrongeſt terms, as if they had driven the Olynthians from Athens: "ὅτε Ὀλυνθίους ἐξεπολεμοῦν τινες ἐνθένδε." Demoſthen. Olynth. i. p. 6.

[75] Demoſthen. Philip. ii. 4.

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reduce the cities of Pydna and Potidæa, commanding the oppoſite ſides of the Thermaic gulph; places, therefore, of conſiderable value, which he wiſhed to ſee dependent on Olynthus, rather than, as at preſent, ſubject to Athens.

Philip beſieges Amphipolis. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

The immediate offers of Philip, his profeſſions and promiſes, in which, as they ſuited his intereſt, he doubtleſs was ſincere, and ſtill more, his ſecret practices with ſome powerful men of Olynthus, effectually prevailed with that republic to abandon the cauſe of Amphipolis, whoſe imprudent inhabitants had been at little pains to prevent thoſe offences and complaints which naturally ariſe between the jealous members of an unequal confederacy. By theſe intrigues, the Macedonian not only removed all oppoſition to his views on the part of the Olynthians, but acquired the ſincere friendſhip of that people, who were ready to aſſiſt his arms, and to ſecond his moſt ambitious deſigns. He therefore prepared for action, becauſe he might now act with ſafety; marched rapidly towards Amphipolis, and preſſed that city with a vigorous ſiege. The inhabitants, deeply affected by the near proſpect of a calamity which they had taken little care to prevent, had recourſe, in their diſtreſs, to Athens. Thither they diſpatched Hierax and Stratocles, two of their moſt diſtinguiſhed citizens, to repreſent the danger of an alliance between Philip and Olynthus; to entreat the Athenians to accept the ſincere repentance of their unfortunate colony, and once more to take Amphipolis under the protection of their fleet.

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At that time the Athenians were deeply engaged in the ſocial war; yet the hopes of recovering ſo important a ſettlement might have directed their attention to Macedon, had not the vigilant policy of Philip ſent them a letter, renewing the aſſurances of his friendſhip, acknowledging their pretenſions to the city, which he actually beſieged, and of which he artfully ſaid, that, in terms of his recent engagement, he hoped ſhortly to put them in poſſeſſion. Amuſed by theſe inſinuating repreſentations, the Athenians treated the deputies of Amphipolis with as little reſpect as they had lately done thoſe of Olynthus. The beſieged city was thus deprived of all hopes of relief; Philip preſſed the attack with new vigor; a breach was made in the wall; and the Amphipolitans, after an obſtinacy of defence which could have no other effect than to provoke the reſentment of the conqueror, at length ſurrendered at diſcretion [76].

Amuſes the Athenians.

Amphipolis ſurrenders. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357. Is annexed to Macedon.

The prudent Macedonian always preferred his own profit to the puniſhment of his enemies. It was his intereſt to preſerve and to aggrandize, not to depopulate, Amphipolis. He baniſhed a few daring leaders, whoſe ſeditious or patriotic ſpirit might diſturb the meaſures of his government. The bulk of the citizens were treated with ſufficient mildneſs. Their territory was reunited to Macedon, from which Philip reſolved that it ſhould never be diſmembered, notwithſtanding his promiſes to the Athenians.

[76] Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. Demoſthen. Olynth. iii. ſect. 4—7.

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Philip puts the Olynthians in poſſeſſion of Pydna and Potidæa.

That he might arm himſelf againſt the reſentment of a people, whom, if he could not deceive, he was determined to defy, he cultivated, with great earneſtneſs, the Olynthian confederacy; and having beſieged and taken the towns of Pydna and Potidæa, he readily ceded them to the Olynthians, who had but feebly aſſiſted him in making theſe conqueſts. In the whole tranſaction Philip affected to act merely as an auxiliary. The Athenian garriſon in Potidæa, who had ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war, he took under his immediate protection, and diſmiſſed them without ranſom, artfully lamenting that the neceſſity of his affairs, and his alliance with Olynthus, obliged him to oppoſe the intereſts of their republic, for which he entertained the moſt ſincere reſpect [77].

Philip purſues his conqueſts in Thrace.

It is impoſſible that the Athenians, weak and credulous as they were, ſhould have been the dupes of this groſs artifice. But they could not immediately withdraw their exertions from the ſocial war, the events of which grew continually more unproſperous. Philip, ever vigilant and active, profited of this favorable diverſion, to purſue his conqueſts in Thrace, to which the poſſeſſion of Amphipolis afforded him an opening. In the beginning of his reign, he had found it neceſſary to purchaſe a peace from Cotys, who ſtill governed that country, but from whom Philip could not actually apprehend any formidable oppoſition. The late acquaintance of that Barbarian with the Grecian

[77] Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. et Demoſth. Philip. ii. et Olynth. i.

religion and manners, which he had adopted in consequence of his connexion with Iphicrates and the Athenians, served only to deprave his faculties and to cloud his reason. We should pronounce absolutely mad, the man who fancied himself enamoured of Minerva; but the ancients, who believed that the gods often appeared in a human form, regarded with more tenderness this frantic enthusiasm. Cotys was allowed to possess his freedom and his crown, whether, with his ambulatory court, he traversed the inhospitable mountains of Thrace, or pitched his tents on the fragrant banks of the Strymon or the Nessus; or, to enjoy with more privacy the favors of his celestial mistress, penetrated into the deep recesses of the beautiful forests which adorned his kingdom. CHAP. XXXIII.

Takes possession of the gold-mines at Crenidæ, afterwards called Philippi. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

At the approach of the Macedonians, having abandoned the grove of Onocarsis, the favorite scene of his wild and romantic enjoyments [78], he endeavoured to stop the progress of the enemy by a letter; but a letter from such a man could excite nothing but ridicule or pity. Philip penetrated eastward thirty miles beyond Amphipolis, to the town of Crenidæ, situated at the foot of Mount Pangæus, and distant ten miles from the sea. He admired the solitary beauty of the place, which being bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by lofty mountains, was watered by many streams and rivulets, which, tempering the dryness of the soil, produced the finest and most delicious

[78] Theopomp. apud Athenæum, l. xii. p. 531.

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fruit and flowers, especially roses, of a peculiar hue and fragrancy. But the attention of Philip was attracted by objects more important, by the gold-mines in that neighbourhood, formerly wrought by colonies from Thasos and from Athens, but totally neglected since the ignorant Thracians had become masters of Crenidæ. Philip expelled those Barbarians from a possession which they seemed unworthy to hold. Having descended into the gold-mines, he traced, by the help of torches, the decayed labors of the ancient proprietors. By his care the water was drained off; the canals, broken or choaked up, were repaired; and the bosom of the earth was again opened and ransacked [79] with eager avidity by a prince who well knew the value of the precious metals. A Macedonian colony was planted at Crenidæ, which thenceforth assumed the name of Philippi [80], a name bestowed also on the golden coins struck by order of Philip [81], to the annual amount of nearly a thousand talents, or two hundred thousand pounds sterling [82].

Philip settles the affairs of Thessaly.

Having effected the main purpose of his Thracian expedition, the prudence of Philip set bounds

[79] Senec. Natur. Quæst. l. v. p. 760. et Demosthen. in Leptin.

[80] The fatal defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius have eclipsed, in their melancholy splendor, all the preceding events which distinguish Philippi. There liberty expired, and virtue yielded to force.

Cum fracta virtus, et minaces
Turpe solum tetigere mento. HORACE.

[81] Regale numisma Philippos.

[82] Diodor. l. xvi. c. ix. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. speaks differently; but the whole of that chapter bears evident marks of ignorance and error.

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to his conquests in that country, and carried his arms into Thessaly, which, by the murder of Alexander of Pheræ, had got three tyrants instead of one. These were, Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron, the brothers-in-law, the assassins, and the successors of Alexander. The resentment of the Thessalians, and the valor of the Macedonian troops, totally defeated those oppressors of their country, who were reduced to such humiliating terms as seemed sufficient to prevent them from being thenceforth formidable either to their own subjects or to their neighbours [83]. The Thessalians, who were susceptible of all impressions, but incapable of preserving any, concluded, in the first emotions of their gratitude, an agreement with their deliverer, by which they surrendered to him the revenues arising from their fairs and towns of commerce, as well as all the conveniences of their harbours and shipping; and extraordinary as this cession was, Philip found means to render it effectual and permanent [84].

Advantages which he derived from that country.

He immediately contracted an alliance with Arybbas, king of Epirus, a small principality which skirted the western frontier of Thessaly. In his excursions from Thebes, Philip had early seen Olympias, the sister of that prince, whose wit and spirit, joined to the lively graces of her youth and beauty, had made a deep impression on his heart. They were initiated, at the same time, in the mysteries of Ceres, during the triennial festival in the

Philip marries Olympias. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

[83] Diodor. l. xvi. c. xiv. et Plut. in Pelopid.

[84] Demosth. Philip. I. 10. Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. xix.

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isle of Samothrace, which had been long as much distinguished as Eleusis [85] itself, by the peculiar worship and protection of this bountiful goddess. But the active ambition which employed and engrossed the first years of Philip's reign had probably banished the memory of his love, when his expedition into Thessaly recalled the image of Olympias. Their first interview naturally revived his tender passions; and as the kings of Epirus were lineally descended from Achilles, the match appeared every way suitable; Arybbas readily yielded his consent, and the beautiful princess was conducted into Macedon [86].

During the solemnities of his nuptials, the neighbouring princes take arms.

The nuptials of Philip were solemnized at Pella with unusual pomp and splendor. Several months were destined to religious shows and processions, to gymnastic games and exercises, to musical and dramatic entertainments. The young and fortunate prince naturally took a principal share in all these scenes of festivity; and it is probable that, amidst the more elegant amusements of his court, Philip might discover that strong propensity to vicious indulgence, that delight in buffoons and flatterers, and other disgraceful ministers of his more criminal pleasures, which, however counteracted and balanced by his ambition and magnanimity, disgraced and tarnished the succeeding glories of his reign. It is certain that the voluptuous inactivity in which he seemed sunk, encouraged the hopes of his enemies [87]. The tributary princes of

[85] See vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 192.
[86] Justin. l. vii. c. vi.
[87] Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

Pæonia and Illyria prepared to rebel; the king of Thrace engaged in their deſigns, which were concerted with more caution than is uſual with Barbarians; and this general conſpiracy of neighbouring ſtates might have repreſſed for a while the fortune of Macedon, if Philip had not been ſeaſonably informed of the danger by his faithful partiſans and emiſſaries in thoſe countries. CHAP. XXXIII.

Philip quashes their conſpiracy. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.

Early in the enſuing ſpring he took the field with the flower of the Macedonian troops. Parmenio, the general in whom he had moſt confidence, cruſhed the rebellion in Illyria. Philip was equally ſucceſsful in Pæonia and Thrace. While he returned from the latter, he was informed of the victory of Parmenio. A ſecond meſſenger acquainted him that his horſes had gained the prize in the chariot-races at the Olympic games; a victory which he regarded as far more honorable, and which, as it proved him a legitimate ſon of Greece, he carefully commemorated, by impreſſing a chariot on his coins. Almoſt at the ſame time a third meſſenger arrived to tell him that Olympias had brought forth a prince at Pella; to whom, as born amidſt ſuch auſpicious circumſtances, the diviners announced the greateſt proſperity [88] and glory.

Philip's letter to Ariſtotle, announcing the birth of Alexander.

Such a rapid tide of good fortune did not overſet the wiſdom of Philip, if we may judge by the firſt authentic tranſaction which immediately followed thoſe events. This was the correſpondence

[88] Plut. in Alexand.

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with Ariſtotle the philoſopher, whoſe merit Philip had early diſcerned at Athens, when he ſtill reſided with his maſter Plato. The firſt letter (fortunately preſerved) is written with a brevity which marks the king and the man of genius. "Know that a ſon is born to us. We thank the gods, not ſo much for their gift, as for beſtowing it at a time when Ariſtotle lives. We aſſure ourſelves that you will form him a prince worthy of his father, and worthy of Macedon." Ariſtotle commenced this illuſtrious employment about thirteen years afterwards [89], when the opening mind of Alexander might be ſuppoſed capable of receiving the benefit of his inſtructions. The ſucceſs of his labors will be explained in the ſequel. The fortune of Alexander ſurpaſſed that of all other conquerors as much as his virtues ſurpaſſed his fortune.

[89] The chronology appears from Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus's letter to Ammæus, who, in order to prove that Demoſthenes had attained the higheſt perfection in the practice, before Ariſtotle had delivered the theory, of eloquence, marks, with great exactneſs, the principal events in the lives of the philoſopher and orator. Ariſtotle, a native of Stagira, came to Athens in his eighteenth year, 367 A. C. There he continued twenty years, as the ſcholar or aſſiſtant of Plato, who died 348 A. C. Ariſtotle left Athens on the death of his maſter, and ſpent three years at Atarnæus, and two at Mytelene. From thence he went to Macedon, in the forty-third year of his age, and 343 years A. C. He was employed eight years in the education of Alexander. He returned to Athens 335 A. C. taught twelve years in the Lyceum, and died the year following at Chalcis, ætat. ſixty-three, A. C. 323, and a year after the death of Alexander. Dionyſius ad Ammæum. He reckons by the Archons of Athens; I have ſubſtituted the years before Chriſt.

Yet

Yet the fame of the philoſopher abundantly repays the honor reflected on him by his royal pupil, ſince ſixteen centuries after the ſubverſion of Alexander's empire, the writings of Ariſtotle ſtill maintained an unexampled aſcendant over the opinions, and even over the actions of men. CHAP. XXXIII.

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Philip's Proſperity. — Imprudent Meaſures of the Amphictyonic Council. — The Phocian, or Sacred War.. — Philomelus ſeizes the Temple of Delphi. — Takes the Field againſt the Thebans and their Allies. — Defeat and Death of Philomelus. — Affairs of Thrace, Macedon, and Attica. — Onemarchus takes the Command of the Phocians. — Encounters Philip in Theſſaly. — He is defeated and ſlain. — Philip's Deſigns againſt Olynthus and Byzantium. — Traverſed by the Athenians. — Phayllus takes the Command of the Phocians. — Philip marches towards Thermopylæ. — Anticipated by the Athenians. — Demoſthenes's firſt Philippic. — Philip's Occupations at Pella. — His Vices — and Policy.

CHAP. XXXIV. Proſperity of Philip in the fifth year of his reign. Olymp. cvii. 1. A. C. 356.

PHILIP had now reigned almoſt five years. He had greatly enlarged the boundaries, he had ſtill more augmented the revenues, of his kingdom. Pæonia, no longer the rival, was become an obſequious province of Macedon. At the expenſe of Thrace and Illyria, he had extended his frontier on the eaſt to the ſea of Thaſos; on the weſt to the lake Lychnidus. He was maſter of Theſſaly without having the trouble to govern it. He ſecured many commercial advantages by the poſſeſſion of Amphipolis. His troops were

numerous and well disciplined; his large finances were regulated with œconomy; and the mines of Philippi furnished him with an annual resource alike useful to his designs, whether he pursued the ambitious career of foreign conquest, or set himself to build up and consolidate the internal grandeur of his dominions. CHAP. XXXIV.

His profound and impenetrable policy.

The power of Philip was admired, and feared, by those who were unable to penetrate the deep principles of his policy, which alone rendered him really formidable. The first and most natural object of his desire was the territory of Olynthus, the most populous and fertile portion of the Macedonian coast. His second and far more arduous purpose was to obtain the sovereignty of Greece. But instead of discovering these designs, he had hitherto cultivated the Olynthians with a careful assiduity, and had deserved their gratitude by many solid and important services. His success had been complete, and if, elated by the many advantages which we have enumerated, he had already prepared to invade Greece, it is more than probable that the Olynthians would have consented to follow his standard. But Philip was sensible, that by snatching too eagerly at this glorious prize, he might destroy for ever his prospect of obtaining it. While the Athenians were occupied and harassed by the destructive war with their confederates, he had, indeed, embraced the opportunity to gain possession of several of their dependent settlements in Thrace and Macedon; coloring, however, these proceedings by the pretence of justice or necessity,

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and tempering even his hoſtilities by many partial acts of kindneſs and reſpect. Before the ſocial war was ended, the ſeeds of diſſenſion, ſo profuſely ſcattered in Greece, were likely to ripen into a new quarrel far more general and important. Philip patiently waited their maturity. His hopes were founded on the domeſtic animoſities of Greece; but the too early diſcovery of his ſyſtem might have united a hundred thouſand[1] warriors againſt their common enemy; whereas, by the ſecret refinements of a ſlow and ſteady policy, he effected his vaſt purpoſes without being obliged, on any one occaſion, to fight againſt thirty thouſand men.

He carefully watches the imprudent meaſures of the Amphictyonic council;

The Amphictyons having recovered their authority in conſequence of the events which have formerly been deſcribed, began early to diſplay thoſe dangerous paſſions with which the exerciſe of uncontrolled power too naturally corrupts the heart. They pretended, that during the decline of their juriſdiction, many unwarrantable abuſes had been introduced, which it became them to remedy. The rights of religion (they ſaid), which it was their firſt duty to maintain, had been materially violated by the Phocians, who, alike regardleſs of the deciſion of the oracle, and of an Amphictyonic decree, had ploughed lands conſecrated to

[1] The number is choſen as a very *moderate* medium between the two hundred and twenty thouſand men, afterwards promiſed to Philip in the general convention of the States at Corinth for the ſervice of the Perſian expedition, and the eighty thouſand which the Greeks actually raiſed againſt Xerxes, and which Thucydides ſays, that the Peloponneſian confederacy alone could ſend into Attica.

Apollo, and therefore withdrawn from agriculture[2]. These lands, however, were confined to the narrow diſtrict between the river Cephiſſus and Mount Thurium, on the weſtern frontier of Bœotia. The crime of the Phocians (if their uſeful labors deſerve the name of crime) was neither great nor unprecedented, ſince the Locrians of Amphiſſa had long cultivated the Criſſæan plain; a more extenſive territory, and conſecrated to the god by far more awful ceremonies[3]. But the proud tyranny of the Amphictyons, careleſs of ſuch diſtinctions, fulminated an angry decree againſt Phocis, commanding the ſacred lands to be laid waſte, and impoſing a heavy fine on that community. CHAP. XXXIV.

It is believed that the Thebans, the enemies and neighbours of Phocis, and whoſe influence at that time predominated in the council, were the principal abettors of this arbitrary meaſure[4]; a ſuppoſition rendered probable by the enſuing deliberations of the Amphictyons. Their next ſentence was directed againſt Sparta, to puniſh the injury of Phæbidas, who, in time of peace, had ſurpriſed and ſeized the Theban citadel. This breach of public faith, however criminal and flagrant, had been committed ſo many years before, that prudence required it to be for ever buried in obſcurity. But, at the inſtigation of the Thebans, the Amphictyons brought it once more to light; commanded the Lacedæmonians to pay a fine of five hundred talents; decreed that the fine ſhould

which are principall abetted by the Thebans;

[2] See vol. i. c. v. p. 224.
[3] See vol. i. c. v. p. 222, et ſeqq.
[4] Juſtin. l. viii. c. i. et ſeqq.

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be doubled, unleſs paid within an appointed time; and if the decree were finally diſregarded, that the Lacedæmonians ſhould be treated as public enemies to Greece[5].

who excite the reſentment of the Phocians. Olymp. cv. 4. A. C. 357.

The Phocians, ſingled out as the firſt victims of oppreſſion, were deeply affected by their danger. To pay the money demanded of them exceeded their faculties. It would be grievous to deſolate the fields which their own hands had cultivated with ſo much toil. The commands of the Amphictyons were indeed peremptory; but that council had not on foot any ſufficient force to render them effectual, ſhould the devoted objects of their vengeance venture to diſpute their authority. This meaſure, daring as it ſeemed, was ſtrongly recommended by Philomelus, whoſe popular eloquence and valor gave him a powerful aſcendant in Phocis. He poſſeſſed great hereditary wealth; contemned the national ſuperſtition; and being endowed with a bold ambitious ſpirit, he expected to riſe, amidſt the tumult of action and danger, to unrivalled pre-eminence in his republic. After repeated deliberations, in which he flattered the vanity, and tempted the avarice of his countrymen, by proving, that to them of right belonged the guardianſhip of the Delphian temple, and the immenſe treaſures contained within its ſacred walls[6],

[5] Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxiii. et ſeqq.

[6] Philomelus cited the reſpectable authority of Homer:

Αυταρ Φωκιων Σχεδιος και Επιστροφος ηρχον
Οι Κυπαρισσον ειχον Πυθωνα τε πετρηεσσαν.

"But Schedius and Epiſtrophus led the Phocians, who inhabited Cypariſſus, and the rocky Python," the ancient name of Delphi.

he brought the majority of the ſenate and aſſembly into his opinion. As the propereſt inſtrument to execute his own meaſures, Philomelus was named general: the Phocian youth flocked to his ſtandard; and his private fortune, as well as the public revenues, were conſumed in purchaſing the mercenary aid of thoſe needy adventurers, who abounded in every province of Greece. CHAP. XXXIV.

The following year was employed by Philomelus in providing arms, in exerciſing his troops, and in an embaſſy which he undertook in perſon to Sparta. As that community had not diſcharged the fine impoſed by the Amphictyons, the penalty was doubled, and the delinquents were condemned to pay a thouſand talents. The exorbitance of this impoſition might have juſtified the Spartans in following the example of Phocis, and ſetting the Amphictyons at defiance. But Archidamus, who poſſeſſed all the caution and addreſs of his father Ageſilaus, was unwilling to take a principal part in the firſt dangerous experiment, and to poſt himſelf in the front of battle, againſt the revered decrees of an aſſembly, conſidered as the legal guardian of national religion and liberty. He aſſured Philomelus that both himſelf and the Spartans fully approved his cauſe; that reaſons of a temporary nature hindered their declaring themſelves openly, but that he might depend on ſecret ſupplies of men and money[7]. **The Phocians under Philomelus prepare for war, and engage the Spartans in their cauſe. Olymp. cvi. 1. A. C. 356.**

[7] Ὁ δε Αρχιδαμος αποδεξαμενος τον λογον, φανερως μεν, κατα το παρον, ουκ εθηκε βοηθησειν, λαθρα δε παντα συμπραξειν, χορηγων και χρηματα και μισθοφορους. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 426.

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Philomelus ſeizes the temple of Delphi. Olymp. cvi. 2. A. C. 355.

Encouraged by this aſſurance, and by a conſiderable ſum[a] immediately put into his hands, Philomelus, at his return, ventured on a meaſure not leſs audacious than unexpected. The temple of Delphi, ſo awfully guarded by ſuperſtition, was ſcarcely defended by any military force. Philomelus, having prepared the imagination of his followers for this bold enterpriſe, immediately conducted them towards Delphi, defeated the feeble reſiſtance of the Thracidæ, who inhabited the neighbouring diſtrict, and entered the ſacred city with the calm intrepidity of a conqueror. The Delphians, who expected no mercy from a man devoid of reſpect for religion, prepared themſelves in ſilent horror, for beholding the complicated guilt of ſacrilege and murder. But the countenance of Philomelus re-aſſured them, and his diſcourſe totally diſpelled their ill-grounded fears. He declared that he had come to Delphi with no hoſtile diſpoſition againſt the inhabitants, with no ſacrilegious deſigns againſt the temple. His principal motive was to emancipate the one and the other from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons, and to aſſert the ancient and unalienable prerogative of Phocis to be the patron and protector of the Delphian ſhrine. To the ſame purpoſe he ſcattered declarations through the different republics of Greece; his emiſſaries acquainted the Spartans that he had deſtroyed the brazen tablets containing the unjuſt decrees againſt Sparta and Phocis; they inflamed the reſentment of the Athenians, naturally

[a] Diodorus (l. xvi. p. 426.) ſays, fifteen talents.

hoſtile to Thebes; and both thoſe republics came to the reſolution of ſupporting the meaſures of Philomelus. CHAP. XXXIV.

The Thebans, on the other hand, who *directed*, and the Locrians, Theſſalians, with other ſtates of leſs conſideration, who tamely *obeyed* the decrees of the Amphictyons, determined to take the field in defence of their inſulted religion and violated laws. Their operations were conducted with that extreme ſlowneſs natural to confederacies. Philomelus acted with more vigor. He received little aſſiſtance from his diſtant allies. But, firſt, by impoſing a heavy tax on the Delphians, who had been enriched by the devotion of Greece, and then, notwithſtanding his declaration, by taking very undue liberties with the treaſure of Apollo[9], he collected above ten thouſand mercenaries, men daring and profligate as himſelf, who ſacrificed all ſcruples of religion to the hopes of dividing a rich ſpoil. Such at leaſt was the general character of his followers. To the few who had more piety, or leſs avarice, he endeavoured to juſtify his meaſures by the authority of an oracle. The Pythia at firſt refuſed to mount the ſacred tripod. Philomelus ſternly commanded her. She obeyed with reluctance, obſerving, that being already maſter of Delphi, he might act without ſanction or control[10]. Philomelus waited for no other anſwer, but gladly interpreted the words as an acknow-

Employs the ſacred treaſure in raiſing mercenaries.

[9] Diodorus ſometimes acknowledges, and ſometimes denies, that Philomelus meddled with the ſacred treaſure.

[10] Αποθεγξαμενης δ' αυτης προς την υπεροχην τω βιαζομενω "ὅτι εξεστι αυτῳ πραττειν ὁ ἐθελεται." Diodor. p. 428.

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ledgment of his abſolute authority; and, with the addreſs ſuitable to his ſituation and character, confirmed the auſpicious declaration of the prieſteſs by the report of many favorable omens [11].

Takes the field againſt the Thebans and their allies. Olymp. cvi. 2. A. C. 355.

Having obtained the ſuppoſed ſanction of religion, Philomelus proceeded to fortify the temple and city of Delphi, in which he placed a ſtrong garriſon; and, with the remainder of his forces, boldly marched forth to repel the incurſions of the enemy. During two years, hoſtilities were carried on with various fortune againſt the Locrians and Thebans. Victory for the moſt part inclined to the Phocians; but there happened not any deciſive action, nor was the war memorable on any other account but that of the exceſſive cruelty mutually inflicted and ſuffered. The Phocian priſoners were uniformly condemned to death, as wretches convicted of the moſt abominable ſacrilege and impiety; and the reſentment of their countrymen retaliated with equal ſeverity on the unhappy captives whom the chance of war frequently put into their hands [12].

Philomelus defeated. Olymp. cvi. 4. A. C. 353.

As both armies anxiouſly expected reinforcements, they were unwilling to riſk a general engagement, till chance rendered that meaſure unavoidable. Entangled among the woods and mountains of Phocis, the convenience of forage attracted them towards the ſame point. The vanguards met unexpectedly near the town of Neone, and began to ſkirmiſh. A general and fierce action followed, in which the Phocians were repelled

[11] Diodor. p. 429. [12] Ibid. p. 530, et ſeqq.

by ſuperior numbers. Pathleſs woods, abrupt rocks and precipices, obſtructed their retreat. In vain Philomelus ſtrove with his voice and arm to rally the fugitives. He himſelf was carried along by the torrent to the brow of a precipice, afflicted with wounds, and ſtill more with anguiſh and deſpair. The enemy advanced; it ſeemed impoſſible to eſcape their vengeance; the reſolution of Philomelus was prompt and terrible; with a vigorous bound he ſprang from the rock, thus eluding the torment of his own guilty conſcience, and the reſentment of his purſuers[13]. While the Thebans and their allies admired this ſpectacle as a manifeſt indication of divine vengeance[14], Onomarchus, the lieutenant and brother of the Phocian general, collected and drew off the ſcattered remains of the vanquiſhed army towards Delphi. The confederates determined to expel them from that holy place, and to inflict on the enemies of Greece and Heaven, a puniſhment ſimilar to that to which the wrath of Apollo had driven the impious Philomelus[15].

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Different cauſes concurred to prevent Philip on the one hand, and Athens and Sparta on the other, from taking a principal or early part in the Phocian war. The intereſted policy of Archidamus,

The Spartans attempt to recover their dominion in

[13] Diodorus hints, that had Philomelus been taken captive, his body would have been ſhockingly mangled: Φοβεμενος την εκ της αιχμαλωσιας αικιαν. p. 432.

[14] Such it appeared to future hiſtorians: και τουτον τον τροπον υπο τω δαιμονιω δικας κατασταθεντα τον βιον. Diodor. ibid.

[15] Diodor. l. xvi. p. 432.

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who directed with abſolute authority the councils of Sparta, was leſs anxious to ſupport the arms of his diſtant confederates, than ſolicitous to recover the Lacedæmonian dominion in Peloponneſus. The opportunity ſeemed favorable for this purpoſe, the Thebans being deeply engaged in another conteſt, and the Athenians in ſtrict alliance with Sparta. For ſeveral years, the arms and intrigues of Archidamus were employed againſt the Meſſenians, Arcadians, and Argives. But his ambitious deſign failed of ſucceſs; the inferior cities of Peloponneſus, rouſed by a common danger, confederated for their mutual defence; and Athens, though actually the ally of Sparta, was unwilling to abandon to the tyranny of that republic her more ancient and faithful allies, the Arcadians and Meſſenians [16].

the Peloponneſus. Olymp. cvi. 3. A. C. 353.

The affairs of Thrace occupy Philip and the Athenians.

While the politics of the Peloponneſus formed a ſyſtem apart, the ſacred war ſhook the centre of Greece, and the affairs of Thrace occupied Philip and the Athenians. Cotys was dead; his ſons, Kerſobleptes, Beriſades, and Amadocus, were all diſſatisfied with the partition of his dominions. While their hoſtilities againſt each other exhibited the odious picture of fraternal diſcord, the prizes for which they contended were ſucceſſively carried off by Philip. The encroachments of that prince

[16] The queſtion appears to have occaſioned warm debates in the Athenian aſſembly: the Spartan and Arcadian parties were animated with the utmoſt zeal; and, according to the lively obſervation of Demoſthenes, the Athenian orators, had they not ſpoke the Attic dialect, would have appeared, the one half Spartans, the other Arcadians. Demoſthen. pro Megalop. p. 83.

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at length engaged Kerſobleptes, the moſt powerful of the co-heirs, to cede the Thracian Cherſoneſus to the Athenians, who ſent Chares with a numerous fleet to take poſſeſſion of that peninſula. The town of Seſtos alone made reſiſtance. It was taken by ſtorm, and treated with great ſeverity by Chares; while Philip beſieged and took the far more important city of Methoné in Pieria. In this ſiege he loſt an eye, a loſs which he is ſaid to have borne with impatience[17], as the circumſtances attending it were alike diſhonorable to his jugdment and humanity[18].

Onomarchus takes the command of the Phocians. Olymp. cvi. 4. A. C. 353.

It appears extraordinary that the Thebans, after the defeat and death of Philomelus, ſhould not have purſued their good fortune, without allowing the enemy time to breathe and recover ſtrength. They probably imagined that the fatal exit of that daring chief would deter a ſucceſſor; and that the

[17] Lucian de Scribend. Hiſt. p. 364.

[18] Theſe circumſtances, however, reſt on the authority of Suidas and Ulpian. It is ſaid, that when the arrow was extracted, the following inſcription appeared on it: "After to Philip's right eye." After, it ſeems, had offered his ſervices to Philip, as an excellent markſman; to which Philip replied, that he would employ him when he waged war with ſtarlings. Philip cauſed the arrow to be ſhot back into the place, with a new inſcription, "That he would hang up After;" a threat which was executed as ſoon as he was maſter of Methoné. Fictions ſtill more incredible were related on this ſubject by the fabulous writers of the age of Alexander. Philip, it was ſaid, loſt his right eye by his unſeaſonable curioſity in prying into the amours of Olympias and Jupiter Ammon. This ridiculous flattery to Alexander has been ſo widely diffuſed, that it was ſuppoſed to be the ſubject repreſented on the celebrated vaſe, which is ſo much better explained by Mr. D'Hancarville. See Recherches ſur les Arts de la Grèce, vol. ii.

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Phocians would crave peace, if not driven to deſpair. Such indeed was the reſolution of the more reſpectable part of the Phocians. But the bold, impious, and needy, who compoſed the moſt numerous deſcription of that people, were bent on continuing the war. An aſſembly was convened, when Onomarchus, in a ſet ſpeech [19], flattered their hopes, and encouraged them to perſevere. His opinion prevailed; he was named general; and his conduct ſoon proved, that he equalled his brother in boldneſs and ambition, and ſurpaſſed him in activity and enterpriſe. None better knew the power of gold, or had more addreſs in employing it. With the Delphic treaſure he coined ſuch a quantity of money as perhaps had never before circulated in Greece. The Phocian army was reſtored and augmented; their allies were rendered more hearty in their cauſe; even their enemies were not proof againſt the temptations which continually aſſailed their fidelity. By ſeaſonable bribes, Onomarchus diſtracted the councils of Thebes, and kept their arms inactive. The neighbouring ſtates were perſuaded to obſerve a neutrality; while the Theſſalians, a people at all times noted for avarice and fraud [20], and of whoſe country

[19] Πεφροντισμενον λογον διελθων. Diodor. p. 432.

[20] The Theſſalians had the ſame character in Greece, as the Ligurians in Italy:

——— Vane Ligus
Nequicquam patrias tentâſti lubricas artes. VIRG.

Euripides ſpeaks of the ſlippery deceits of the Theſſalians. Demoſthenes (Olynth. i. p. 4. ex edit. Wolf.) ſays, ειτα τα των θετταλων· ταυτα γαρ απιστα μεν ην δη που φυσει, και αιει ποτ' ανθρωποις. "Philip was farther diſtreſſed by the inſurrections of the Theſſalians, a people faithleſs by nature, at all times, to all men."

the proverb ſaid, that it had never produced a bad horſe or an honeſt man, openly embraced the cauſe of Phocis. CHAP. XXXIV.

Theſe multiplied advantages were not allowed to languiſh in the hands of Onomarchus, who hoped to eclipſe the unjuſt motives of his enterpriſe by the ſudden ſplendor of victory. At the head of a numerous and well-appointed army, he poured down on Locris and Doris, ravaged the country, took Thronium by ſtorm, laid ſeveral cities under contribution, pierced into Bœotia, and made himſelf maſter of Orchomenus. The Thebans aſſembled their forces to ſtem the torrent. Onomarchus firſt met with a repulſe before the walls of Chæronea, and ventured not to renew the engagement, having weakened his forces by placing garriſons in the important places which he had taken, as well as by ſending a detachment of ſeven thouſand men, under his brother Phayllus, into Theſſaly[21]. Succeſs of his arms.

In that country, the intrigues of Philip had counteracted the gold of Onomarchus. But Lycophron, who was the chief partiſan of the latter, and whom Philip had formerly diveſted of his authority, had again eſtabliſhed himſelf in Pheræ, Pegaſæ, Magneſia, and ſeveral places of leſs note, declared for the tyrant, and for Phocis. The Macedonian intereſt prevailed elſewhere; and the factions were equally balanced, when Philip, with his uſual diligence, entered Theſſaly, defeated Phayllus, He encounters Philip in Theſſaly, and obliges him to retire.

[21] Diodor. p. 434.

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beſieged and took Pegaſæ, and drove the enemy with diſgrace towards the frontier of Phocis. The fear of loſing his newly acquired intereſt among the Theſſalians, made Onomarchus evacuate Bœotia, and advance againſt Philip with his whole army. The Macedonians, though leſs numerous, did not decline the engagement. At the firſt charge the Phocians gave way, and retreated towards the neighbouring mountains. Philip ordered his men to purſue in their ranks. It was then that the Phocians really began the battle. Onomarchus, foreſeeing that the Macedonians would follow in cloſe order, had poſted a detachment on the ſummit of the precipice, who were ready, on a given ſignal, to roll down fragments of rock, and ſtones of an enormous ſize, on the embattled phalanx. This was the only mode of attack for which the Macedonians were not prepared. The line of march, in which the moment before they proceeded with ſuch firmneſs and confidence, was converted into a dreadful ſcene of carnage and ruin. Before they recovered from their conſternation, the flying Phocians, who had decoyed them into this ambuſh, returned to the charge. Philip, however, rallied his men; and while Onomarchus heſitated to advance, drew them off in good order, ſaying, that they did not retreat through fear, but retired like rams, in order to ſtrike with the more impetuous vigor[22].

Onomarchus defeated and ſlain.

This ſaying was finally juſtified, although the Phocians and Lycophron firſt enjoyed a ſhort

[22] Polyæn. Stratag. l. ii. c. xxviii. Diodor. l. xvi. 34, et ſeqq.

triumph.

triumph. The tyrant eſtabliſhed himſelf, as he thought, ſecurely, in his native city; the Phocians, reinforced by their Theſſalian allies, again invaded Bœotia, aſſaulted and took Coronæa, and dreadfully alarmed the Thebans, by the deyaſtations committed in the very centre of their territory. But the time of vengeance arrived. Philip having recruited his army, returned into Theſſaly. The unſteady partiſans of Lycophron, had they determined to ſhare his danger, would have proved unable to ſupport his cauſe. A conſiderable portion of the Theſſalians received the king of Macedon as their deliverer. Onomarchus was thus obliged to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. At the head of twenty thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, he marched to the defence of Lycophron, and was met by the enemy, ſtill more numerous, on the level coaſt of Magneſia. To remind his ſoldiers that they fought in the cauſe of Delphi and of Heaven, Philip crowned their heads with the laurel conſecrated to Apollo, and adorned his enſigns and ſtandards with the emblems and attributes of that divinity[21]. Their onſet was impetuous and fierce, and their valor, animated by enthuſiaſm, rendered them irreſiſtible, though the enemy, conſcious of guilt, fought with the fury of deſpair. Three thouſand Theſſalian cavalry, who had ſignally contributed to the victory of Philip, rendered the purſuit bloody and deſtructive; while the Phocians, having thrown away their armor, fled towards the ſea, allured

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[21] Juſtin. l. viii. 2.

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by the ſight of the Athenian fleet under Chares, which was returning from the Cherſoneſus. That commander ſeems not to have made any attempt to protect them. Above ſix thouſand periſhed in the battle, or in the purſuit. The body of Onomarchus was found among the ſlain; Philip ordered it to be hung on a gibbet, as a mark of peculiar infamy; the reſt were thrown into the ſea, as unworthy, by their impious ſacrilege, of the rites of funeral. Three thouſand were taken alive; but it is not abſolutely certain whether they were drowned, or reduced into captivity; though the latter opinion is the more probable[a].

Philip's deſigns againſt Olynthus and Byzantium.

It might be expected that ſuch a deciſive blow ſhould have proved fatal to the Phocians. But Philip, who had conquered them in Theſſaly, durſt not purſue his advantages by invading Phocis;

[a] The leaving ſuch a circumſtance at all doubtful, is very diſhonourable to the accuracy of the compiler Diodorus. His words are, τελος δε, των Φωκεων και μισθοφορων ανηρεθησαν μεν υπερ τους εξακισχιλιους, εν οις ην και αυτος ο στρατηγος. ηλωσαν δε ου ελαττους των τρισχιλιων. ο δε Φιλιππος τον μεν Ονομαρχον εκρεμασεν, τους δε αλλους ως ιεροσυλους κατεποντισε. Literally, "At length above ſix thouſand of the Phocians and mercenaries were, on the one hand, taken up *dead*, among whom was the general. Not leſs than three thouſand were, on the other hand, taken priſoners. Philip hung up Onomarchus, and threw the reſt into the ſea, as guilty of ſacrilege." The learned reader will perceive, that I have given the full force of the word ανηρεθησαν: and from the preciſe and diſtinctive force of the particles μεν and δε, which ſeparate the two firſt clauſes of the text, I am of opinion that the τους αλλους can apply only to the reſt of thoſe who were taken up dead. There is nothing determinate to be learned from the word κατεποντισεν, which ſignifies barely to plunge into the ſea.

well knowing, that an attempt to paſs the ſtraits of Thermopylæ would alarm not only his enemies but his allies. It was his intereſt to perpetuate diſſenſions in Greece. For that reaſon he fomented the diſcord that reigned among the ſtates of Peloponneſus; and though he had puniſhed the obnoxious Phocians, he was unwilling to terminate a war which diverted the public attention from watching too ſtudiouſly his own ambitious deſigns. His victory over an odious enemy extended his juſt renown. He ſecured the dominion of Theſſaly, by planting garriſons in Pheræ, Pegaſæ, and Magneſia. His army was ready to march towards Greece on the firſt favorable opportunity; but till that ſhould arrive, he rejoiced to ſee both diviſions of that country involved in war, which allowed him to accompliſh, unmoleſted, the ſubordinate purpoſes of his reign. He had long deceived the Olynthians by good offices and promiſes, but now began to throw off the maſk, and to ſhow that he meant to be their maſter. He actually applied to Kerſobleptes, whom he detached from the intereſt of Athens; and having raiſed him on the ruins of the neighbouring chieftains of Thrace, thereby obtained his confidence, and waited an occaſion to deſtroy him with ſecurity [25]. The dominions of that prince opened the way to Byzantium, the poſſeſſion of which muſt have early tempted the ambition of Philip, who knew ſo well to eſtimate the importance of its ſituation both in commerce

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[25] Juſtin. l. viii. 3. Demoſth. Olynth. 2 et 3.

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and in war. He began to diſcover his deſigns againſt Byzantium by attacking the fortreſs of Heræum, a place ſo called from the neighbouring temple of Juno, which formed its principal ornament. The town of Heræum was ſmall, and in itſelf unimportant; its harbour was dangerous and deceitful; but being ſituate contiguous to Byzantium, it ſerved as an outwork and defence to that rich and populous city[26].

His meaſures counteracted by the Athenians.

The Athenians had ſufficient penetration to diſcern the drift of thoſe enterpriſes. They formed an alliance with the republic of Olynthus; they warned Kerſobleptes of his danger; they voted a numerous fleet to ſail to the defence of Heræum, or rather of Byzantium, with which, though rendered independent of Athens by the ſocial war, they ſtill carried on a lucrative commerce. But theſe ſpirited exertions were not of long continuance. Philip's wound at Methoné, together with the continual labor and fatigue to which he had afterwards ſubmitted, threw him into a dangerous malady. The report of his ſickneſs was, before it reached Athens, magnified into his death. The Athenians rejoiced in ſo ſeaſonable a deliverance, and laying aſide their naval preparations, bent their principal attention to the ſacred war[27].

The Phocian, or ſacred war continued by Phayllus.

That unhappy conteſt was renewed by Phayllus, the laſt ſurviving brother of Philomelus and Onomarchus. As his cauſe became more deſperate, Phayllus availed himſelf to the utmoſt of the only

[26] Juſtin. l. viii. 3. Demoſth. Olynth. 2 et 3. [27] Idem, ubi ſupra.

CHAP. XXXIV. Olymp. cviii. 1. A. C. 352.

reſource which was left him. Having converted into ready money the moſt precious dedications of Delphi, he doubled the pay of his mercenaries. This extraordinary encouragement brought new adventurers to his ſtandard, and ſoon rendered his army equal to that of either of his predeceſſors. The fugitive Theſſalians, aſſembled in a body by Lycophron, entered into his pay. By means of the Delphic treaſure, he acquired, likewiſe, the public aſſiſtance of a thouſand Lacedæmonians, two thouſand Achæans, five thouſand Athenian foot, with four hundred cavalry. Theſe powerful reinforcements enabled the Phocians to take the field with a good proſpect of ſucceſs, and rendered thoſe who had ſo lately been the objects of pity, again formidable to their enemies[28].

Philip, in order to oppoſe him, marches towards Thermopylæ.

Philip, meanwhile, had recovered from his indiſpoſition. The votes and preparations of the Athenians had taught him that his deſigns could no longer be concealed. He was acquainted with the alliance formed between that republic and Olynthus. His emiſſaries gave him intelligence of the actual commotions in Greece, where the countenance and aſſiſtance of ſo many powerful ſtates abetted the ſacrilege of the Phocians. The occaſion required that he ſhould appear in favor of his allies, and in defence of the pious cauſe which he had formerly maintained with ſo much glory. His trophies gained over Onomarchus were ſtill freſh and blooming; and not only the Thebans,

[28] Diodor. p. 436.

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Dorians, and Locrians, who were principals in the war, but the ſincere votaries of Apollo in every quarter of Greece, ſecretly expected him as their deliverer, while his enemies admired his piety and trembled at his valor; and as they had been lately amuſed with the news of his ſickneſs and death, they would now view with religious terror his unexpected appearance at Thermopylæ, to aſſert the violated rights of the Delphian temple. Such were the hopes and motives on which Philip, at the head of a numerous army, directed his march [29] towards thoſe celebrated ſtraits, which we have formerly deſcribed, and ſo often mentioned.

This meaſure alarms the Athenians;

But the event ſhowed, that on this occaſion he had made a falſe eſtimate of the ſuperſtition or timidity of the Greeks, and particularly had built too much on the patience and indolence of the Athenians. That people penetrated his deſigns, and determined to oppoſe them. Under the veil of religious zeal, they doubted not that he concealed the deſire to invade and conquer their country; and, on the firſt intelligence of his expedition, their foreſight and patriotiſm repreſented the Macedonians, Theſſalians, and Thebans, pouring down like a deſtructive inundation, on Attica and Peloponneſus. With an alacrity and ardor, of which there was no recent example in their councils, they flew to arms, launched their fleet, ſailed to Thermopylæ, and took poſſeſſion of the ſtraits [30].

who ſail to Thermopylæ, and guard the ſtraits.

[29] Diodor. l. xvi. p. 437.

[30] Demoſthen. de Falſâ Legat. ſect. 29.

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Philip retires in diſappointment.

Never did Philip meet with a more cruel diſappointment, than in being thus anticipated by a people whom he had ſo often deceived. He retired with deep regret, leaving the Phocian war to be carried on by the Thebans and their allies. Meanwhile, the Athenians placed a guard at Thermopylæ; and, elated by the firſt inſtance of their ſucceſs againſt the Macedonian, called an aſſembly to deliberate on meaſures proper to reſtrain his ambition.

Demoſthenes's firſt appearance againſt Philip.

This aſſembly is rendered memorable by the firſt appearance of Demoſthenes againſt Philip, whoſe meaſures from this moment he ceaſed not to watch, and to counteract. Two years before, this illuſtrious orator, whoſe works have been more praiſed than read, and more read than underſtood, began, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, to appear on the theatre of public life. The Athenians were then involved in the ſacred war; their northern poſſeſſions were continually inſulted, plundered, or conquered by Philip; yet in this ſituation of affairs, the mercenary partiſans of that prince, in order to divert the public attention from his too aſpiring deſigns, affected to extend their views to Aſia, and to be alarmed by the motions of Artaxerxes Ochus, who was preparing to reduce the rebels of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phœnicia. In every aſſembly of the people, the creatures of Philip dwelt, with exaggerated terror, on the naval and military preparations of the great king, which they repreſented as certainly deſtined to revenge the recent injuries committed by the Athenian troops, under Chares, on the coaſt of Aſia. The trophies

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of Miltiades, Themiſtocles, and Cimon, were adorned with all the pomp of eloquence; and the Athenians were exhorted to imitate thoſe memorable exploits of their anceſtors in the Perſian war, which ſhed a luſtre on all the ſucceeding periods of their hiſtory.

Sentiments of the wiſeſt Athenians reſpecting this prince.

In this popular enthuſiaſm joined Iſocrates the orator, together with the ſtateſman and general Phocion, two men whoſe talents and virtues would have done honor to the moſt illuſtrious age of the republic. The unblemiſhed integrity of Iſocrates, the diſintereſted poverty of Phocion, afford ſufficient proof that neither of theſe great men were corrupted by Macedonian gold. But they both perceived that the indolence and unſteadineſs of Athens were incapable to contend with the unceaſing activity of Philip, and both exhorted their countrymen to gain and cultivate the friendſhip of a prince, againſt whom they could not make war with any reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs.

Thoſe of Iſocrates in particular.

Iſocrates, from the moſt accurate and extenſive ſurvey of the political hiſtory of Greece, diſcovered that a foreign war alone could heal the domeſtic diſſenſions which reigned in every quarter of that divided country; and from a thorough knowledge of the inherent defects in the government of Thebes, Athens, and Sparta, he regarded Macedon as the ſtate, and Philip as the general, beſt entitled, and beſt qualified, to aſſume the command of a military expedition into Aſia, to revenge ancient wrongs, and to deliver the Grecian colonies from the actual oppreſſion of Barbarians.

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On this important ſubject he addreſſed a diſcourſe to Philip; he repeatedly inſiſted on the ſame topic with the Athenians; and it is obſcurely related, that on one occaſion he reconciled thoſe hoſtile powers [31], and engaged them to concur in this extenſive yet rational ſcheme of conqueſt.

The peculiar views of Demoſthenes.

The ſentiments and views of Demoſthenes were equally different from thoſe of Iſocrates and Phocion on the one hand, and from thoſe of the infamous hirelings of Philip on the other. None knew better than he did the corruption and degeneracy of his countrymen; but he hoped to rouſe them from their lethargy; a deſign arduous as it may ſeem, ſometimes effected by his eloquence, the moſt powerful, glowing, and ſublime, ever employed by man; and which, of all men, he had been at moſt pains to acquire and cultivate [32]. His imagination was filled with the ancient glory of the republic; in the ardor of patriotiſm he forgot the moderation of philoſophy; and while he ſternly maintained the prerogatives and pretenſions of his country, he would rather have ſeen Athens defeated at the head of her allies, than victorious under the ſtandard of the Macedonians, or any ſtandard but her own. With ſuch ſentiments and character, he was naturally a favorite of the people, and a warm partiſan of popular government; while Phocion, like moſt men of ſenſe and worth in that age, preferred a moderate ariſtocracy;

[31] See the life of Iſocrates, prefixed to my tranſlation of his works.

[32] Dionyſ. Halicarn. et Plut. de Demoſt.

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and Iſocrates was inclined to regard a well-regulated monarchy as the beſt of all governments [33].

appear in public orations.

In his firſt ſpeeches before the aſſembly, Demoſthenes announced himſelf as the miniſter of the people at large, whom he exhorted to awaken from their indolence, and at length to aſſume the direction of their own affairs. They had been too long governed by the incapacity of a few ambitious men, to the great detriment and diſgrace of the community. Firſt an orator at the head of all, under him a general, abetted by a faction of three or four hundred, availed themſelves of the ſloth and negligence of a people careleſs of every thing but pleaſure, to domineer in the public councils, and to become maſters of the ſtate. From conſiderations of their preſent corruption and weakneſs, as well as of the deſigns and commotions of neighbouring powers, he adviſed them to forſake all diſtant and romantic ſchemes of ambition; and, inſtead of carrying their arms into remote countries, to prepare for repelling the attacks that might be made againſt their own dominions. He inſiſted earneſtly on a better regulation of their finances, on the retrenching of many ſuperfluous branches of expenſe, and eſpecially on a more equitable repartition of public burdens, in proportion to the fortunes of individuals; which, though the income of the ſtate had dwindled to four hundred talents, were actually more conſiderable than at any former period. While the rich cheerfully paid

[33] See his Nicocles, Evagoras, etc.

their contributions, the poor muſt be willing to forego the burdenſome gratuities which they derived from the treaſury; and all muſt be ready to take the field in perſon, that the public ſervice might be no longer betrayed, or diſgraced, by ſtrangers and mercenaries [34]. CHAP. XXXIV.

Subſequent events juſtified the opinions, and enforced the counſels of Demoſthenes. The Athenians were delivered from their ill-grounded fears of Artaxerxes Ochus, when they beheld the preparations of that monarch directed againſt his rebellious ſubjects. The encroachments of Philip became continually more daring and more formidable; and his recent attempts to ſeize the ſtraits of Thermopylæ ſhowed the neceſſity of oppoſing him with re-united vigilance and vigor. His firſt Philippic.

In this juncture, ſo favorable to awakening the activity of Athens, Demoſthenes mounted the roſtrum [35] before any other orator, apologizing for this forwardneſs in a man not yet thirty years of age, by obſerving, "That already the uſual ſpeakers had given their opinions on the ſubject of Philip; and that, had *their* advices been uſeful and practicable, they muſt have precluded the neceſſity of any farther deliberation. Firſt of all, Athenians! you ought not to deſpair; no! not although your affairs ſeem indeed involved in equal confuſion and danger. For the ſame circumſtance which is

[34] Vid. Oration. de Claſſibus, et de Ordinand. Republic.

[35] I have uſed that word, becauſe adopted in our language to expreſs the βημα, pulpit or gallery appropriated to the ſpeakers in the Athenian aſſembly.

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the cauſe of your paſt misfortunes, ought to furniſh the ſource of your preſent hope. What is that? Your own negligence and ſloth, not the power of your enemies, have diſordered the ſtate. Had your diſtreſs ariſen, notwithſtanding your utmoſt care to prevent it, there would then be little hope of relief. But ſince it is occaſioned by your own miſconduct, you need only repair your errors, in order to retrieve your affairs. Conſidering the weakneſs of Athens, thus deſpoiled of her dominions, and the ſtrength of Philip, which has increaſed immoderately at our expenſe, ſhould you think him a formidable enemy, you doubtleſs think aright. Yet reflect, Athenians! that there was a time when we poſſeſſed Pydna, Potidæa, Methoné, and all the ſurrounding territory; that the nations in that neighbourhood, now ſubject to Philip, were then independent, and preferred the alliance of Athens to that of Macedon. In the infancy of his fortune, had Philip reaſoned timidly, as we do now, 'How ſhall I, deſtitute of allies, attack the Athenians, whoſe garriſons command my frontier?' he would not have engaged in thoſe enterpriſes which have been crowned with ſuch ſignal ſucceſs, nor raiſed his kingdom to ſuch an unexampled pitch of grandeur. No, Athenians! he knew well, that towns and fortreſſes are but prizes of ſkill and valor [16],

[16] Αλλ' οιδεν, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, τυτο καλως εκεινος, ὁτι ταυτα εϛι ἁπαντα τα χωριὰ αθλα τϖ πολεμϖ κειμενα εν μεσω. In ancient times the figure had more force, as well as dignity; becauſe at the Olympic, and other ſacred games, the ſpectators were uſed to behold the prizes propoſed to the victors, κειμενα εν μεσω, expoſed in the middle of the field, to excite their emulation and ardor. See vol. i. c. v.]

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propoſed to the combatants, and belong of right to the conqueror; that the dominions of the abſent are ſeized by thoſe who take the field, and the poſſeſſions of the negligent and ſlothful by the vigilant and intrepid. Guided by theſe principles, he has ſubdued, and governs all; holding ſome communities by right of conqueſt, and others under the title of allies; for allies no prince nor ſtate can want, who are not wanting to themſelves. But ſhould you, Athenians! imitate the example of Philip, and at length, rouſing from your lethargy, apply ſeriouſly to your intereſt, you would ſpeedily recover thoſe advantages which your negligence only has loſt. Favorable occaſions will yet occur; for you muſt not imagine that Philip, like a god, enjoys his proſperity for ever fixed and immutable[17]. No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among thoſe ſeemingly the moſt devoted to his cauſe. Theſe are univerſal paſſions, from which the allies of Macedon are not, ſurely, exempted. They have hitherto concealed them, finding no reſource in you; but it depends on your councils to call them into action. When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigor? when rouſed by ſome event—when urged by ſome neceſſity—What can be more urgent than the preſent juncture? To freemen, the moſt neceſſary of all motives

[17] The original is inimitable: μη γαρ ως θεω νομιζετ' εκεινω τα παροντα πεπηγεναι πραγματα αθανατα. Join the τα and the πραγματα, the article and the ſubſtantive, and the charm will be diſſolved.

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is the ſhame of miſconduct. Or ſay, will it ſtill be your ſole buſineſs to ſaunter in the public place, inquiring after news? What can be more new, than that a Macedonian ſhould conquer Athens, and enſlave Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but in great danger. How are you concerned in theſe rumors? What matters it to you whether he is ſick or dead, ſince, if you thus manage your affairs, your folly will ſoon raiſe up another Philip [88]?"

Meaſures propoſed by Demoſthenes for reſiſting Philip.

After this animated remonſtrance, Demoſthenes propoſes a plan of operations calculated chiefly for defence. The Athenians, he obſerves, were not yet prepared to meet Philip in the field. They muſt begin by protecting Olynthus, and the Cherſoneſus, from his incurſions. For this purpoſe, it was neceſſary to raiſe a body of two thouſand men light-armed, and an adequate proportion of cavalry, which were to be tranſported under a proper convoy (as Philip had his fleet) with all expedition to the iſles of Lemnos, Thaſos, and Sciathos, contiguous to the coaſt of Macedon. Conveniently poſted in thoſe iſlands, where they would enjoy neceſſaries in abundance, the Athenian troops might avail themſelves of every favorable incident, to appear at the firſt ſummons of their allies, and either to repel the inroads of the Macedonians, or

[88] The ſenſe indeed of that period, but neither its force nor its harmony, can be tranſlated. Τεθνηκε Φιλιππος; μα μα δια! αλλ' ασθενει. τι δε υμιν διαφερει; και γαρ αν ετος τι παθη, ταχεως υμεις ετερον Φιλιππον ποιησετε, αν περ ετω προσεχητε τοις πραγμασι τον νουν. ωδε γαρ ετος παρα την εαυτε γωμην τοσουτον επηυξηται, οσον παρεκ την υμετεραν αμελειαν.

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to haraſs the extended, and, in many parts, defenceleſs territory of that people. Meanwhile, preparations would be made at home for carrying on the war in due time, with more numerous forces, and with greater vigor. Such moderate propoſals prove that Demoſthenes well underſtood the genius of his countrymen. He required that only the fourth part of the troops ſhould conſiſt of Athenian citizens, and the immediate ſupplies were only to amount to ninety talents. He knew that higher demands would alarm their indolence and love of pleaſure; and ſo fatally were they ſunk in the diſſipated amuſements of the city, that it is probable the ſmall armament propoſed did not actually ſet ſail; it is certain that no future preparations were made adequate to the public ſervice.

Philip affects to lay aſide his ambition.

The profound policy of Philip foſtered the ſupine negligence of his enemies. For more than two years after his retreat from Thermopylæ, that crafty prince much confined himſelf to his dominions, and chiefly to his capital, anxious to diſſipate the clamor occaſioned by his too great precipitation to ſeize the gates of Greece. In that interval he indeed made an expedition to chaſtiſe the rebellious ſpirit of the Theſſalians. But the greateſt part of his time was ſpent at Pella, and addicted to the arts of peace, which he judged with ſkill, and encouraged with munificence. That favorite city was adorned with temples, theatres, and porticoes. The moſt ingenious artiſts of Greece were ſummoned, by liberal rewards, to the court

His occupation during a long reſidance at Pella. A. C. 350, & 349.

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of Macedon [39]; and men of talents and genius [40], who were too often expoſed to envy and perſecution in the former country, were received with open arms by a prince, who, amidſt the tumult of war, aſſiduouſly cultivated the ſtudies of literature and eloquence. In his domeſtic government, Philip adminiſtered juſtice with impartiality, liſtened with condeſcenſion to the complaints of his meaneſt ſubjects, and diſdaining the ceremonious and forbidding pomp of tyranny, maintained an intercourſe of viſits and entertainments with his courtiers and generals [41].

His vices;

In a prince ſo reſpectably employed, it is difficult to conceive the odious and deteſtable vices with which Philip is upbraided by Demoſthenes [42]; yet the brief deſcriptions occaſionally ſketched by the orator are filled up by an ancient hiſtorian, who repreſents the infamies of the life of Philip in language well fitted to arraign the horrors of Nero or Heliogabalus. Could we believe the acrimony of Theopompus, a writer who flouriſhed in the age of Alexander, by whom he was rewarded and honored, not perhaps the leſs willingly becauſe he had expoſed or exaggerated the vices of his father, Philip ſullied his great actions by the moſt enormous and deteſtable crimes. Alike avaricious and prodigal, the wealth which he had amaſſed by

[39] Juſtin. l. viii. c. 3.

[40] Among other Greeks who lived at Philip's court were, Leoſthenes the orator, Neoptolemus the poet, Ariſtodemus and Satyrus, celebrated players. Æſchin. et Demoſthen. paſſim.

[41] Plut. in Apophth. et in Demoſthen. et Alexand.

[42] Vid. Demoſthen. ex edit. Wolf. pp. 1. 8. 48. 66, etc.

injuſtice

injuſtice and rapacity, the diſſipated in he moſt flagitious gratifications, and in company with the meaneſt and moſt worthleſs of mankind. His companions were choſen promiſcuouſly from Macedonians and Greeks, and eſpecially from Theſſalians, the moſt profligate of the Greeks, and were admitted to his familiarity and friendſhip in proportion to their proficiency in the moſt odious and unnatural abominations [43] that ever polluted the worſt men in the moſt corrupt ages of the world. We muſt, doubtleſs, make allowances for the gall

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[43] The epithets given them by Theopompus are, Βδέλυροι, *abominabiles*; and λαξαυροι; the laſt word is compounded of λα, *valde*, and ταῦρος, *taurus*, and tranſlated *inſegniter mentulatus*, which correſponds to the *enormitas membrorum* of the Auguſtan hiſtorians. The following deſcription of the friends of Philip is too indecent for modern language: "Horum enim quidam jam viri barbam identidem radebant et vellebantur: alii vero barbati citra pudorem viciſſim ſe impudicabant, ſtupris intercutibus ſe flagitantes; regi vero duo vel tres circumducebantur qui paterentur muliebria, et eandem operam navarent alios ſubagitantes. Quamobrem illos jure aliquis non amicos regis, ſed amicas eſſe credidiſſet; nec milites ſed proſtibula nuncupaſſet, ingenio quidem et naturâ ſanguinarios, moribus autem virilia ſcorta, etc." This paſſage is quoted from the forty-ninth book of Theopompus. In his twenty-ſixth book he ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe: "Philippum cum Theſſalos intemperantes eſſe, ac laſcivæ petulantiſque vitæ proſpiceret, eorum conventus ac contubernia inſtituiſſe: iiſque uti placeret modis omnibus fuiſſe conatum, Cum illis ſaltaſſe, commiſſatum fuiſſe, cuivis libidini ſe ac nequitiæ tradidiſſe." A miſtaken paſſage of Diodorus has made ſome learned men doubt the authenticity of theſe deſcriptions. Diodorus (l. xvi. ſect. 3.) ſays, that Theopompus γεγραφέναι ὀκτὼ βίβλους, πρὸς τοῖς πεντήκοντα ἃς ὧν πέντε διαφωνεῖσι; "had written the hiſtory of Philip in fifty-eight books, five of which differ in ſtyle from the reſt." Were we therefore to ſuppoſe the five laſt books ſpurious (for that is the inference which has been drawn), the obſervation of Diodorus would not at all affect the paſſages above-cited.

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of a writer, noted to a proverb for ſeverity. Yet there is ſufficient collateral evidence, that Philip's ſtrong propenſity to low wit, obſcenity, and drunkenneſs, rendered him a prey to buffoons, and paraſites, and flatterers, and all the worthleſs retinue of intemperance and folly. Theſe diſgraceful aſſociates of the prince, formed, in time of war, a regiment apart, of about eight hundred men, whoſe gradual waſte was continually recruited by new members, who either were, or ſoon became, worthy of the old; for, as we ſhall ſoon have occaſion to relate, the whole band were alike cowardly and profligate.

and policy.

But in whatever manner Philip employed his private hours, he at no time loſt ſight of thoſe great principles of policy which regulated his public adminiſtration. Under pretence of wanting money to ſupply the expenſe of his buildings, and other public works, he employed an expedient which is well known in latter times, and which has been carried to ſuch exceſs as threatens the ſafety of thoſe governments which it was intended to uphold. The letting looſe of the Delphic treaſures had diffuſed near a million ſterling over Greece [44]. The unſettled ſtate of that country

[44] The ſacred war laſted ten years, and coſt the Phocians ten thouſand talents, near two millions; it had already laſted five years, and may be ſuppoſed to have coſt near the half of that ſum. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 453. He ſays, that the gold and ſilver dedications (which were coined into money) ὑπερβαλλειν τα μυρια ταλαντα "exceeded ten thouſand talents;" a prodigious ſum (conſidering the relative value of money in thoſe days), of which the ſudden diffuſion could not fail to produce moſt important conſequences.

rendered thoſe who had acquired wealth very uncertain of enjoying it. With the rich and avaricious, Philip employed proper agents to take up[45] money at high intereſt, which procured him two advantages of a very important kind, the attaching to his government and perſon a numerous and powerful band of creditors; and the enabling him to pay, under the title of debts, and therefore without ſuſpicion, the various penſions and gratuities by which he maintained his influence among the orators and leading men in the ſeveral republics.

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[45] Juſtin. viii. 3.

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Negligence and Licentiouſneſs of the Athenians. — Philip's Intrigues in Eubœa. — Phocion defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans. — Philip invades the Olynthian Territory. — Demoſthenes's Orations in favor of the Olynthians. — Expedition of Chares. — Philip takes Olynthus. — Celebrates the Feſtival of the Muſes at Dium. — Commits naval Depredations on Attica. — His Embaſſy to Athens. — The Athenian Embaſſy to Philip. — Character of the Ambaſſadors. — Their Conference with the King. — Differently reported to the Senate and Aſſembly. — Philip's Conqueſts in Thrace. — The Phocian War. — Negociations. — Philip's Intrigues. — Decree of the Amphictyons againſt Phocis. — Executed by Philip. — Macedon acknowledged the principal member of the Amphictyonic Council.

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THE Athenians, deceived by the inactivity of the king of Macedon, indulged themſelves, without reſerve, in their favorite amuſements. Their confederates, the Phocians, were abandoned; the war with Philip, in which they might well have conſidered themſelves as principals, was neglected. Magiſtrates and people ſeemed ſolely attentive to regulate public feſtivals and proceſſions, and to aſcertain the reſpective merit of dramatic poets and performers. The fund originally intended for the

exigences of war, had already been appropriated to the theatre; and a law was now enacted, on the motion of Eubulus, an artful flatterer of the multitude, rendering it a capital crime to propoſe altering this unexampled and moſt whimſical deſtination. It was in vain for Demoſthenes to reſiſt the popular torrent. He was oppoſed and overcome by Eubulus and Demades, the latter of whom, with talents that might have adorned his country, condeſcended to ſell its intereſts to the public enemy. CHAP. XXXV.

Born in the loweſt condition of life, Demades retained the vices of his birth; and always diſcovered that ſordid ſpirit, and weltered in thoſe brutal exceſſes, which betray the want of early culture. Yet the acuteneſs of his apprehenſion, the ſtrength of his reaſon and memory, and, above all, the bold and copious flow of his unpremeditated eloquence, in which he was allowed to excel even Demoſthenes [1] himſelf, raiſed him to a conſpicuous rank in the aſſembly; and it being his buſineſs, as the hireling of Philip, to ſail along with the ſtream of popular frenzy, which the patriotiſm of his rival endeavoured to ſtruggle with, and to ſtem, he poſſeſſed a free and ample ſcope for exerciſing his abilities. Juſtified by Demades.

The people of Athens triumphed in the victory of perfidious demagogues over the wiſeſt and beſt of their fellow-citizens, or rather over the laws and conſtitution of their country, when Philip began to Philip's intrigues in Eubœa. Olymp. cvii. 4. A. C. 349.

[1] Plutarch. in Demoſthen.

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play thoſe batteries which he had patiently raiſed with ſuch ſkill and ſecrecy. The iſland of Eubœa, which he called the fetters of Greece, was the firſt object of his attack. Since the expulſion of the Thebans of which we have formerly taken notice, the Athenians had preſerved their intereſt in the iſland, where they maintained a ſmall body of troops. The different cities, however, enjoyed the independent government of their own laws; they appointed their own magiſtrates; they ſometimes made war againſt each other; and ſeparately aſſumed the prerogatives of free and ſovereign ſtates, while they all collectively acknowledged their dependence on Athens. Such political arrangements made room for the intrigues of Philip. He fomented their civil diſcord; gained partiſans in each city; and, at length, under color of protecting his allies, landed ſeveral Macedonian battalions in the iſland[a].

Danger to which the Athenian intereſt in that iſland was expoſed;

Matters were ſoon diſpoſed to his wiſh. The Macedonians were allowed to occupy the moſt advantageous poſts. The Athenian party exclaimed and threatened; but Plutarch, the leader of that party, was gained to the intereſts of Philip, and demanded auxiliaries from Athens, only to betray them into the hands of their enemies. Demoſthenes, who alone penetrated this dark ſcheme of villany, entreated and conjured his countrymen to put no confidence in Plutarch. But he was ſingle in his opinion. The confidants of Philip were

[a] Æſchin. in Cteſiphont. et Demoſth. de falſâ Legation. et de Pace.

true to their maſter, and therefore urged the expedition. The friends of their country were eager to ſave the iſle of Eubœa, and the capricious multitude, ever in extremes, ruſhed with as much impetuoſity to an enterpriſe intended for their ruin, as they had long ſhown backwardneſs to engage in every other [3]. The promptitude and vigor of their preparations much exceeded the expectation, and even alarmed the fears, of the Macedonian faction. But the latter had gone too far to retreat; nor could they foreſee the conſequences that happened, ſo contrary to their hopes. The Athenians, in fact, obtained a deciſive victory, not by the ſtrength of their arms, which was inferior to the enemy's, but by the wiſe choice of a general.

from which they are extricated by Phocion.

The conſummate prudence of Phocion, who, on his arrival in Eubœa, found things in a worſe ſtate than had been repreſented, riſked no chance of defeat, and loſt no opportunity of advantage [4]. Having choſen a favorable poſt, which was on all ſides ſurrounded by broken and uneven ground, he deſpiſed the clamors of his men and the inſults of the enemy. The treacherous Plutarch was quickly defeated in a mock battle, in which he fell back on the Athenian cavalry, who fled in diſorder to the camp of Phocion. The Eubœans and Macedonians purſued with a raſh and intemperate ardor; and, elated with victory, and confident in their ſuperior numbers, prepared to aſſail the camp. The general, meanwhile, performed a ſacrifice, which he ſtudiouſly prolonged, either from

[3] Demoſth. de Pace. [4] Plutarch. in Phocion.

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He defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans.

religion or policy, until he beheld the diſorder of the aſſailants, embarraſſed by the unequal ground, and by their own raſhneſs. He then commanded his men to ſtand to their arms, and ſallying from his entrenchments with intrepid valor, increaſed the confuſion of the enemy, who were repelled with great ſlaughter towards the plain which they had at firſt occupied. The activity of Cleophanes, who had rallied and formed the Athenian cavalry, rendered the victory complete. The remains of the vanquiſhed took refuge in the fortreſs of Zeratra, in the northern corner of the iſland, which, being attacked, made a feeble reſiſtance[5]. The garriſon ſurrendered; but Phocion reſtored all the Eubœans to liberty, leſt the people of Athens, inflamed by their popular leaders, might treat them with that cruelty, which, on a ſimilar occaſion, they had inflicted on the rebellious citizens of Mitylené[6]. Having ſpent a few weeks in ſettling the affairs of the iſland, he returned in triumph to Athens, his ſhips drawn up in line of battle, their ſterns crowned with garlands, and the rowers keeping time to the ſound of martial muſic. His fellow-citizens received him with acclamations of joy; but their imprudence did not allow them to reap the fruits of his ſucceſs. Moloſſus, an obſcure ſtranger, was appointed, by cabal, to command the troops left in the iſland; and Philip, having renewed his intrigues, carried them on with the ſame dexterity, and met with better ſucceſs[7].

[5] Plut. in Phocion. [6] See above, vol. ii. c. xvi. pp. 377, et ſeqq.
[7] Plut. in Phocion.

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It is worthy of attention, that Demoſthenes followed the ſtandard of Phocion to Eubœa, though he had ſtrongly diſapproved the expedition. Both he and his rival Æſchines, of whom we ſhall ſoon have occaſion to ſpeak more fully, ſerved in the cavalry. Demoſthenes was reproached with being the firſt who deſerted his rank, and among the laſt who returned to the charge. Æſchines behaved with diſtinguiſhed gallantry, and had the honor of being appointed by Phocion to carry home the firſt intelligence of the victory[a].

Oppoſite behaviour of Demoſthenes and Æſchines in the battle.

Philip's diſappointment in Eubœa only ſtimulated his activity. His toils were ſpread ſo widely all around him, that when one part failed he could catch his prey in another. The Olynthians, againſt whom he ſeemed to have long forgotten his reſentment, were aſtoniſhed to obſerve that ſeveral of their citizens grew rich and great in a manner equally ſudden and unaccountable; and that they enlarged their poſſeſſions, built ſtately palaces, and diſplayed a degree of magnificence and grandeur hitherto unknown in their frugal republic. The unexpected invaſion of Philip revealed the myſtery. A conſiderable party had grown wealthy by betraying the ſecrets, expoſing the weakneſs, and foſtering the ill-timed ſecurity of their country[b]. Their influence at home had recommended them to Philip, and the wages of their iniquity had increaſed that influence. It would not probably have been difficult to prove their treaſon, but it ſeemed dangerous to puniſh it; and the Olynthians

Philip invades the territory of Olynthus. Olymp. cvii 4. A. C. 349.

[a] Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione, et Demoſth. in Midiam.
[b] Demoſthen. Olynth. paſſim.

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The Olynthians implore the aid of Athens.

were more immediately concerned to repel the open ravagers of their territory. In this emergency they truſted not to their domeſtic forces of ten thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe [10], but ſent an embaſſy to Athens, inveighing in the ſtrongeſt terms againſt Philip, who had firſt courted, then deceived, and at laſt invaded and attacked them, and craving aſſiſtance from the Athenians, in conſequence of the alliance formerly concluded between the two republics, to defeat the deſigns of a tyrant equally daring and perfidious.

State of parties in Athens.

Had the people of Athens heartily undertaken the cauſe of Olynthus, Philip would have been expoſed a ſecond time to the danger which he had eluded with ſo much addreſs in the beginning of his reign. Thebes was employed and exhauſted in the Phocian war; the grandeur of Sparta had decayed as much as her principles had degenerated; the inferior ſtates extended not their views of policy beyond their reſpective diſtricts. But the Athenians, recently ſucceſsful in Eubœa, and reinforced by the ſtrength and reſentment of ſuch a republic as Olynthus, might have ſtill rendered themſelves formidable to the public enemy, eſpecially as at this juncture the rebellious humors of the Theſſalians broke out afreſh, and led them capriciouſly to oppoſe, with as much eagerneſs as they had often helped to promote, the intereſt of Macedon. But to compenſate theſe unpromiſing circumſtances, Philip poſſeſſed ſtrenuous abettors of his power within the walls of Athens and Olynthus; and his garriſons actually commanded the principal poſts

[10] Demoſth. de falſâ Legatione.

in Theſſaly. Above all, the indolence and vices of his enemies were moſt favorable to his cauſe. The late ſucceſs in Eubœa, which ſhould have animated a brave and generous people to new exertions and dangers, only replunged the Athenians into a ſlothful ſecurity. While they enjoyed their theatrical entertainments, their ſhows and feſtivals, and all the eaſe and luxury of a city-life, they were little inclined to engage in any enterpriſe that might diſturb the tranquil courſe of their pleaſures. In this diſpoſition they were encouraged by their perfidious orators, who ſtrongly exhorted them to beware of involving themſelves in the danger of Olynthus, or of provoking the reſentment of a prince whoſe power they were unable to reſiſt. The orator Demades particularly diſtinguiſhed his zeal in the Macedonian intereſt; adviſing an abſolute and total rejection of the demands of the Olynthian ambaſſadors.

Demoſthenes at length aroſe, and as the deſign of calling the aſſembly had been already explained, entered immediately on the queſtion under deliberation. "On [11] many occaſions, Athenians! have the gods declared their favor to this ſtate, but never more manifeſtly than in the preſent juncture.

First oration of Demoſthenes in favor of the Olynthians.

[11] I mean not a tranſlation of Demoſthenes. The inſerting his ſpeeches entire would deſtroy the humble uniformity of this hiſtorical work, with the deſign of which it would be inconſiſtent to tranſcribe what the orator found it neceſſary to ſay, repeat, and enforce ſo often. Beſides, Demoſthenes is one of the few Greek writers that has been tranſlated, as the late Mr. Harris ſays in his Philological Inquiries, by competent perſons: Drs. Leland and Francis, in Engliſh; Mr. Tourreil and the abbé Auger, in French; and the Abbé Ceſarotti, in Italian.

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That enemies ſhould be raiſed to Philip, on the confines of his territory, enemies not contemptible in power, and, which is more important, ſo determined on the war, that they regard every accommodation with Macedon, firſt as inſidious, next as the deſtruction of their country, can be aſcribed to nothing leſs than the bountiful interpoſition of heaven. With every thing elſe on our ſide, let us not be wanting to ourſelves; let us not be reproached with the unſpeakable infamy of throwing away, not only thoſe cities and territories which we inherited from our anceſtors, but thoſe occaſions and alliances offered us by fortune and the gods. To inſiſt on the power and greatneſs of Philip belongs not to the preſent ſubject. He has become great through your ſupine neglect, and the perfidy of traitors whom it becomes you to puniſh. Such topics are not honorable for you: I wave them as ſuperfluous, having matter more material to urge. To call the king of Macedon perjured and perfidious, without proving my aſſertions, would be the language of inſult and reproach. But his own actions, and not my reſentment, ſhall name him; and of theſe I think it neceſſary to ſpeak for two reaſons; firſt, that he may appear, what he really is, a wicked man; and, ſecondly, that the weak minds who are intimidated by his power and reſources, may perceive that the artifices to which he owes them are now all exhauſted, and that his ruin is at hand. As to myſelf, Athenians! I ſhould not only fear but admire Philip, had he attained his preſent height of

grandeur by honorable and equitable means. But after the moſt ſerious examination I find, that at firſt he ſeduced our ſimplicity by the flattering promiſe of Amphipolis; that he next ſurpriſed the friendſhip of Olynthus by the deceitful gift of Potidæa; that, laſtly, he enſlaved the Theſſalians, under the ſpecious pretence of delivering them from tyrants. In one word, with what community hath he treated which hath not experienced his fraud? Which of his confederates hath he not ſhameleſsly betrayed? Can it be expected, then, that thoſe who promoted his elevation, becauſe they thought him *their* friend; will continue to ſupport it, when they find him a friend to his own intereſt alone? Impoſſible! When confederacies are formed on the principles of common advantage and affection, each member ſhares the toils with alacrity; all perſevere: ſuch confederacies endure. But when worthleſſneſs and lawleſs ambition have raiſed a ſingle man, the ſlighteſt accident overthrows the unſtable edifice of his grandeur. It is not, no! Athenians! it is not poſſible to found a laſting power on treachery, fraud, and perjury. Theſe may ſucceed for a while: but time reveals their weakneſs. For, as in a houſe, a ſhip, and in ſtructures of every kind, the foundation and lower parts ſhould be firm and ſolid, ſo the grounds and principles of action ſhould be juſt and true. But ſuch qualities belong not to the actions of Philip [12].

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[12] The important, though trite proverb, that in public, as well as in private tranſactions, "honeſty is the beſt policy," was

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"I am of opinion, then, that fearleſs of conſequences, you ought to aſſiſt Olynthus with the utmoſt celerity and vigor, and to diſpatch an embaſſy to the Theſſalians, to inflame their hoſtility. But take care, Athenians! that your ardor evaporate not in reſolutions and decrees. Be ready to pay your contributions; prepare to take the field; ſhow yourſelves in earneſt, and you will ſoon diſcover not only the hollow faith of the allies of Philip, but the internal and concealed infirmity of Macedon itſelf. That kingdom has emerged from obſcurity amidſt the conteſts of neighbouring ſtates, during which the ſmalleſt weight, put into either ſcale, is ſufficient to incline the balance. But, in itſelf, Macedon is inconſiderable and weak, and its real weakneſs is increaſed by the ſplendid but ruinous expeditions of Philip. For the king and his ſubjects are actuated by very different ſentiments. Domineered

never expreſſed, perhaps with ſuch dignity, as in the following words of Demoſthenes: ὁταν μεν γαρ ὑπ' ευνοιας τα πραγματα συῃ, καὶ πασι ταυτα συμφορη τοις μετεχουσι τ̃ς πολεμ̃, καὶ συμπονειν, καὶ φερειν τας συμφορας, καὶ μενειν εθελωσι οἱ ανθρωποι· ὁταν δε εκ πλεονεξιας τις, ωσπερ ὕτος ισχυση, ἡ πρωτη προφασις, καὶ μικρον πταισμα ἅπαντα ανεχαιτισε, καὶ διαλυσεν. ὰ γαρ εστι, ω ανδρες Αθηναιοι, αδικουντα καὶ επιορκουντα καὶ ψευδομενον, δυναμιν βεβαιαν κτησασθαι· αλλα τα τοιαυτα εις μεν ἀπαξ, καὶ βραχυν χρονον, αντεχει· καὶ σφοδρα γε ηνθησεν επι ταις ελπισιν, αν τυχη τ̃ χρονω δε φωραται, καὶ περι αυτα καταπιπτει. ὡσπερ γαρ οικιας, οιμαω, καὶ πλοιου, των αλλων των τοιουτων τα κατωθεν ισχυροτατα ειναι δει, ὕτω καὶ των πραξεων τας αρχας καὶ τας υποθεσεις αληθεις καὶ δικαιας ειναι προσηκει τουτο δε καὶ ενι νυν ευ τοις πεπραγμενοις Φιλιππω· Demoſthen. Olynth. i. or Olynth. ii p. 7th, in the common but incorrect edition of Wolfius.

by ambition, he diſregards eaſe and ſafety; but his ſubjects, who individually have little ſhare in the glory of his conqueſts, are indignant, that, for the ſake of one man, they ſhould be haraſſed by continual warfare, and withdrawn from thoſe occupations and purſuits, which afford the comforts and happineſs of private life. On the great body of his people, Philip, therefore, can have no reliance; nor, whatever may be ſaid of their valor and diſcipline, can he depend more on his mercenaries. For I am informed, by a man of undoubted veracity, who has juſt arrived from Macedon, that none of Philip's guards, even thoſe whom he treats with the affectionate, but deceitful names of companions, and fellow-ſoldiers, can merit his eſteem, without incurring his hatred and perſecution. Such is the intolerable jealouſy, ſuch the malignant envy, which crowns the other odious vices of this monſter, who, defying every ſentiment of virtue and decency, drives from his preſence all who ſhudder, all who are diſguſted, at the moſt unnatural enormities; and whoſe court is continually crowded by buffoons, paraſites, obſcene poets and drunkards; wretches who, when drunk, will dance, but ſuch dances [13] as modeſty dare not name. Slight and trivial as theſe matters may to ſome appear, they exhibit the worthleſſneſs of Philip, and announce the infelicity

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[13] The κορδακισμος. Demoſth. p. 8. Vid. Schol. ad Ariſtoph. in Nubib. From the deſcription above given of Athenian manners, it appears that Demoſthenes's delicacy was merely complimental.

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which awaits him. The dangerous defects of his character are hid in the blaze of proſperity [14]; but when misfortune happens, his native deformity will appear. For it is eaſy to prove that, as in the bodily frame, men, during the ſeaſon of health, are inſenſible of what is weak and diſordered in their conſtitutions, which imperfections are immediately felt on the firſt approach of ſickneſs; ſo the glory of foreign conqueſt conceals the vices and defects of republics and monarchies; but let calamity happen, let the war be carried to their frontiers, and thoſe hitherto latent evils immediately become manifeſt.

"If there is a man among you, Athenians! who thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy, becauſe he is fortunate, I agree with that man. Fortune [15] has a mighty influence, or rather Fortune alone domineers in human affairs. Yet could you be perſuaded to do but the ſmalleſt part of your duty, I would greatly prefer your fortune to Philip's; for *you*, ſurely, have better reaſon to truſt in the aſſiſtance of Heaven. But we remain, I think, inactive, heſitating, delaying, and deliberating, while our enemy takes the field, braving ſeaſons and dangers, and neglecting no opportunity of advantage. And if the indolent and careleſs are abandoned by their beſt friends, can we expect that the gods, however favorable, ſhould aſſiſt us, if we will not help ourſelves?"

[14] Secundæ res mirè ſunt viriis obtentui. Salluſt.

[15] From what is ſaid below, it appears that, by Fortune, Demoſthenes here means the diſpenſations of Providence; and by good Fortune, the Favor of Heaven.

The

CHAP. XXXV. The extravagant expedition of Chares.

The people of Athens, animated to their duty, on the one hand, by Demoſthenes, and ſeduced, on the other, by the hirelings of Philip [16] and their own deceitful paſſions, imprudently ſteered a middle courſe, which, in public affairs, is often the moſt dangerous. Convinced that the preſervation of Olynthus was the beſt ſafeguard of Attica, yet unwilling to tear themſelves from their beloved pleaſures, they determined to ſend Chares, with a fleet and two thouſand mercenaries, to the aſſiſtance of their allies. This commander, who was the idol of the multitude, but the diſgrace of his country and of his profeſſion [17], ſhowed no ſolicitude to protect the dependences of Olynthus, which ſucceſſively ſubmitted to the Macedonian arms. To gratify the rapacity of his troops, he made a deſcent on the fertile coaſt of Pallené, where, falling in with eight hundred men commanded by Audæus, called the friends of Philip, he obtained over thoſe contemptible cowards an eaſy and ludicrous victory, which ſerved only to amuſe the comic poets of the times. Having gained this advantage, Chares became unwilling to try his fortune in any ſeverer conflict; and diſdaining, as he affected, to follow the motions of Philip, returned home, and celebrated his triumph over the vain, boaſtful, and voluptuous Audæus [18];

[16] Philochorus in Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammonium.

[17] Timotheus ſaid of him, (" that he was fitter to carry the baggage, than to command an army." Plut. in Apophth.

[18] Among his contemporaries, he was nicknamed ἀλεκτρυών, the cock. Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

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not, however, with the ſpoils of the vanquiſhed, but with the ſum of ſixty talents, which he had extorted from the Phocians, who were actually in alliance with Athens [19].

Philip beſieges Olynthus.

The thoughtleſs multitude, who judged of the expedition of Chares by the expenſive pomp with which he entertained them at his return, talked extravagantly of invading Macedon, and chaſtiſing the inſolence of Philip [20], when a ſecond embaſſy arrived from Olynthus. The inhabitants of this place had been ſhut up within their walls; they had loſt Stagyra, Miciberna, Toroné, cities of conſiderable ſtrength, beſides many inferior towns, which, on the firſt appearance of Philip, were forward to receive his bribes, and to open their gates [21]; and this ſhameful venality, in places well provided for defence, made the king of Macedon obſerve to his generals, that he would thenceforth conſider no fortreſs as impregnable, which could admit a mule laden with money [22]. Dejected by continual loſſes, the Olynthians turned their thoughts to negociation, that they might at leaſt amuſe the invader till the arrival of the Athenian ſuccours. Philip penetrated their deſign, and dexterouſly turned their arts againſt them; affecting to lend an ear to their propoſals, but meanwhile continuing

[19] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. [20] Demoſthen. Olynth. ii.
[21] Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 450.
[22] Plutarch. ubi ſupra. Diodorus, p. 451, relates the matter ſomewhat differently. But he acknowledges that the king of Macedon boaſted that he had augmented his dominions more by gold than by arms. Diodorus, p. 450.

his approaches, till, having got within forty ſtadia of their walls, he declared that of two things one was neceſſary, either *they* muſt leave Olynthus, or *he* Macedon [23]. This explicit declaration from an enemy, who often flattered to deſtroy, but who might always be believed when he threatened, convinced the Olynthians of what they had long ſuſpected, that their utter ruin was at hand. They endeavoured to retard the fatal moment by a vigorous ſally, in which their cavalry, commanded by Apollonides, particularly ſignalized their valor [24]. But they were repulſed by ſuperior numbers, and obliged to take refuge in the city. CHAP. XXXV.

Second embaſſy to Athens.

In this poſture of affairs, the ambaſſadors ſailed for Athens; and having arrived there, found, to their utter aſtoniſhment, the multitude ſtill enjoying the imaginary triumph of Chares. This commander, who chiefly owed his credit to the aſcendant of ſuperficial qualities over the undiſcerning folly of the people, was a warm and active partiſan of democracy, and as ſuch viewed, even by Demoſthenes, with too partial eyes. The orator, beſides, well knew that the irregular, uſeleſs, or deſtructive operations of the Athenian arms, ought not always to be charged on the miſconduct of the general. The troops were always ill paid; ſometimes not paid at all; and therefore diſobedient and mutinous. Inſtead of ſubmitting to control, they often controlled their leaders; their reſolutions were prompt and ungovernable; when they could not perſuade, they threatened; and

[23] Demoſthen. Philipp. iii. [24] Id. ibid.

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The demands of the Olynthians again enforced by Demoſthenes.

compelled even prudent commanders to meaſures wild, ruinous, and diſhonorable.

Demoſthenes, therefore, who again undertook to ſecond the demands of Olynthus, waved all accuſation againſt particular perſons. After endeavouring to repreſs the vain confidence of his countrymen, which had been excited by the ſuppoſed advantages of Chares, and the venal breath of corrupt orators, he deſcribes the real danger of their allies, which he perſuades them to regard as their own. The criſis was now arrived; and if they neglected the preſent opportunity of fulfilling their engagements to Olynthus, they muſt ſoon be obliged to meet Philip in Attica. He reminds them of the various occaſions, which they had already loſt, of repelling this rapacious tyrant, this hoſtile Barbarian, this mixture of perfidy and violence, for whom he cannot find any name ſufficiently reproachful. "But ſome perhaps will ſay, it is the buſineſs of a public ſpeaker to adviſe, not to upbraid. We wiſh to aſſiſt the Olynthians, and we will aſſiſt them; but inform us how our aid may be rendered moſt effectual. Appoint magiſtrates, Athenians! for the inſpection of your laws; not to enact new laws; they are already too numerous; but to repeal thoſe whoſe ill effects you daily experience; I mean the laws reſpecting the theatrical funds (thus openly I declare it), and ſome about the ſoldiery. By the firſt, the ſoldier's pay is conſumed; as theatrical expenſes, by the uſeleſs and inactive; the ſecond ſcreen from juſtice the coward who declines the ſervice, and damp the ardor of

the brave who would be ready to take the field. Till theſe laws be repealed, expect not that any man will urge your true intereſt, ſince his honeſt zeal muſt be repaid with deſtruction." After inſiſting ſtill farther on this delicate and dangerous ſubject, Demoſthenes probably obſerved diſpleaſure and reſentment in the countenances of his hearers, and then (as his cuſtom was) artfully turning the diſcourſe: "I ſpeak thus, not with a view to give offence, for I am not ſo mad as wantonly to offend; but becauſe I think it the duty of a public ſpeaker to prefer your intereſt to your pleaſure. Such were the maxims and conduct (you yourſelves know it) of thoſe ancient and illuſtrious orators whom all unite to praiſe, but none venture to imitate; of the virtuous Ariſtides, of Nicias, of Pericles, and of him whoſe name [25] I bear. But ſince miniſters have appeared who dare not addreſs the aſſembly, till they have firſt *conſulted* you about the *counſels* which they ought to give, who aſk, as it were, What ſhall I propoſe? What ſhall I adviſe? In what, Athenians! can I do you pleaſure? the ſweet draught of flattery has concealed a deadly poiſon; our ſtrength is enervated, our glory tarniſhed, the public beggared and diſgraced, while thoſe ſmooth-tongued declaimers have acquired opulence and ſplendor [26],

[25] Demoſthenes, who acted ſuch a diſtinguiſhed part in the Peloponneſian war. See above, vol. iii. c. xvii. p. 2, et ſeqq.

[26] It is worthy of obſervation that, in this diſcourſe throughout, Demoſthenes inſiſts that the people at large enjoyed much leſs authority in his time than in the days of Ariſtides, etc. All

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Conſider, Athenians! how briefly the conduct of your anceſtors may be contraſted with your own; for if you would purſue the road to glory and happineſs, you need not foreign inſtructors: it will be ſufficient to follow the example of thoſe from whom you are deſcended. The Athenians of former times, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence to which you are accuſtomed, held, with general conſent, the ſovereignty of Greece for ſixty-five years [27]; depoſited above ten thouſand talents in the citadel; kept the king of Macedon in that ſubjection which a Barbarian owes to Greece; erected many and illuſtrious trophies of the exploits which their own valor had atchieved by land and ſea; in a word, are the only people on record whoſe glorious actions tranſcend the power of envy. Thus great in war, their civil adminiſtration was not leſs admirable. The ſtately edifices which they raiſed, the temples which they adorned, the dedications which they offered to the gods, will never be excelled in magnificence; but, in private life, ſo exemplary

depends, he aſſerts, on the popular orators and magiſtrates, "ὁ τι ἂν ἐκεῖνοι θέλωσιν." Yet it is well known that, ſince the age of Ariſtides, the government had become more democratical. Demoſthenes himſelf allows this: the orators, he ſays, dare not addreſs the people now with that freedom which they uſed formerly. — This apparent contradiction ſhows the nature and tendency of that ſpecies of popular government which the Greeks called ochlogarchy. — The populace are the ſlaves of their demagogues, and the demagogues of the populace. Inſtead of liberty, there is an interchange of ſervitude.

[27] Demoſthenes's chronology here is not accurate. See above, vol. iii. 232. in the note.

was their moderation, and ſo ſcrupulous their adherence to the frugal maxims of antiquity, that if any of you has examined the houſe of Ariſtides or Miltiades, he will find them undiſtinguiſhed above the contiguous buildings by ſuperior elegance or grandeur. The ambition of thoſe illuſtrious ſtateſmen was to exalt the republic, not to enrich themſelves [28]; and this juſt moderation, accompanied by piety and patriotiſm, raiſed their country (and no wonder!) to the height of proſperity. Such was the condition of Athens under thoſe ſincere and honeſt men. Is it the ſame, or nearly the ſame, under the indulgence of our preſent miniſters? I wave other topics on which I might enlarge. But you behold in what ſolitude we are left. The Lacedæmonians loſt; the Thebans haraſſed by war; no other republic worthy of aſpiring to the ſovereignty. Yet, at this period, when we might not only have defended our own poſſeſſions, but have become the arbiters and umpires of all around us, we have been ſtripped of whole provinces; we have expended fifteen hundred talents fruitleſsly; we have loſt, in time of peace, the alliances and advantages which the arms of our anceſtors had acquired; and we have raiſed up and armed a moſt formidable enemy againſt ourſelves. If not, let the man ſtand forth who can ſhow from what other cauſe Philip has derived his greatneſs. But the miſerable condition of our foreign affairs is, perhaps, compenſated by the happineſs of our

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[28] Privatus illis cenſus erat brevis:
Commune magnum. HOR. ode xv. l. ii.

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domeſtic ſtate, and the ſplendid improvements of our capital. Roads repaired, walls whitened, *fountains*, and *follies* [29]! And the miniſters who have procured us thoſe magnificent advantages, paſs from poverty and meanneſs to opulence and dignity; build private palaces which inſult the edifices of the public; grow greater as their country becomes leſs, and gradually riſe on its ruins. What is the ſource of this diſorder? It is, Athenians! that formerly the people did their duty, took the field in perſon, and thus kept the magiſtrates in awe."

Licentiouſneſs of the Athenian troops under the profligate Charidemus.

The aſſembly remained inſenſible to the motives of intereſt and honor. Inſtead of taking the field in perſon, they ſent to Olynthus a body of foreign infantry, amounting to four thouſand, with a hundred and fifty horſe, under the command of Charidemus. This unworthy general, who was the ſlave of his mercenaries, and of his own deteſtable paſſions, gratified the rapacity of his troops by ravaging the Macedonian province of Bottiæa, on the confines of Chalcis. At length, however, he threw his forces into Olynthus; and the beſieged, encouraged by this reinforcement, hazarded another ſally, in which they were defeated and repelled with conſiderable loſs. The Athenian mercenaries were rendered every day more contemptible by their cowardice, and more dangerous by their licentiouſneſs. The beaſtly Charidemus had

[29] Πηγας και λημας. Demoſthenes diſdained not ſuch a gingle of words when it preſented itſelf naturally, but as it rarely occurs in his works, it is plain that he never ſought for it.

neither inclination nor ability to reſtrain their irregularities. According to his cuſtom, he drank, at every meal, to a ſcandalous exceſs: his brutality inſulted the women of Olynthus; and ſuch was his impudent and abandoned profligacy, that he demanded of the ſenate, as a reward for his pretended ſervices, a beautiful Macedonian youth, then captive in the city [30].

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The cauſe of the Olynthians vigorouſly ſupported by Æſchines and Demoſthenes.

In this ſtate of affairs, the Olynthians a third time applied to Athens. On the preſent occaſion, Æſchines, who afterwards became ſuch an active partiſan of the Macedonian intereſt, particularly diſtinguiſhed his zeal and his patriotiſm. The ſpeech of Demoſthenes, to the ſame purpoſe, is ſtill on record. He exhorts and conjures his countrymen to ſend to Olynthus an army of citizens, and at the ſame time to make a diverſion, by invading the Macedonian coaſt. Unleſs both be done, the indefatigable induſtry of Philip would render either ineffectual. "Have you ever conſidered the rapid progreſs of this prince? He began by taking Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa, and Methoné; from thence he poured his troops into Theſſaly, and became maſter of Pheræ, Pegaſæ, and Magneſia. Then, turning towards Thrace, he over-ran provinces, conquered and divided kingdoms, and ſeated himſelf on the trophies of fallen crowns and broken ſceptres. I ſpeak not of his expedition againſt the Pæonians and Illyrians, into Epirus,—and where has not ambition conducted his arms? But why this long enumeration?

[30] Theopomp. apud Athen. l. x. p. 436.

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— To prove the important opportunities which your negligence has loſt, and the unextinguiſhable ardor of an adverſary, whoſe ſucceſſive conqueſts continually bring him nearer to your walls. For is there a man in this aſſembly, whoſe blindneſs perceives not that the ſufferings of the Olynthians are the forerunners of our own? The preſent conjuncture calls you, as with a loud voice, at length to rouſe from your lethargy, and to profit by this laſt teſtimony of the bountiful protection of the gods. Another is not to be expected, after the many which you have deſpiſed and forgotten: I ſay *forgotten*; for favorable conjunctures, like riches, and other gifts of heaven, are remembered with gratitude, only by thoſe who have underſtanding to preſerve and to enjoy them. The ſpendthrift diſſipates his thankfulneſs with his wealth [31], and the ſame imprudent folly renders him both miſerable and ungrateful." After theſe bold expoſtulations, or rather reproaches, he encourages them to relieve Olynthus, by obſerving, that Philip would never have undertaken the ſiege of that place, if he had expected ſuch a vigorous reſiſtance; eſpecially at a time when his allies were ready to revolt; when the Theſſalians wiſhed to throw off the yoke; when the Thracians and Illyrians longed to recover their freedom. Thus the power of Philip, lately repreſented as ſo formidable, is by no

[31] The obſervation is uncommon, but juſt: αλλα οιμαι, παρομοιον εστι, ὁπερ ἡ περι της των χρηματων κτησεως. αν μεν γαρ ὁσα αν ἡις λαβῃ ἡ σωσῃ, μεγαλην ἐχει τὴ τυχὴ την χαριν. αν δὲ ἀναλωσας λαβῃ, συναναλωσει ἡ το μεμνησθαι τὴ τυχὴ την χαριν. Demoſt. Olynth. iii. Olynth. i. p. 2. ex edit. Wolf.

means real and ſolid; one vigorous effort might yet overwhelm him; and the paſſion of hope, as well as that of fear, is rendered ſubſervient to the purpoſe of the orator. He again touches on the article of ſupplies; but with ſuch caution as ſhows that his former more explicit obſervations had been heard impatiently. "As to money for the expenſes of the war (for without money nothing can be done), you poſſeſs, Athenians! a military fund exceeding that of any other people. But you have unfortunately withdrawn it from its original deſtination, to which were it reſtored, there could not be any neceſſity for extraordinary contributions. What! do you propoſe *in form*[72], that the theatrical money ſhould be applied to the uſes of the ſoldiery? No, ſurely. But I affirm, that ſoldiers muſt be raiſed; that a fund has been allotted for their ſubſiſtence; and that in every well-regulated community, thoſe who are paid by the public, ought to ſerve the public. To profit of the preſent conjuncture, we muſt act with vigor and celerity, we muſt diſpatch ambaſſadors, to animate the neighbouring ſtates againſt Philip; we muſt take the field in perſon. If war raged on the frontiers of this country, with what rapidity would the Macedonians march hither? Why will you throw away a ſimilar opportunity? Know, that but one alternative remains, to carry the war into Macedon, or to receive it in Attica. If Olynthus reſiſts, we may ravage the territories of Philip;

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[72] Such a propoſal, the Athenians had abſurdly declared puniſhable by death.

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should that republic be destroyed, who will hinder him from coming hither? The Thebans! To say nothing too severe, they would rather reinforce his arms. The Phocians! they who, without our assistance, cannot defend themselves. O! but he dares not come! It is madness to think that the designs of which he already boasts with such bold imprudence, he will not venture to execute, when nothing opposes his success". I think it unnecessary to describe the difference between attacking Philip at home, and waiting for him here. Were you obliged, only for one month, to encamp without the walls, and to subsist an army in the country, your husbandmen would sustain more loss than has been incurred by all the former exigences of the war. This would happen, although the enemy kept at a distance; but at the approach and entrance of an invader, what devastation must be produced! Add to this, the insult and disgrace, the most ruinous of all losses, to men capable of reflection."

Philip takes Olynthus. Olymp. cviii. i. A. C. 348.

The arguments of Demosthenes prevailed; an embassy was sent into Peloponnesus, to inflame the hostility of that country against Philip; and it was determined to assist the Olynthians with an

* With all his policy, Philip seems to have had the vanity of a Greek. The vigor of the original is not to be translated: "Αν δε ἐκεινα Φιλιππος λαβῃ, τις αυτον ἐτι κωλυσει δουρο βαδιζειν; Θηβαιοι; μη λιαν πικρον ειπειν ᾖ, ᾗ συνεισβαλωσι ἑτοιμως. αλλα Φωκεις; ὁι την οικειαν ουχ οἱοι τε ὀντες Φυλαττειν, εαν μη βοηθησητε ὑμεις· ἡ αλλος τις; αλλ' ὁταν ουχι βουλησεται — των ατοποτατων μεντοι αν ειη, ει ὁ γυν ανοιαν οφλισκανων, ὁμως ἐκλαλει, ταυτα δυνηθεις μη πραξει. I have used a little freedom with the "ουχι βουλησεται."

army of Athenian citizens. But before this reſo- CHAP.
lution could be carried into effect, Olynthus was XXXV.
no more. The cavalry belonging to that place had acted with great ſpirit againſt the beſiegers. As the works were too extenſive to be completely inveſted, the Olynthian horſemen made frequent incurſions [34] into the ſurrounding territory, where they not only ſupplied themſelves with proviſions and forage, but beat up the quarters, attacked the advanced poſts, and intercepted the convoys of the enemy. Theſe advantages were chiefly owing to the merit of one man. In the various ſkirmiſhes, as well as in the two general engagements which had happened ſince the commencement of the ſiege, Philip perceived that Apollonides, who commanded the enemy's horſe, diſplayed ſuch valor and abilities as might long retard, perhaps altogether defeat, the ſucceſs of his undertaking. His ſecret emiſſaries were therefore ſet to work; perfidious clamors were ſown among the populace of Olynthus; Apollonides was publicly accuſed; and, by the malignant practices of traitors, condemned to baniſhment on a ſuſpicion of treaſon [35]. The command of the cavalry was beſtowed on Laſthenes and Euthycrates, two wretches who had ſold their country to Philip. Having obtained ſome previous ſucceſſes, which had been concerted the better to maſk their deſigns, they advanced againſt a Macedonian poſt; carried it at the firſt onſet; purſued the flying

[34] Diodorus, l. xvi. 53. [35] Demoſth. de falſâ Legatione.

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garrison; and betrayed their own troops into an ambush prepared by the enemy. Surrounded on all sides, the Olynthians surrendered their arms; and this fatal disaster encouraging the Macedonian partisans within the walls, soon opened the gates of Olynthus [16]. The conqueror entered in triumph, plundered and demolished the city, and dragged the inhabitants into servitude [17]. Lasthenes, Euthycrates, and their associates, shared the same, or even a worse fate. Philip is said to have abandoned them to the indignant rage of the Macedonian soldiers, who butchered them almost before his eyes. It is certain, that though his mean and blind ambition often employed treachery, his justice or his pride always detested the traitor [18].

This important conquest inspires Philip with the ambition to seize Thermopylæ

The conquest of Olynthus put Philip in possession of the region of Chalcis, and the northern coast of the Ægean sea; an acquisition of territory, which rendered his dominions on that side round and complete. His kingdom was now bounded, on the north by the Thracian possessions

[16] Demosth. de falsâ Legatione.

[17] Four reasons conspired to produce the severe treatment of the Olynthians: 1. Philip had lost a great many men in the siege; πολλὰς των στρατιωτων εν ταις τειχομαχιαις απεβαλεν. Diodor. p. 450. 2. The Olynthians had received his natural brothers, Aridæus and Menelaus, accused of treason. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. 3. Philip wanted money to carry on his intrigues in other cities; διαρπασας δε αυτην (scil. Ολυνθον) και τους ενοικουντας εξανδραποδισαμενος, ελαθυροπωλησε. τουτο δε πραξας, χρηματων τε πολλων εις τον πολεμον υπορησε. 4 Diodorus immediately after adds the fourth reason, "That he might deter the neighbouring cities from opposing his measures." Diodor. p. 459.

[18] Demosth. Olynth. iii. sect. 3.

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of Kerſobleptes, and on the ſouth by the territory of Phocis, a province actually comprehending the ſtraits of Thermopylæ, which had formerly belonged to a different diviſion of Greece. Beſides the general motives of intereſt, which prompted him to extend his dominions, he diſcerned the peculiar importance of acquiring the Thermopylæ and the Helleſpont, ſince the former was emphatically ſtyled the Gates of Greece, and the latter formed the only communication between that country and the fertile ſhores of the Euxine. Greece, exceeding in population the proportion of its extent and fertility, annually drew ſupplies of corn from thoſe northern regions. The Athenians, in particular, had ſettlements even in the remote peninſula of Crim Tartary, anciently called the Taurica Cherſoneſus, by means of which they purchaſed and imported the ſuperfluous productions of that remote climate[39]. Their ſhips could only ſail thither by the Helleſpont; and ſhould that important ſtrait be reduced under the power of an enemy, they muſt be totally excluded from a uſeful, and even neceſſary, branch of commerce.

and the Helleſpont.

Philip perceived theſe conſequences. It was the general intereſt of all the Grecian republics to aſſiſt Kerſobleptes and the Phocians, which was, in other words, to defend the Helleſpont and Thermopylæ. The intereſt of the Macedonian was diametrically oppoſite; nor could he expect to

Philip celebrates the feſtival of the Muſes at Dium. Olymp. cviii. 1. A. C. 348.

[39] Demoſthen. in Leptin.

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accompliſh the great objects of his reign, unleſs he firſt rendered himſelf maſter of thoſe important poſts. This delicate ſituation furniſhed a proper exerciſe for the dexterity of Philip. After the deſtruction of Olynthus, he celebrated a public feſtival of gratitude and joy, at the neighbouring town of Dium; to which, as at the Olympian and other Grecian games, all the republics were promiſcuouſly invited, whether friends or enemies [40]. It appears that ſeveral Athenians aſſiſted at theſe magnificent entertainments, which laſted nine days, in honor of the Muſes, and which wanted no object of elegance or ſplendor, that either art could produce or wealth could purchaſe. The politeneſs and condeſcending affability of Philip obliterated the remembrance of his recent ſeverity to Olynthus; and his liberal diſtribution of the ſpoils of that unfortunate city [41] gained him new

[40] Demoſth. de falſâ Legatione, et Diodor. p. 451.

[41] Both Demoſthenes and Diodorus mention an anecdote which does honor to Philip, and ſtill more to Satyrus the player. After dinner, the king, according to his cuſtom, was diſtributing his preſents; amidſt the general feſtivity, Satyrus alone wore a ſad countenance. The king addreſſed him kindly, and, in the language of the times, deſired him to ask a boon. Satyrus ſaid, that ſuch preſents as others received (cups of gold, etc.) ſeemed to him of little value: that he had indeed ſome thing to ask, but feared a denial. Philip having encouraged him, he proceeded: "Apollophanes of Pydna was my friend: at his death, his two daughters, both arrived at a marriageable age, were ſent to Olynthus, taken captive, and ſubjected to all the calamities of ſervitude. Theſe are the preſents I requeſt, not with any deſign unworthy of their father or myſelf, but that I may give them ſuch portions as ſhall enable them to marry happily." Apollophanes had been an active opponent, and even friends,

friends, and confirmed the attachment of his old partisans.

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Philip unexpectedly commits naval depredations on Attica.

Amidst these scenes of rejoicing and festivity, Philip seems not to have forgotten, one moment, that the most immediate object of his policy was to detach the Athenians from the cause of Phocis and Kersobleptes, who were both their allies. For this purpose, while he courted individuals with peculiar address, he determined to make the public feel the inconvenience of the war, the better to prepare them for the insidious proposal of a separate peace. The bad conduct of Chares left the sea open to the Macedonians, who had silently acquired a considerable naval force. Philip begun to attack the Athenians on their favorite element. His fleet ravaged their tributary islands of Lemnos and Imbros; surprised and took a squadron of Athenian vessels, stationed on the southern coast of Eubœa; and, encouraged by these advantages, boldly sailed to Attica, made a descent on the shore of Marathon, repelled the Athenian cavalry, headed by Deotimus, ravaged the territory, and carried off the Salaminian galley. From thence they proceeded to the isle of Salamis, and defeated a considerable detachment commanded by Charidemus. The illustrious trophies of Marathon and Salamis were effaced by the insults of the Macedonians, whose fleet returned home in triumph,

the personal enemy, of Philip; yet this prince granted the request of Satyrus, and enabled him liberally to provide for the daughters of his friend.

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adorned with hoſtile ſpoils, and with military and naval glory[42].

His intrigues give him poſſeſſion of Eubœa.

The activity of Philip ſeconded his good fortune. His intrigues were renewed in Eubœa. Under pretence of delivering the iſland from the tyranny and extortions of Moloſſus, the Athenian commander, he landed ſuch a body of troops there, as proved ſufficient, with the aſſiſtance of his adherents, to expel the Athenians. Such a multiplication of calamities might have diſguſted that people with the war againſt Philip, whoſe hoſtility, directed againſt them alone, ſeemed to have forgotten the Phocians and Kerſobleptes; when ſecret but zealous partiſans of Macedon arrived at Athens, as ambaſſadors from Eubœa, commiſſioned to ſettle amicably all differences between the two countries. They obſerved, that Philip had left the iſland abſolutely free and independent; and that, though conſtrained to take arms in defence of his allies, he was ſincerely deſirous of making peace with the Athenians. The repreſentations of the Eubœan ambaſſadors were enforced by the influence of two Athenians, Ariſtodemus and Neoptolemus, the firſt diſtinguiſhed as a player, the ſecond as a player and poet, who having acquired fortunes in Macedon, returned to their own

His deceitful embaſſy to Athens;

[42] In the chronology of theſe events, I have followed Dr. Leland. See his Life of Philip, vol. ii. p. 43. The events themſelves are related in the oration of Demoſthenes commonly entitled the Firſt Philippic, but which the Doctor, with great probability, conſiders as two diſtinct orations ſpoken at different times.

country, to forward the measures of their liberal protector. They affirmed that the king of Macedon earnestly wished to live on good terms with the republic; and the Athenians paid much regard to men, whose talents were then highly esteemed, and who had remitted the riches amassed in a foreign country, to purchase lands in Attica, and to supply with alacrity the exigences of the public service. CHAP. XXXV.

Demosthenes saw through these dark and deep artifices [43]; but in vain endeavoured to alarm the unsuspecting credulity of his countrymen. On a future occasion, after the plot had become manifest, he upbraids their careless indifference and delusion at this important crisis. "Had you been spectators in the theatre, and not deliberating on matters of the highest moment, you could not have heard Neoptolemus with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment [44]." In vain exposed by Demosthenes.

Such was the disposition of the assembly, when Æschines returned from his Peloponnesian embassy. He had assembled the great council of the Arcadians; revealed to them the dangerous views of Philip, which threatened the liberty of Greece; and, notwithstanding the powerful opposition of Hieronymus, and other Macedonian partisans, had engaged that people to approve the patriot zeal of Athens, and to deliberate on taking arms in the common cause. In relating the success of his embassy, he inveighed with great severity against Æschines returns from his embassy, and awakens the public resentment against Philip.

[43] Demosthen. de Chersoneso, et de Pace.

[44] Demosthen. de Chersoneso.

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those mercenary traitors, who had sold the interests of their country to a cruel tyrant. The Greeks had full warning of their danger. The miserable fate of Olynthus ought ever to be before their eyes. At his return through Peloponnesus, he had beheld a sight sufficient to melt the most obdurate heart; thirty young Olynthians, of both sexes, driven like a herd of cattle, as a present from Philip to some of the unworthy instruments of his ambition [45].

The susceptible and ever-varying temper of the multitude was deeply affected by the representations of Æschines; the pacific advices of Neoptolemus and his associates were forgotten; war and revenge again echoed through the assembly. At the requisition of Æschines, ambassadors were dispatched to confirm the hostile resolutions of the Arcadians, and to awaken the terror of the neighbouring republics. The Athenian youth were assembled in the temple of Agraulos to swear irreconcileable hatred against Philip and the Macedonians, and the most awful imprecations were denounced against the mercenary traitors who co-operated with the public enemy. This fermentation might at length have purified into strong and decisive measures; and had Philip possessed only an ordinary degree of vigilance, a confederacy might have been yet formed in Greece sufficient to repel the Macedonian arms. But that consummate politician thought nothing done while any

[45] Demosthen. de falsâ Legatione, sect. 5.

thing was neglected; and, as he allowed not the slightest opportunity to pass unimproved, he often derived very important benefits from seemingly inconsiderable causes. CHAP. XXXV.

Dexterity of that prince in diverting the storm.

An Athenian of the name of Phrynon, a man wealthy and powerful, had been attacked, robbed, and confined by some Macedonian soldiers, who obliged him to purchase his liberty by a very considerable ransom [46]. As this violence had been committed during the fifteen days of truce that followed the celebration of the Olympic games, Phrynon very judiciously supposed that the king of Macedon, who had long been ambitious of obtaining a place in the Grecian confederacy, would not abet this act of injustice and impiety. He had therefore requested his countrymen, who at that time prepared to negociate with Philip an exchange of prisoners, to join him in commission with Ctesiphon, a man of experience and capacity, who had been already named to that embassy; imagining that by appearing in a public character, he might the more easily recover the ransom and other monies that had been unjustly extorted from him. Having arrived in Macedon, the ambassadors were received and treated by Philip with uncommon politeness and respect; their demands were most obligingly granted, or rather prevented; the king apologized to Phrynon for the ignorant rusticity of his soldiers, which had led them to act so unwarrantably; and he lamented both to Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the necessity of their present

[46] Æschines de falsâ Legatione.

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miſſion, ſince he had nothing more ſincerely at heart than to live on good terms with their republic [47]. At their return to Athens, the repreſentations of ſuch men could not be without weight; nor could they fail being extremely favorable to the king of Macedon.

He improves every favorable incident.

Another incident followed, which was improved with no leſs dexterity [48]. At the taking and ſack of Olynthus, Stratocles and Eucrates, two Athenians of diſtinction, had been ſeized and carried into Macedon. By ſome accident theſe men had not been releaſed with the other priſoners. Their relations were anxious for their ſafety, and therefore applied to the Athenians, that a proper perſon might be ſent to treat of their ranſom. Ariſtodemus was employed in this commiſſion, but was more attentive to paying his court than performing his duty; and, at his return home, neglected to give an account of his negociation. Philip, meanwhile, whoſe vigilance never ſlept, and who well knew the hoſtile reſolutions in agitation againſt him at Athens, releaſed the priſoners without ranſom, and diſmiſſed them with the higheſt expreſſions of regard. Moved by gratitude, Stratocles appeared in the aſſembly, blazed forth the praiſes of the king of Macedon, and loudly complained againſt the careleſs indifference of Ariſtodemus, who had neglected to report his embaſſy [49].

The Athenians are perſuaded

The artful player, thus called upon to act his part, excuſed his omitting to relate *one* example of

[47] Æſchines de falſâ Legatione. [48] Id. ibid. [49] Id. ibid.

kindneſs, in a man who had recently given ſo many proofs of the moſt unbounded generoſity. He expatiated on the candor and benevolence of Philip, and eſpecially on his profound reſpect for the republic, with which, he aſſured them, the king of Macedon was earneſt to conclude a peace, and even to enter into an alliance, on the moſt honorable and advantageous terms. He probably reminded them of the misfortunes which had attended their arms ſince they commenced war againſt this prince. Fifteen hundred talents expended with diſgrace; ſeventy-five dependent cities, including thoſe of the Chalcidic region, loſt irrecoverably; Olynthus deſtroyed; Eubœa revolted; Athens diſhonored and exhauſted; and Macedon more powerful and more reſpected than at any former period. This repreſentation did not exceed the truth; and the calamities of the war had long inclined to peace the more moderate and judicious portion of the aſſembly. The artificial generoſity of Philip, in his treatment of Phrynon and Stratocles, blazoned by the eloquence of Ariſtodemus, fixed the wavering irreſolution of the multitude. The military preparations were ſuſpended. Even Demoſthenes and Æſchines yielded to the torrent; and imagining that a bad peace was better than a bad war (ſince it was impoſſible to expect ſucceſs from the fluctuating councils of their country), ſupported a decree [59] of Philocrates for ſending a

CHAP. XXXV. to ſend an embaſſy to Philip.

[59] The decree was attacked by one Licinus. Demoſthenes defended it; and both Demoſthenes and Æſchines, as appears from the text, were on the embaſſy.

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herald and ambaſſadors to diſcover the real intentions of Philip, and to hearken to the terms of accommodation with which he had ſo long amuſed them.

Character of the ambaſſadors.

The miniſters appointed to this commiſſion ſeem to have been purpoſely choſen among men of oppoſite principles, who might mutually be checks on each other. Phrynon, Cteſiphon, Ariſtodemus, and Philocrates, who had uniformly teſtified their confidence in the king of Macedon, were oppoſed by Æſchines and Demoſthenes, who had long diſcovered their ſuſpicions of that prince. To the embaſſy were added Nauſicles and Dercyllus, men diſtinguiſhed by the public offices which they had diſcharged with equal patriotiſm and fidelity; Jatrocles, the choſen friend of Æſchines; and Cimon, illuſtrious for the name he bore, which deſcended to him from the greateſt and moſt fortunate of the Athenian commanders. The whole number amounted to ten, beſides Agalocreon of Tenedos, who was ſent on the part of the Greek iſlands in alliance with Athens [53].

Difficulties occaſioned by the quarrel between Demoſthenes and Æſchines.

Thus far contemporary authors agree; but in deſcribing the events which followed the departure of the ambaſſadors, all is inconſiſtency and contradiction. The miſunderſtanding that aroſe between Æſchines and Demoſthenes, the former of whom was impeached by the latter, furniſh us, in the accuſation and defence, with the fulleſt and moſt diffuſe, but at the ſame time the leaſt authentic, materials, that preſent themſelves in any paſſage of

[53] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

Grecian hiſtory. The whole train of the negociation, as well as the events connected with it, are repreſented in colors the moſt diſcordant; facts are aſſerted and denied; while both parties appeal to the memory of the aſſembly before which they ſpoke, to the teſtimony of witneſſes, and even to the evidence of public decrees and records; circumſtances that muſt appear very extraordinary, unleſs we conſider that ſuborning of witneſſes, perjury, and even the falſifying of laws and records, were crimes not unuſual at Athens[52]. Amidſt this confuſion, the diſcerning eye of criticiſm would vainly endeavour to penetrate the truth. Æſchines was indeed acquitted by his countrymen. But nothing poſitive can be learned from a partial ſentence, pronounced three years after the alleged crimes had been committed, when the power of Philip had increaſed to ſuch an alarming degree, as gave his faction a decided aſcendant even in the Athenian aſſembly. CHAP. XXXV.

Account of the negociation. Olymp. cviii. 1. cviii. 2. A. C. 348 and 347.

To diſentangle ſuch perplexity, we ſhall keep chiefly to thoſe facts which are allowed on both ſides, deducing from them ſuch conſequences as ſeem moſt natural and probable. In the courſe of one year, three embaſſies were ſent to Philip; the firſt to propoſe a peace, the ſecond to ratify it, the third to ſee the conditions of it obſerved; and in that ſpace of time Kerſobleptes, being ſtripped of his dominions, was reduced into captivity, and Philip having ſeized Thermopylæ, invaded Phocis,

[52] See my Diſcourſe on the Character and Manners of the Athenians, prefixed to Lyſias and Iſocrates.

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and deſtroyed the twenty-two cities of that province in leſs than twenty-two days. Nor was this all: a foreign prince having made himſelf maſter of Thermopylæ and the Helleſpont, the moſt valuable ſafeguards of Greece — having invaded and deſolated the territory of a Grecian republic, the moſt reſpectable for its antiquity, power, and wealth, the ſeat of the Amphictyonic council, and of the revered oracle of Delphi — Theſe daring meaſures tended ſo little to excite the diſpleaſure of Greece, that the king of Macedon had no ſooner accompliſhed them, than he threatened to attack Athens (who weakly lamented calamities which ſhe had neither prudence nor courage to prevent) at the head of a general confederacy of the Amphictyonic ſtates.

Diſſenſion of the ambaſſadors.

Such extraordinary tranſactions, of which hiſtory ſcarcely offers another example for the inſtruction of poſterity, Demoſthenes aſcribes entirely to the corruption and perfidy of the Athenian ambaſſadors. "The felicity of Philip," he ſays, "conſiſts chiefly in this; that having occaſion for traitors, fortune has given him men treacherous and corrupt beyond his moſt ſanguine hopes and prayers[1]." This, doubtleſs, is the exaggeration of an orator, deſirous by every means to blacken the character of his colleagues in the embaſſy, and particularly that of his adverſary Æſchines. Yet it will appear, from the moſt careful ſurvey of the

[1] Subſequent writers have copied the language of Demoſthenes, και χρηματων πληθος διαδυς τοις εν ταις πολεσι ισχυουσι, πολλους εσχε προδοτας των πατριδων. Diodorus, ubi ſupra.

events of thoſe times, that the incapacity and neglect, if not the treaſon, of the Athenian miniſters, greatly contributed to the ſucceſs of the Macedonian arms.

Conference of the ambaſſadors with Philip.

From the firſt moment of their departure from Athens, the ambaſſadors began to betray their mutual jealouſies and ſuſpicions of each other's fidelity. The dangerous character of Philocrates was equally dreaded by Æſchines and Demoſthenes [54]; and the latter, if we may believe his rival, ſo much diſguſted the other ambaſſadors, by the moroſe ſeverity of his temper, that they had almoſt excluded him their ſociety; a circumſtance rendered credible, not merely by the partial evidence of an adverſary, but by the reſentment and indignation always expreſſed by Demoſthenes againſt the behaviour of his colleagues. Having arrived at Pella, they were introduced to an audience; and ſpoke, as had been agreed on, in the order of their ſeniority. The diſcourſe of Æſchines was the moſt copious and elaborate, but ſeemed rather calculated for gaining merit with the Athenian aſſembly, than for influencing the conduct of Philip. "He recalled to the memory of the king, the favors of the Athenians towards his anceſtors; the diſtreſſed condition of the children of Amyntas; the ſolicitations of Euridicé; and the generous interpoſitions of Iphicrates, to whom the family of Philip owed the crown of Macedon. Having touched ſlightly on the ungrateful returns made by Ptolemy and Perdiccas, he dwelt on the

Speech of Æſchines

[54] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

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injuſtice of thoſe hoſtilities which Philip had committed againſt the republic, eſpecially in taking Amphipolis which his father Amyntas had acknowledged to be a dependent colony of Athens. He inſiſted on the impropriety of retaining this poſſeſſion, which as it could not be claimed by any ancient title, neither could it be held by the right of conqueſt, not being gained in any war between the two ſtates. In the time of profound peace between Athens and Macedon, Philip had taken from the Amphipolitans an Athenian city, which it concerned his juſtice and his honor to reſtore without delay, to its lawful and acknowledged owners".

That of Demoſthenes.

Had Æſchines wiſhed to furniſh Philip with a pretence for protracting the negociation, he could not have done it more effectually than by ſuch a demand. It could not poſſibly be expected, that a victorious monarch ſhould ſet bounds to his own triumphs, in order to purchaſe peace by tamely ſurrendering one of the moſt important of his acquiſitions. In this light the propoſal appeared to Demoſthenes, who thought that his colleague had totally forgotten the object of the embaſſy, the diſtreſſed ſtate of Athens, how greatly the people had been haraſſed by the war, and how eagerly they wiſhed for peace. It was now his own turn to ſpeak before a prince whom he had often and highly offended, whoſe character and actions he had ever viewed and repreſented with the utmoſt ſeverity; but whom, on the preſent occaſion, it was his buſineſs to ſooth rather than to irritate.

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The novelty of the ſituation might have diſconcerted a man of leſs ſenſibility than Demoſthenes. The envious jealouſy of his colleagues was prepared to liſten, with a malicious ear, to thoſe irreſiſtible arguments which the orator is ſaid to have promiſed, with a very unbecoming confidence; the Macedonian courtiers expected ſome prodigy of eloquence from the perpetual opponent of their admired maſter. Amidſt the ſilent ſuſpenſe of an unfavorable audience, Demoſthenes began to ſpeak with ungrateful heſitation, and after uttering a few obſcure and interrupted ſentences, his memory totally forſook him. Philip endeavoured to remove his embarraſſment with a mortifying politeneſs, telling him that he was not now in a theatre [55], where ſuch an accident might be attended with diſagreeable conſequences; and exhorting him to take time for recollection, and to purſue his intended diſcourſe. Demoſthenes again began, but without better ſucceſs. The aſſembly beheld his confuſion with a malignant pleaſure; and the ambaſſadors were ordered to withdraw.

His embarraſſment and confuſion.

After a proper interval, they were ſummoned to the royal preſence. Philip received them with great dignity, and anſwered with preciſion and elegance the arguments reſpectively uſed by the ſeveral ſpeakers, particularly thoſe of Æſchines.

Philip anſwers the ambaſſadors;

[55] Notwithſtanding the paſſion of the Athenians for dramatic entertainments, and their conſideration for the character of players beyond that of any other nation, they were indecently ſevere againſt their negligences and faults on the theatre; as appears from various paſſages of the judicial orations of Demoſthenes and Æſchines.

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The confuſed hints of Demoſthenes he paſſed over with merited neglect; thus proving to the world, that the man who had ever arraigned him with moſt ſeverity in the tumultuous aſſemblies of Greece, had not dared to ſay any thing in his preſence which deſerved the ſmalleſt notice or reply.

Invites them to an entertainment.

The ambaſſadors were then invited to an entertainment, where Demoſthenes is ſaid to have behaved with great weakneſs, and where Philip diſplayed ſuch powers of merriment and feſtivity, as eclipſed his talents for negociation and war. The ambaſſadors were perſuaded of his candor and ſincerity, and diſmiſſed with a letter to the people of Athens, aſſuring them that his intentions were truly pacific, and that as ſoon as they conſented to an alliance with him, he would freely indulge thoſe ſentiments of affection and reſpect which he had ever entertained for their republic.

Their departure from Macedon.

Artifices of Demoſthenes.

The mortification which Demoſthenes had received, made him at firſt vent his chagrin by condemning the conduct of his colleagues; but when he reflected, that a fair repreſentation of facts would greatly depreciate his character at Athens, policy prevailed over reſentment. He began privately to tamper with his companions on the road, freely rallied the confuſion into which he had been betrayed, extolled the ready genius and memory of Æſchines; and endeavoured, by promiſes and flattery, to ingratiate himſelf with thoſe whom his recent behaviour had juſtly provoked and diſguſted. In a converſation at Lariſſa in Theſſaly, he acknowledged the maſterly reaſoning

of the king of Macedon. The ambaſſadors all joined in the praiſes of this extraordinary man. Æſchines admired the ſtrength and perſpicuity with which he had anſwered their reſpective diſcourſes; and Cteſiphon cried out in tranſport, that, in the courſe of a long life, he had never beheld a man of ſuch a polite and engaging deportment. Demoſthenes then artfully ſaid, "he apprehended they would not venture to make ſuch repreſentations to the Athenian aſſembly; that their honor and ſafety required them to be conſiſtent in their reports;" to which they all aſſented; and Æſchines acknowledges, that he was prevailed on by the entreaties of his rival to promiſe, that he would give a favorable and falſe account of the behaviour of Demoſthenes, and aſſure the people of Athens, that he had ſpoken with dignity and firmneſs on the affair of Amphipolis. CHAP. XXXV.

They report their negociation to the ſenate.

According to the forms of the republic, the ambaſſadors firſt reported the ſucceſs of their negociation, and delivered the letter of Philip, to the ſenate of the Five Hundred. They explained, in order, what each had ſaid in preſence of the king; when Demoſthenes, riſing up the laſt, affirmed with his uſual oath of aſſeveration [56], "that the ambaſſadors had not ſpoken in the ſenate as they did before Philip; that they had ſpoken much better in Macedon: he then moved, that they ſhould be honored with a crown of

[56] Μα Δια, indecently explained "by Jove," ſince the expreſſion is elliptical, and includes a ſhort prayer, ευχομαι τον Δια σωζειν τα ειμα; "my aſſertion is true, may Jove thus protect em."

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sacred olive [57], and invited next day to an entertainment in the Prytanæum [58].

The same reported to the assembly.

The day following, they made their report to the assembly of the people; when the ambassadors, finding the subject not disagreeable to their hearers, expatiated on the politeness, condescension, eloquence, and abilities of the prince, with whom their republic was ready not only to negociate a peace, but to contract an alliance. Having allowed them to exhaust this fertile subject, Demosthenes at length arose, and, after those contortions of body, which, if we believe his adversary, were familiar to him, declared, that he was equally surprised at those who, in a deliberation of such importance, could talk of such trifles, and at those who could endure to hear them. "The negociation may be briefly reported. Here is the decree by which we are commissioned. We have executed this commission. Here is Philip's answer (pointing to the letter). You have only to examine its contents". A confused murmur arose in the assembly, some applauding the strength and precision of the speech, others condemning the asperity of the speaker. As soon as he could be heard, Demosthenes thus proceeded: "You shall see how I will lop off those superfluous matters. Æschines praises the memory and eloquence of Philip, in which, however, I find nothing extraordinary, since any other man, placed in the same advantageous

Extraordinary behaviour of Demosthenes.

[57] See the Discourse of Lysias on an accusation for cutting down a consecrated olive.

[58] Æschin. de falsâ Legatione.

circumstances

circumſtances of rank and fortune, would be equally attended to and admired. Cteſiphon praiſes the gracefulneſs and dignity of his perſon; my colleague Ariſtodemus does not yield to him in theſe particulars. Others admire his mirth and gaiety at table; yet in ſuch qualities Philocrates excels him [59]. But this is unſeaſonable. I ſhall therefore draw up a decree for convening an extraordinary aſſembly, to deliberate on the peace and the alliance [60]".

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The decree was propoſed on the eighth of March, and the aſſembly was fixed for the ſeventeenth of the ſame month. In the interval, arrived, as ambaſſadors from Philip, Antipater, the moſt reſpected of his miniſters, Parmenio, the braveſt of his generals; and Eurylochus, who united, almoſt in an equal degree, the praiſes of eloquence and valor. Parmenio had been employed in the ſiege of Halus, a place filled with malecontents from Theſſaly, who ſtill reſiſted the Macedonian power in that country. That he might have leiſure to join his colleagues, Parmenio ordered the ſiege to be converted into a blockade; and the merit of three ſuch ambaſſadors ſufficiently announced the important purpoſes which Philip wiſhed to effect by the preſent negociation. They were received with great diſtinction by the ſenate, and (what ſeems extraordinary) lodged in the houſe of Demoſthenes,

Philip ſends ambaſſadors to Athens.

[59] Even by Demoſthenes's teſtimony, it required the combination of ſeveral Athenian characters to match the various excellences of Philip.

[60] Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

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who was careful to adorn their ſeats in the theatre, and to diſtinguiſh them by every other mark of honor [61]. Having been introduced, on the appointed day, into the aſſembly, they declared the object of their commiſſion, to conclude in the name of their maſter a peace and alliance with the people of Athens. Demoſthenes, in an elaborate ſpeech, urged the expedience of liſtening to their demands; but without neglecting the intereſt of the Athenian allies. Æſchines delivered the ſame opinion, and ſeverely reproached Philocrates, who urged the neceſſity of precipitating the treaty. The two firſt days were ſpent in debate; but on the third, the influence of Philocrates prevailed, chiefly, if we believe Demoſthenes, by the unexpected acceſſion of Æſchines to that party. He, who had hitherto been a ſtrenuous defender of the intereſt of Kerſobleptes, declared that he had now altered his opinion. That peace was neceſſary for Athens, and ought not to be retarded by the ſlow deliberations of other powers. That the circumſtances of the republic were changed; and that, in their actual ſituation, it was an idle vanity to attend to thoſe who flattered them with pompous panegyrics of the magnanimity of their anceſtors; ſince the weakneſs of Athens was no longer called on to undertake the protection of every ſtate that could not defend its own cauſe [62].

who corrupt Æſchines.

During the negociation, Phi-

Demoſthenes had formerly ſuſpected the treachery of Æſchines; but this ſpeech fully convinced him,

[61] Æſchin. in Cteſiphone. [62] Demoſthen. de falſâ Legatione.

that if his adverſary had not before ſold himſelf to Philip, he had then been tampered with, and gained by the Macedonian ambaſſadors. But Demoſthenes, and the aſſembly in general, ſaw the neceſſity of immediately ratifying the peace with that prince, who had actually taken the field in Thrace, along the coaſt of which the Athenians ſtill poſſeſſed Serrium, Doriſcus, and ſeveral other tributary cities. A decree was propoſed for this purpoſe, and ambaſſadors were named, who might, with all convenient ſpeed, repair to Philip, in order mutually to give and receive the oaths and ratifications of the treaty juſt concluded at Athens. The ambaſſadors were Eubulus, Æſchines, Cteſiphon, Democrates, and Cleon; the principal of whom, being entirely devoted to the Macedonian intereſt, contrived various pretences to delay their departure. In this interval, Kerſobleptes met with the unhappy fate of which we have already taken notice; and Philip, encouraged by the ſucceſs of his intrigues, ventured to attack the cities of Serrium and Doriſcus, which readily ſubmitted to his arms[63]. Upon intelligence of the latter event, the Athenians diſpatched Euclides to inform the king of Macedon, that the places which he had taken belonged to Athens; to which he coldly replied, that he had not been ſo inſtructed by his ambaſſadors, nor was there any mention of thoſe cities in the treaty recently ſigned, but not yet ratified, between the two powers.

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Æſchines and his colleagues ſtill delayed to ſet

Third embaſſy to Philip.

[63] Demoſthen. Orat. v. in Philipp.

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out, although the conduct of Philip continually urged the neceſſity of haſtening their departure. They were finally ordered to be gone, in conſequence of a decree propoſed by Demoſthenes [64], who was unable to prevail on the Athenians, till it was too late, to pay due regard to the intereſt of Kerſobleptes. In twenty-five days the Athenian miniſters arrived at Pella, a journey which they might have performed in ſix; and inſtead of directly proceeding to Philip, who was employed in reducing the cities on the Propontis, they patiently waited, above three weeks, the return of that monarch to his capital. During their reſidence in Pella, they were joined by Demoſthenes, who, at his own requeſt, had been added to this commiſſion, under pretence of ranſoming ſome Athenian captives, but in reality with a view to watch the conduct of his colleagues. Philip at length arrived: the ambaſſadors were called to an audience. On this occaſion they ſpoke, not as formerly, according to their reſpective ages, but in an order, if we believe Æſchines, firſt eſtabliſhed by the impudence of Demoſthenes; whoſe diſcourſe, as repreſented by his adverſary, muſt have appeared highly ridiculous, even in an age when the decent formality of public tranſactions was little known or regarded.

Speech of Demoſthenes;

Anticipating his more experienced colleagues, he obſerved, "That they were unfortunately divided in their views and ſentiments. That his own were ſtrictly conformable to thoſe of Philip. From

[64] Demoſth. de falſâ Legatione.

the beginning he had adviſed a peace and alliance with Macedon. That he had procured all poſſible honors for the ambaſſadors of that country during their reſidence in Athens, and had afterwards eſcorted their journey as far as Thebes. He knew that his good intentions had been miſrepreſented to Philip, on account of ſome expreſſions that had dropped from him in the Athenian aſſembly. But if he had denied the ſuperior excellence of that prince in beauty, in drinking, and in debate[65], it was, becauſe he believed ſuch qualities to belong to a woman, a ſponge, and a hireling rhetorician and ſophiſt, rather than to a warlike monarch, and mighty conqueror." This extraordinary apology excited the deriſion of the Macedonian courtiers, and made the Athenian ambaſſadors hold down their heads in confuſion[66].

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Æſchines firſt recovered his compoſure; and modeſtly addreſſing Philip, obſerved, "That the preſent was not a proper occaſion for the Athenian miniſters to praiſe or to defend their own conduct. They had been deemed worthy of their commiſſion by the republic which employed them, and to which alone they were accountable[67]. Their actual buſineſs was to receive Philip's oath in ratification of the treaty already concluded on the part of Athens. The military preparations carrying on in every part of Macedon could not but excite

of Æſchines.

[65] See above, p. 401.

[66] Æſchin. de falſâ Legatione.

[67] The ſpeech of Æſchines, as reported by himſelf, is inimitably graceful and dignified. Λεγων ὁτι πεπωθειεν ἡμας Αθηναιοι πρεσβεις, etc. Vid. p. 261, et ſeqq. edit. Wolf.

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their fears for the unhappy Phocians. But he entreated Philip, that, if he was determined to gratify the Thebans by making war on that unfortunate people, he would make at leaſt a proper diſtinction between the innocent and the guilty. The ſacrilegious violators of the temple ought to be puniſhed with due ſeverity; the ſtate itſelf muſt be ſpared; ſince the laws and inſtitutions of Greece guard the ſafety of every Amphictyonic city. Æſchines then ſpoke, in the ſevereſt terms, againſt the injuſtice and cruelty of the Thebans, who, he ventured to propheſy, would repay the partiality of Philip with the ſame falſhood and ingratitude with which they had been accuſtomed to requite their former allies and benefactors."

Philip's profound diſſimulation in treating with the Athenian ambaſſadors.

The diſcourſe of Æſchines, though it could not be expected to move the reſolutions of the king, was well calculated to raiſe the credit of the ſpeaker, when it ſhould be reported in his own country. Philip confined himſelf to vague expreſſions of friendſhip and reſpect. The ambaſſadors of Thebes were already at Pella, a circumſtance which furniſhed him with a pretence for declining to make an explicit declaration in favor of Phocis. But he hinted his compaſſionate concern for that republic; and requeſted the Athenians to accompany him to Theſſaly, that he might avail himſelf of their abilities and experience to ſettle the affairs of that country, which required his immediate preſence. Extraordinary as this demand was, the Athenians readily complied with it, notwithſtanding the king, who had ordered his army to march, was

attended in this expedition by the ambaſſadors of Thebes, who, as well as the Athenians, were daily entertained at his table, and whoſe views were diametrically oppoſite to the intereſts both of Phocis and of Athens[68]. CHAP. XXXV.

The unhappy and diſtracted ſituation of the former republic promiſed a ſpeedy iſſue to the Sacred War, which, for more than two years, had been feebly carried on between the Phocians on one ſide, and the Thebans and Locrians on the other, by ſuch petty incurſions and ravages as indicated the inveterate rancor of combattans, who ſtill retained the deſire of hurting, after they had loſt the power[69]. During the greater part of that time, the Athenians, amuſed by their negociation with Philip, afforded no aſſiſtance to their unfortunate allies. The treaſures of Delphi, immenſe as they were, at length began to fail. The Phocians, thus abandoned and exhauſted, reflected with terror and remorſe on their paſt conduct; and, in order to make atonement for their ſacrilegious violations of the temple, inſtituted a judicial inquiry againſt Phaleucus, their general, and his accomplices, in plundering the dedications to Apollo[70]. Several were condemned to death; Phaleucus was depoſed; and the Phocians, having performed theſe ſubſtantial acts of juſtice, which tended to remove the odium that had long adhered to their cauſe, ſolicited with better hopes of ſucceſs the aſſiſtance of Sparta and Athens.

The Phocian war carried on with little activity on either ſide. Olymp. cviii. 2. A C. 349.

The Phocians condemn the plunderers of the temple.

[68] Demoſthen. de falſâ Legatione.
[69] Diodor. l. xvi. p. 454.
[70] Idem, l. xvi. p. 452.

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The Spartans claim the superintendency of the temple.

But the crafty Archidamus, who had long directed the Spartan councils, conſidered the diſtreſs of the Phocians as a favorable opportunity to urge the claim of his own republic to the ſuperintendency of the Delphic temple; and actually ſent ambaſſadors into Theſſaly, to confer with the king of Macedon on that ſubject [71]. The Athenians paid more attention to the requeſt of their allies, who, as an inducement to excite their activity, offered to put them in poſſeſſion of the towns of Nicæa, Alpenus, and Thronium, which commanded the ſtraits of Thermopylæ. But this ſalutary plan, which might have retarded the fate of Greece, was defeated by Phaleucus, who commanding eight thouſand mercenaries, that acknowledged no authority but that of their general, eſtabliſhed his head-quarters at Nicæa, and deſpiſed the menaces both of Phocis and of Athens.

Phaleucus and his mercenaries ſeize Nicæa.

Diſaſter of the Phocians in the temple of Abæan Apollo.

Mortifying as this diſappointment muſt have been, it was followed by a diſaſter in another quarter ſtill more terrible. The Phocians had fortified the city of Abæ, to defend their northern frontier againſt the depredations of the Locrians. The Thebans, reinforced by ſome auxiliaries of Macedon, marched againſt that place. The Phocians, with more courage than prudence, met them in the field; but were defeated with great ſlaughter, and purſued, in their diſordered flight, through the ſurrounding territory. A party of above five hundred took refuge in the temple of

[71] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. ubi ſupra.

Abæan Apollo, where they remained for ſeveral days, ſleeping under the porticoes, on beds of dried herbs, ſtraw, and other combuſtible materials. An accidental fire, that began in the night, was communicated to the whole edifice, part of which was conſumed, while the unhappy Phocians were ſtifled, or burnt to aſhes[22]. CHAP. XXXV.

The Thebans failed not to repreſent this calamity as a judgment of heaven, againſt the daring impiety of wretches, who had ventured to take refuge in the temple of a god whom their ſacrilege had long offended. They entreated Philip to aſſiſt them in deſtroying the remnant of the guilty race. This was the chief purpoſe of their embaſſy to that prince, whom the Athenians, as related above, entreated to ſpare the nation, while he puniſhed the criminals; and the Lacedæmonians, regardleſs of the fate of Phocis, thought only of making good their ancient claim to the guardianſhip of the Delphic temple. The Thebans inſtigate Philip to deſolate Phocis.

Philip treated the deputies of the three republics with apparent frankneſs and cordiality, under the veil of which he knew ſo well to diſguiſe the intereſts of his policy and ambition. He aſſured the Thebans, that his arms ſhould be employed to recover for them the towns of Orchomenus, Coronæa, and Tilphoſſeum, which, ever ready to rebel againſt a tyrannical capital, had readily ſubmitted to the Phocians, during their invaſion of Bœotia. The Phocians, he ſaid, had rendered Philip attempts in vain to corrupt the Theban ambaſſadors.

[22] Diodorus, p. 454.

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themſelves the objects of divine diſpleaſure; it would be as meritorious to puniſh, as it was impious to protect them. He was determined that both they and their allies ſhould ſuffer thoſe calamities which their crimes ſo juſtly deſerved. Thus far Philip was ſincere; for, in theſe particulars, the views of Thebes were exactly conformable to his own. But in his mind he agitated other matters, in which the intereſt of Thebes interfered with that of Macedon. To accompliſh thoſe purpoſes, without offending his allies, it was neceſſary to gain the ambaſſadors. Careſſes, flattery, and promiſes, were laviſhed in vain. Money was at length tendered with a profuſe liberality; but, though no man ever poſſeſſed more addreſs than Philip in rendering his bribes acceptable, the Theban deputies remained honeſt and uncorrupted, firmly maintaining to the end their patriotiſm and their honor. Philon, the chief of the embaſſy, anſwered for his colleagues: "We are already perſuaded of your friendſhip for us, independent of your preſents. Reſerve your generoſity for our country, on which it will be more profitably beſtowed; ſince your favors, conferred on Thebes, will ever excite the gratitude both of that republic and its miniſters[73]."

Philip corrupts and deceives the Athenian ambaſſadors.

Demoſthenes extols the dignity of this reply, as becoming rather the ambaſſadors of Athens. But theſe miniſters, though one object of their commiſſion was to ſave the Grecian ſtate which the

[73] Demoſthen. de falſâ Legatione.

Thebans wiſhed to deſtroy, diſcovered neither integrity nor ſpirit. All of them, but Demoſthenes himſelf, accepted the preſents of the king of Macedon, who found little difficulty in perſuading men, thus prepoſſeſſed in his favor, that he pitied the Phocians; that he reſpected Athens; that he deteſted the inſolence of Thebes; and that, ſhould he ever proceed to the ſtraits of Thermopylæ, his expedition would be more dangerous to that ſtate than to its enemies. At preſent, however, he obſerved, that he had private reaſons for managing the friendſhip of a people who ſet no bounds to their reſentment. From ſuch motives, he had hitherto declined ratifying the peace with Athens; but this meaſure he would no longer defer. He only entreated, that to ſave appearances with the Thebans, the name of the Phocians might be omitted in the treaty. This arduous work was at length brought to a concluſion; and, for the more ſecrecy, tranſacted in a place which Demoſthenes calls a tavern, adjoining to the temple of Pollux, in the neighbourhood of Pheræ. The Athenian ambaſſadors took leave, affecting to be perſuaded (perhaps perſuaded in reality) of the good intentions of the king of Macedon. About the ſame time, the ambaſſadors of Sparta departed, but with far leſs ſatisfaction. They either perceived, from the beginning, the artifices of the prince with whom they came to treat, or at leaſt made ſuch a report to Archidamus, as convinced him that his republic had not any advantage to expect from the preponderance of the Macedonian intereſt,

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and the deſtruction of the Phocians; and that, ſhould the Spartans perſiſt in their claim to the ſuperintendency of the Delphic temple, they muſt prepare to aſſert it by force of arms.

Philip's flattering letter to the Athenians.

Archidamus raiſed an army for this purpoſe, and marched towards the ſtraits. But the intrigues of Philip, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, rendered his hoſtility as impotent as his negociations had been fruitleſs. From Theſſaly that prince had already ſent a letter to the Athenians, couched in the moſt artful terms. He expreſſed his profound reſpect for the ſtate, and his high eſteem for its ambaſſadors; declaring that he ſhould omit no opportunity of proving how earneſtly he deſired to promote the proſperity and glory of Athens. He requeſted that the means might be pointed out to him, by which he could moſt effectually gratify the people. Of the conditions of the peace and alliance, he was careful to make no mention; but after many other general declarations of his goodwill, he entreated them "not to be offended at his detaining their ambaſſadors, of whoſe eloquence and abilities he wiſhed to avail himſelf in ſettling the affairs of Theſſaly [74]."

Æſchines gives an account of the embaſſy to the Athenian aſſembly.

Soon afterwards theſe ambaſſadors returned home; and having given an account of their negociation to the ſenate of the Five hundred, with very little ſatisfaction to that ſelect body, they next appeared before the popular aſſembly. Æſchines firſt mounted the roſtrum, and in an elaborate and artful

[74] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. ubi ſupra.

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diſcourſe, ſet forth the advantages reſulting from his ſucceſsful embaſſy, in which he had perſuaded Philip to embrace preciſely thoſe meaſures which the intereſt of Athens required. That, now, the people had peace inſtead of war, and that, without haraſſing themſelves by military expeditions, they had only to remain quietly at home, enjoying the amuſements of the city, and in a few days they would learn that Philip had paſſed Thermopylæ, to take vengeance, not on the Phocians, but on the Thebans, who had been the real authors of the war, and who, having entertained a deſign of ſeizing the temple, were not the leſs culpable (as had been proved to Philip) becauſe they had failed in this impious purpoſe. That the Bœotian allies of Theſpiæ and Platæa, whoſe hatred to Thebes was as inveterate as their attachment to Athens was ſincere, would be reſtored to their priſtine ſtrength and ſplendor. That the Thebans, not the Phocians, would be compelled to pay the fine impoſed by the Amphictyonic council, and to repair the fatal effects of ſacrilege and profanation. That the magiſtrates of Thebes foreſaw the hoſtility of Philip, and well knew by whom it had been excited. "They have therefore," ſaid Æſchines, "devoted me to deſtruction, and actually ſet a price upon my head. The people of Eubœa are equally alarmed by our accommodation with Philip, not doubting that their iſland will be reſtored to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis. Nor are theſe the only advantages of the treaty: another point of ſtill higher importance, a point of the

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most intimate concern to the public, has been secured. But of this I shall speak at another time, since at present I perceive the envy and malignity of certain persons ready to break forth." The advantage hinted at, with such significant obscurity, was the recovery of Oropus, a considerable city on the Athenian frontier, which had long been subject to Thebes.

The suspicions of Demosthenes ridiculed by his colleagues.

This specious harangue, so flattering to the indolence and vain hopes of the multitude, was received with general approbation, notwithstanding the opposition of Demosthenes, who declared that he knew nothing of all those great advantages promised by his colleague; and that he did not expect them. Æschines and Philocrates heard him with the supercilious contempt of men who possessed a secret with which he was unacquainted. But when he endeavoured to continue his discourse, and to expose their artifice and insincerity, all was clamor, indignation, and insult. Æschines bade him remember, not to claim any share of the rewards due to the important services of his colleagues. Philocrates, with an air of pleasantry, said, it was no wonder that the hopes of Demosthenes were less sanguine than his own, "since he drinks water; I wine." This insipid jest was received with loud bursts of laughter and applause, which prevented the assembly from attending to the spirited remonstrances of Demosthenes. A motion was made, and agreed to, for thanking Philip for his equitable and friendly intentions, as well as for ratifying a perpetual peace and alliance between

Athens and Macedon. In the ſame decree, it was determined that the Phocians ſhould ſubmit to the Amphictyonic council, under pain of incurring the diſpleaſure of the republic [75]. CHAP. XXXV.

The ſucceſs of Philip's artifices with the Athenians deceives the Phocian ambaſſadors at Athens

Theſe articles, together with the ſecret motives which produced them, were, by the emiſſaries of Philip, immediately communicated to the Phocian ambaſſadors then reſiding at Athens; who, tranſported with joy at the proſpect of averting the calamities which long threatened their country, loſt no time in tranſmitting the agreeable intelligence to their fellow-citizens. They concluded, with a high degree of probability, that, however Philip might deceive the Phocians, the miniſters of Athens could never be ſo bold as publicly to deceive the Athenians; and that, therefore, they could no longer entertain any reaſonable doubt of the favorable diſpoſition of the king of Macedon. This belief was ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, that when Archidamus marched into Phocis at the head of an army in order to defend the temple againſt Philip, the Phocians rejected his aſſiſtance, obſerving, that they feared for Sparta much more than for themſelves; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned into Peloponneſus [76].

which makes the Phocians reject the aſſiſtance of Sparta.

Philip negociates with Phaleucus the ceſſion of Nicæa.

Philip was now prepared for executing his grand enterpriſe. Halus, long beſieged, had ſubmitted to the united arms of Parmenio and his own. Freſh troops had arrived from Macedon. The Athenians were appeaſed; the Lacedæmonians had

[75] Demoſthen. de falſâ Legatione. [76] Ibid.

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retired; the Phocians were impoſed on; the Theſſalians, Thebans, and Locrians, were ready to follow his ſtandard. One obſtacle only remained, and that eaſy to be ſurmounted. Phaleucus, who commanded eight thouſand mercenaries, ſtill kept poſſeſſion of Nicæa. But a man who had betrayed the intereſt of his own republic, could not be very obſtinate in defending the cauſe of Greece. Philip entered into a negociation with him, in order to get poſſeſſion of Nicæa [77], without which it would have been impoſſible to paſs the Thermopylæ; and while this tranſaction was going forward, wrote repeated letters to the Athenians, full of cordiality and affection.

Philip continues to veil his deſigns in obſcurity.

He ſuſpected the dangerous capriciouſneſs of a people, whoſe ſecurity might yet be alarmed; and whoſe oppoſition might ſtill prove fatal to his deſigns, ſhould they either march forth to the ſtraits, or command their admiral Proxenus, who was ſtationed in the Opuntian gulph, between Locris and Eubœa, to intercept the Macedonian convoys; for the frontiers both of Phocis and Theſſaly having long lain waſte in conſequence of the ſacred war, Philip received his proviſions chiefly by ſea. The ſeaſonable profeſſions of friendſhip, contained in the letters, not only kept the Athenians from liſtening to the remonſtrances of Demoſthenes, but prevailed on them to depute that orator, together with Æſchines, and ſeveral others, whoſe advice and aſſiſtance Philip affected to deſire in ſettling the arduous buſineſs in which he was engaged. Demoſthenes

[77] Diodor. l. xvi. p. 455.

ſaw

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saw through the artifice of his enemies, for withdrawing him, at this important crisis, from his duty in the assembly: he therefore absolutely refused the commission. Æschines, on pretence of sickness, staid at home to watch and counteract the measures of his rival. The other ambassadors departed, in compliance with the request of Philip, and the orders of their republic, and in hopes of seeing a treaty fulfilled, which, they had been taught to believe, would be attended with consequences equally advantageous and honorable [72].

Disasters of Phaleucus and his followers.

While the ambassadors travelled through Eubœa, in their way to join the king of Macedon, they learned, to their utter astonishment, the wonderful events that had been transacted. Phaleucus had been persuaded to evacuate Nicæa. He retired towards Peloponnesus, and embarked at Corinth, with a view to sail to Italy, where he expected to form an establishment. But the capricious and ungovernable temper of his followers compelled him to make a descent on the coast of Elis. After this they re-embarked, and sailed to Crete, where their invasion proved fatal to their general. Having returned to the Peloponnesus, they were defeated by the Eleans and Arcadians. The greater part of those who survived the battle, fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they were shot with arrows or precipitated from rocks. A feeble remnant escaped to their ships, but perished soon afterwards in an insurrection which

[72] Demosthen. de falsâ Legatione.

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they had excited, or fomented, in the iſle of Sicily. The deſtruction of this numerous body of men is aſcribed by ancient hiſtorians[79] to the divine vengeance which purſued their ſacrilege and impiety. It is aſtoniſhing that thoſe ſuperſtitious writers did not reflect on the ſwifter and more terrible deſtruction that overtook the whole Phocian nation, by whom the wickedneſs of Phaleucus and his followers had been ſo recently condemned; and by whom, had not power been wanting, it would have been puniſhed with an exemplary rigor.

Cruel decree of the Amphictyons againſt Phocis;

Philip having paſſed the ſtraits of Thermopylæ, was received by the Phocians as their deliverer. He had promiſed to plead their cauſe before the Amphictyonic council, to the deciſions of which that credulous people conſented to ſubmit, well knowing that a prince who entered Greece at the head of a numerous army might eaſily control the reſolutions of the Amphictyons, and fondly believing that prince to be their friend. The deputies of Athens had not yet arrived; thoſe of the ſouthern republics had not even been ſummoned. The Locrians, Thebans, and Theſſalians, alone compoſed the aſſembly that was to decide the fate of Phocis; a country which they had perſecuted with unrelenting hoſtility in a war of ten years. The ſentence was ſuch as might be expected from the cruel reſentment of the judges. It was decreed that the Phocians ſhould be excluded from the general confederacy of Greece, and for ever deprived of the right to ſend repreſentatives to the

[79] Diodorus, l. xvi. c. xx. gives this as the general opinion.

council of Amphictyons: that their arms and horſes ſhould be ſold for the benefit of Apollo; that they ſhould be allowed to keep poſſeſſion of their lands, but compelled to pay annually from their produce the value of ſixty thouſand talents, till they had completely indemnified the temple; that their cities ſhould be diſmantled, and reduced to diſtinct villages, containing no more than ſixty houſes each, at the diſtance of a furlong from each other; and that the Corinthians, who had recently given them ſome aſſiſtance, ſhould therefore be deprived of the preſidency at the Pythian games; which important prerogative, together with the ſuperintendency of the temple of Delphi, as well as the right of ſuffrage in the Amphictyonic council, loſt by the Phocians, ſhould thenceforth be transferred to the king of Macedon. It was decreed that the Amphictyons, having executed theſe regulations, ſhould next proceed to procure all due repairs and expiations to the temple, and ſhould exert their wiſdom and their power to eſtabliſh, on a ſolid foundation, the tranquillity and happineſs of Greece [80].

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which is cruelly executed by the Macedonians. Olymp. cviii. 2. A. C. 347.

This extraordinary decree, when communicated to the Phocians, filled that miſerable people with ſuch terror and diſmay, as rendered them totally incapable of acting with vigor or with union. They took not any *common* meaſures for repelling the invader; a few cities only, more daring than the reſt, endeavoured, with unequal ſtrength, to defend their walls, their temples, and the revered

[80] Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et ſeqq.

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tombs of their anceſtors. Their feeble reſiſtance was ſoon overcome; all oppoſition ceaſed; and the Macedonians proceeded to execute the will of the Amphictyonic council with inflexible cruelty, and with ſuch undiſturbed order and ſilence as ſeemed more dreadful than the tumultuary ravages of the fierceſt war. Without dropping a tear, or heaving a ſigh, ſince the ſmalleſt mark of regret was conſtrued into an obſtinacy of guilt, the wretched Phocians beheld the deſtruction of their ancient monuments and trophies, their proud walls levelled with the ground, the fertile banks of the divine Cephiſſus covered with ruin and deſolation, and the venerable cities of Daulis, Penopeus, Lilæa, and Hyampolis, which had flouriſhed above nine centuries in ſplendor and proſperity, and which will ever flouriſh in the ſong of Homer, ſo totally burned or demoliſhed as ſcarcely to leave a veſtige of their exiſtence [81]. After this terrible havoc of whatever they poſſeſſed moſt valuable and reſpected, the inhabitants were driven like herds of cattle to the ſettlements allotted for them, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of ſtern and unrelenting maſters. At the diſtance of three years, travellers, who paſſed through Phocis to viſit the temple of Delphi, melted with compaſſion, or ſhuddered with horror, at the ſight of ſuch piteous and unexampled devaſtation. They turned their reluctant eyes from the ſhattered ruins of a country, and a people, once ſo illuſtrious; the youth, and men of full age,

[81] Pauſanias in Phocic. et Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et ſeqq.

had either perished in the war, or been dragged into captivity; the populous cities were no more; and the villages were thinly inhabited by women, children, and wretched old men, whose silent but emphatic expressions of deep-rooted misery exceeded all power of words to describe[82].

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The news of these events produce consternation in Athens.

The unexpected news of those melancholy events reached Athens in five days. The people were then assembled in the Piræus to examine the state of their harbours and shipping. The dreadful intelligence filled them with consternation. They imagined that they already beheld the destructive armies of Macedon and Thessaly, excited by the inveterate hostility of Thebes, pouring in upon their northern frontier, and overwhelming the whole country with havoc and desolation. A decree immediately passed, at the motion of Callisthenes, which marked the utmost danger and dismay. It was resolved, "that the Athenians, who usually resided in the country, should be summoned to the defence of the city; that those, within the distance of twelve miles round, should, along with their persons, transport their most valuable effects into the city or the Piræus; that those at a greater distance should respectively convey themselves and their property to the nearest fortresses, particularly Eleusis, Phylé, Aphidna, and Sunium, the principal places of strength in the Attic territory[83]."

Philip writes the Athenians

This decree shows, that terror was the first movement of the Athenians; but vengeance was

[82] Demosthen. et Æschin. de falsâ Legat. et de Coron.

[83] Demosthen. de falsâ Legat. sect. 20.

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the ſecond. Reluctantly cooped up within their walls, they called aloud for arms: levies were prepared for the relief of Phocis; and their admiral Proxenus, who had lately returned from the neighbouring coaſt, was ordered again to direct his courſe towards that country. The king of Macedon was duly attentive to thoſe tranſactions, of which he had been regularly informed by his emiſſaries. He therefore wrote a letter to the Athenians, in that ſtyle of ſuperiority which the ſucceſs of his policy and of his arms, juſtly entitled him to aſſume. After acquainting them with his treatment of the Phocians, he mentions his being informed of their preparations for ſupporting that impious people, who were not included in the treaty of peace recently ſigned and ratified between Athens and Macedon. He exhorts them to lay aſide this unwarrantable deſign, which could have no other effect than to ſhow the iniquity and extravagance of their conduct, in arming againſt a prince, with whom they had ſo lately concluded an alliance. "But if you perſiſt, know that we are prepared for repelling your hoſtilities with equal firmneſs and vigor."

in a ſtyle very different from what he had formerly uſed.

This mortifying letter was received at the ſame time that the Athenian ambaſſadors returned from Eubœa, and brought ſuch accounts of the deſtruction of the Phocians, that it appeared ſcarcely poſſible to afford them any relief. All that remained was to ſave, from the unrelenting vengeance of their enemies, the miſerable wreck of that unfortunate

The Athenians paſs a decree for receiving the fugitive Phocians.

community. The Athenians paſſed a decree for receiving the fugitives with kindneſs, and for providing them with ſettlements in Attica, or in the foreign dependences of the republic; a reſolution which, though it was founded on the moſt evident duties of gratitude and humanity towards ancient and faithful allies, gave great offence to the inexorable cruelty of the Theſſalians and Thebans [44]. CHAP. XXXV.

Philip proteſts the Phocians againſt the inhuman vengeance of their Grecian foes;

Amidſt theſe tranſactions the Macedonian partiſans, and eſpecially Æſchines and Philocrates, whoſe vain aſſurances had been attended with ſuch fatal effects, had juſt cauſe to dread the reſentment of their country. The former, who had been the principal agent in this diſgraceful ſcene of intrigue and deluſion, no longer affected ſickneſs; he forgot the threatenings denounced againſt him by Thebes; he diſregarded the Athenian decree, prohibiting any citizen to ſtir from the walls; and having waited for, and beheld, the deſtruction of the Phocians with as much indifference, if we may believe his adverſary, as he would have ſeen the concluſion of any ordinary affair, which concerned merely his pecuniary intereſt, he repaired to Philip to receive the wages of his iniquity. Æſchines accounts for his journey at this time by a more honorable, but leſs probable cauſe, the deſire of ſaving the feeble and unhappy remnant of the Phocian nation, who were perſecuted to extremity by

[44] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. de falſâ Legat. ſect. 20.

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the barbarous vengeance of their Grecian foes, and protected at the interceſſion of the Athenian orator, by the clemency or compaſſion of the Macedonians. There is reaſon to believe that Æſchines, in order to gain merit with his countrymen, whoſe reſentment he had ſo highly provoked, oppoſed an inhuman reſolution of precipitating from rocks all thoſe of the Phocians who had attained the age of puberty. But the king of Macedon, whoſe character was not naturally flagitious, or cruel without neceſſity, muſt, of his own accord, have been inclined to avert ſuch an atrocious and bloody ſentence, which, without promoting his intereſt, would have for ever ruined his fame.

and the Bœotians againſt the cruelty of Thebes.

This concluſion appears the more probable, ſince, we are aſſured, that, upon the ſame principle, but with far leſs ſucceſs, he aſſumed the protection of the oppreſſed Bœotians. Orchomenus, Coronæa, Hyampolis, with other cities of leſs note in Bœotia, were, in conſequence of the ruin of their Phocian allies, again ſubjected to the dominion of Thebes; a republic, always haughty and unrelenting, who, on this occaſion, prepared to treat the rebels with more than her uſual inſolence and cruelty. Philip eſpouſed the cauſe of the injured with a generous ardor, extremely diſagreeable to the Thebans. His humanity, whether real or affected, was loudly extolled by his partiſans in moſt republics of Greece. It redounded, however, more to his own glory, than to the benefit of the afflicted Bœotians; who, being expelled from their

own country by the intolerable oppreſſion of Theban tyranny, ſought refuge in the compaſſionate boſom of Athens[35].

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Having finiſhed the ſacred war in a manner ſo favorable to his own intereſt and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, to the number of two hundred, and aſſiſted in the hymns, prayers, and ſacrifices offered to Apollo, in acknowledgment of his divine protection of their councils and arms. The name of the pious king of Macedon, who had been the principal inſtrument of their ſucceſs, reſounded in the ſacred Pœans ſung in honor of the God. The Amphictyons ratified all the tranſactions of that prince, erected his ſtatue in the temple of Delphi, and acknowledged, by a ſolemn decree, the kingdom of Macedon as the principal member of the Hellenic body[36]. Philip at the ſame time appointed deputies to preſide at the Pythian games, the celebration of which was nearly approaching, and to which moſt of the Grecian ſtates had already ſent their repreſentatives. The Athenians, ſtung with indignation and regret, abſtained from this feſtival. An embaſſy was therefore diſpatched to them in the name of the Amphictyons, requiring their concurrence with meaſures recently embraced by the general council of Greece; and remonſtrating againſt their diſpleaſure at the aggrandizement of a prince with whom they had ſo lately contracted an alliance.

Macedon declared by the Amphictyons a member of the Hellenic body. Olymp. cviii. 3. A. C. 346.

[35] Demoſthen. et Æſchin. de falſâ Legat. ſect. 20.

[36] Diodor. l. xvi. p. 60.

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Even the Athenians admit this pretenſion.

The deliberations of the Athenian aſſembly, on this occaſion, ſhowed the full extent of their own folly, and evinced the conſummate policy of Philip. They acknowledged, with dejection and anguiſh, that they had neglected the many opportunities preſented them by the favor of heaven, for repreſſing the ambition of their rival; that the time of acting, with vigor and boldneſs, was now no more; that the cauſe of Greece was an empty name, ſince the Greeks ſurrendered their dignity to the king of Macedon; and that it became their own republic to conſult rather its ſafety than its honor, and to maintain peace with a monarch againſt whom they were by no means prepared to wage war. Even Demoſthenes[97] recommended this reſolution; leſt, ſays he, we ſhould offend thoſe now aſſembled, who call themſelves the Amphictyons, and thus excite a general war againſt ourſelves. The Thebans, beſide ancient cauſes of quarrel with us, are incenſed at our harbouring their exiles; the Locrians and Theſſalians reſent our protecting the Phocians; the Argives, the Meſſenians, and Megalopolitans, are diſpleaſed at our concurring with the views of Lacedæmon. If we refuſe the demands of Philip and the Amphictyons, they may aſſault us with the combined arms of all thoſe ſtates, which we are totally unable to reſiſt. One point, therefore, is neceſſary, the continuance of the preſent peace; not that it is ſo very excellent, or ſo worthy of you; but, of what kind ſoever it may be, it were more for the intereſt of

[97] Demoſthen. de Pace.

your affairs, that it never had been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you ſhould infringe it. This opinion was univerſally approved: Macedon was acknowledged a member of the Grecian confederacy; and Iſocrates, an Athenian of the higheſt merit and reputation, addreſſed a diſcourſe to Philip, in which he exhorted him to diſdain inglorious victories over his countrymen and friends, to employ his authority to extinguiſh, for ever, the animoſities of Greece, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Macedon now formed a part, againſt the wealth and effeminacy of Perſia, its ancient and natural enemy [88].

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Whether theſe exhortations proceeded from the virtuous ſimplicity which did not ſuſpect, or from the inſinuating and artful policy which, though it ſuſpected, hoped to prevent, the hoſtile projects [89] of Macedon, the meaſures of Philip were, doubtleſs, taken with too much care, and his plans founded too deep and firm, to be ſhaken by the ſpecious eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invaſion of Aſia; the conqueſt of the Perſian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own paſſions, nor the arguments of other men, could haſten, retard, or vary his undeviating progreſs in a ſyſtem which could only be completed by conſolidating his ancient, before he attempted new conqueſts.

[88] Iſocrat. Orat. Philipp.

[89] See the Life of Iſocrates, prefixed to my tranſlation of his works.

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.